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Abstract	  
	  
	  This	   thesis	   discusses	   the	   interconnection	   between	   spatial	   practices	   and	   the	  construction	  of	  moral	  personhood,	  based	  on	  the	  example	  of	  homelessness	  and	  squatting	  activism	  in	  ‘Austerity	  Britain’.	  Drawing	  on	  18	  months	  of	  ethnographic	  fieldwork	  with	   persons	  who	   have	   no	   fixed	   address	   in	   the	  West	   of	   England,	   I	  explore	  the	  connections	  between	  spatiality,	  embodied	  cognition	  and	  the	  moral	  construction	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  	  Because	  bodies	  are	  spatial	  objects,	  embodied	  cognition	   is	  necessarily	  spatial	  –	  ‘human	   beings	   are	   spatial	   beings’.	   Moral	   personhood	   is	   therefore	   also	   and	  especially	  spatially	  constructed,	  most	  importantly	  through	  metaphors	  of	  ‘inside’	  vs.	   ‘outside’.	  Drawing	  on	  cognitive	  anthropology	  and	  psychoanalysis,	   I	   identify	  two	  distinct	  models	  of	  the	  self	  informed	  by	  spatial	  metaphors,	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘territorial	  self’	  and	  the	  ‘spatial	  self’.	  These	  cognitive	  models,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  relations	  between	  self	  and	  other	  they	  imply,	  come	  to	  inform	  the	  construction	  of	  distinct	   spatial	   configurations	  which	   can	  be	  observed	   from	  a	   small	   scale	  –	   for	  example	  an	  individual	   ‘home’	  –	  to	  a	  large	  scale,	  e.g.	  the	  territorial	  nation	  state.	  The	   territorial	   self	   corresponds	   to	  a	   ‘moral	   space’	   characterised	  by	  notions	  of	  securisation,	  defensible	  boundaries	  and	  a	  dual	  mode	  of	  exclusion	  and	  internment	  that	  produces	  (racialised	  and	  gendered)	  ‘spatial	  others’.	  The	  spatial	  self,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  implies	  an	  ethical	  stance	  that	  takes	  seriously	  the	  spatial	  component	  of	  embodiment,	  and	  thus	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  self	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  shelter,	  understood	  as	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  safe	  space	  –	  within	  and	  without	  the	  body	  –	   that	   embodied	   persons	   need	   in	   order	   to	   physically,	   cognitively	   and	   socially	  function.	  	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  I	  argue	  that	  homelessness	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  result	  of	  multi-­‐‑layered	  social	  processes	  based	  in	  a	  pervasive	  logic	  of	  territoriality.	  ‘The	  homeless	  person’	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  territorial	  entitlement	  that	  translates	  into	  a	  loss	  of	  moral	  personhood,	  often	  referred	  to	   in	  the	   literature	  as	   ‘social	  death’.	   I	  conclude	  that	  squatting,	  as	  a	  political	  and	  ethical	  practice,	  aims	  not	  only	  at	  the	  removal	   of	   an	   immediate	   material	   lack,	   but	   also	   and	   especially	   at	   the	   re-­‐‑construction	  of	  moral	  personhood	  through	  a	  practical	  ethics	  of	  recognising	  and	  responding	  to	  the	  vulnerability	  inherent	  in	  embodiment.	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Introduction	  	  	  	  One	  day	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  1921,	  Harry	  Cowley,	  a	  chimney	  sweep	  from	  Brighton,	  decided	  that	  enough	  was	  enough.	  	  A	  drummer	  boy	  in	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  in	  his	  youth,	  Cowley	  had	  been	  injured	  at	  the	  age	  of	  17	  and,	  after	  his	  recovery,	  had	  been	  re-­‐‑deployed	  to	  bury	  the	  dead	  soldiers	  of	  World	  War	  One.	  On	  his	  return	  to	  Brighton,	  he	   had	   found	   the	   survivors	   and	   their	   families	   living	   in	   abject	   poverty	   in	  overcrowded	  slum	  accommodation	  or	  in	  tents	  on	  the	  local	  racecourse.	  The	  day	  Cowley	   decided	   to	   take	   action	   arrived	   when	   he	   met	   the	   family	   of	   an	   ex-­‐‑serviceman,	   camped	   out	   in	   the	   tent-­‐‑city	   overlooking	   town.	   He	   recounts:	   “I	  thought;	  this	  wont	  be	  allowed	  to	  go	  on,	  I	  asked	  the	  man	  ‘are	  you	  prepared	  to	  go	  in	  a	  house	  if	  me	  and	  my	  men	  find	  you	  one’	  he	  said	  ‘yes’	  So	  we	  got	  together	  our	  boys	  and	  at	  3	   in	   the	  morning	  under	   cover	  of	  dark	  we	   forced	  our	  way	   into	  an	  empty	  house	  in	  Cheltenham	  Place	  and	  moved	  the	  family	  in”1.	  	  Cowley	  proceeded	   to	   form	  a	   group	  of	   local	  men	  who	   soon	  began	   to	   routinely	  break	   into	  empty	  properties	  and	  move	   in	  homeless	   locals.	  The	  group	  not	  only	  lent	   practical	   support	   to	   the	   squatter	   families,	   but	   also	   acted	   as	   vigilantes	   to	  protect	  the	  new	  residents	  from	  eviction	  and	  violence	  by	  landlords	  or	  the	  police.	  	  Their	   actions	   continued	   until	   after	   World	   War	   Two,	   when	   a	   new	   wave	   of	  impoverished	  and	  traumatised	  ex-­‐‑soldiers	  returned	  from	  the	  front,	  to	  find	  what	  in	  today’s	  terms	  one	  could	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  property	  bubble.	  In	  Cowley’s	  words:	  	  
	  “Well	  when	  this	  last	  War	  ended	  Brighton	  was	  loaded	  with	  empty	  houses,	  yer	  see.	  
There	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  buying	  empty	  houses	  cheap	  and	  selling	  them	  or	  renting	  
at	  exorbitant	  prices,	  people	  couldn’t	  afford	  them,	  One	  day	  I	  went	  to	  do	  some	  work	  
in	   an	   old	   ladies	   home,	   she	   saved	   £400	   in	   her	   life,	   her	   and	   her	   husband	  was	   old	  
people.	  I	  valued	  the	  house	  at	  £600	  and	  they	  was	  being	  asked	  £1,600.	  I	  thought	  this	  
don’t	  come	  right,	  your	  £400	  gone	  up	  in	  the	  air	  and	  you’ll	  never	  live	  long	  enough	  to	  
buy	  the	  place	  and	  be	  secure”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  All	  citations	  by	  Harry	  Cowley	  taken	  from:	  BBC	  Southern	  Counties	  Radio	  (2005)	  at	  BBC	  WW2	  People’s	  War	  archive,	  Article	  ID	  A4212217	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  Cowley’s	   sense	   of	   justice	   made	   him	   not	   only	   a	   squatting	   activist,	   but	   also	   a	  staunch	  antifascist:	   “When	  I	  read	  about	  the	  brutality	   to	   the	   Jews	  anything	   like	  that	  I	  could	  cry	  and	  have	  cried.	  And	  I	  felt	  it	  was	  my	  duty	  to	  fight	  against	  it”.	  Fuelled	  by	  this	  sense	  of	  solidarity,	  Cowley	  and	  his	  group	  fought	  the	  rising	  far	  right	  in	  the	  shape	   of	   Oswald	   Mosley’s	   ‘British	   Union	   of	   Fascists’	   –	   oftentimes	   physically.	  Cowley	  recounts	  being	  assaulted	  and	  hospitalised,	  having	  his	  property	  attacked	  and	  having	  himself	  incited	  violence	  to	  shut	  down	  local	  fascist	  rallies.	  	  Asked,	  after	  one	  such	  bloody	  battle,	   to	   justify	  their	  actions,	  Cowley	  replied	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  men:	  “no	  mine	  wasn’t	  rough	  boys;	  they	  were	  conscientious”.	  	  Some	  90	  years	   later,	  Mike	  Weatherley,	   conservative	  MP	   for	  Hove	  –	  a	  place	   so	  close	  to	  Brighton	  that	  nowadays	  they	  are	  considered	  the	  same	  town,	  Brighton	  and	  Hove	   –	   launched	   an	   entirely	   different	   campaign.	  Weatherley	   had	   become	  irate	   with	   the	   activities	   of	   local	   squatters,	   who	   he	   saw	   as	   infringing	   on	   the	  fundamental	  territorial	  claims	  of	  Hove’s	  citizens:	  	  	  
“It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  of	  those	  who	  are	  homeless	  have	  squatted	  but	  this	  does	  not	  make	  
them	   squatters.	   A	   typical	   squatter	   is	   middle-­‐‑class,	   web-­‐‑savvy,	   legally-­‐‑minded,	  
university-­‐‑educated	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   society-­‐‑hating.	   They	   are	   very	   often	  
extremely	  intimidating	  and	  violent.	  They	  are	  political	  extremists	  whose	  vision	  for	  
society	   is	  a	  dysfunctional	  medieval	  wasteland	  without	  property	  rights,	  where	  an	  
Englishman’s	  home	  is	  no	  longer	  his	  castle”.2	  
	  Despite	   his	   most	   likely	   inaccurate	   account	   of	   medieval	   property	   relations,	  Weatherley	  made	   it	  his	  mission	   to	  prevent	   such	  an	  apocalyptic	   scenario	   from	  becoming	  reality.	  In	  2010,	  he	  tabled	  a	  motion	  to	  parliament,	  which	  for	  the	  first	  time	  would	  make	  squatting	   in	   the	  UK	  a	  criminal	  offence;	  a	  piece	  of	   legislation	  later	  dubbed	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law’	  by	  squatting	  activists.	  The	  campaign	  in	  favour	  of	  criminalisation	   that	   Weatherley	   spearheaded	   during	   2010/11	   sparked	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Mike	  Weatherley’s	  official	  home	  page:	  http://www.mikeweatherleymp.com/2013/03/04/squatting-­‐‑statement/	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veritable	  media	  frenzy	  about	  ‘antisocial’	  squatters,	  and	  increasingly	  linked	  them	  to	   another	   group	   whose	   occupancy	   of	   space	   frequently	   arouses	   resentment:	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers.	  According	  to	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  media	  (The	  Daily	  Mail	  and	  Daily	  Telegraph	  being	  the	  most	  vocal,	  see	  also	  Dee,	  2013,	  247),	  and	  somewhat	  contrary	  to	  Weatherley’s	  sociological	  assessment,	  squatters	  were	  now	  supposed	  to	  be	  predominantly	   ‘Eastern	  European	  Gypsies’	  who,	  according	   to	  a	  common	  trope,	  broke	  into	  hardworking	  citizen’s	  houses	  when	  the	  residents	  had	  just	  left	  to	  go	  to	  the	  shops,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  drunkenly	  lay	  waste	  to	  honest	  taxpayer’s	  possessions	  and	  bank	  accounts.	  	  	  Squatters	  and	  Homelessness	  charities,	  who	  were	  consulted	  on	  the	  proposed	  law,	  pointed	   out	   that	   not	   only	  was	   this	   scenario	   highly	   unlikely3,	   but	   also	   that	   an	  effective	   ban	   on	   squatting	   would	   criminalise	   possibly	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	  homeless	  persons	  who	  had	  no	  other	  means	  of	  shelter.	  Regardless	  of	  their	  protest,	  the	  law	  was	  passed	  by	  parliament	  in	  September	  2011	  –	  stuck,	  somewhat	  like	  in	  a	  Trojan	  horse,	  as	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  back	  of	  the	  controversial	  ‘legal	  aid	  bill’.	  Since	  then,	  over	  a	  hundred	  persons	  have	  been	  arrested	  on	  the	  new	  charges,	  and	  some	  have	  been	  sentenced	  to	  several	  months	  in	  prison.	  The	  law	  has	  been	  cited	  as	   playing	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   death	   of	   at	   least	   one	   homeless	   man,	   Daniel	  Gauntlett,	  who	  froze	  to	  death	  outside	  an	  empty	  bungalow	  in	  2011,	  after	  allegedly	  being	  denied	   access	   to	   it	   by	   the	  police4.	  Mike	  Weatherley	   commented	   shortly	  after:	  “Squatters	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  peddle	  their	  myths.	  If	  squatters	  really	  cared	  about	  the	  homeless	  then	  they	  would	  help	  them	  access	  council	  services,	  not	  scare	  them	  into	  believing	  that	  they	  would	  be	  arrested”5.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  legal	  reasons	  –	  a	  house	  that	  was	  actually	  occupied	  was	  already	  protected	  by	  law	  under	  the	  clause	  of	  a	  ‘displaced	  residential	  occupier’,	  i.e	  squatting	  in	  such	  a	  building	  was	  already	  a	  criminal	  offence	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law’.	  Squatters	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  the	  first	  task	  in	  finding	  a	  squat	  was	  practically	  always	  to	  ensure	  the	  property	  was	  actually	  uninhabited	  	  4	  www.ismikeweatherleydeadyet.co.uk	  –	  a	  website	  dedicated	  to	  collective	  anticipation	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  Mike	  Weatherley	  MP	  5	  Mike	  Weatherley’s	  official	  home	  page:	  http://www.mikeweatherleymp.com/2013/03/04/squatting-­‐‑statement/	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Harry	  Cowley	  and	  Mike	  Weatherly	  personify	  two	  different	  approaches	  to	  what	  one	  could	  call	  Britain’s	  on-­‐‑going	  space	  crisis.	   It	   is	  of	  course	  not	  called	  a	   ‘space	  crisis’	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  humans	  have	  parcellated	  space	  in	  order	  to	  negotiate	  living	  arrangements,	  it	  is	  usually	  called	  a	  housing	  crisis.	  The	  current	  one	  has	  been	  the	  subject	   of	   lively	   public	   debate	   since	   the	   2008	   recession	   and	   the	   following	  austerity	  cuts,	  job	  losses	  and	  benefit	  cutbacks.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  crisis	  has	  reached	  endemic	  proportions,	  with	  hardly	  a	  week	  passing	  without	  news	  of	  a	  steep	  increases	  in	  homeless	  applications	  to	  local	  authorities,	  more	  people	  living	  in	  insecure	  and	  hazardous	  rented	  accommodation,	  repossessions,	  soaring	  rents	  and	   property	   prices,	   and	   reductions	   in	   housing	   related	   benefits.	   Despite	   its	  constant	   presence,	   quantifying	   the	   housing	   crisis	   is	   difficult	   –	   at	   the	   time	   of	  writing,	  charity	  Shelter	  estimates	  that	  over	  30.000	  people	  are	  threatened	  with	  eviction	  in	  London	  alone,	  but	  how	  many	  exactly	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  establish.	  The	  private	  rented	  sector	  is	  so	  unstable	  that	  being	  a	  renter	  counts	  as	  only	  one	  step	   up	   from	   homelessness,	   and	   there	   are	   staggering	   numbers	   of	   ‘hidden	  homeless’	  –	  according	  to	  charity	  Crisis	  about	  380.0006	  –,	   	  people	  with	  no	  fixed	  address	  who	   sleep	   on	   floors	   and	   sofas	   at	   the	   houses	   of	   friends	   or	   family.	   For	  women,	   this	   frequently	   translates	   into	   extreme	   vulnerability	   to	   violence	   and	  sexual	  exploitation	  as	   they	  are	  specifically	   targeted	  by	  men	  offering	  shelter	   in	  exchange	  for	  sexual	  and	  domestic	  services7.	  Tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  households	  are	  only	  able	  to	  afford	  their	  mortgages	  or	  rents	  with	  difficulty,	  and	  no	  one	   is	  sure	  exactly	  how	  many	  street	  homeless	  there	  are,	  since	  the	  official	  figures	  only	  count	  those	  who	  have	  come	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  authorities	  –	  which	  many	  avoid	  for	  good	  reason.	  Despite	   the	   lack	  of	   comprehensive	  statistics,	   government	   figures	  show	   that	   the	  number	  of	   counted	   rough	   sleepers	  has	   increased	  by	  55%	  since	  2010.8	  In	  recent	  months,	  the	  topic	  has	  gathered	  momentum,	  with	  public	  protests	  and	  marches	  against	  homelessness	  –	  however,	  from	  the	  side	  of	  official	  politics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/files/publications/HHBIC_report%5B1%5D.pdf	  7	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  a	  cursory	  search	  of	  online	  platforms	  like	  Craigslist	  reveals	  several	  advertisements	  a	  week	  explicitly	  offering	  such	  a	  deal.	  See	  also:	  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-­‐‑2307630/Im-­‐‑creep-­‐‑just-­‐‑looking-­‐‑help-­‐‑The-­‐‑men-­‐‑using-­‐‑Craigslist-­‐‑offer-­‐‑free-­‐‑rooms-­‐‑exchange-­‐‑maid-­‐‑service-­‐‑sex.html	  8https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-­‐‑_Autumn_2014.pdf	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and	  policy,	  the	  problem	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  available	  space,	  and	  thus	  the	  suggested	  solution	  most	  often	  consists	  in	  ‘build	  more	  housing’.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  not	  true	  that	  there	  is	  no	  space	  –	  according	  to	  the	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Policy	  Research,	  there	  are	  an	  estimated	  635.000	  empty	  properties	   in	  the	  UK,	  200.000	  of	  which	  have	   been	   empty	   for	  more	   than	   six	  months9.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	  mechanism	   of	   allocating	   this	   space	   to	   those	  who	   need	   it,	   and	   no	   language	   in	  which	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  doing	  so	  besides	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  invisible	  hand.	  	  	  Homelessness	  and	  housing	  precarity	  are	  thus	  most	  often	  framed	  as	  an	  economic	  problem,	  an	  issue	  of	  the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  property	  rights.	  That	  is	  of	  course	  not	  incorrect	  –	  since	  space	  under	  capitalism	  is	  allocated	  by	  economic	  rather	  than	  political	  means,	  the	  homeless	  most	  often	  find	  themselves	  in	  this	  position	  because	  they	   are,	   for	   one	   reason	   or	   another,	   unable	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   market	   for	  shelter.	  To	  trace	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  in	  welfare	  policy,	  labour	  market	  conditions,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  housing	  market	  or	  the	  contractions	  of	  global	  capitalism	  is	  important,	   and	   I	   will	   consider	   some	   of	   these	   aspects	   in	   the	   following	   pages.	  Generally,	   however,	   this	   text	   is	   going	   to	   approach	   the	  matter	   from	   a	   slightly	  different	  angle	  –	  while	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  economic	  aspect	  of	  allocating	  space,	  I	  will	  at	  the	  same	  time	  try	  to	  cut	  through	  this	  layer	  and	  its	  language,	  and	  have	  a	  look	  at	  the	   thing	   that	   is	   being	   allocated	   –	   space	   itself,	   and	   the	  manifold	  ways	   human	  beings	  use	  it	  to	  structure	  their	  phenomenal	  world.	  	  My	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  a	  general	  observation:	  human	  beings	  are	  spatial	  beings.	  This	   means	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   that	   we	   perceive	   of	   ourselves	   and	   of	   others	   in	  inherently	   spatial	   ways.	   For	   example,	   we	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   in	   space	   and	  through	  space	  –	  from	  the	  micro-­‐‑politics	  of	  arranging	  bodies	  relative	  to	  each	  other	  in	   public	   or	   private	   places,	   to	   the	   macro-­‐‑politics	   of	   defining	   ‘territories’	   and	  constructing	   insiders	   and	   outsiders.	   We	   also	   perceive	   of	   our	   own	   embodied	  existence	   as	   spatial	   –	   because	   our	   bodies	   are	   spatial	   objects,	   we	   experience	  ourselves	   as	   ‘being	   spaces’,	   we	   talk	   about	   ‘having	   boundaries’,	   of	   bodily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  http://www.ippr.org/assets/media/publications/pdf/back-­‐‑on-­‐‑the-­‐‑market_Dec2014.pdf	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‘invasions’	  and	  of	  ‘externalising’	  parts	  of	  what	  we	  consider	  ‘us’.	  For	  this	  reason,	  as	  Judith	  Butler	  writes,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  feel	  that	  our	  bodies	  are	  our	  own	  and	  that	  they	  are	  safe	  spaces	  for	  us	  to	  ‘inhabit’	  (2004,	  25).	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  necessary	  connection	  between	  this	  experience	  of	  the	  body	  as	  spatial	  and	  of	  the	  body	   in	   space	   –	   bodies	   are	   built	   so	   that	   they	   require	   a	  minimum	   of	   space	   to	  function	   as	  much	   as	   they	   require	   food	   and	   air.	   For	   example,	   in	   order	   for	   our	  nervous	  system	  to	  unwind	  and	  recover,	  we	  need	  a	  safe	  space	  in	  which	  we	  can	  let	  our	  body	  relax.	  The	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  space	  means	  that	  basic	  biological	  functions	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled,	  and	  deprivation	  from	  rest	  is	  therefore	  also	  form	  of	  torture.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  to	  be	  homeless,	  in	  its	  most	  basic	  existential	  form,	  means	  not	  to	  have	  a	  safe	  space	  within	  or	  without	  the	  body,	  and	  as	  we	  will	  see,	   ‘spatial	  abjection’,	  thus	  understood,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  those	  who	  are	  conventionally	  considered	  ‘the	  homeless’.	  	  Because	   space	   is	   such	   a	   basic	   need,	   it	   also	   profoundly	   informs	   the	   ways	   we	  construct	   ourselves	   and	   others	   cognitively	   and	   socially.	  We	   speak	   of	   ‘distant’	  relations	  and	  ‘close’	  friends,	  we	  say	  that	  something	  is	  ‘beneath’	  us	  or	  that	  we	  are	  ‘beside	   ourselves’	   with	   grief	   or	   rage.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   momentous	   spatial	  metaphor	   is	   that	   of	   ‘inside’	   and	   ‘outside’	   –	   we	   construct	   social	   categories	  according	  to	  who	  belongs	  on	  the	  inside	  of	  a	  real	  or	  imagined	  space,	  and	  is	  thus	  one	  of	  ‘us’,	  and	  who	  belongs	  on	  the	  outside	  and	  is	  one	  of	  ‘them’	  (Anderson,	  2013).	  More	  importantly,	  we	  do	  not	  just	  assign	  these	  categories,	  but	  we	  construct	  real,	  material	  spaces	  according	  to	  this	  very	  principle.	  This	  goes,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  for	  the	   built	   environment,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   we	   construct	   material	   arrangements	   that	  produce	  and	  re-­‐‑enforce	  particular	  categories	  of	  people.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  also	  goes	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  ‘social	  spaces’,	  that	  is,	  symbolic	  spaces	  that	  are	  ‘made	  of’	  social	  relations.	  Homelessness	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  results	  of	  this	  fact	  –	  the	  homeless	  are	  ‘outsiders’	  in	  that	  they	  are	  both	  outside	  of	  social	  relations	  –	  a	  state	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘social	  death’	  (Patterson	  1985)	  –	  and	  also	  outside	  of	  the	  material	  structures	  that	  shelter	  bodies.	  Their	  example	  shows	  how	  the	  metaphor	  of	  inside	  and	  outside	  can	  translate	  into	  a	  matter	  of	  sheer	  survival,	  and	  that	  ‘social	  death’	  and	  real	  death	  are	  often	  closely	  related.	  The	  political	  and	  ethical	  practices	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of	  squatters	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  following	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  strategies	  of	  survival	   in	  more	   than	  one	  sense	  –	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  physical	   survival	   through	  obtaining	  shelter	  by	  any	  means	  necessary,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  social	  survival	  through	  providing	  those	  who	  are	  abandoned	  ‘outside’	  with	  basic	  human	  respect	  and	  solidarity.	  	  As	   the	   reader	   may	   have	   already	   guessed,	   my	   position	   on	   these	   issues	   is	   not	  exactly	  neutral.	  I	  hope	  that	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  make	  clear	  why	  this	  is	  so	  –	  mostly	   it	   is	  a	   result	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  during	   the	   fieldwork	   that	  has	   led	   to	   this	  thesis,	   I	   also	  was	   a	   squatter,	   and,	   at	   least	   in	   legal	   terms,	   homeless.	  My	   ‘data’	  therefore	   stems	   not	   so	   much	   from	   disinterested	   observation,	   but	   from	   –	  unintended	  –	  affectedness,	  a	  circumstance	  that	  has,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss,	  profoundly	  influenced	   my	   approach.	   This	   thesis	   is	   therefore	   at	   least	   in	   part	   auto-­‐‑ethnographic,	   although	   I	   hope	   to	   have	   avoided	   the	  pitfalls	   of	   excessive	  navel-­‐‑gazing.	   My	   own	   involvement	   with	   the	   squatting	  movement	   influences	   not	   so	  much	   the	   ‘validity’	   of	   my	   data	   –	   I	   will	   freely	   admit	   that	   I	   do	   not	   believe	  ethnography,	   as	   a	   social	   practice	   in	   which	   human	   beings	   comment	   on	   social	  practices	  among	  other	  human	  beings	  can	  ever	  be	  ‘objective’	  or	  ‘neutral’	  –	  but	  the	  angle	  from	  which	  I	  chose	  to	  approach	  the	  data.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss,	  there	  was	  never	  much	  of	  a	  question	  about	  whether	  I	  was	  going	  to	  approach	  squatting	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	   policy,	   economics	  or	   even	   ‘proper’	   anthropology	   –	  not	  because	  these	  things	  do	  not	  matter,	  but	  because	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  squatter,	  the	  immediate	  question	  is	  a	  basic	  moral	  one	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  outweigh	   the	   interests	  of	  property.	  Perhaps	  a	  better	  anthropologist	   than	   I	  am	  might	  have	  succeeded	  in	  taking	  a	  balanced	  position	  on	  this	  issue,	  but	  I	  have	  found	  myself	  unable	  to	  pretend	  that	  I	  am	  in	  any	  doubt	  that	  what	  the	  squatters	  did	  was,	  on	   the	   whole,	   morally	   justified.	   I	   will	   therefore	   not	   bore	   my	   reader	   with	   a	  dishonest	  attempt	  at	  ‘objectivity’,	  although	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  replace	  it	  with	  (Critical)	  Realism.	  	  	  The	  decision	  to	  base	  this	  thesis	  on	  a	  CR	  framework	  occurred	  not	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  data	  collection,	  but	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  data	  analysis,	  or	  more	  precisely	  at	  the	  point	  of	  
	   16	  
transition	  between	  fieldwork	  and	  writing.	  This	  choice	  was	  initially	  not	  so	  much	  indicated	  by	  the	  data	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  but	  rather,	  by	  the	  necessity	  to	  find	  some	  kind	  of	  speaker	  position	  or	  perspective	  to	  author	  my	  text	  from.	  In	  constructing	  such	  a	  speaker	  position,	  I	  found	  that	  I	  largely	  had	  the	  options	  of	  speaking	  about	  my	  respondents	  as	  If	  I	  were	  neutrally	  describing	  natural	  phenomena	  (“homeless	  people	  as	  they	  occur	  in	  the	  natural	  world”),	  or	  as	  autonomous	  speakers	  whose	  voices	   I	   could	   represent,	   while	   simultaneously	   relegating	   them	   to	   mere	  subjective	  opinions.	  I	  found	  some	  understanding	  for	  this	  particular	  problem	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Sayer	  (2005,	  2011),	  and	  from	  there	  ventured	  into	  CR	  more	  broadly,	  especially	  into	  Bhaskar’s	  work	  on	  ontology.	  	  	  Gaining	  an	  approximate	  understanding	  of	  what	  CR	  is	  and	  what	  it	  does,	  I	  became	  increasingly	  convinced	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  a	  suitable	  framework	  to	  construct	  my	  own	  positionality	  from,	  but	  that	  it	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  mount	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  metatheoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   anthropology	   more	   generally	   (for	   one	  anthropologist	   who	   agrees,	   see	   Brereton	   2004,	   2011).	   While	   it	   was	   not	   the	  purpose	   of	   my	   thesis	   to	   write	   a	   comprehensive	   critique	   of	   anthropology,	   I	  therefore	  used	   chapters	  3	   and	  4	   to	   sketch	   the	  basic	   building	  blocks	  of	   such	   a	  critique	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  my	  present	  topic	  and	  as	  far	  as	  they	  were	  relevant	  to	  my	   own	  positionality.	  Within	   these	   limits,	   the	   use	   of	   CR	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	  strategic	  in	  the	  sense	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  3	  –	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  platform	  on	  which	  I	  am	   satisfied	   I	   can	   treat	   the	   expressions	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   with	   epistemic	  respect	  and	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  (if	  not	  the	  certainty)	  of	  their	  claims	  being	  true.	  	  	  	  It	   would	   therefore	   be	   misleading	   to	   claim	   that	   this	   is	   ‘a	   Critical	   Realist	  Ethnography’	   in	   that	   every	   step	   of	   data	   collection	   and	   interpretation	   was	  informed	  by	  CR.	  Nevertheless,	  concepts	  and	  processes	  from	  CR	  were	  used	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  throughout	  the	  work,	  in	  a	  theoretical	  sense	  for	  example	  in	  the	  use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   emergence	   in	   chapter	   5,	   or	   practically,	   in	   employing	   a	  broadly	   retroductive	   approach	   to	   data	   analysis.	   Retroduction,	   as	   opposed	   to	  induction	  or	  deduction	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  that	  goes	  “from	  a	  description	  and	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analysis	   of	   concrete	   phenomena	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   basic	   conditions	   for	   these	  phenomena	  to	  be	  what	  they	  are”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  80),	  i.e.	  it	  asks	  what	  has	  to	   be	   the	   case	   for	   the	   observed	   phenomena	   to	   be	   the	   outcome.	   This	  mode	   of	  argument	   leads	   to	   the	  discovery	  of	  what	  CR	  calls	   ‘transfactual	  conditions’	  of	  a	  given	  phenomenon,	  or	  the	  ‘powers	  and	  mechanisms’	  that	  underlie	  it	  (Danermark	  et	   al,	   2002,	   78),	   and	   thus	   to	   increasingly	   general	   and	   abstract	   theoretical	  categories.	  An	  example	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  generalisation	  are	  the	  categories	  I	  call	  here	  ‘relational	   patterns’,	   as	   they	   are	   generalisations	   arrived	   at	   by	   comparing	   and	  abstracting	  from	  the	  dynamics	  of	  different	  types	  of	  concrete	  social	  relations.	  For	  additional	  discussion	  of	  how	  CR	  informs	  the	  structure	  and	  argument	  of	  the	  thesis	  see	  Literature	  review	  and	  conclusion.	  	  	  My	  personal	  involvement	  in	  the	  field	  has	  also	  led	  me	  to	  realise	  that	  a	  discussion	  of	  space	  has	  to	  begin	  with	  acknowledging	  that	  spatial	  practices,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	   social	   practices,	   are	   also	   inevitably	   ethical	   practices.	   This	  means	   that	   the	  social	   relations	   that	   construct	   and	   are	   constructed	   by	   spatial	   configurations	  contain	  particular	  statements	  about	  how	  people	  ought	  to	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  –	  space	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  socially,	  but	  also	  and	  especially	  morally	  constructed.	  In	  this	  context,	  Harry	  Cowley	  and	  Mike	  Weatherley	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  two	  different	  moral	  paradigms	  –	  roughly	  speaking,	  while	  one	  attempted	  to	  get	  those	  on	  the	  outside	  inside,	  the	  other	  tried	  to	  get	  those	  inside	  out.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  these	  are	  not	  just	  individual	  political	  or	  moral	  standpoints	  –	  they	  stand	  for	  two	  different	   ‘meta-­‐‑patterns’	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  space,	  and	  the	  ‘ideal-­‐‑types’	  Cowley	  and	  Weatherley	  represent	  will	  therefore	  repeatedly	  pop	  up	  in	  this	  thesis	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  –	  perhaps	  surprising	  –	  contexts.	  Harry	  Cowley	  (the	  myth,	  if	  not	  the	  man),	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  represent	  a	  paradigm	  that	  I	  will	  describe	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘spatial	   self’.	   This	   construction,	  which	   I	  will	   trace	   through	  different	  discursive	  arenas,	  from	  Winstanley’s	  account	  of	  the	  Fall	  to	  feminist	  ‘Safe	  Spaces’,	  refers	  to	  the	  embodied	  self	  in	  its	  basic	  spatiality.	  Ethical	  practices	  focusing	  on	  the	  spatial	  self	  are	  informed	  by	  a	  logic	  of	  embodiment	  and	  vulnerability,	  and	  by	  an	  ethical	  ‘imperative’	  to	  respond	  to	  need.	  Mike	  Weatherley	  (I	  cannot	  know	  to	  what	  degree	  the	  man	  is	  deserving	  of	  the	  myth)	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  proponent	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of	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  paradigm	  –	  that	  of	  the	  ‘territorial	  self’,	  as	  it	  is	  exemplified	  from	   Hobbes’	   account	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Nature	   to	   contemporary	   ‘gated	  communities’.	  As	  I	  will	  show,	  it	  corresponds	  both	  to	  a	  spatial	  practice	  that	  centres	  on	   notions	   of	   securisation,	   exclusion	   and	   internment;	   and	   to	   an	   ethics	   of	  domination	   and	   violent	   competition.	   While	   the	   real	   Cowley	   and	   the	   real	  Weatherley	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  ‘selves’	  of	  these	  kinds,	  their	  political	  and	  ethical	  practices	  make	  them	  fitting	  exemplars	  for	  the	  two	  spatial	  configurations	  I	  will	  describe.	  	  	  While	   in	   my	   discussion	   I	   will	   touch	   on	   a	   number	   of	   disciplinary	   fields	   –	   for	  example	  moral	  anthropology,	  psychoanalysis	  and	  cognitive	  anthropology	  -­‐‑	   the	  focal	  point	  for	  this	  discussion	  will	  be	  squatting	  as	  a	  response	  to	  homelessness.	  This	  thesis	  is	  therefore	  something	  of	  a	  salvage	  mission,	  since	  with	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law',	  squatting	  in	  the	  way	  I	  describe	  it	  here	  has	  been	  made	  a	  criminal	  offence.	  This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   squatting	   has	   disappeared	   –	   it	   is	   still	   legal	   to	   squat	  commercial	  properties,	  and	  even	  though	  a	  law	  banning	  this,	  too,	  is	  underway,	  the	  sheer	  magnitude	  of	  the	  homelessness	  problem	  means	  that	  squatting	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  go	  away	  any	  time	  soon.	  However,	  for	  an	  ethnographer	  it	  makes	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  difference	  if	  the	  practice	  one	  is	  documenting	  is	  this	  or	  that	  side	  of	  the	  law	  –	  although	  ‘illegal’	  and	  ‘immoral’	  are	  hardly	  the	  same	  thing,	  the	  documentation	  of	  illegal	  practices	  can	  pose	  considerable	  ethical	  challenges.	  In	  this	  case,	  these	  lie	  not	  least	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘criminals’	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  are	  people	  who	  are,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  vulnerable	  because	  they	  are	  homeless,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss,	  were	  the	  target	  of	  police	  investigation	  and	  infiltration	  even	  before	  the	  new	  offence	  was	  created.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  11,	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law’	  therefore	   targeted	  not	   only	   homeless	   people,	   it	   also	   and	  particularly	   targeted	  political	  dissent.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  even	  the	  ‘innocent’	  documentation	  of	  practices	  this	  side	   of	   the	   law	  may	   cause	   harm,	   let	   alone	   of	   those	   that	  may	   be	   of	   debatable	  morality	  but	  certain	  illegality.	  Therefore,	  I	  cannot	  offer	  a	  traditional	  ‘ethnography	  of’	  squatters,	  detailing	  a	  ‘community’	  in	  all	  its	  colourful	  detail,	  since	  more	  often	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than	  not	  this	  kind	  of	  anthropology	  ends	  up	  being	  used	  as	  an	  infiltration	  manual.	  This	   text	   is	   therefore	   not	   so	   much	   an	   ethnography	   of	   squatters	   as	   it	   is	   an	  ethnographic	   text	   about	   squatting	   as	   a	   political	   and	   ethical	   practice,	   and	   its	  particular	  cultural	  and	  political	  context	  in	  ‘Austerity	  Britain’.	  This	  means	  that	  I	  will	   deliberately	   take	   a	  wider	   angle	   than	   just	   one	   focusing	   on	   ‘squatters’	   as	   a	  discrete	  group,	  rather,	  I	  will	  consider	  other	  aspects	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life	  in	  Britain	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  related	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  homelessness	  and	  resistance.	  This	  wider	  view	  will	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  support	  my	  argument	  that	  spatial/ethical	  practices	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  one	  particular	  cultural	  group,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  will	  ensure	  that	  this	  text	  does	  not	  become	  an	  example	  of	  the	  ‘culture	  of	  poverty’	  genre	   that	   studies	   deprivation	   as	   if	   it	   was	   the	   product	   of	   a	   bounded,	   self-­‐‑perpetuating	  milieu	  rather	  than	  wider	  social	  and	  political	  processes	  (Bourgois,	  2001).	   For	   the	   same	   reason,	   the	   reader	   will	   also	   not	   find	   any	   detailed	   ‘case	  studies’,	  descriptions	  of	  particular	  persons	  or	   ‘life	  histories’	  of	  the	  people	  who	  appear	   in	   this	   narrative.	   All	   names	   are	   made	   up	   and	   in	   some	   cases,	   I	   have	  composed	   characters	   from	   different	   real	   people.	   For	   this	   reason,	   my	  ethnographic	  data	  may	  not	  be	  as	   ‘thick’	  as	   it	  may	  have	  been	  otherwise,	  and	  in	  some	  parts	   of	   the	   text	   I	  will	   have	   to	   resort	   to	   unusual	  ways	   of	   depiction.	   For	  example,	  in	  presenting	  a	  particular	  squatting	  action	  in	  chapters	  9	  and	  10,	  I	  will	  adopt	   a	   form	   of	   narration	   that	   does	   not	   place	   any	   particular	   person	   at	   the	  occupation,	  and	  voices	  the	  aims	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  project	  through	  materials	  the	  activists	  themselves	  intended	  for	  the	  public	  view	  (this	  is	  not	  because	  the	  action	  was	   illegal,	   but	   rather	   because	   activists	   in	   general	   are	   often	   under	   on-­‐‑going	  surveillance).	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  I	  will	  read	  the	  2011	  Bristol	  riot	  in	  chapter	  11	  through	  materials	  that	  have	  been	  deliberately	  put	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  by	  eye-­‐‑witnesses,	  which,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss,	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  text	  does	  not	  cause	  any	  harm.	  	  	  The	  text	  is	  structured	  not	  so	  much	  along	  a	  particular	  analytical	  framework	  but	  along	  a	  narrative	  –	  my	  fieldwork	  as	  it	  happened,	  beginning	  to	  end.	  This,	  to	  me,	  seemed	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  of	  telling	  a	  story,	  and	  I	  found	  out	  belatedly	  that	  the	  mechanics	  of	  constructing	  a	  narrative	  are	  somewhat	  different	  from	  those	  of	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constructing	  an	  argument.	  Rather	  than	  presenting	  a	  conclusion	  up	  front	  and	  then	  substantiating	  it	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  therefore	  develop	  an	  argument	  as	   the	   story	   progresses,	   and	   so	   also	   document	   the	   process	   through	   which	   I	  arrived	  at	  my	  conclusion.	  I	  hope	  in	  this	  way	  to	  partially	  mediate	  the	  tension	  Sayer	  (1992,	  2000)	  identifies	  between	  narrative	  and	  analysis	  in	  Social	  Science	  writing,	  which	   is	   owed	   both	   to	   the	   abovementioned	   difference	   in	   impetus	   –	   showing	  versus	  explaining	  –	  and	  in	  part	  to	  the	  technical	  demands	  of	  the	  writing	  process	  itself,	  i.e.	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  writer	  always	  implicitly	  interacts	  with	  an	  audience	  (Sayer,	  2000,	  148).	  	  	  In	   summary,	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   social	   cognition,	   and	   especially	   moral	  cognition,	   have	   a	   specifically	   spatial	   component.	   This	   argument	   is	   based	   on	  several	  premises:	  a)	  due	  to	  the	  spatial	  nature	  of	  embodiment	  (Metzinger,	  2004)	  the	   human	   experience	   of	   having	   a	   ‘self’	   is	   inherently	   spatial;	   b)	   since	   this	  experience	   of	   self	   is	   dependent	   on	   affirmation	   and	   reinforcement	   by	   others,	  social	  cognition	  itself	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  spatial	  component,	  which	  becomes	  especially	   evident	   in	   the	   cognitive	   and	   social	   construction	   of	   an	   ‘inside’	   vs	   an	  ‘outside’	  (see	  also	  Douglas,	  1966);	  c)	  these	  social	  categories	  are	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  constructed	  cognitively	  in	  social	  interaction,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  come	  to	  bear	  upon	  the	  construction	  of	  material	  spaces	  such	  as	  ‘homes’	  or	  nation	  states.	  There	  are	  therefore	  connections	  and	  parallels	  between	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  embodied	  self	   and	   human-­‐‑made	   spatial	   arrangements,	   some	   of	   which	   this	   thesis	   will	  discuss	   in	   detail;	   d)	   the	   social	   categories	   of	   ‘insider’	   and	   ‘outsider’	   inherently	  contain	  a	  moral	  component,	  and	  thus,	  the	  kinds	  of	  ‘selves’	  cognitively	  constructed	  through	  these	  spatial	  categories,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  spaces	  these	  selves	  operate	  in,	  have	  a	  moral	  component.	  ‘Space’	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  not	  just	  socially,	  but	  also	  and	  especially	  morally	  constructed.	  	  	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  thesis	  draws	  on	  the	  ethnographic	  data	  to	  show	  that	  squatting	  as	  a	  political	  practice	  involves	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  co-­‐‑operative	  construction	  of	  particular	   kind	   of	   embodied	   selves,	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   the	   construction	   of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  spatial	  arrangements.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  merely	  a	  response	  to	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material	  deprivation	  or	  a	   form	  of	  political	  protest	  –	  although	  it	  can	  be	  both	  of	  these	  things	  –	  but	  it	  can	  also	  and	  especially	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ethical	  practice	  that	  can	  offset	  some	  of	  the	  negative	  implications	  homelessness	  has	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  an	  embodied	  self.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  homelessness,	   this	  experience	   is	   often	   discussed	   under	   the	   label	   ‘mental	   health’,	   in	   so	   far	   as	  homelessness	  and	  associated	  forms	  of	  social	  exclusion	  involve	  disturbances	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  self	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘mental	  illness’.	  As	  outlined	  in	  anthropology	  e.g.	  by	  Tanya	  Luhrmann	  (2007,	  2008),	  street	  homelessness	  has	  a	  severely	   negative	   impact	   on	   mental	   health,	   often	   leading	   to	   symptoms	   of	  psychosis	   and	   suicidality.	   Luhrmann	   suggests	   that	   these	   adverse	   cognitive	  symptoms	  correlate	  with	   ‘social	  defeat’,	   i.e.	  with	  consistent	  experiences	  of	   “an	  actual	  social	  encounter	  in	  which	  one	  person	  physically	  or	  symbolically	  loses	  to	  another	   one.	   The	   encounter,	   then,	  must	   be	   contested	   (or	   the	   individual	  must	  experience	   it,	   at	   least,	   as	   contested),	   and	   the	   individual	  must	  experience	   loss”	  (2007,	  151).	  While	   I	   agree	  with	  Luhrmann’s	  description	  of	  homelessness	  as	   a	  state	  of	  near	  permanent	  ‘social	  defeat’,	  the	  concept	  itself	  is	  derived	  from	  animal	  studies	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	  naturalises	  and	  de-­‐‑politicises	   ‘social	  defeat’	  among	  humans.	  	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  therefore	  use	  a	  term	  that	  describes	  a	  very	  similar	  social	  dynamic,	  namely	  the	  Hegelian	  concept	  of	  ‘misrecognition’	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  misrecogniton,	  analogous	  to	  ‘social	  defeat’,	  threatens	  a	  person’s	  experience	  of	  self,	  while	  its	  opposite	  ‘recognition’	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  reinforces	  and	  strengthens	  this	  experience	  of	  self.	  In	  so	  far	  as	  the	  self	  has	  spatial	  properties	  as	  outlined	  above,	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  are	  here	  interpreted	  as	  spatial	  practices	   in	  which	  selves	  are	   cognitively	  and	  materially	  constructed	  as	  spatial	  categories,	  most	  importantly	  along	  the	  distinction	  of	  ‘insider’	  and	  ‘outsider’.	  To	  be	  misrecognised,	   for	   the	   homeless,	   therefore	  means	   to	   be	   constructed	   as	   an	  outsider	   to	   the	   moral	   order,	   which	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   involves	   a	   process	   of	  cognitively	  splitting	  and	  projecting	  morally	  undesirable	   traits	  of	   the	  dominant	  class	  onto	  those	  who	  are	  misrecognised,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  to	  materially	  exclude	  them	  from	  the	  means	  of	  obtaining	  shelter,	  thus	  making	  them	  both	  metaphorical	  and	  literal	  ‘outsiders’.	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The	  guiding	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis	  are:	  	  How	   does	   social	   cognition	   impact	   the	   phenomenal	   experience	   of	   self	   in	   the	  context	  of	  inequality	  and	  exclusion,	  particularly	  homelessness?	  In	  what	  ways	  can	  these	  forms	  of	  social	  cognition	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ethical	  and	  what	  follows	  from	  this	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  homelessness	  and	  squatting?	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  spatiality	  in	  the	  co-­‐‑operative	  cognitive	  construction	  of	  selves	  and	  are	  there	  different	  kinds	  of	  spatially	  constructed	  selves	  in	  relation	  to	  others?	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Literature	  review	  	  	  	  	  This	  section	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  bodies	  of	  literature	  used	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  well	   as	   secondary	   literatures	   drawn	   on	   in	   order	   to	   discuss	   specific	   points	  emerging	   from	   the	  data.	   In	   general	   terms,	   the	  use	  of	   literature	   in	   this	   project	  followed	  the	  direction(s)	  suggested	  by	  the	  ethnographic	  data,	  i.e.	  after	  data	  was	  first	   systematically	   organised	   and	   analysed,	   literature	   was	   then	   chosen	   to	  interpret	  and	  discuss	  potential	  connections	  indicated	  by	  the	  data.	  For	  this	  reason,	  while	  an	  initial	  literature	  review	  was	  undertaken	  before	  fieldwork	  commenced,	  this	   literature	  was	   subsequently	   amended	   in	   order	   to	   include	  other	   bodies	   of	  theory	   that	   could	   be	   put	   in	   productive	   dialogue	  with	   the	   data.	   The	   choice	   of	  literature	   is	  therefore	  driven	  by	  connections	  between	  phenomena	  observed	  in	  fieldwork	  and	  the	  motivation	  to	  explain	  these;	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  impetus	  to	  place	  the	  data	  within	  one	  or	  more	  specific	  bodies	  of	  literature,	  or	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  any	  one	  literature.	  As	  ethnographic	  data	  is	  by	  its	  nature	  diverse,	  i.e.	   in	   this	   case	   potentially	   spanning	   the	   domains	   of	   divergent	   fields	   such	   as	  politics	   and	   policy,	   economics,	   psychology,	   biology	   and	   many	   more,	   a	  compromise	  must	  be	  made	  between	   limiting	  the	  use	  of	   literature	  sources	  to	  a	  manageable	   scope,	   and	   representing	   the	   data	   in	   as	   comprehensive	   a	   way	   as	  possible	  without	  limiting	  what	  can	  be	  observed	  to	  what	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  any	  one	  theory.	  While	  this	  thesis	  therefore	  draws	  on	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  sources	  from	  a	   variety	   of	   disciplines,	   care	   was	   taken	   to	   ensure	   that	   literatures	   used	   are	  structurally	   and	   logically	   compatible	   and	   do	   not	   produce	   contradictory	   or	  incommensurable	   accounts.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   a	   core	   structural	   argument	  was	  chosen	   as	   outlined	   below,	   and	   further	   literature	   was	   added	   based	   on	   its	  structural	  compatibility	  with	  the	  core	  theoretical	  argument.	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  The	   literatures	   used	   fall,	   for	   the	  most	   part,	   into	   three	   intersecting	   categories,	  namely:	  	  
•   literature	  on	  embodied	  cognition,	  including	  psychoanalysis	  	  
•   literature	  on	  morality	  and	  ethics	  
•   literature	  on	  social	  and	  political	  structure,	  including	  the	  social	  production	  of	  space	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  therefore	  give	  a	  short	  overview	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  these	  three	   areas	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   thesis	   and	   of	   the	   overall	   structure,	   before	  discussing	  them	  separately	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  	  	  
1.   Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
	  
	  Figure	  1:	  Overall	  Structure	  	  The	  above	  diagram	  illustrates	  schematically	  how	  the	  three	  fields	  of	  theoretical	  interest	  relate	  to	  each	  other.	  At	  the	  central	  intersection	  of	  the	  three	  domains	  is	  what	  in	  the	  following	  I	  will	  discuss	  as	  the	  theoretical	  core,	  comprised	  in	  the	  main	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Axel	  Honneth	  and	  amended	  with	  work	  drawn	  from	  Hegel	  and,	  in	  parts,	   Judith	  Butler.	   The	   rationale	   for	   centring	  Honneth	  was	   that	   his	  work	  on	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recognition	  theoretically	  grounds	  the	  argument	  made	  in	  this	  thesis	  –	  that	  there	  are	  important	  connections	  between	  embodied	  cognition,	  ethics	  and	  social	  status	  –	   and	   provides	   a	   broad	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   discussing	   what	   these	  connections	  could	   look	   like.	   In	  drawing	  on	  Hegel,	  Honneth	  establishes	  several	  key	  theoretical	  assumptions	  that	  guide	  this	  work,	  namely:	  a)	  that	  there	  are	  two	  basic	  forms	  of	  social	  relationships,	  characterised	  by	  a	  tendency	  towards	  equality	  and	  inequality	  respectively,	  b)	  that	  these	  relationships	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  ethical	  and	   thus	   equality	   and	   inequality	   have	   an	   ethical	   dimension	   c)	   that	   there	   is	   a	  cognitive	  dimension	  to	  how	  these	  relationships	  are	  established	  and	  maintained,	  which	   can	   be	   productively	   discussed	   by	   drawing	   on	   object	   relations	  psychoanalysis	  and	  d)	  that	  there	  is	  a	  social	  dimension	  to	  these	  relations	  which	  is	  reflected	  on	  the	  level	  of	  social	  structure.	  The	  thesis	  therefore	  adopts	  Honneth’s	  argument	  that	  the	  terms	  ‘recognition’	  and	  ‘misrecognition’	  refer	  to	  two	  specific	  forms	  of	  ethical	  relationships,	  which	  can	  be	  discussed	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  cognition	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  larger-­‐‑scale	  social	  relationships,	  as	  its	  core	  assumption.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	  2:	  Initial	  Abstraction	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In	   terms	  of	   the	  mode	  of	   analysis,	  Honneth’s	   argument	  was	   operationalized	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  his	  terms	  ‘recognition’	  and	  ‘misrecognition’	  were	  taken	  to	  refer	  to	   internally	   related	   structural	   patterns	   characterising	   a	   range	   of	   different	  human	  relationships	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  above	  diagram.	  ‘Structural	  pattern’	  here	  refers	   to	   the	   result	   of	   a	  process	  of	   abstraction	   (see	   also	   Sayer,	   2013,	   120f)	   in	  which	   the	   two	   relational	   modes	   in	   question	   were	   stripped	   of	   their	   concrete	  content	   to	   function	   as	   structural	   representations	   of	   the	   two	   type	   of	   internal	  relations	  in	  question.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  two	  abstract	  modes	  of	  relating	  were	  made	  available	   for	   the	   process	   of	   abduction,	   which	   means	   “to	   interpret	   and	  recontextualize	  individual	  phenomena	  within	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  or	  a	  set	  of	  ideas	   -­‐‑	   	   to	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   something	   in	   a	   new	  way	   by	   observing	   and	  interpreting	  this	  something	  in	  a	  new	  conceptual	  framework”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	   79).	   The	   abstract	   patterns	   were	   thus	   transposed	   into	   a	   variety	   of	  theoretical	  and	  disciplinary	  contexts	  in	  order	  to	  show	  parallels	  and	  connections	  between	  these	  contexts.	  For	  example,	  in	  locating	  the	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	  first	   in	   fieldwork	   relationships,	   then	   in	   specific	   forms	   of	   the	   social	   relations	  pertaining	  to	  gender	  and	  ‘race’,	  and	  finally	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  concrete	  spaces	  which	  reflect	  these	  relations,	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  all	  of	  these	  manifestations	  share	  structural	  similarities.	  	  The	  ‘mechanics’	  of	  the	  argument	  are	  therefore	  based	  on	  moving	  the	  structural	  patterns	  through	  the	  different	  bodies	  of	  literature	  as	  illustrated	  overleaf,	  while	  continually	  referring	  to	  the	  dimension	  of	  ontological	  depth	  suggested	  by	  Critical	  Realism	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   the	   concrete	   powers	   and	   mechanisms	   that	  accompany	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  patterns	  in	  a	  particular	  setting.	  For	  example,	  in	  asking	  what	  mechanisms	  underlie	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	  in	   the	   context	   of	   homelessness,	   the	   thesis	   draws	   on	  psychoanalysis,	   cognitive	  science,	  and	  social	  psychology,	  to	  ask	  what	  individual	  and	  social	  mechanisms	  are	  responsible	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	   in	   the	  relation	  between	  homeless	  and	  ‘settled’	  persons.	  As	  is	  usual	  for	  the	  CR	  understanding	  of	  powers	  and	  mechanisms,	  these	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  absolute,	  causal	  relationships,	  but	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rather	   as	   dynamic	   and	   contingent	   powers	   and	   thus,	   tendencies	   rather	   than	  absolute	  properties	  (Sayer	  2005).	  	  	  The	  abductive	  argument	   is	  moved	  along	  by	  way	  of	  an	  ethnographic	  narrative,	  which	  provides	  the	  ‘vehicle’	  by	  which	  the	  abstract	  patterns	  are	  moved	  forward	  through	  the	  theoretical	  domains.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  abstract	  patterns	  derived	  from	  the	  core	  are	  moved	  through	  the	  areas	  of	  ethics,	  social	  structure	  and	  embodied	  cognition	   in	   a	   roughly	   (but	   not	   strictly)	   circular	   motion,	   with	   the	   conclusion	  arriving	  back	  at	   the	  question	  of	  ethics	  on	  a	  higher	   level	  of	  generalisation	  than	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  relationship	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  below	  diagram	  schematically	  illustrates	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  
	  	  Figure	  3:	  Mechanics	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  base	  and	  theoretical	  core	  as	  well	  as	  the	  adjacent	  literatures	  in	  more	  detail.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  sources	  drawn	  on	  fall	  clearly	  into	  one	  of	  the	  domains,	  others	  (such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  discussion	  of	  connectionist	  models	  of	  moral	  cognition	  in	  chapter	  five)	  fall	  into	  more	  than	  one,	  i.e.	  serve	  as	  
	   28	  
‘bridge-­‐‑building’	   theories	   that	   allow	   for	   a	   translation,	   and	   strengthen	   the	  conceptual	  links,	  between	  the	  three	  domains.	  	  	  
2.   Literature	  	  
	  
2.1  	  Base:	  Critical	  Realism	  
	  The	  thesis	  rests	  on	  a	  metatheoretical	   framework	  grounded	  in	  Critical	  Realism,	  exemplified	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Archer	  (1995),	  Collier	  (1994),	  Bhaskar	  (1978/2013,	  1987/2009,	   2010,	   2014),	   Danermark	   et	   al	   (2002),	   Sayer	   (1992,	   1997,	   2000,	  2005,	   2011)	   among	   others.	   As	   the	   rationale	   for	   this	   choice	   of	   metatheory	   is	  discussed	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  thesis	  (see	  introduction	  and	  chapters	  3	  and	  4)	  I	  shall	  only	   repeat	   these	   arguments	   here	   briefly:	   a)	   CR	   provides	   a	   grounding	   for	  ethnographic	   research	   and	   writing	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   real	   dialogue	   between	  competing	  perspectives	  on	  the	  social	  and	  material	  world,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  mere	  reiterating	  of	  simultaneously	  existing	  ‘subjective’	  points	  of	  view,	  none	  of	  which	  can	   be	   verified;	   b)	   CR	   allows	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   causality	   that	   allows	   for	   the	  identification	   of	   causative	  mechanisms	  which	  make	   the	   emergence	   of	   specific	  phenomena	   more	   likely	   without	   causally	   determining	   them,	   thus	   lending	  credence	  to	  theories	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  verify	  in	  more	  traditional	  approaches,	  such	  as	  e.g.	  feminism,	  Marxism	  or	  the	  here	  implied	  general	  humanism;	  c)	  CR	  thus	  adds	  a	  ‘depth	  dimension’	  to	  ethnography	  which	  takes	  it	  beyond	  mere	  description	  into	   the	   realm	   of	   explanation	   of	   what	   human	   beings	   are	   like;	   d)	   CR	   adds	   to	  possible	  explanations	  a	  specifically	  moral/political	  dimension	  via	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘explanatory	  critique’	  and;	  e)	  via	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘emergence’,	  CR	  opens	  an	  arena	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  embodied	  cognition	  that	  goes	  beyond	  mind/body	  dualism	  (see	  chapter	  5).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  use	  of	  CR	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  located	  purely	  on	  the	  conceptual/theoretical	  level	  and	  did	  not	  specifically	  influence	  the	  process	  of	  data	  gathering,	  although	  especially	  Sayer’s	   work	   allowed	   for	   a	   post-­‐‑hoc	   theorisation	   of	   some	   ethical	   issues	  encountered	  during	  fieldwork.	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2.2  	  Theoretical	  core:	  Honneth,	  Hegel,	  Butler,	  (Heidegger)	  
	  The	  argument	  in	  this	  thesis	  draws	  together	  three	  more	  than	  substantial	  areas	  of	  theoretical	   interest,	   and	   it	  would	   certainly	  be	   a	   formidable	   task	   to	   attempt	   to	  integrate	   these	   from	   square	   one.	   For	   this	   reason,	   I	   have	   chosen	   to	   build	   my	  argument	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Axel	  Honneth,	  in	  particular	  his	  discussion	  of	  recognition	  as	   derived	   from	   a	   Hegelian	   ethics	   (Honneth,	   1996),	   since	   this	   conceptual	  framework	  does	  much	  of	   the	  work	  of	  establishing	   the	   links	  between	  morality,	  social	  status	  and	  cognition	  that	  I	  want	  to	  discuss.	  As	  I	  outline	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  2,	  Honneth	  draws	  on	   the	   early	  works	  of	  Hegel	   to	   establish	   an	   ethical	  theory	   based	   on	   the	   concepts	   of	   ‘recognition’	   and	   ‘misrecognition’.	   Following	  Hegel,	  these	  terms	  refer	  to	  particular	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations	  based	  in	  either	  the	  relationship	  of	  two	  mutually	  constituting	  subjects	  (recognition)	  or	  a	  subject	  and	  an	  other	  who,	  within	  the	  relation,	  is	  specified	  as	  a	  less-­‐‑than-­‐‑subject,	  i.e.	  an	  object	  (misrecognition).	   	   It	   is	  worth	   noting	   that,	   in	   line	  with	  Hegel’s	   general	   theory,	  these	  forms	  of	  relations	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  static	  configurations	  but	  rather	  as	  processes,	  movements	  or	  tendencies.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  mutual	  co-­‐‑constitution	  of	  the	  partners	  in	  these	  interactions	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  event,	  but	  rather,	  an	  ongoing	  dynamic	   in	  which	   the	   relationship	   tends	   either	   toward	   increasing	   equality	   or	  toward	   increasing	   inequality.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   dynamic	   is	   that	   each	   act	   of	  recognition	  begets	  another	  act	  of	  recognition,	  and	  conversely,	  ‘misrecognition’	  of	  an	   object	   by	   a	   subject	   invariably	   results	   in	   the	   object	   not	   being	   able	   to	  reciprocate,	  and	  thus	  the	  subject-­‐‑character	  of	  the	  original	  subject	  is	  lost	  as	  well.	  Objectification	  therefore	  begets	  objectification	  and	  vice	  versa,	  in	  a	  dynamic	  and	  constantly	  evolving	  relation.	  	  This	   basic	   structural	   view	   of	   relationship	   opens	   up	   Honneth’s	   theory	   in	   two	  directions.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   drawing	   directly	   on	   Hegel,	   he	   can	   specify	   these	  relationships	  as	  ethical,	  since	  ethics	  is	  the	  original	  concern	  of	  Hegel’s	  theory	  of	  
Sittlichkeit	  as	  a	  state	  of	  harmonious	  integration	  of	  all	  parts	  of	  society.	  Honneth’s	  theory	  therefore	  invites	  a	  link	  between	  the	  discussion	  of	  (in)equality	  and	  moral	  theory,	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   thesis,	   allows	   me	   to	   connect	   with	   current	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debates	   in	  moral	   anthropology.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	  Honneth	   links	   this	   ethical	  theory	  to	  embodied	  cognition	  by	  discussing	  the	  Hegelian	  terms	  ‘recognition’	  and	  ‘misrecognition’	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  correlates	   in	   individual	  psychology,	  drawing	  specifically	  on	  object	  relations	  psychoanalysis.	  This	  thesis	  takes	  up	  this	  strand	  too,	   expands	  on	   the	  psychoanalytic	   theory	  and	   links	   it	  with	  work	   in	   cognitive	  anthropology	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  Honneth	  and,	  going	  back	  to	  the	  source,	  Hegel	  (1807,	  1812,	  1820),	  the	   core	   theoretical	   framework	   also	   borrows	   from	   the	  work	   of	   Judith	   Butler,	  specifically	   her	   argument	   in	   Frames	   of	   War	   (2009)	   that	   the	   appreciation	   of	  vulnerable	  embodiment	  can	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  recognition	  and	  empathy.	  Since	  Butler’s	  overall	  work	  is	  theoretically	  diverse,	  broad	  in	  scope,	  and	  has	  undergone	  important	   and	   profound	   developments	   in	   recent	   decades,	   it	   would	   not	   be	  possible	   here	   to	   give	   a	   full	   appreciation	   of	   her	   contribution,	   however,	   the	  abovementioned	   argument	   is	   relevant	   here	   because	   of	   the	   link	   it	   establishes	  between	  a	  theory	  of	  recognition	  and	  vulnerable	  embodiment.	  The	  ‘import’	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  necessary	  since	  embodiment	  is	  relatively	  under-­‐‑discussed	  in	  both	  Honneth	  and	  Hegel	  himself	  (Stark,	  2014,	  93).	  Butler’s	  discussion	  of	  vulnerability	  is	   interesting	   for	  my	  purposes	  here	  because	  she	   links	   the	   themes	  of	  empathy,	  embodiment,	   recognition	   and	   vulnerability	   that,	   as	   my	   argument	   progresses,	  open	  up	  a	  dialogue	  with	  psychoanalytic	  approaches	  centering	  on	  trauma	  and	  the	  body10.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  fact	  that	  Butler	  has	  drawn	  on	  Hegelian	  theory	  in	  earlier	  work,	  for	  example	   the	   The	   Psychic	   life	   of	   Power	   (1997).	   In	   that	   text,	   Butler	   discusses	   the	   dynamics	   of	  subjection	   under	   a	   Foucauldian/Nietzschean/Althusserian	   paradigm	   and	   arrives	   at	   the	  conclusion	  that	   the	   linguistic	  convergence	  of	   the	   two	  meanings	  of	   ‘subjection’	   (a)	   ‘becoming	  a	  subject’	  and	  b)	  ‘being	  subordinated’)	  exhaustively	  reflects	  the	  real	  process	  of	  subject-­‐‑formation	  by	   means	   of	   power.	   Hegel’s	   ‘unhappy	   consciousness’	   is	   therefore	   the	   result	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  subjectivity	   is	   necessarily	   the	   result	   of	   power	   relations,	   and	   thus	   the	   emerging	   subject	   is	  confronted	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  very	  power	  it	  attempts	  to	  emancipate	  itself	  from.	   In	   contrast	   to	   her	   later	   work,	   which	   I	   draw	   on	   here,	   Butler’s	   use	   of	   a	  Foucauldian/Nietzschean	   concept	   of	   power,	   as	   well	   as	   her	   insistence	   to	   take	   a	   linguistic	  conflation	   for	   a	   real	   convergence	   to	   me	   appears	   problematic	   in	   several	   ways,	   not	   least	   that	  Foucauldian/Nietzschean	  and	  Hegelian	  notions	  of	   the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  subjection	  are	  quite	  different.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	   ultimately	   different	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis,	   I	   cannot	   undertake	   a	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  Butler’s	  work	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  and	  I	  therefore	  explicitly	  limit	  my	  use	  of	  her	  theory	  to	  her	  discussion	  of	  vulnerable	  embodiment	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  empathy	  and	  recognition.	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Finally,	  I	  include	  aspects	  of	  Heidegger’s	  work	  in	  the	  core	  framework,	  not	  so	  much	  because	   his	   theory	   supports	   my	   argument,	   but	   because	   it	   serves	   as	   a	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  Hegelian	  notion	  of	  relational	  ethics	  derived	  from	  Honneth.	  As	   I	   discuss	   in	   chapter	   eight,	   I	   draw	  on	   critical	   interpretations	   of	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  ‘Being’	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  his	  ‘Struggle	  for	  Being’	  implies	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  misrecognition,	  and	  that	  his	  discussion	  of	  spatiality	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  how	  relations	  of	  misrecognition	  come	  to	  bear	  upon	  the	  construction	   of	   space	   and	   spatially	   constructed	   gendered	   and	   racialised	  identities	   (see	   also:	   Faye,	   2006,	   2009;	  McBride,	   1997;	   Iris	   Young	  1997,	   2001;	  Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  Julian	  Young	  2001).	  For	  my	  purposes	  here,	  Heidegger	  therefore	  serves	  somewhat	  as	  the	  antithesis	  to	  a	  Hegelian	  notion	  of	  Sittlichkeit.	  Additionally,	   through	   his	   influence	   on	   French	   philosophy	   and	   thus	  poststructuralism,	  Heidegger	   also	   illustrates	   the	   anti-­‐‑humanist	   impetus	  of	   the	  meta-­‐‑theoretical	  models	  in	  Anthropology	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  (see	  Wolin,	  1993,	  2004).	  	  
	  
2.3  	  Area	  1:	  Ethics	  
	  The	   first	   area	  of	   literature	   this	   thesis	  branches	  out	   into	   is	   ethics,	  primarily	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  subfield	  of	  moral	  anthropology	  as	  represented	  by	  e.g.	  Laidlaw	  (2002,	  2013),	  Oksala	  (2005),	  Faubion	  (2001,	  2011),	  Zigon	  (2007,	  2008,	  2010),	  Mattingly	   (1998,	   2012),	   Robbins	   (2004,	   2007,	   2012,	   2013),	   Csordas	   (2013),	  Lambek	  (2000,	  2010),	  Parish	  (1994).	  From	  the	  core	  theoretical	  framework,	  I	  take	  the	  assumption	  that	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  the	  ethical	  character	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations,	  the	  concept	  of	  ethics	  used	  must	  be	  explicitly	  relational,	  i.e.	  take	  into	  account	  two	  sides	  of	  a	  dyadic	  ethical	  relationship.	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  4,	  this	  is	  a	  slight	  deviation	  from	  the	  bulk	  of	  current	  work	  in	  moral	  anthropology,	  which,	  as	  Laidlaw	  (2013)	  argues,	  is	  based	  predominantly	  in	  a	  paradigm	  of	  virtue	  ethics.	  Anthropologists	  concerned	  with	  virtue	  ethics,	  including	  Laidlaw	  (2013),	  Oksala	  (2005),	  Lambek	  (2010),	  generally	  speak	  about	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  person’s	  moral	  ‘character’.	  The	  possession	  of	  virtues,	  in	  this	  model,	  is	  what	  renders	  a	  person	  ‘good’,	  and	  moral	  development	  is	  seen	  predominantly	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as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   acquisition	   of	   such	   virtues.	   Debates	   subsequently	   focus	   on	  questions	   of	   structure	   and	   agency	   in	  moral	   behaviour	   (Faubion,	   2010,	   2011;	  Zigon,	   2007,	   2008,	   2010),	   and	   the	   relationship	  between	   ‘everyday	   ethics’	   and	  conscious	   ethical	   choice.	   As	   I	   argue	   in	   chapter	   5,	   these	   arguments	   have	   two	  weaknesses,	   namely	   a)	   a	   focus	   on	   individual	   ‘character’	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   an	  assessment	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  other;	  and	  b)	  an	  implicit	  tendency	   toward	  a	  covert	   form	  of	  mind/body	  dualism.	   I	   seek	   to	   resolve	   these	  problems	  by	  drawing	  on	  a)	  work	  in	  cognitive	  anthropology	  that	  seeks	  to	  theorise	  embodied	  cognition	  in	  a	  roughly	  monist	  fashion	  (e.g.	  Bloch,	  2011),	  b)	  work	  that	  seeks	  to	  address	  the	  moral	  dimension	  of	  embodiment(e.g.	  Sayer,	  2005;	  Ignatow,	  2009)	  and	  c)	  the	  relational	  concept	  of	  ethics	  derived	  from	  Honneth	  (see	  above).	  	  	  This	  relational	  concept	  of	  ethics	  also	  informs	  my	  discussion	  of	  methodology	  in	  chapters	  1	   and	  2,	   since,	   as	   I	   discuss,	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   interrogate	  my	  own	  fieldwork	  ethics	  under	  the	  same	  theoretical	  paradigm	  as	  the	  data.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  in	  anthropological	  fieldwork	  in	  general	  and	  this	  thesis	  in	  particular.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  this	  argument,	  I	  also	  draw	  on	  literature	  concerned	  with	  methodology	  and	  fieldwork	  ethics	  more	  broadly,	   for	   example	   Bourdieu’s	   (1977)	   discussion	   of	   what	   he	   terms	   a	  ‘theoretical	  distortion’	  inherent	  in	  fieldwork	  and	  Wacquant’s	  (2005)	  concept	  of	  ‘carnal’	  ethnography	  as	  a	  stance	  that	  takes	  seriously	  the	  role	  of	  embodiment	  in	  fieldwork.	  From	  these	  authors,	  I	  take	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  in	  the	  ethical	  sense	  discussed	  by	  Honneth	  underlies	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  power	  in	   anthropological	   fieldwork	   and	   writing,	   discussed	   e.g.	   by	   Scheper-­‐‑Hughes	  (1995)	  Rosaldo	  (1993)	  Geertz	  (1988);	  Clifford&Marcus	  (1986);	  Marcus&Fischer	  (1986),	  Said	  (1979),	  and	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  address	  them,	  it	  is	  necessary,	  as	  argued	  by	  Sayer	  (2011,	  2005),	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  moral	  dimension	  of	  fieldwork	  relationships,	  which	  I	  again	  theorise	  through	  Honneth.	  Additionally,	   I	  draw	  on	  literature	  on	  empathy	  as	  represented	  by	  e.g.	  Koegler	  and	  Stueber	  (2000),	  Stueber	  (2000,	   2006),	   Makkreeel	   (1992,	   1996,	   2000),	   Grondin	   (1994),	   Clark	   (2007),	  Bohart	  and	  Greenberg	  (1997),	  Gladstein	  (1984),	  Rachman	  (1988),	  (1983,	  1987,	  2000),	  Eisenberg	  (1987,	  2000,	  2007),	  Batson	  (1991,	  2009),	  Ickes	  (1997),	  Decety	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and	  Jackson	  (2006),	  Decety	  and	  Sommerville	  (2003),	  Singer	  et	  al	  (2006,	  2007,	  2009),	  Batson	  (1991,	  2009),	  Eisenberg	  et	  al	  (1989),	  Goldman	  (2006),	  Gallese	  et	  al	  (1998,	  2004),	  de	  Waal,	  (2009),	  Wollheim,	  (1973,	  1974,	  1984)	  	  which	  broadly	  discusses	  the	  biological	  and	  social	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  relating	  I	   discuss	   under	   ‘recognition’.	   As	   the	   literature	   on	   empathy	   is	   extremely	  voluminous	  and	  distributed	  throughout	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciplines,	  I	  mainly	  limit	  myself	  to	  the	  concept	  as	  discussed	  by	  feminist	  authors	  such	  as	  Gilligan	  (1982)	  and	  Noddings	  (1984,	  2010,	  2013)	  and	  poignantly	  formulated	  by	  Vetlesen	  (1994).	  	  	  
2.4  	  Area	  2:	  Embodied	  cognition	  
	  The	  second	  theoretical	  area	  of	  interest	  is	  that	  of	  cognitive	  science,	  since,	  as	  Bloch	  and	   Astuti	   (2012)	   argue,	   “anthropology	   is	   part	   of	   cognitive	   science	   in	   that	   it	  contributes	  to	  the	  unitary	  theoretical	  aim	  of	  understanding	  and	  explaining	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  animal	  species	  Homo	  sapiens”	  (453).	   ‘Cognitive	  science’	  in	  this	  sense	   spans	   several	   disciplinary	   fields	   and	   subfields	   in	   as	   far	   as	   they	   are	  concerned	  with	   cognition	   or	   the	   cognitive	   aspects	   of	   social	   relationships.	   The	  literature	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  falls	  into	  two	  broad	  categories,	  a)	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  and	  b)	  psychoanalysis.	  	  Cognitive	  Science/Philosophy	  of	  Mind:	  I	  draw	  here	  mainly	  on	  work	  which	  seeks	  to	   integrate	   ‘naturalist’	   and	   ‘culturalist’	   views	   of	   embodied	   cognition,	   such	   as	  Bloch	  (2011,	  2013),	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  links	  between	  psychodynamics,	  embodiment	   and	   ethics	   made	   throughout	   the	   thesis.	   Another	   contribution	   in	  cognitive	   anthropology	   comes	   from	   Sperber	   (1985),	   whose	   theory	   of	   an	  ‘epidemiology	  of	  representations’	  I	  use	  in	  chapter	  10	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  cultural	  transmission	  of	  the	  relational	  patterns	  discussed	  above.	  Furthermore,	  I	  draw	  on	  literature	   from	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mind,	   such	   as	   Dennett	   (1989),	   Clark	   et	   al	  (1996),	  Churchland	  (1989b,	  1996),	  DesAutels	  (1996)	  Clark	  and	  Chalmers	  (1998),	  May	  et	  al	   (1996)	   in	  order	   to	   strengthen	  my	  argument	  about	   the	   link	  between	  embodiment	  and	  moral	  cognition.	  All	  these	  approaches	  argue	  that	  there	  need	  not	  be	  a	  rigid	  conceptual,	  theoretical	  or	  even	  disciplinary	  distinction	  between	  ‘mind’	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and	  ‘embodiment’	  or	  between	  ‘human	  nature’	  and	  ‘culture’,	  and	  that	  the	  study	  of	  ethics	   should	   take	  both	  aspects	   into	  account,	   a	   suggestion	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	  follow.	  I	  also	  include	  further	  sources	  in	  this	  area	  such	  as	  Lakoff	  &	  Johnson	  (1980)	  Lakoff	  &	  Johnson	  (1999),	  Lakoff	  &	  Nunez	  (2000)	  Clark	  (1997),	  Edelman	  (2004),	  Damasio	   (1999),	   Clark	   (2001),	   Churchland	   (1988),	   Dennett	   (1993),	  Dennett/Humphrey	   (1989),	   McGilchrist	   (2009),	   Hofstadter	   (1980,	   2008),	   in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  individual	  points,	  without	  claiming	  to	  represent	  the	  full	  scope	  of	   these	   author’s	   works.	   A	   special	   place	   in	   the	   argument	   falls	   to	   Metzinger’s	  (2004)	  self-­‐‑model	  theory,	  which	  gives	  a	  useful	  model	  of	  how	  the	  ‘self’	  emerges	  from	   the	   brain.	  Metzinger	   also	  makes	   the	   link	   between	   the	   body	   as	   a	   spatial	  object,	  space	  as	  a	  survival	  need,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  selfhood	  that	  guide	  this	  thesis.	  As	   I	   discuss,	   his	   ‘self-­‐‑model’,	   read	   through	  a	  Hegelian	   lens,	   can	  help	   to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  why	  inequality	  has	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  experience	  of	   self	   and	   mental	   health	   (Luhrmann,	   2007b),	   without	   having	   to	   resort	   to	  ultimately	  biologistic	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘social	  defeat’.	  	  	  Psychoanalysis:	   As	   already	   implicated	   in	   the	   core	   theoretical	   framework,	  psychoanalysis,	  particular	  the	  bundle	  of	  approaches	  known	  as	  ‘object	  relations’	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  social	  relations	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	   –	   are	   intrapersonally	   represented	   and	   interpersonally	  transmitted.	   As	   I	   discuss	   in	   chapter	   5,	   this	   brand	   of	   psychoanalytic	   theory	  assumes	   that	   particular	   relational	   configurations	   (‘object	   relations’)	   are	  internalised	   during	   development	   and	   reproduced	   in	   individual	   and	   collective	  behaviour.	   I	   follow	   Honneth	   here	   in	   drawing	   mainly	   on	   work	   by	   Donald	  Winnicott	  (1965/1971,	  1990)	  and	  Jessica	  Benjamin	  (1988,	  1990,	  1998,	  2013),	  which	   I	   amend	  with	  work	   by	   Fairbairn	   (1954/1994,	   see	   also	  Kernberg	   2002,	  Peireira	   and	   Scharff,	   2002),	   since,	   as	   I	   argue	   in	   chapter	  5,	   this	  work	  provides	  some	  important	  theoretical	  tools	  for	  linking	  the	  discussion	  of	  object	  relations	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  (Hegelian)	  ethics.	  I	  further	  discuss	  aspects	  of	  psychopathology	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  representation	  of	  object	  relations	  through	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Kernberg	   (1975,	  1976,	  1984),	   Fromm	  (1964)	  Kohut	   (1971),	   John	  Bowlby	  (1951),	  Hare	  (1999)	  and	  Babiak/Hare	  (2006).	  Further	  work	  in	  this	  area	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comes	  from	  Duffell	  (2000,	  2014)	  and	  Schaverien	  (2004,	  2011),	  whose	  discussion	  of	   the	   psychodynamics	   of	   the	  British	   ruling	   class	   gives	   a	   concrete	   example	   of	  object	   relations	   psychodynamics	   and	   contributes	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  psychodynamics	   of	   class	   in	   Britain.	   Selected	   ideas	   are	   also	   taken	   from	   Laing	  (1973/2010),	  whose	  concept	  of	   ‘ontological	  security’	  I	  employ	  in	  chapter	  7,	  as	  well	  as	  Miller	  (1984,	  1996,	  1997,	  2002)	  and	  Gruen	  (1992,	  2007),	  who	  contribute	  an	   understanding	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   childhood	   abuse	   on	   cognition	   from	   a	  psychoanalytic	   point	   of	   view,	   and	   literature	   on	   trauma	   and	   its	   cognitive	  consequences	  more	   broadly,	   such	   as	   Van	   der	   Kolk	   (1984,	   1994,	   2003,	   2012),	  Lifton	   (1989),	   Thaler-­‐‑Singer	   (2003).	   Finally	   Moore	   (2007a)	   discusses	  psychoanalytic	   concepts	   in	   the	   context	   of	   anthropology	   and	   thus	   provides	  disciplinary	  grounding	  for	  the	  above.	  	  
	  
2.5  	  Area	  3:	  Social/Political	  theory	  
	  This	   area	   encompasses,	   broadly	   speaking,	   theory	   that	   discusses	   social	  relationships	  outside	  the	  individual	  dyadic	  relations	  implied	  in	  most	  of	  the	  above	  theories.	   While	   authors	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   psychoanalysis	   or	   cognitive	   science	  frequently	  make	  statements	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  embodied	  cognition	  in	  large-­‐‑scale	  human	  relationships	  (e.g.	  Duffell,	  2000,	  2014	  or	  Fiske,	  2010),	  the	  precise	  modes	  of	  interaction	  between	  individual	  cognition	  and	  collective	  behaviour	  are	  far	  from	  straightforward.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  a	  balance	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  sought	  between	  a	  sufficient	  contextualisation	  of	  the	  ethnographic	  data	  within	  the	  broader	  political	   and	  economic	   situation	  at	   the	   time	  of	   fieldwork,	   and	   the	  intended	   focus	   on	   embodied	   cognition.	   This	   issue	   was	   technically	   addressed	  through	  approaching	  the	  choice	  of	  social	  theories	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  their	  formal	   structural	   compatibility	  with	   the	   theoretical	   core,	  while	   ensuring	   their	  content	  resonated	  with	  the	  themes	  and	  concepts	  emerging	  from	  the	  data.	  In	  this	  light,	  some	  theories	  proved	  more	  compatible	  than	  others	  –	  for	  example,	  Corey	  Robin’s	   treatment	  of	   Conservatism	   in	   chapters	  9	   and	  10	  was	   chosen	  not	   only	  because	  it	  discusses	  conservative	  ideology,	  but	  because	  Robin’s	  conceptual	  and	  explanatory	  framework,	  which	  pitches	  a	  ‘master’	  ruling	  class	  against	  a	  rebellious	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subaltern,	   is	  structurally	  compatible	  with	  the	  Hegelian	  conception	  of	   the	  basic	  dynamics	  of	  social	  relations	  as	  derived	  from	  the	  core	  theories,	  and	  thus	  amenable	  to	  the	  abductive	  transference	  of	  the	  abstract	  relational	  patterns	  discussed	  above,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ideologically	  reflecting	  a	  position	  that	  resonates	  with	  the	  values,	   ideals	  and	  sentiments	  expressed	  by	  respondents	   in	   the	   field.	  Similarly,	  Patterson’s	   (1985)	   discussion	   of	   slavery	   and	   ‘social	   death’	   can	   be	   made	  productive	  in	  this	  discussion	  first	  and	  foremost	  because	  he	  specifically	  discusses	  slavery	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  quasi-­‐‑Hegelian	  power	  dynamics,	  and	  thus	  renders	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  meaningful	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  core	  theoretical	  position	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  fact	  that	  Patterson’s	  argument	  has	  widely	  been	  used	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation	  of	  homeless	  people	  (see	  below),	  furthermore	  opens	  up	  an	  avenue	  to	  ground	  the	  abstract	  concept	  of	  ‘recognition’	  in	  empirical	  data	  from	  secondary	  sources,	   and	   thus	   supports	   the	   argument	   that	   ‘recognition’	   is	   not	   merely	   a	  theoretical	  entity,	  but	  a	  real	  process	  manifesting	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels	  from	  the	  biological	   to	   the	   cultural.	   In	   this	   sense,	   theory	   was	   generally	   chosen	   for	   its	  explanatory	   or	   integrative	   potential	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   concrete	   data	   in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  theoretical	  core,	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  a	  maximum	  of	  coherence	  between	   different	   theories	   and	   theoretical	   positions,	   while	   allowing	   for	   a	  maximum	  of	  flexibility	  in	  adapting	  the	  theory	  to	  the	  data.	  	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  there	  are	  several	  relevant	  literatures	  relating	  to	  aspects	  of	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  this	  thesis	  draws	  on.	  As	  the	  argument	  specifically	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  abovementioned	  relational	  patterns	  come	  to	  inform	  the	  construction	  of	  physical	   and	   social	   space,	   and	   how	   they	   are	   in	   turn	   reflected	   by	   such	   spatial	  arrangements,	  I	  draw	  on	  literature	  discussing	  the	  social	  production	  of	  space	  in	  general	   (Lefevbre,	   1974/1991;	   Massey,	   1992,	   2005),	   the	   specifically	   spatial	  component	  of	   cognition	  as	   relating	   to	  psychoanalysis	   (Bachelard	  1958/1994),	  and	  the	  role	  of	  power	  in	  this	  context	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  human	  territoriality	  (Sack,	  1986;	  Newman,	  1972;	  Minton,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  I	  draw	  on	  authors	  who	  discuss	  (spatial)	  power	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  and	  ‘race’	  (Dworkin,	  2000;	  Stoltenberg,	   2000,	   2005;	   Dresser/Fleming;	   2007	   Fanon	   1967),	   and	   since	   this	  thesis	   is	   concerned	   with	   homelessness,	   particularly	   authors	   who	   discuss	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gendered	   and	   racialised	   constructions	   of	   the	   ‘home’,	   such	   as	   Mallet	   (2004),	  Moore	  (2007b),	  Douglas	  (1991),	  Dovey	  (1985),	  Wardhaugh,	  (1999);	  Somerville,	  (1992),	   Tucker	   (1994),	   Ginsberg	   (1999),	   Ingold,	   (1995)	   Jackson	   et	   al	   (1995).	  These	   authors	   particularly	   emphasise	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   theoretical	   tension	  between	  notions	  of	  ‘home’	  as	  a	  safe	  haven	  and	  as	  a	  ‘prison’,	  which	  in	  chapters	  6	  and	  7	  I	  relate	  to	  the	  relational	  patterns	  described	  above	  (see	  also	  Wardhaugh,	  1999;	   Jones,	   1995,	   2000;	   Goldsack,	   1999,	   Giddens,	   1984,	   1990;	   Dupuis	   and	  Thorns,	  1996,	  1998;	  Chapman/Hockey,	  1999a/b;	  Massey,	  1992;	  Passaro,	  1996;	  Porteous,	  1976;	  De	  Beauvoir,	  1952;	  Said,	  1993;	  Young,	  1997;	  Mohanty/Martin,	  2003;	  O’Mahony,	  2006;	  Weir,	  2008).	  	  Furthermore,	   I	   draw	   on	   two	   types	   of	   work	   from	   the	   field	   of	   political	   theory,	  namely	   a)	   work	   that	   theorises	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   ‘self’	   in	   terms	   of	   political	  categories,	   (e.g.	   Brace	   1997;	   Nedlesky,	   1990;	   Bartelson	   1995).	   Here,	   I	   draw	  particularly	  on	  Brace’s	  (1997)	  conception	  of	  a	  ‘territorial’	  versus	  a	  ‘spatial’	  self	  and	  their	  respective	  political	  configurations,	  since,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  chapter	  6,	  these	  concepts	   are	   exceptionally	   well	   suited	   to	   describing	   the	   inner	   dynamics	   of	  actually	  existing	  embodied	  ‘selves’	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  spaces	  they	  construct	  in	  the	  material	   and	   social	  world.	   In	   accordance	  with	   the	   structural	   patterns	   derived	  from	  the	  theoretical	  core,	  I	  read	  the	  ‘territorial	  self’	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  a	  self	  involved	   in	   a	   relational	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition,	   and	   conversely,	   the	   ‘spatial	  self’	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  recognition.	  The	  theoretical	  positions	  Brace	  develops	  these	   categories	   from	   (Winstanley	   and	   Hobbes	   respectively)	   furthermore	  provide	  valuable	  insight	  into	  the	  speculative	  social	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  emergence	   of	   such	   ‘selves’	   in	   the	   physical	  world.	   	   b)	  work	   on	   the	   immediate	  political	  context	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  situated	  in,	  i.e.	  UK	  politics	  between	  2010	  and	  2012	  and	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  ideological	  figures	  of	  this	  politics	  as	  far	  as	  they	  have	  relevance	   for	   the	  ethnography.	  This	   involves	   literature	  on	  contemporary	  events	   in	   party	   politics,	   social	   policy	   and	   political	   economy,	   and	   additionally	  selected	   work	   on	   conservative	   ideology,	   to	   the	   degree	   that	   it	   serves	   to	  contextualise	   the	   actions	   described	   in	   the	   ethnography,	   for	   example	  Hodkinson/Robbins	   (2013),	   Kisby	   (2010),	   Levitas	   (2012),	   North	   (2011),	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Teasdale	  et	  al	  (2012),	  Buckland	  et	  al	  (2013),	  Jacobs/Manzi	  (2013),	  Bale	  (2008),	  Davies/Pill	  (2012),	  Hughes/Mooney	  (1998),	  Newman	  (2001),	  Eccleshall	  (1980).	  Furthermore,	  approaches	  were	  included	  which	  provide	  a	  broader	  background	  to	  the	   above	   specific	   political	   questions,	   such	   as	   Robin	   (2011),	   Brace	   (2004),	  Scruton	   (1980/2000),	   Faulks	   (1998),	   and,	   for	   illustrative	   purposes,	   original	  quotations	  of	  political	  theorists	  referenced	  by	  the	  above,	  such	  as	  Burke	  (1790)	  and	   von	   Mises	   (1951/1981).	   Anthropological	   discussions	   of	   property	   are	  represented	  by	  Hann	  (1993,	  1998,	  2003,	  2007),	  Hann	  and	  Hart	  (2009),	  Carrier	  (1998),	   Bloch	   (1975,	   2013),	   Nugent	   (1993),	   Strathern,	   (1996,	   1999,	   2009),	  Graeber	  (1997,	  2006),	  MacPherson	  (1978),	  Meillassoux	  (1972)	  and	  Macpherson,	  (1978),	  and	  in	  a	  wider	  context	  Cooper	  (2007)	  and	  the	  authors	  in	  the	  2009	  Special	  Edition	   of	   Theoretical	   Inquiries	   in	   Law.	   In	   order	   to	   illustrate	   the	   cultural	  transmission	   of	   the	   abovementioned	   structural	   patterns	   through	   political	  ideology,	  historical	  evidence	  was	  included	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  pertained	  to	  the	  type	  of	  social	  relations	  in	  question,	  such	  as	  Wood	  (2001),	  Garnett	  (2007)	  Keats-­‐‑Rohan	  (1999),	   Singman	   (1998),	   Littrell	   (2009).	   Additionally,	   authors	   were	   included	  whose	  work	  illustrates	  particular	  aspects	  of	  this	  process	  of	  cultural	  transmission	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  spatiality/territoriality,	  such	  as	  Shearing	  (1983,	  2001),	  Cahill	   (2001,	   2006)	   and	   Clark	   (2010,	   2014).	   Harvey	   (2003,	   2005,	   2008)	   is	  included	  because	  of	  his	  focus	  on	  spatial	  aspects	  of	  political	  economy,	  Anderson	  (2013)	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   spatial	   ‘othering’	   in	   the	   context	   of	   migration,	   and	  Postone	  (1980)	  as	  well	  as	  Scholz	  (2007)	  for	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  transference	  of	  racist	  argumentative	  figures	  onto	  other	  than	  the	  originally	  racialised	  groups.	  	  Next	  to	  these	  more	  general	  sources,	  the	  thesis	  specifically	  draws	  on	  literature	  on	  squatting	  (Prujit,	  2013;	  Cattaneo	  et	  al,	  2014;	  Dee,	  2013)	  and,	  as	  implied	  by	  the	  main	  ethnographic	  focus,	  homelessness.	  In	  this	  area,	  literature	  includes	  general	  discussions	   of	   homelessness	   (Hutson,	   1999;	   Rosengard	   et	   al,	   2002,	   Drake,	  O’Brien,	  &	  Beiuyck	  1981,	  Dant	  &	  Deacon	  1989,	  Fitzpatrick	  1998,	  Kennett	  &	  Marsh	  1999,	  Fitzpatrick,	  Kemp	  &	  Klinker	  2000,	  Neale	  1997,	  Pleace	  1998,	  2000,	  Stones	  2001	  Wenzel/Koegel/Gelberg,	  2000,	  Eynan	  et	  al,	  2002,	  Tosi,	  2007,	  Wacquant,	  2001,	  Beier	  et	  al,	  2008,	  Hopper	  et	  al	  2010),	  anthropological	  and	  ethnographic	  treatments	   (Glasser	   and	   Bridgman,	   1999;	   Madden,	   2003,	   Desjarlais,	   1997,	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Luhrmann,	   2007,	   2008,	   Bourgois,	   1998,	   Ravenhill,	   2008,	   Williams,1996),	  discussions	  of	  Critical	  Realism	  in	  homelessness	  research	  (Williams,	  2001,	  2003,	  Fitzpatrick	  2005),	  discussions	  of	  homelessness	  and	  trauma	  (Goodman	  et	  al,	  1995	  Crisis,	  2011,	  Newburn	  and	  Rock,	  2004,	  Herman	  et	  al	  1997,	  Buhrich	  et	  al,	  2000,	  Martijn/Sharpe,	   2006),	   domestic/sexual	   violence	   as	   a	   major	   predictor	   of	  homelessness	   (Davis	  et	  al,	  2000;	  Dutton,	  2006;	  McRobie,	  2012	  Wisdom	  1989;	  Gill,	  2010;	  Street	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Bowman,	  1993;	  Fairchild/Rudman,	  2008;	  Sullivan	  et	   al,	   2010;	   Rajoura	   et	   al,	   2012),	   and	   discussions	   of	   homelessness	   and	   ‘social	  death’	   (Ruddick	   2002	   Ligget,	   1991)	   as	  well	   as	   the	   original	   formulation	   of	   the	  concept	   in	   Patterson	   (1985,	   2012).	   A	   specific	   body	   of	   literature	   refers	   to	   the	  situation	  of	  Gypsies	   and	  Travellers,	  who,	   albeit	   not	   ‘homeless’	   in	   a	   traditional	  sense,	   nevertheless	   are	   constructed	   as	   ‘spatial	   others’	   and	   thus	   discriminated	  against	  (Martin,	  2002,	  1998;	  Davis,	  1997;	  Bancroft,	  2012;	  Simhandl,	  2006;	  Okely,	  1983;	   Clark	   and	   Greenfields,	   2006;	   Greenfields	   and	   Home,	   2006;	   Smith	   and	  Grenfields,	  2012,	  2013;	  Greenfields	  2009;	  Greenfields	  and	  Smith	  2010;	  Parry	  et	  al,	  2004;	  van	  Cleemput,	  2007;	  Greenfields,	  2007;	  Bhopal,	  2004;	  Cemlyn,	  2008;	  Commission	  for	  Racial	  Equality,	  2006;	  Kabachnik,	  2009).	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Picton	  Street,	  Bristol,	  five	  in	  the	  afternoon.	  I	  am	  pushing	  everything	  I	  own,	  packed	  
into	  bags	  and	  bin	  liners,	  through	  the	  streets	  of	  St	  Pauls	  on	  a	  wooden	  trolley.	  	  
	  
The	  trolley	  is	  heavy	  and	  unwieldy,	  and	  more	  than	  once	  tries	  to	  escape	  my	  grip	  on	  
the	  icy	  roads	  to	  launch	  itself	  into	  the	  rows	  of	  parked	  cars	  that	  line	  the	  pavement.	  
Gavin	  saunters	  next	  to	  me,	  ostensibly	  refusing	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  my	  struggle	  with	  
the	  vehicle.	  We	  are	  heading	  south	  from	  Redland	  to	  his	  squat	  in	  Easton,	  where	  I	  
am	  allowed	  to	  store	  my	  belongings	  until	  our	  crew	  has	  finally	  sorted	  out	  a	  squat	  
of	  our	  own.	  We	  have	  just	  been	  evicted	  for	  the	  third	  time	  in	  two	  weeks	  and	  I’m	  
tired	  of	  hurried	  packing	  manoeuvres	  and	  heavily	  loaded	  treks	  across	  the	  city.	  If	  
there	   is	  no	   safe	  place	   for	  my	  body	  at	   this	  point	   then	  at	   least	   for	   the	   carefully	  
selected	  objects	  that	  constitute	  the	  whole	  of	  my	  worldly	  belongings.	  
	  
Swearing,	  I	  try	  to	  wrestle	  the	  trolley	  around	  a	  sharp	  corner	  and	  nearly	  end	  up	  
flying	  	  downhill	  towards	  Shaftesbury	  Avenue	  dragged	  by	  its	  sheer	  weight.	  Gavin	  
grudgingly	  stretches	  out	  a	  hand	  and	  stops	  both	  me	  and	  the	  trolley	  before	  we	  can	  
turn	   in	  to	  a	  bag-­‐‑lady-­‐‑shaped	  missile.	  A	   few	  careful	   turns	   later	  we	  are	  back	  on	  
even,	   yet	   slippery,	   ground,	   beginning	   to	   feel	   warm	   despite	   the	   -­‐‑15	   Celsius	  
temperatures.	  
	  
The	   intervention	   seems	   to	  have	   triggered	  Gavin	  out	  of	  his	   sullen	   silence.	   “This	  
trolley	  is	  shit,”	  he	  declares,	  “whered’ya	  get	  that	  from	  anyway?”	  
	  
I	  inform	  him	  that	  the	  trolley	  has	  been	  sourced	  by	  Simon,	  who	  borrowed	  it	  from	  
another	  crew,	  who	  has	  picked	  it	  up	  somewhere	  under	  unclear	  and	  possibly	  not	  
entirely	  legal	  circumstances.	  Gavin	  rolls	  his	  eyes.	  
	  
“Simon’s	  an	  idiot”	  he	  says,	  “I	  mean,	  did	  he	  really	  think	  squatting	  hospital	  property	  
was	  going	  to	  fly?	  I	  mean,	  re-­‐‑ally?”	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I	  bite	  my	  tongue	  and	  keep	  pushing	  while	  he	  launches	  into	  a	  lengthy	  analysis	  of	  
our	  most	  recent	  eviction	  and	  our	  crew’s	  general	  ineptitude	  at	  squatting.	  He	  is	  not	  
being	  fair,	  but	  then	  I’m	  guessing	  the	  source	  of	  his	  aggravation	  is	  not	  our	  crew’s	  
strategy,	  nor	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  trolley	  for	  that	  matter.	  He	  proves	  me	  right	  a	  second	  
later.	  
	  
“I	  don’t	  get	  what	  you’re	  doing	  anyway”	  he	  says,	  pointing	  at	  my	  miserable	  load.	  “I	  
mean,	  look	  at	  you”.	  I	  look	  at	  myself.	  In	  my	  tatty	  army	  coat	  and	  five	  layers	  of	  woolly	  
jumpers	  I	  look	  like	  an	  extra	  from	  Les	  Miserables.	  	  
	  
“I	   really	   thought	  you	  were	  cleverer	   than	   this,”	  he	   continues,	   shaking	  his	  head.	  
“You’re	  just	  like	  all	  the	  other	  middle	  class	  kids	  coming	  here	  playing	  revolution.	  
Like,	  look	  at	  me,	  I’m	  homeless,	  I’m	  hard-­‐‑core”	  	  -­‐‑	  at	  the	  word	  ‘hard-­‐‑core’	  he	  makes	  
the	  ironic	  speech-­‐‑mark-­‐‑gesture	  with	  his	  fingers	  	  -­‐‑	  “you	  should	  ask	  some	  people	  
who	  really	  are	  homeless,	  they’ll	  tell	  you	  how	  hard-­‐‑core	  it	  is”.	  	  Figure	  4:	  Fieldnote	  1	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Chapter	  One:	  Of	  Life	  and	  Fieldwork	  
	  
	  
Only	  those	  with	  no	  concerns	  can	  be	  
literally	  aimless	  Margaret	  Archer	  	  	  If	  anthropologists	  and	   the	  homeless	  have	  one	   thing	   in	  common,	   it	   is	   that	   they	  have	  no	  place.	  To	  be	  homeless	  as	  a	  socio-­‐‑spatial	  phenomenon	  “is	  by	  definition	  to	  be	  a	  person	  without	  a	  place	  of	  one’s	  own,	  to	  be	  someone	  who	  is	  dis-­‐‑placed	  or	  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑place”	  (Wardhaugh,	  2000,	  111).	  According	  to	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  this	  condition	  of	  ‘placelessness’	  is	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  anthropologist’s	  default	  state:	  	  	  
	  “The	  anthropologist’s	   particular	   relation	   to	   the	   object	   of	   his	   study	   contains	   the	  
markings	   of	   a	   theoretical	   distortion	   inasmuch	   as	   his	   situation	   as	   an	   observer,	  
excluded	  from	  the	  real	  play	  of	  social	  activities	  by	  the	  fact	  he	  has	  no	  place	  (except	  
by	  choice	  or	  by	  way	  of	  a	  game)	  in	  the	  system	  observed	  and	  has	  no	  need	  to	  make	  a	  place	  for	  himself	  there,	  inclines	  him	  to	  a	  hermeneutic	  representation	  of	  practices.”	  (Bourdieu,	  1977,	  1,	  emphasis	  mine)	  	  What	   unites	   the	   homeless	   and	   the	   anthropologist	   is	   thus	   the	   fact	   that	   their	  presence	  within	  the	  network	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  constitute	  ‘society’	  is,	  from	  the	   perspective	   of	   society,	   superfluous,	   a	   non-­‐‑position.	   Both	   are	   seen	   to	  contribute	  nothing	  to	  the	  ‘real	  play	  of	  social	  activities’	  and	  thus,	  are	  presumed	  to	  have	  no	  stake	  in	  a	  social	  system	  they	  can	  only	  observe	  from	  the	  outside.	  But	  while	  the	  homeless	  person	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  explanatory	  models,	  presumed	  to	  have	  had	  this	  position	  forced	  upon	  them,	  the	  anthropologist	  is	  seen	  here	  as	  a	  free	  agent	  who	  can	  choose	  to	  make	  a	  place	  for	  himself	  in	  the	  system	  he	  observes,	  or	  choose	  not	  to.	  Bourdieu	  critiques	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  latter	  –	  choosing	  to	  remain	  an	  outsider	  who	   tries	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   rules	   of	   a	   game	   he	   has	   no	   particular	   interest	   in	  playing	   –	   constitutes	   what	   is	   commonly	   seen	   as	   ‘scientific	   distance’	   or	  ‘objectivity’,	  namely:	  “making	  a	  virtue	  out	  of	  necessity	  by	  converting	  a	  de	  facto	  exclusion	  into	  a	  choice	  of	  method”	  (ibid,	  10).	  The	  emphasis	  on	  ‘choice’	  is	  certainly	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a	   hallmark	   of	  Bourdieu’s	   anthropologist11	  –	   he	   distinguishes	   himself	   from	   the	  homeless	  person	  in	  that	  he	  is	  free	  to	  elect	  to	  join	  or	  not	  join	  the	  game,	  and	  he	  certainly	   has	   no	   ‘need’	   to.	   As	  Andrew	  Sayer	   remarks:	   “This	   removal	   from	   the	  pressures	   of	   practical	   activity	   also	   reflects	   and	   signals	   the	   privileged	   social	  position	  of	  the	  academic”	  (2011,	  15).	  	  	  Precisely	   this	  was	   the	  charge	   that	  was	   levelled	  at	  me	  by	  my	   friend	  and	   fellow	  squatter	   Gavin	   in	   the	   scene	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   chapter.	   But	   what	   for	  Bourdieu	  amounts	  ‘merely’	  to	  a	  theoretical	  distortion,	  for	  Gavin	  constituted	  an	  insult.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  two	  problems	  are	  not	  only	  related,	  but	  that	  they	  stem	  from	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  dynamic.	  What	  Bourdieu	  identifies	   as	   the	   ‘placelessness’	   of	   the	   anthropologist	   produces	   a	   particular	  attitude	   to	   ‘fieldwork’,	  which	   defines	   it	   as	   something	   categorically	   other	   than	  ‘life’.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss,	  this	  peculiar	  opposition	  stems	  precisely	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  anthropologist	  has	  no	  ‘place’	  in	  the	  field	  specifically	  as	  a	  moral	  agent	  –	  he	  ‘has	  no	  need	  to’	  make	  such	  a	  place	  for	  himself,	  since	  he	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  depend	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  others	  that	  would	  reflect	  to	  him	  what	  his	  place	  is	  or	  should	  be.	  Thus	  staying	  outside	  of	  ‘the	  real	  play	  of	  social	  activities’,	  he	  is	  presumed	  to	  be	  outside	   of	   social	   relations,	   not,	   like	   his	   interlocutors,	   part	   of	   complex	  relationships	   that	   create	  and	  sustain	   identity,	  but	  a	   solitary	  ego	  who,	   from	  an	  ‘objective’	  vantage	  point,	  observes	  and	  chronicles	  these	  relations.	  His	  ‘objectivity’	  is	  defined	  not	  just	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  has	  no	  stake	  in	  the	  social	  process,	  but	  that	  he	  has	  very	  little	  at	  stake	  relative	  to	  the	  other.	  From	  this	  fundamental	  difference	  in	  outlook	  stems	  not	  only	  the	  ‘theoretical	  distortion’	  Bourdieu	  points	  out,	  but	  also	  the	  kind	  of	  imbalance	  that	  led	  to	  the	  above	  argument.	  	  My	  relationship	  with	  Gavin	  has	  shaped	  the	  making	  of	  this	  thesis	   like	  no	  other,	  academic	  or	  ethnographic,	  and	  it	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  without	  him,	  this	  thesis	  would	  not	  have	  happened.	  Our	  friendship	  was	  initially	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  cultural	  misunderstandings,	  not	  least	  of	  which	  was	  my	  initial	  ignorance	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Actually,	  the	  anthropologist	  of	  Bourdieu’s	  critique	  –	  Bourdieu’s	  theory	  is	  after	  all	  devised	  to	  rectify	  this	  situation	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nature	  and	  background	  of	  squatting	  in	  the	  UK.	  When	  I	  first	  arrived	  in	  Brighton	  to	  do	   a	   postgraduate	   degree	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Sussex	   after	   a	   short	   and	  unsatisfying	   career	   as	   a	   social	   worker,	   I	   had	   no	   plans	   whatsoever	   of	   doing	  research	  on	  and	  within	  British	  society.	   In	  so	  far,	   I	  approached	   ‘British	  culture’	  with	  all	  the	  naivety	  and	  enthusiasm	  of	  a	  privileged	  migrant	  who	  is	  making	  a	  polite	  effort	  to	  fit	  in,	  but	  has	  not	  bet	  her	  fate	  and	  fortune	  on	  her	  chosen	  destination	  (in	  so	  far	  I	  was	  perhaps	  already	  an	  anthropologist	  in	  the	  making).	  I	  had	  been	  heavily	  involved	  in	  vaguely	  anarchist	  ‘autonomous’	  politics	  in	  my	  native	  Vienna,	  and	  thus	  circumvented	  British	  ‘mainstream’	  culture	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course,	  aiming	  to	  join	  the	  British	  branch	  of	   the	  same	  movement	   I	  already	  considered	  myself	  part	  of.	  Luckily,	  Brighton	  supplied	  ample	  opportunity	  to	  attach	  myself	  to	  what	  by	  dress	  code	  and	  jargon	  I	  identified	  as	  my	  subcultural	  niche,	  and	  it	  did	  not	  take	  long	  until	  I	  met	  my	  first	  squatters.	  What	  I	  did	  not	  immediately	  understand,	  however,	  was	  that	  squatting	  in	  the	  UK	  –	  for	  the	  most	  part	  –	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  what	  I	  was	  used	  to.	  	  	  Shortly	  before	  I	  left,	  Vienna	  had	  seen	  some	  rather	  spectacular	  squatting	  ‘actions’	  on	  part	  of	  a	  radical	  left	  that	  was	  comprised	  largely	  of	  middle	  class	  students	  like	  myself.	  The	  modus	  operandi	  of	  these	  actions	  involved	  a	  very	  public	  takeover	  of	  high	  profile	   (council)	  properties,	  passionate	  demands	  (addressed	  to	  no	  one	   in	  particular)	  for	  ‘autonomous	  spaces’,	  and	  subsequent	  heavy-­‐‑handed	  eviction	  by	  police,	  usually	  all	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  days.	  The	  occupations	  drew	  intense	  media	  attention,	  especially	  when	   they	   involved	  more	   than	   the	  usual	  degree	  of	  police	  brutality,	   but	   rarely	  made	   it	   beyond	  a	   spectacular	   assertion	  of	   solidarity	  with	  those	  deprived	  of	  affordable	  living	  space.	  Few	  of	  the	  occupiers	  themselves	  were	  precariously	  housed,	  and	  the	  occasional	  participation	  of	  actual	  homeless	  people	  tended	   to	   turn	   theoretical	   solidarity	   into	   practical	   class	   conflict	   very	   quickly.	  This,	  however,	  was	  my	  unquestioned	  understanding	  of	  ‘squatting’	  when	  I	  came	  to	  Britain,	  and	  I	  was	  thus	  thrilled	  to	  be	  told	  that	  here,	  squatting	  was	  actually	  legal	  (or	  at	   least	  not	   illegal).	  The	   first	   squats	   I	  visited	   in	  Brighton	  were	  grim,	  dingy	  places	  without	  heating	  and	  sometimes	  without	  electricity,	  but	  how	  lucky	  were	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these	   anarchists	   (which	   is	   what	   most	   identified	   themselves	   as)	   to	   have	   an	  unlimited	  supply	  of	  spaces	  to	  turn	  into	  anything	  they	  wanted!	  	  	  I	  met	  Gavin	  one	  night	  after	  a	  squat	  party,	  me	  trying	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  house	  by	  the	  half-­‐‑barricaded	  entrance,	  him	  trying	  to	  get	  in.	  He	  was	  17	  and	  making	  a	  point	  of	  classic	  punk	  attire,	  including	  a	  tidy	  green	  Mohican	  and	  a	  Subhumans	  t-­‐‑shirt.	  We	  ended	  up	  chatting	  and	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  he	  had	  just	  been	  thrown	  out	  of	  the	  squat	  because	  of	  a	  romantic	  relationship	  gone	  badly	  wrong,	  and	  had	  nowhere	  to	  go.	  Drunk	  and	  by	  identification	  always	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  romantically	  disadvantaged,	  I	  offered	  him	  to	  crash	  at	   the	  windowless	  room	  I	  was	  renting	   in	  a	   flat	  near	  the	  seafront.	  That	  Gavin’s	  experience	  somewhat	  differed	  from	  mine	  became	  obvious	  the	  minute	  my	  middle	   class	  housemates	   started	   to	  hide	   their	  valuables	  at	   the	  mere	  sight	  of	  him.	  Offended	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  my	  guest,	  I	  assured	  the	  embarrassed	  Gavin	  that	  my	  house	  was	  his	  house,	  and	  over	  the	  next	  few	  months	  he	  became	  a	  regular	  visitor	  when	  he	  was	  in	  between	  squats	  or	  just	  plain	  hungry.	  One	  of	   the	   first	  born-­‐‑and-­‐‑bred	  British	  people	  –	  as	  opposed	   to	  other	  academic	  migrants	   –	   I	   came	   into	   contact	   with,	   he	   forever	   shaped	   my	   intuitive	  understanding	  of	  ‘British	  culture’	  by	  introducing	  me	  to	  The	  Specials,	  trilby	  hats	  and	  the	  ‘This	  is	  England’	  films.	  Unencumbered	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  ‘research’	  and	  curious	   to	   learn	  about	  my	  new	   friend’s	   life,	   I	   enthusiastically	  embraced	  a	  whole	  world	  of	  cultural	  references,	  the	  class	  implications	  of	  which	  I	  did	  not	  even	  begin	  to	  understand.	  Much	  later,	  I	  would	  sometimes	  wonder	  why	  some	  British	  people	   snubbed	   me,	   until	   I	   realised	   that	   I	   had	   inadvertently	   picked	   up	  mannerisms	   and	   ways	   of	   speaking	   that	   for	   them,	   had	   very	   clear	   class	  associations.	  	  	  Gavin’s	   biography,	   which	   he	   volunteered	   over	   the	   course	   of	   my	   first	   year	   in	  England,	  forced	  me	  to	  take	  a	  critical	  look	  at	  some	  of	  my	  unquestioned	  cultural	  preconceptions.	   When	   I	   first	   told	   him	   I	   was	   a	   social	   worker	   (in	   Austria	  synonymous	  with	  ‘bleeding	  heart	  liberal’),	  his	  eyes	  darted	  to	  the	  nearest	  exit	  and	  he	  became	  extremely	  uncomfortable	  until	  I	  explained	  I	  wasn’t	  entitled	  to	  work	  in	  Britain.	  As	  it	  emerged,	  Gavin,	  who	  had	  been	  homeless	  at	  age	  15,	  had	  filed	  social	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workers	  right	  up	  there	  with	  cops	  as	  authorities	  that	  were	  not	  to	  be	  trusted.	  His	  experience	   of	   the	   system	   of	   homeless	   provision	   was	   one	   of	   coercion	   and	  contempt,	  and	  he	  empathically	  preferred	  squatting	  or	  even	  the	  street	  to	  the	  ‘help’	  they	  offered	  him.	  I	  admired	  Gavin’s	  aptitude	  at	  survival	  –	  he	  was	  street-­‐‑wise	  in	  a	  way	  I	  could	  never	  have	  been	  –	  and	  looked	  at	  the	  world	  with	  the	  eyes	  of	  someone	  who	  could	  find	  use	  value	  where	  others	  saw	  only	  waste.	  I	  would	  watch	  in	  dismay	  as	  he	  investigated	  bins	  and	  thrown-­‐‑away	  lunch	  packs	  for	  edible	  scraps,	  and	  was	  informed	  that	  he	  had	  once,	  when	  there	  was	  nothing	  else,	  eaten	  a	  pigeon.	  In	  time,	  we	  developed	  an	  awkward	  dance	  around	  food	  and	  other	  provisions,	  which	  I	  saw	  no	   reason	   not	   to	   fund	   in	   order	   to	   also	   have	   something	   to	   contribute	   to	   our	  adventures.	  Gavin’s	  survival	  instincts	  clearly	  told	  him	  to	  go	  for	  a	  free	  lunch	  when	  one	   was	   offered,	   but	   his	   pride	   meant	   he	   had	   to	   refuse	   at	   least	   twice	   before	  accepting.	  	  	  The	   offense	   that	   Gavin	   later	   took	   at	   my	   ‘voluntary’	   embracing	   of	   poverty	  stemmed,	  in	  essence,	  from	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  Bourdieu’s:	  that	  I	  had	  no	  place	  in	  that	  world.	  Unconcerned	  with	  theoretical	  distortions,	  Gavin	  simply	  thought	  I	  was	   lucky,	   and	   my	   failing	   to	   acknowledge	   this	   privilege	   made	   my	   behaviour	  offensive	  to	  him.	  From	  his	  point	  of	  view,	  I	  not	  only	  misinterpreted	  the	  situation	  (I	   thought	   his	   life	   was	   glamorous	   and	   fun	   while	   he	   felt	   it	   was	   difficult	   and	  restrictive),	  but	  more	   importantly,	   I	   failed	   to	  see	  what	  his	   situation	  meant	   for	  him,	  and	  thus,	  I	  failed	  to	  see	  him.	  The	  problem	  the	  two	  of	  us	  confronted	  here	  was	  a	   classical	   anthropological	   one	   –	   if	   Bourdieu	   is	   right,	   then	   all	   anthropological	  knowledge	  is	  fallible	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  ever	  really	  know	  what	  the	  situation	  another	  is	  in	  means	  from	  their	  own	  perspective.	  While	  for	  Bourdieu	  this	  issue	  is	  mainly	  a	  practical	  one	  –	  a	  question	  of	  the	  appropriate	  technology	  of	  knowledge	  production	  –	  it	  has	  wider	  implications	  for	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  I	  will	  ask	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   particularly	   the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   commonly	  referred	   to	   as	   ‘empathy’	   and	   its	   role	   for	   morality	   and	   ethics.	   But	   most	  importantly,	  the	  problem	  was	  a	  personal	  one,	  and	  if	  I	  concern	  myself	  here	  with	  empathy,	  then	  I	  do	  so	  at	  least	  in	  part	  to	  make	  up	  for	  my	  personal	  failure	  to	  use	  it.	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When	  I	  speak	  about	   ‘empathy’	   in	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  the	  term	  loosely,	   in	  order	  to	  simply	   refer	   to	   the	   capacity	   to	  gain	   insight	   into	  what	  another’s	   circumstances	  mean	  for	  them	  from	  their	  own	  perspective.	  This	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  fact	  that	  what	  exactly	  empathy	   is	  and	  how	  it	  works	   is	  subject	   to	  vast	  and	   longstanding	  debates,	  which	  I	  can	  only	  rehash	  here	  in	  the	  briefest	  of	  summaries.	  The	  concept	  is	  widely	  used	   in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  disciplinary	  contexts12	  and	  has	  no	  one	  clearly	  defined	  meaning.	  The	  considerable	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  empathy	  spans	  several	   centuries	   –	   beginning	   with	   David	   Hume’s	   (1739)	   and	   Adam	   Smith’s	  (1759)	  discussions	  of	  the	  human	  propensity	  to	  “sympathise	  with	  others,	  and	  to	  receive	  by	  communication	  their	  inclinations	  and	  sentiments,	  however	  different	  from,	  or	  even	  contrary	  to	  our	  own”	  (Hume,	  1739,	  317).	  It	  ranges	  from	  relatively	  wide	  definitions,	  encompassing	  forms	  of	  empathy	  common	  to	  human	  and	  non-­‐‑human	  animals	  (e.g.	  de	  Waal,	  2009)	  to	  relatively	  narrow	  ones,	  focused	  on	  a	  very	  specific	   form	   of	   identification	   with	   the	   experience	   of	   another	   (e.g.	  Wollheim,	  1973,	  1974,	  1984)13.	  	  	  Feminist	   theorists	   such	   as	   Gilligan	   (1982),	   Noddings	   (1984,	   2010,	   2013)	   and	  Held	  (2006),	  have	  emphasised	  the	  role	  of	  empathy,	  understood	  as	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  “feeling	  with”	  (Noddings,	  1984),	  for	  a	  feminist	  ethics,	  which,	  as	  they	  argue,	  departs	  from	  traditional	  approaches	  that	  emphasise	  the	  role	  of	  abstract	  rules	  and	  principles	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  ethical	  life.	  For	  feminist	  writers,	  the	  problem	  consists	  mainly	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   models	   underestimate	   the	   role	   of	   emotion	   and	  concern	   in	  ethical	  behaviour,	   and	   that	   they	   construe	  ethical	   actors	  as	  entirely	  autonomous	   and	   independently-­‐‑rational	   actors,	   thus	   adhering	   to	   a	   Western-­‐‑masculine	  notion	  of	  the	  subject	   in	  general	  and	  the	  ethical	  subject	   in	  particular	  (Noddings,	  1984,	  30).	  Noddings	  warns	  that	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  models	  of	   empathy	   repeat	   this	   bias,	   in	   that	   they	   understand	   empathy	   as	   a	   way	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  term	  within	  phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics	  see	  e.g.	  Koegler	  and	  Stueber	  (2000),	  Stueber	  (2000,	  2006),	  Makkreeel	  (1992,	  1996,	  2000),	  Grondin	  (1994).	  In	  Clinical	  Psychology	  and	  Psychoanalysis	  e.g.	  Clark	  (2007),	  Bohart	  and	  Greenberg	  (1997),	  Gladstein	  (1984),	  Rachman	  (1988).	  In	  developmental	  and	  social	  psychology	  e.g.	  Hoffman	  (1983,	  1987,	  2000),	  Eisenberg	  (1987,	  2000,	  2007),	  Batson	  (1991,	  2009),	  Ickes	  (1997).	  In	  Neuroscience	  e.g.	  Decety	  and	  Jackson	  (2006),	  Decety	  and	  Sommerville	  (2003),	  Singer	  et	  al	  (2006,	  2007,	  2009),	  Batson	  (1991,	  2009),	  Eisenberg	  et	  al	  (1989),	  Goldman	  (2006),	  Gallese	  et	  al	  (1998,	  2004).	  	  13	  For	  a	  historical	  and	  systematic	  overview	  see	  e.g.	  Coplan	  and	  Goldie,	  2011	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projecting	  oneself	  into	  the	  situation	  of	  another	  (thus	  technically	  ‘replacing’	  the	  other	   with	   the	   self)	   rather	   than	   a	   mutual,	   communicative	   process	   of	   sharing	  experience	  (Noddings,	  2010).	  However,	   in	  critiquing	  this	  state	  of	  affairs,	  some	  feminist	  authors	  appear	  to	  have	  end	  up	  in	  the	  opposite	  extreme	  –	  for	  example	  Tronto	   (1995)	   takes	   her	   account	   of	   empathy	   as	   ‘care’	   so	   far	   that	   the	   self	  relinquishes	  its	  own	  needs	  and	  wants	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  cared	  for,	  to	  the	  point	  that	   it	   all	   but	   disappears	   as	   an	   autonomous	   entity.	   This	   shows	   the	   general	  problem	   of	   conceptions	   of	   empathy	   which	   focus	   on	   a	   particular	   mode	   of	  ‘perspective	  shifting’	  –	  e.g.	  Wollheim’s	  concept	  of	  ‘central	  imagining’	  (1973,	  1974,	  1984,	  critical:	  Goldie,	  2006,	  2011):	  empathy	  is	  most	  often	  assumed	  to	  involve	  a	  replacement	  of	  one	  self	  with	  another,	  rather	  than	  a	  meeting	  in	  which	  both	  are	  preserved.	   Another	   variant	   of	   this	   problem	   is	   exemplified	   e.g.	   in	   the	  work	   of	  Hartman	  (1997)	  who	  writes	  against	  ‘empathy-­‐‑based’	  attempts	  at	  solidarity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  black	   slavery.	   	   She	   asserts	   that	   for	   the	  white	   subject,	   to	   attempt	   to	  empathically	   experience	   the	   pain	   of	   the	   black	   slave	   amounts	   to	   an	   act	   of	  colonisation	   and	   appropriation	   of	   the	   black	   body	   by	   the	   white.	   Due	   to	   the	  inherently	  unequal	  relationship	  between	  white	  master	  and	  black	  slave,	  the	  black	  body	  becomes	  an	  “empty	  vessel”	  which	  is	  “stolen”	  by	  the	  white	  man	  in	  an	  act	  that	  turns	  empathy	  into	  a	  further	  extension	  of	  racial	  violence	  (35)1.	  Almeida	  (2013)	  concludes	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Hartman’s	   argument	   that	   therefore,	   empathy	   is	  precluded	   between	   racialised	   bodies,	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	   relationship	   of	  domination	  and	  submission	  that	  is	  already	  established.	  This	  critique	  is	  certainly	  persuasive	  if	  indeed	  empa.thic	  recognition	  could	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  travelling	  of	  the	  “universal,	  powerful	  and	  dominant”	  white	  spirit	  into	  the	  “empty	  black	  body”	  whose	  own	  experience	  thus	  becomes	  “irrelevant”	  (Almeida,	  2013,	  88),	  or	  more	  generally,	   as	  a	   form	  of	   shifting	  one’s	  own	   first-­‐‑person	  viewpoint	  ‘into’	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  of	  the	  other.	  The	  point	  of	  care	  ethicists	  however	  is	  that	  this	  conceptualisation	  precisely	  rests	  on	  a	  dubious	  a	  priori	  assumption	  of	  self	  and	  other	  as	  separate	  and	  isolated	  entities,	  which	  can	  only	  ever	  replace	  one	  another,	  but	  never	  actually	  ‘meet’.	  	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  here	  go	  with	  a	  definition	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Arne	  Vetlesen:	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  “Empathy	  I	  define	  as	  humanity’s	  basic	  emotional	  faculty,	  and	  as	  one	  indispensably	  
at	   work	   in	   an	   unimpaired	   exercise	   of	   moral	   judgment.	   Being	   essentially	   a	  Sichmitbringen	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  Sichaufgeben14,	  empathy	  preserves	  the	  ‘meeting	  of	  
particulars’...	   as	   the	   very	   kernel	   of	   moral	   judgment.	   In	   preserving	   this	   kernel,	  
empathy	   leaves	   intact	   the	   distinctness	   and	   unique	   identity	   of	   the	   person	   who	  
empathises	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  his	  or	  her	  addressee.	  Having	  stated	  this,	  I	  hasten	  to	  
add	   that	   empathy	   maintains	   distinctness;	   it	   does	   not	   absolutize	   it,	   nor	   does	   it	  
suspend	  it”	  (Vetlesen,	  1994,	  119,	  emph.	  orig.).	  	  	  Empathy,	   thus	  understood,	  does	  not	   involve	  a	   ‘perspective	  shift’	  so	  much	  as	   it	  involves	  an	  understanding	  what	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other	  is	  directed	  at	  –	   it	  involves	  having	  some	  kind	  of	  common	  language	  or	  experience	  that	  both	  selves	  can	  agree	  represents	  what	  is	  being	  empathised	  about.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  make	  some	  suggestions	  what	  that	  could	  be.	  	  	  Despite	   these	   conceptual	   challenges,	   the	   question	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  understand	  what	  another	  person’s	  circumstances	  mean	  for	  them	  from	  their	  own	  perspective	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  insight	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  participant	  observation	  as	  a	   fieldwork	  method.	  As	   I	  will	  argue	   later	  on,	   it	  also	  provides	  a	  helpful	  framework	  for	  some	  of	  the	  ethical	  questions	  my	  respondents	  actively	  addressed.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  political	  issues	  such	  as	  homelessness	  can	  or	  should	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  matter	  of	  empathy	  (or	  lack	  thereof),	  but	  rather,	  that	  the	  social	  and	  political	  relations	  which	  create	  homelessness	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  also	   create	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   empathy	   (or	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	  for	  its	  absence).	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  following,	  empathy	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘feeling	  with’	  becomes	  possible	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  particular	  ways	  of	  relating	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  the	  example	  of	  homelessness	  shows	  that	  conversely,	  particular	  ways	  of	  relating	  to	  one	  another	  can	  make	  empathy	  difficult	  or	  impossible.	  The	  relationship	   between	   anthropologist	   and	   respondent	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   a	  social	  relationship	  can	  be	  set	  up	  from	  the	  start	  in	  a	  way	  that	  impedes	  empathic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  German,	  roughly:	  “a	  ’bringing	  oneself	  along’	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  ’surrendering	  oneself’”.	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understanding,	   simply	   by	   assuming	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   of	   significance	   that	  could	  be	  shared	  between	  self	  and	  other.	  Particularly	  –	  and	  this	  was	  the	  gist	  of	  Gavin’s	  criticism	  of	  me	  as	  well	  as	  of	  Bourdieu’s	  criticism	  of	  our	  discipline	  –	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  element	  that	  is	  crucial	  to	  an	  adequate	  appraisal	  of	   what	   a	   social	   situation	   is	   about:	   actual	   affectedness.	   As	   far	   as	   Gavin	   was	  concerned,	  in	  order	  to	  adequately	  empathise	  with	  his	  situation,	  I	  would	  not	  so	  much	  have	  had	  to	  ‘put	  myself	  into	  his	  shoes’	  but	  to	  share	  his	  evaluation	  of	  what	  was	   going	   on,	   and	   he	   concluded	   that	   I	  was	   unable	   to	   do	   so	   because	  my	   own	  possibilities	  of	  encountering	  joy	  or	  suffering	  were	  not	  nearly	  as	  affected	  by	  the	  situation	  we	  found	  ourselves	  in	  as	  were	  his.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  this	  discrepancy	  in	  evaluative	  judgment	  underlies	  the	  problematic	  of	  empathic	  understanding	  as	  a	  means	  of	  producing	  ethnographic	  knowledge.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘Field’	  As	  Morally	  Neutral	  Zone	  	  	  The	   prevalence	   of	   Bourdieu’s	   ‘theoretical	   distortion’	   is	   exemplified	   in	   the	  reluctance	  of	  some	  anthropologists	  to	  admit	  that	  what	  they	  think	  of	  as	  ‘fieldwork’	  is	   the	   same	   thing	   as	   what	   they	   think	   of	   as	   their	   ‘life’.	   Consequently,	   when	  anthropologists	  Athena	  McLean	  and	  Anette	  Leibing	  issued	  a	  call	  to	  colleagues	  to	  contribute	   to	   a	   volume	   that	   would	   address	   the	   ‘blurred	   boundaries	   between	  ethnography	   and	   life’,	   they	   were	   surprised	   at	   the	   enthusiastic	   response	   they	  received.	   Anthropologists	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   research	   areas	   and	   career	   stages	  volunteered	   experiences	   that	   were	   meant	   to	   address	   the	   “shadow	   side	   of	  fieldwork”,	   that	   is,	   “situations	   where	   the	   borders	   of	   personal	   life	   and	   formal	  ethnography	   begin	   to	   blur	   and	   the	   research	   field	   loses	   its	   boundedness”	  (McLean/Leibing	  2008,	  xii).	  It	  appeared	  almost	  as	  if	  the	  sheer	  act	  of	  questioning	  a	   strict	   dichotomy	   between	   ‘personal	   life’	   and	   ‘formal	   ethnography’	   had	   a	  cathartic	  effect	  on	  a	  number	  of	  researchers,	  who	  had	  long	  suspected	  that	  such	  a	  dichotomy	  might	   be	   spurious,	   but	   had	   been	   afraid	   to	   say	   so.	   In	   adopting	   the	  imagery	   of	   ‘blurred	   boundaries’,	   the	   participants	   could	   finally	   verbalise	   their	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experience	  that,	  actually,	  their	  life	  and	  fieldwork	  had	  mixed	  quite	  a	  bit,	  without	  having	  to	  go	  all	  the	  way	  and	  question	  why	  such	  a	  dichotomy	  should	  exist	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  The	  apparent	  contrast	  between	  life	  and	  fieldwork	  cannot	  solely	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  cultural	  difference	  that	  is	  implied	  in	  much	  anthropological	  research,	  although	  this	  difference	  is	  often	  invoked	  to	  justify	  it.	  Moral	  relativism	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  assumption	  that	  anthropologists	  should	  not	  make	  moral	  judgments	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  and	  actions	  they	  encounter	  in	  the	  field	  –	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  anthropological	  habitus	  for	  a	  good	  reason:	  early	  anthropology	  has	  often	  been	  all	   too	   ready	   to	   pass	   judgment	   on	   people	   it	   regarded	   ‘uncivilised’	   or	   ‘savage’,	  without	   questioning	   its	   own	  moral	   assumptions.	   But,	   as	   for	   example	   Andrew	  Sayer	  points	  out,	   the	  assumption	  of	  moral	  neutrality	  on	  part	  of	  the	  researcher	  comes	  at	  the	  price	  of	  a	  severe	  misrepresentation	  of	  the	  life-­‐‑world	  of	  the	  people	  who	   are	   being	   researched.	   Sayer,	   following	  Margaret	  Archer,	   emphasises	   that	  human	  beings	  are	  ‘evaluative	  beings’,	  i.e.	  that	  they	  crucially	  interpret	  the	  world	  around	  them	  in	  the	  form	  of	  normative	  judgments:	  “we	  do	  so	  because,	  while	  we	  are	  capable	  and	  can	  flourish,	  we	  are	  also	  vulnerable	  and	  susceptible	  to	  various	  kinds	  of	  loss	  or	  harm;	  we	  can	  suffer”	  (Sayer,	  2011,	  1).	  He	  therefore	  argues	  that	  ignoring	  precisely	  the	  dimension	  of	  social	  life	  that	  matters	  most	  to	  people,	  social	  science	  “tends	  to	  produce	  bland	  accounts	  of	  social	  life,	  in	  which	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  the	  import	  of	  things	  for	  people”	  (ibid,	  6).	  	  	  The	  problem	  Sayer	  addresses	  here	  is	  that	  Bourdieu’s	   ‘theoretical	  distortion’	  in	  practice	  translates	  into	  a	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  distortion.	  Cognitively,	  the	  conflation	   of	   ‘dis-­‐‑affectedness’	   and	   ‘objectivity’	   leads	   to	   a	   complementary	  conflation	   of	   ‘affectedness’	   and	   ‘subjectivity’,	   which	   results	   in	   a	   paradigm	   in	  which	  those	  who	  are	  most	  affected	  by	  a	  situation	  are	   least	   likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ‘objectively’	  understand	  it.	  The	  disinterested,	  detached	  rationality	  of	  the	  person	  who	  is	  least	  affected,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  seen	  as	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  ‘scientific’	  contribution.	  This	  has	  not	  only	  epistemological	  consequences	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense,	  such	  as	  have	  been	  challenged	  by	   feminist	  standpoint	   theorists,	  among	  others	  (e.g.	  Harding	  2004;	  Hartsock	  1983,	  1998;	  Stanley	  and	  Wise	  1990),	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but	  more	  generally	  political	  ones	  –	  to	  interrogate	  it	  would	  inevitably	  mean	  to	  ask:	  by	  what	   token	   of	   power	   is	   the	   anthropologist	   exempt	   from	   being	   affected	   by	  things	  that	  fundamentally	  shape	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  other?	  How	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  he	   or	   she	   can	   afford	   to	   suspend	   judgment	   and	   act	   as	   if	   the	   possibilities	   of	  flourishing	  or	  suffering	  inherent	  in	  a	  situation	  did	  not	  matter?	  In	  not	  asking	  this	  question,	  ‘the	  field’	  is	  cast	  as	  a	  morally	  neutral	  zone	  in	  which	  the	  anthropologist’s	  evaluative	  judgment	  is	  suspended,	  and	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  way	  distinguished	  from	  the	  anthropologist’s	  life,	  in	  which	  things	  arguably	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  him	  or	  her.	  This	  cognitive	  distortion	  then	  leads	  to	  a	  behavioural	  distortion,	  in	  that	  the	  anthropologist	  acts	  as	  if	  he	  or	  she	  indeed	  had	  no	  ‘place’	  in	  the	  field	  as	  a	  moral	  agent,	  and	  thus	  has	  no	  need	  to	  recognise	  the	  other	  as	  such.	  	  	  In	   my	   own	   case,	   I	   partly	   circumvented	   this	   issue	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   what	  eventually	  became	  my	  ‘fieldwork’	  started	  out	  as	  simply	  a	  new	  and	  exciting	  part	  of	  my	  life.	  My	  first	  forays	  into	  Bristol	  were	  weekend	  excursions	  during	  which	  I	  stayed	  wherever	   Gavin	  was	   currently	   bedding	   down	   –	   sometimes	   I	  would	   be	  hosted	   in	   a	   stately	   Victorian	   building	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   town,	   sometimes	   in	   a	  ramshackle	  warehouse	  in	  an	  area	  not	  even	  the	  squatters	  liked	  to	  walk	  around	  in	  at	  night.	  Gavin	  took	  his	  role	  as	  a	  host	  very	  seriously,	  making	  sure	  that	  I	  had	  a	  safe	  place	  to	  sleep	  even	  when	  he	  himself	  did	  not.	  On	  one	  occasion,	  a	  squat	  we	  were	  staying	  in	  was	  evicted	  during	  my	  stay	  and	  Gavin	  made	  a	  point	  of	  depositing	  me	  at	  the	  door	  of	  the	  safest	  house	  in	  Bristol	  (the	  Co-­‐‑op	  Road	  squat	  that	  was	  going	  to	  become	   an	   important	   hub	   in	  my	   Bristol	   geography	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come,	   see	  chapter	   12)	   before	   disappearing	   to	   an	   unknown	   crash	   place	   with	   all	   his	  belongings	  stuffed	  into	  the	  stacked	  up	  bags	  he	  carried	  on	  his	  back.	   I	  would,	   in	  return,	  buy	   food,	  drinks	  and	   tobacco	   for	  both	  of	  us,	   and	  sometimes	   the	  entire	  house,	   always	   vaguely	   guilt-­‐‑ridden	   at	   this	   obvious	   display	   of	   my	   economic	  privilege.	  When	  housing	  was	  secure,	  we	  would	  spend	  my	  weekend	  stays	  walking	  around	  town	  and	  visiting	   important	  nodes	   in	   the	  ever-­‐‑fluid	  network	  of	  squats	  and	  social	  centres.	  Gavin,	  having	  nothing	  else	  to	  do	  than	  socialise	  all	  day,	  was	  a	  walking	   grapevine	   of	   information	   that	   he	   passed	   around	  on	  his	   tours,	   and	  he	  always	  knew	  where	  a	  particular	  group	  or	  person	  could	  be	   found.	  Having	  very	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limited	  funds	  and	  a	  deep	  suspiciousness	  toward	  bicycles,	  he	  walked	  everywhere,	  and	   trudging	   along	   behind	   him	   often	   for	   several	   hours	   at	   a	   time,	   I	   got	   the	  topography	  of	  Bristol	  into	  my	  feet	  long	  before	  it	  ever	  reached	  my	  head.	  As	  Tim	  Ingold	  puts	  it:	  “As	  people,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  everyday	  lives,	  make	  their	  way	  by	   foot	  around	  a	   familiar	   terrain,	   so	   its	  paths,	   textures	  and	  contours,	   variable	  through	   the	   seasons,	   are	   incorporated	   into	   their	   own	   embodied	   capacities	   of	  movement,	  awareness	  and	  response	  –	  or	  into	  what	  Gaston	  Bachelard	  calls	  their	  ‘muscular	  consciousness’”(Ingold,	  2004,	  333)15.	  	  During	  this	  phase,	  I	  got	  an	  impressive	  demonstration	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  havoc	  that	  ‘detached’	   research	   can	   cause	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   those	   it	   is	   about.	   One	   afternoon,	  Gavin	  and	  I	  visited	  a	  squat	  (now	  long	  gone)	  near	  the	  Fishponds	  junction	  of	  the	  M32,	  a	  place	  that	  would	  later	  become	  my	  home	  for	  over	  a	  year.	  The	  squat	  was	  a	  smallish	  terrace	  with	  low	  ceilings	  and	  a	  narrow	  staircase,	  kept	  well	  and,	  judging	  from	  the	  degree	  of	  furnishing	  and	  gardening	  already	  accomplished,	  squatted	  for	  quite	   a	   while.	   When	   we	   arrived,	   the	   handful	   of	   residents	   assembled	   in	   the	  cluttered	  living	  room	  were	  engaged	  in	  animated	  debate,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  palpable	  sense	  of	  agitation	  in	  the	  air.	  As	  it	  emerged,	  the	  squat	  had	  been	  visited	  by	  a	  team	  of	  students	  from	  one	  of	  the	  local	  universities	  just	  hours	  previously.	  The	  students	  had	   elected	   to	   do	   a	   research	   project	   about	   squatting	   for	   one	   of	   their	   courses	  (apparently	   this	  was	   all	   the	   rage	   among	   ‘radical’	   students	   at	   the	   time,	  myself	  being	  no	  exception)	  and	  had	  approached	  one	  resident,	  who	  had	  agreed	  to	  do	  an	  interview.	  Evidently	  though,	  they	  had	  been	  less	  than	  tactful:	  	  “They	  just	  come	  barging	  in	  here	  and	  shove	  a	  camera	  in	  everyone’s	  face	  and	  stick	  
their	   nose	   in	   people’s	   rooms”	   one	   exasperated	   resident	   complained,	   “I	  mean,	   I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In	  my	  case,	  this	  learning-­‐‑by-­‐‑walking	  resulted	  in	  a	  completely	  false	  mental	  image	  of	  Bristol’s	  geography,	  which	  I	  only	  realised	  when	  after	  several	  months	  I	  finally	  looked	  at	  a	  map.	  Throughout	  my	  time	  there,	  I	  was	  constantly	  confused	  about	  what	  direction	  I	  was	  walking	  in	  and	  was	  frequently	  surprised	  at	  having	  ended	  up	  somewhere	  completely	  different	  from	  where	  I	  thought	  I	  was	  going.	  This	  only	  ended	  when	  I	  got	  a	  car	  and	  could	  move	  around	  much	  faster	  than	  on	  foot.	  As	  most	  squatters,	  I	  never	  used	  public	  transport	  in	  Bristol,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  forbidding	  price	  of	  tickets	  (compare	  here	  Urry’s	  (2000,	  51)	  argument	  that	  due	  to	  affordable	  public	  transport,	  walking	  has	  largely	  lost	  its	  stigma	  as	  connected	  to	  poverty	  –	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  it	  isn’t	  connected	  to	  poverty).	  
	   54	  
never	  agreed	  to	  be	  filmed.	  I	  don’t	  give	  a	  fuck	  about	  their	  project.	  And	  then	  they	  ask	  
what	  we	  live	  on	  and	  so	  and	  if	  we	  break	  into	  houses,	  what	  the	  fuck!	  Like,	  yeah,	  I	  do	  
criminal	  damage	  all	  the	  time,	  (and	  they	  expect	  me	  to	  say	  this)	  on	  camera!”	  	  The	   residents	   appeared	   visibly	   shaken	   by	   the	   student’s	   intrusive	   behaviour.	  What	  upset	  them	  most	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  students	  had	  invaded	  their	  private	  space	  as	  if	  it	  was	  some	  sort	  of	  exhibit,	  with	  no	  regard	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  was	  actually	  somebody’s	  home.	  “Ya	  know,	  I	  live	  here!”	  was	  said	  several	  times	  during	  the	  discussion,	  as	  if	  to	  reaffirm	  that	  a	  squat	  was	  indeed	  a	  home	  like	  every	  other	  and	   that	   the	   rules	  of	  etiquette	   that	  apply	   to	  being	   invited	   to	  someone’s	  house	  apply	  here	  as	  much	  as	  elsewhere:	  “you	  don’t	  go	  round	  someone’s	  home	  and	  film	  them	  in	  their	  undies,	  do	  you?”	  	  This	  ‘academic	  burglary’	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  the	  distinction	  between	  life	  and	  ‘fieldwork’	  leads	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  distortions	  I	  have	  discussed	  above.	  Whatever	  the	  student’s	  motivation,	  they	  had	  clearly	  set	  out	  to	  quarry	  the	  ‘field’	  for	  some	  ‘data’	   (the	   more	   visually	   exciting	   the	   better),	   and	   thereby	   suspended	   any	  consideration	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  interacting	  with	  persons	  who	  considered	  the	  ‘data’	  their	  life.	  Behaviour	  that	  would	  certainly	  be	  unacceptable	  in	  most	  other	  social	  situations	  was	  thus	  sanctioned	  in	  that	  the	  question	  ‘should	  one	  behave	  like	  this’	  did	  not	  even	  arise	  –	  the	  squatters	  were	  simply	  not	  regarded	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  equals	  in	  relation	  to	  whom	  one	  asks	  such	  questions.	  Whatever	  the	  result	  of	  this	  research	  turned	  out	  to	  be,	  it	  thus	  categorically	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  squatter’s	  situation	  had	  for	  them,	  namely	  that	  they	  regarded	  the	  space	  they	  were	  occupying	  as	  their	  home,	  and	  saw	  the	  scientific	  intrusion	  as	  a	  violation.	  The	  ‘theoretical	   distortion’	   of	   privileged	   detachment	   (i.e.	   the	   assumption	   that	   one	  does	   not	   have	   a	   ‘place’	   in	   the	   social	   system	   one	   is	   researching	   and	   can	   thus	  suspend	   evaluative	   judgment)	   thus	   translated	   seamlessly	   into	   cognitive	   and	  behavioural	  distortions	  that	  made	  it	   impossible	   for	  the	  researchers	  to	  see	  and	  treat	  the	  squatters	  as	  actual	  people	  with	  concerns	  not	  unlike	  their	  own.	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Acerbating	  the	  sheer	  intrusiveness	  of	  the	  researchers	  was,	  for	  the	  residents,	  the	  fact	   that	   they	   did	   not	   understand	   (nor	   was	   it	   explained	   to	   them)	   what	   the	  students	  were	  doing	  this	  research	  for.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  had,	  perhaps	  correctly,	  concluded	  that	  the	  researchers	  were	  after	  a	  grade,	  a	  degree,	  or	  something	  else	  that	  was	  going	  to	  advance	  their	  careers,	  and	  that	  they,	  the	  residents,	  had	  been	  made	  instruments	   in	  attaining	  this	  objective.	  They	  had	  thus	  identified	  another	  dimension	  of	  the	  problematic	  life-­‐‑fieldwork	  dichotomy	  –	  that	  if	  the	  people	  who	  inhabit	  the	  field	  are	  not	  regarded	  ends	  in	  themselves,	  then	  this	  means	  that	  they	  are	  being	  made	  means	  to	  ends	  other	  than	  themselves.	  The	  resulting	  relationship	  between	  researcher	  and	  researched	  is	  characterised	  by	  what	  Max	  Horkheimer	  (1974)	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘instrumental	  reason’:	  	  “Instrumental	  reason	  has	  two	  opposing	  elements:	  the	  abstract	  ego	  emptied	  of	  all	  
substance	  except	  its	  attempt	  to	  transform	  everything	  in	  heaven	  and	  on	  earth	  into	  
means	   for	   its	  preservation,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  an	  empty	  nature	  degraded	  to	  
mere	  material,	  mere	  stuff	  to	  be	  dominated,	  without	  any	  other	  purpose	  than	  that	  of	  
this	  very	  domination”	  (Horkheimer,	  1974,	  95)	  	  The	  ‘abstract	  ego’	  here	  is	  Bourdieu’s	  anthropologist,	  who	  has	  not	  place	  nor	  stake	  in	  the	  social	  system	  in	  question,	  but	  nevertheless	  hangs	  around	  to	  see	  what	  can	  be	  made	  useful	  for	  his	  or	  her	  own	  ends.	  ‘Emptied	  of	  all	  substance’,	  i.e.	  devoid	  of	  the	   needs,	   desires,	   potentials	   and	   vulnerabilities	   that	   would	   result	   in	   an	  evaluative	  judgment	  of	  the	  social	  situation,	  his/her	  only	  reason	  to	  even	  be	  in	  the	  ‘field’	  is	  to	  collect	  the	  ‘data	  material’	  that	  will	  allow	  him/her	  to	  advance	  his/her	  own	  social	  and	  economic	  self-­‐‑interest.	  The	  other	  is	  thus	  objectified	  as	  the	  ‘stuff’	  that	  will	  allow	  the	  subject	  to	  get	  ahead,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  concerns	  are	  made	  into	  the	  ‘product’	   that	   the	   academic	   sells	   in	   the	   marketplace	   of	   publications,	  presentations	  and	  job	  interviews.	  This	  ugly	  scenario	  is	  not,	  per	  se,	  the	  result	  of	  the	  anthropologist’s	  inherent	  immorality	  or	  callousness	  –	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  us,	  paying	  the	  bills	  is	  a	  necessity,	  and	  our	  research	  is	  (among	  other	  things)	  a	  means	  to	  do	  so.	  ‘Fieldwork’	  (with	  its	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etymological	  link	  to	  ‘work’,	  i.e.	  ‘labour’)	  and	  life	  are	  thus	  separate	  also	  because	  ‘fieldwork’	  is	  that	  which	  one	  does	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  have	  a	  ‘life’16.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  most	  anthropologists	  would	  protest	  that	  this	  is	  hardly	  the	  whole	  story	  of	  doing	  fieldwork.	  Many	  researchers	  –	  those	  who	  responded	  to	  MacLean’s	  and	  Leibig’s	   project	   are	   just	   a	   few	   examples	   –	   have	   found	   mutually	   supportive,	  solidary	   and	   nurturing	   relationships	   with	   their	   respondents,	   and	   many	   have	  openly	   campaigned	   for	   methodologies	   which	   minimise	   exploitation	   and	  maximise	  the	  benefit	  of	  ethnographic	  research	  for	  those	  it	  is	  about	  (e.g.	  Scheper-­‐‑Hughes,	   1995).	   On	   a	   theoretical	   level,	   Horkheimer’s	   bleak	   outlook	   has	   been	  challenged	  by	  theories	  emphasising	  a	  more	  communicative	  concept	  of	  rationality	  (e.g.	  Habermas	  1984;	  Honneth	  1996),	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  fieldworkers	  have	  begun	   to	   realise	   that	   in	   order	   to	   abandon	   the	   instrumentalisation	   and	  objectification	   of	   the	   other,	   we	   must	   allow	   ourselves	   to	   be	   affected	   and	  transformed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘the	  field’.	  	  As	  Loïc	  Wacquant	  puts	  it:	  	  	  “The	  multiplex	  rapports	  that	  we	  develop	  with	  our	  key	  informants	  are	  malleable	  and	  
subject	  to	  the	  same	  variations	  and	  vagaries	  as	  ordinary	  social	  ties;	  they	  range	  from	  
the	  instrumental	  to	  the	  affective,	  from	  the	  exploitive	  to	  the	  mutual,	  from	  fleeting	  to	  
lasting,	  and	  from	  shallow	  to	  deep	   ...(t)hey	  always	  have	  a	  peculiar	  curving	  due	  to	  
their	  inscription	  in	  the	  research	  enterprise,	  but	  their	  import	  is	  not	  eo	  ipso	  reducible	  
to	  that	  single	  purpose.	  One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  hold	  an	  exalted	  notion	  of	  interpersonal	  
fusion	  or	  an	  irenic	  vision	  of	  the	  family	  to	  recognize	  that	  long-­‐‑term	  field	  friendships	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  assessment	  arguably	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  here	  present	  endeavour	  of	  obtaining	  a	  PhD	  in	  anthropology	  by	  means	  of	  telling	  this	  story.	  Traditionally,	  if	  the	  student	  wants	  to	  persuade	  the	  disciplinary	  gatekeepers	  to	  grant	  him	  or	  her	  full	  status	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  anthropological	  discipline,	  he	  or	  she	  has	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  somebody	  or	  other	  has	  successfully	  been	  objectified	  in	  an	  anthropological	  fashion.	  As	  proof	  of	  this	  act	  functions	  the	  ethnographic	  text,	  which	  represents	  the	  final	  gestalt	  of	  the	  other	  made	  into	  a	  thing.	  Anthropological	  initiation	  therefore	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  involve	  an	  element	  of	  relating	  in	  which	  equality	  of	  subjects	  is	  ritually	  established	  by	  objectifying	  a	  third	  party,	  constituting,	  metaphorically	  speaking,	  a	  kind	  of	  sublimated	  human	  sacrifice.	  Stoltenberg	  (2000,	  2005)	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument	  for	  the	  constituent	  act	  of	  masculine	  subjectivity	  –	  he	  argues	  that	  men	  prove	  to	  each	  other	  their	  identities	  as	  men	  by	  together	  objectifying	  an	  ‘other’	  who	  represents	  the	  less-­‐‑than-­‐‑masculine.	  This	  parallel,	  in	  my	  view,	  is	  not	  coincidental,	  as	  the	  ‘scholarly	  subject’	  of	  the	  traditional	  academic	  hierarchy	  has	  variously	  been	  identified	  as	  inherently	  masculine	  (e.g.	  Harding,	  1986,	  1993;	  Hartsock,	  1987)	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can,	  under	  definite	  circumstances,	  be	  transformative	  of	  both	  parties	  and	  grow	  to	  
take	  on	  a	  filial	  or	  fraternal/sisterly	  quality“	  (Wacquant,	  2005,	  450).	  	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  such	  mutually	  transformative	  relationships,	  it	  is	  however	  necessary	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  fieldwork	  situation	  as	  a	  ‘real	  player’	  –	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  cultural	  insider	  or	  practiced	  participant,	  but	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  willing	  to	  behave	  as	  if	  the	  situation	  and	  relationships	  actually	  mattered	  to	  oneself.	  	  	  In	  my	  own	  case,	  the	  practical	  convergence	  of	  evaluative	  judgment	  that	  came	  to	  inform	  my	  fieldwork	  was	  due	  as	  much	  to	  consideration	  as	  it	  was	  to	  accident.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   it	  was	  clear	   to	  me	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  my	   fieldwork	  year	   that	  a	  conventional	   ‘researcher’	   habitus	   was	   not	   going	   to	   be	   regarded	   with	   much	  sympathy	  by	  the	  squatters.	  Not	  only	  were	  they	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  potentially	  exploitative	  nature	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  thing,	  they	  also	  related	  this	  very	  nature	  to	  the	  class	  privilege	  that	  they	  saw	  in	  academic	  research.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  squatters	  I	  met	   squatted	   at	   least	   in	   part	   because	   they	   could	   not	   afford	   any	   other	   living	  space,	  most	  identified	  as	  ‘working	  class17’	  and	  many	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  labour	  market	  due	  to	  immigration,	  health-­‐‑	  or	  disability	  status;	  and	  so	  spending	  a	  decade	  in	  university	  for	  them	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  privilege	  indeed.	  Moreover,	  since	  there	   was	   a	   considerable	   overlap	   between	   squatters	   and	   ‘leftist’	   activists	  engaged	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  causes,	  they	  were	  well	  aware	  that	  police	  infiltration	  was	  a	  real	  possibility	  (see	  also	  chapter	  11).	  The	  resulting	  mistrust	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  data-­‐‑gathering	   activity	   meant	   that	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   I	   would	   have	   to	   clearly	  demonstrate	   that	   I	   was	   willing	   to	   align	   my	   personal	   interests	   with	   theirs.	   I	  therefore	  had	  to	  reconsider	  the	  housing	  arrangements	  I	  had	  expected	  to	  set	  up	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  term	  ‘working	  class’	  was	  used	  to	  mean	  a	  number	  of	  different	  things.	  While	  some	  squatters	  used	  it	  strictly	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Marx’	  political	  economy,	  others	  used	  it	  in	  a	  more	  sociological/cultural	  context	  and	  again	  others	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  binary	  relation	  of	  domination	  they	  identified	  between	  the	  ‘ruling’	  (including	  the	  ‘middle’)	  and	  the	  ‘working	  class’.	  While	  some	  used	  ‘class’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  type	  of	  employment,	  others	  used	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  height	  of	  income	  and	  yet	  others	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  wealth.	  To	  make	  matters	  more	  complicated,	  some	  held	  that	  if	  one	  was	  born	  ‘working	  class’	  one	  remained	  so	  despite	  social	  mobility,	  while	  others	  claimed	  that	  even	  formerly	  ‘middle	  class’	  people	  could	  become	  ‘working	  class’	  if	  they	  fulfilled	  the	  requirements	  regarding	  type	  of	  employment	  etc.	  Disagreements	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘class’	  and	  its	  membership	  could	  fill	  entire	  evenings.	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during	  fieldwork	  –	  I	  had	  planned	  to	  rent	  a	  cheap	  room	  in	  ‘the	  field’	  while	  keeping	  my	   place	   in	   Brighton	   and	   to	   go	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   two	  whenever	   I	  needed	  a	  break.	  This	  spatial	  set-­‐‑up	  was	  of	  course	  designed	  to	  establish	  and	  keep	  up	  the	  ‘life-­‐‑fieldwork’	  dichotomy,	  and	  thereby	  my	  privilege	  of	  disinterest.	  Driven	  more	   by	   a	   vague	   intuition	   than	   any	   ‘proper’	   methodological	   consideration,	   I	  therefore	  abandoned	  this	  plan	  and	  decided	  to	  move	  to	  Bristol	  full	  time	  and	  live	  in	  a	  squat.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   my	   efforts	   at	   arriving	   at	   the	   possibility	   of	   empathic	  understanding	  via	  the	  route	  of	  evaluative	  alignment	  was	  aided	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘life’	   decided	   to	   intrude	   into	   my	   ‘fieldwork’	   in	   a	   rather	   personal	   way.	  Anthropologists	  do	  not	  usually	  include	  in	  their	  ethnographies	  an	  account	  of	  the	  finances	   behind	   their	   project	   or	   the	   way	   that	   they	   materially	   sustained	  themselves	  during	  their	  fieldwork	  –	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  if	  the	  anthropologist	  was	  not	  funded	  at	  least	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  or	  she	  could	  eat	  and	  put	  a	  roof	  over	  his	  or	  her	  head,	  the	  research	  would	  not	  have	  happened.	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  frequent	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule	  are,	  but	  my	  fieldwork	  most	  certainly	  fell	  into	  that	  category.	  The	   problem	  was	   not	   that	   I	   had	   been	   unable	   to	   obtain	   funding	   –	   I	   had	   been	  accepted	  by	  a	  postgraduate	  school	  in	  Vienna	  that	  was	  generously	  endowed	  with	  a	  stipend,	  and	  was	  intended	  to	  run	  parallel	  to	  my	  PhD	  programme.	  At	  the	  time	  I	  applied,	   its	   teaching	   structure	   was	   organised	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   I	   could	  comfortably	  do	  a	  PhD	  in	  Britain	  with	  the	  traditional	  year-­‐‑long	  fieldwork,	  and	  fly	  to	  Vienna	  every	  two	  months	  to	  attend	  classes.	  My	  plan	  fell	  apart,	  however,	  when	  the	  postgraduate	  school	  announced	  that	  it	  had	  changed	  its	  teaching	  schedule,	  so	  that	  presence	  would	  be	  required	  every	  other	  week	  and	  fieldwork	  was	  limited	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  three	  months.	  	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this	  change,	  I	  had	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  that	  basically	  came	  down	  to	  returning	  to	  Vienna	  and	  doing	  a	  PhD	  there,	  or	  staying	  and	  having	  no	  money.	  After	  short	  deliberation,	  I	  opted	  for	  returning	  my	  scholarship	  and	  moving	  to	  London	  with	  a	   few	  hundred	  pounds	   to	  my	  name.	  One	  may	  call	   this	   choice	  profoundly	  irresponsible,	  but	  it	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  decisive	  factor	  in	  the	  course	  my	  research	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took.	  I	  managed	  to	  obtain	  another,	  smaller	  grant,	  enough	  to	  get	  me	  through	  my	  first	  year,	   and	  embarked	  on	   fieldwork	  with	  a	   rapidly	  declining	  budget	  and	  no	  certainty	  of	  future	  income.	  About	  halfway	  in,	  I	  ran	  out	  of	  money,	  just	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  my	  flat	  in	  Brighton	  –	  then	  my	  only	  home	  –	  was	  evicted	  in	  the	  course	  of	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  ‘revenge	  eviction‘18.	  While	  it	  would	  therefore	  be	  entirely	  fair	  to	  attribute	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  became	  really	  homeless	  at	  least	  in	  part	  to	  my	  own	  recklessness,	  as	  a	  result	  I	  experienced	  first	  hand	  the	  difference	  it	  makes	  whether	  one	  participates	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  fieldwork	  situation	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  freely	  chosen	  scientific	  interest,	  or	  if	  one	  is	  actually	  affected	  by	  the	  sort	  of	  phenomena	  one	  studies.	  	  	  For	  one	  thing,	  I	  was	  soon	  to	  find	  out	  that	  being	  a	  squatter,	  rather	  than	  just	  being	  a	  visitor	  in	  squats,	  demands	  near	  constant	  attention	  and	  focus.	  The	  logistics	  of	  scouting,	   opening,	   repairing	   and	   securing	   buildings,	   the	   legal	   scuffles	   over	  possession,	   eviction	   proceedings	   and	   the	   near	   constant	   threat	   of	   facing	   the	  exposure	  and	  danger	  of	  the	  street	  are	  not	  only	  time-­‐‑consuming,	  but	  put	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  in	  a	  state	  of	  constant	  alert,	  as	  there	  is	  never	  quite	  a	  sense	  of	  safety,	  even	  in	   sleep.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   ‘activist’19	  nature	  of	   squatting,	   its	   political	   and	  ethical	   underpinnings,	   inform	   a	   political	   identity	   that	   (by	   virtue	   of	   removing	  one’s	  own	  and	  others’	  profound	  lack	  of	  something	  elementary	  to	  survival)	  relies	  heavily	   on	   a	   sense	   of	   ‘fighting	   for	   a	   good	   cause’.	   While	   I	   had	   previously	  experienced	   similarly	   unsafe-­‐‑yet-­‐‑invigorating	   situations	   as	   part	   of	   political	  activism,	   these	   had	   always	   been	   temporary,	   a	  matter	   of	   days	   or	  weeks.	  With	  constant	  exposure,	  as	  I	  was	  to	  learn,	  a	  situation	  like	  this	  produces	  a	  peculiar	  form	  of	  embodiment,	  a	  sense	  of	  collectively	   ‘living	  on	  the	  edge’	  that	  suspends	  many	  conventional	  distinctions	  between	  individuals,	  such	  as	  race,	  class	  or	  gender,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  term	  ‘revenge	  eviction’	  has	  been	  used	  in	  public	  debate	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  eviction	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  tenant	  has	  made	  a	  complaint	  about	  the	  property	  that	  the	  landlord	  does	  not	  want	  to	  respond	  to.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  property	  was	  in	  such	  bad	  shape	  that	  my	  housemates	  and	  me	  complained	  to	  the	  local	  Health	  and	  Safety	  authority,	  who	  had	  ordered	  the	  landlord	  to	  fix	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems.	  A	  week	  later,	  we	  received	  notice	  to	  vacate	  the	  property.	  19	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘activism’	  with	  caution,	  since	  similarly	  to	  ‘fieldwork’	  it	  implies	  a	  bounded	  set	  of	  practices,	  which	  are	  removed	  or	  distinguished	  from	  ‘normal	  life’.	  Squatters	  did	  not	  commonly	  refer	  to	  themselves	  as	  ‘activists’	  since	  they	  regarded	  their	  political	  activities	  (including	  squatting)	  a	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  their	  condition.	  For	  them,	  being	  politically	  active	  was	  their	  life.	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certainly	   that	   of	   researcher	   versus	   researched.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   will	  therefore	   have	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   embodiment,	   and	   particularly	   its	   relation	   to	  spatiality,	  and	  argue	  that	  embodied	  experience	  forms	  the	  basis	  for	  establishing	  the	  kind	  of	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  other	  that	  above	  I	  have	  identified	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  empathic	  understanding.	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Chapter	  Two:	  Shelter	  
	  
	  
Let's	  face	  it.	  We're	  undone	  by	  each	  
other.	  And	  if	  we're	  not,	  we're	  missing	  
something.	  Judith	  Butler	  	  	  ‘Ethnographic	   space’	   exists	   in	   a	   physical	   and	   a	   textual	   sense.	   Critiques	   of	  domination	  within	  anthropology	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  textual	  representation	  of	  the	  other	   (e.g.	  Said,	  1979),	   rather	   than	   the	  actual	   spatial	   relation	  between	   the	  anthropologist	  and	  the	  ‘native’.	  It	  could	  of	  course	  be	  argued	  that	  textual	  space	  in	  some	  ways	  reproduces	  power	  relations	  in	  physical	  space	  –	  Said’s	   ‘Orientalism’	  for	  example	  refers	  to	  the	  imaginary	  construction	  of	  an	  other	  who	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  spatially	  removed	  enough	   to	  be	  able	   to	  serve	  as	  a	  canvas	   for	  all	  kinds	  of	  projection.	  Similarly,	  the	  prototypical	  ‘colonial	  other’	  is	  produced	  spatially	  before	  he/she	  enters	  the	  textual	  space	  of	  ethnography	  –	  in	  subjecting	  this	  other	  to	  its	  territorial	  claim,	  the	  ‘Western’	  subject	  has	  factually	  established	  the	  relationship	  of	   domination	   and	   submission	   that	   finds	   its	   textual	   representation	   in	   a	  condescending	  and	  exploitative	  attitude	  toward	  the	  ‘native’.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  discuss	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   anthropologist	   and	  his	   ‘other’	   through	   a	  discussion	  of	  their	  respective	  positions	  within	  and	  toward	  space,	  based	  on	  my	  arrival	  in	  Bristol	  and	  the	  way	  that	  spatiality	  informed	  the	  relationships	  I	  began	  to	  form	  there.	  	  As	  my	  starting	  point,	  I	  want	  to	  take	  the	  assumption	  that	  since	  the	  body	  is	  a	  spatial	  object,	   spatiality	   is	   an	   integral	   feature	   of	   a	   person’s	   experience	   of	   their	   self,	  physically	  grounded	  in	  the	  very	  way	  our	  brains	  produce	  the	  phenomena	  we	  call	  our	  ‘selves’.	  	  As	  the	  German	  cognitive	  scientist	  Thomas	  Metzinger	  (2004)	  argues,	  our	   experience	   of	   ourselves	   as	   ‘selves’	   (what	   he	   calls	   our	   “phenomenal	   self-­‐‑model”	   or	   PSM20)	   essentially	   consists	   in	   our	   brains	   continually	  mapping	   our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  To	  be	  entirely	  clear,	  Metzinger	  is	  saying	  that	  actually,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘self’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  discrete,	  empirically	  recognizable	  entity,	  a	  ‘little	  man’,	  ‘soul’	  or	  ‘spirit’.	  The	  subjective	  experience	  of	  having	  a	  ‘self’	  stems	  from	  the	  way	  our	  brains	  render	  incoming	  perceptual	  data,	  since	  without	  such	  a	  perspective,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  our	  organism	  to	  operate	  in	  the	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entire	  psycho/physical	  system,	  creating	  an	  (ideally	  accurate)	  simulation	  of	  it,	  and	  endowing	  this	  virtual	  model	  with	  a	  first-­‐‑person	  perspective	  which	  he	  calls	  the	  “Phenomenal	  Model	  of	  the	  Intentionality	  Relation”	  (PMIR).	  The	  latter	  means	  that	  a	  self	  becomes	  a	  functioning	  self	  only	  through	  a	  form	  of	  directedness	  at	  the	  world,	  a	  consciously	  experienced	  “nonverbal	  arrow”	  linking	  self	  and	  non-­‐‑self,	  “uniting	  subject	   and	   object”	   (316)21.	  Without	   such	   an	   experience	   of	   directedness	   –	   of	  being	  in	  an	  active	  relation	  with	  the	  world	  –	  our	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  as	  ‘selves’	  is	  literally	  extinguished.	  	  	  The	  ‘protagonist’	  of	  this	  intentionality	  relation	  –	  the	  entity	  we	  think	  of	  as	  our	  ‘self’	  –	   is	  by	  definition	  spatial.	   Since	  our	  bio-­‐‑physical	   ‘system’,	   the	  body,	  has	  spatial	  properties,	  our	  phenomenal	  self-­‐‑model	  is	  spatially	  coded	  within	  the	  brain,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  brain	  represents	  physical	  states	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  embodied	  emotions.	  “Emotional	  content”	  therefore,	  “is	  always	  spatial	  content”	  (382),	  and	  through	  bodily	  sensations	  we	  construe	  ourselves	  as	  spatial	  beings.	  But	  not	  only	  that	   –	   spatiality,	   for	  Metzinger,	   is	   also	  what	   enables	   us	   to	   become	   evaluative	  beings:	  	  “The	   emotional	   self-­‐‑model	   can	   be	   analyzed	   as	   the	   integrated	   class	   of	   all	   those	  
representational	  states	  modeling	  the	  overall	  state	  of	  affairs	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
system.	  As	  opposed	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  representational	  content	  they	  are	  structured	  
along	  a	  valence	  axis.	  They	  contain	  a	  normative	  element,	  and	  this	  element	  is,	  for	  
instance,	  expressed	  as	  affective	  tone.	  What	  is	  nonconceptually	  represented	  by	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  world.	  The	  ‘phenomenal	  self	  model’	  is	  therefore	  more	  of	  a	  necessary	  cognitive	  illusion.	  However,	  since	  people	  cannot	  perceive	  of	  themselves	  in	  any	  other	  way,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  for	  practical	  purposes,	  the	  PSM	  is	  what	  people	  mean	  when	  they	  refer	  to	  their	  ‘self’.	  	  
21	  Although	  the	  PMIR	  shares	  a	  lot	  of	  features	  with	  that	  which	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘agency’,	  I	  consider	  it	  a	  more	  useful	  concept	  to	  distinguish	  the	  directedness	  of	  humans	  and	  some	  nonhuman	  animals	  at	  the	  world	  of	  objects.	  ‘Agency’,	  in	  some	  accounts,	  is	  defined	  purely	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  cause	  some	  effect	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  thus	  for	  example	  in	  Bruno	  Latour’s	  actor/network	  theory	  (2005)	  can	  without	  difficulty	  be	  attributed	  to	  inanimate	  objects.	  Although	  this	  is	  in	  principle	  possible	  precisely	  because	  ‘agency’	  is	  so	  loosely	  defined,	  in	  my	  opinion	  it	  strips	  the	  concept	  of	  any	  explanatory	  power	  whatsoever	  and	  produces	  accounts	  that	  border	  on	  the	  absurd	  (see	  for	  example	  Nimmo,	  2011,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  milk).	  But	  even	  if	  one	  agrees	  that	  inanimate	  objects	  can	  have	  ‘agency’,	  they	  most	  certainly	  cannot	  muster	  intentionality	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  PMIR.	  Although	  I	  cannot	  expand	  on	  this	  discussion	  here,	  in	  my	  opinion	  it	  is	  therefore	  worth	  considering	  altogether	  replacing	  ‘agency’	  with	  a	  concept	  modeled	  on	  the	  ‘intentionality	  relation’.	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affective	  valence	  or	  tone	  will	  in	  many	  cases	  be	  the	  survival	  value	  of	  a	  specific	  state	  
of	  affairs”	  (ibid,	  emph.	  orig.).	  	  	  This	  is,	  in	  essence,	  an	  evolutionary	  biologist’s	  version	  of	  Sayer’s	  claim	  that	  things	  matter	  to	  people	  because	  they	  impact	  on	  whether	  we	  flourish	  or	  suffer.	  It	  points	  to	   the	   inextricable	   connection	  between	   self,	   spatial	   experience	   and	   evaluative	  judgment:	   “By	   possessing	   a	   conscious,	   emotional	   self-­‐‑model	   we	   are	   not	   only	  given	   to	   ourselves	   as	   spatially	   extended	   beings,	   but	   as	   beings	   possessing	  interests	  and	  goals.”	  (384)	  	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  spatiality	  of	  our	  bodies	  as	  our	  own	  spatiality	  is	  therefore	  a	  crucial	  condition	  for	  our	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  as	  beings	  who	  have	  ‘selves’,	  and	  who	  can	  flourish	  or	  suffer.	  As	  a	  result,	  as	  Judith	  Butler	  puts	  it:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  claim	  that	  our	  bodies	  are	  in	  a	  sense	  our	  own	  and	  that	  we	  are	  entitled	  to	  claim	  rights	   of	   autonomy	   over	   our	   bodies”	   (2004,	   25).	   I	   read	   Butler’s	   claim	   that	  embodiment	   implies	   that	   “our	  bodies	  are	   in	  a	   sense	  our	  own”	  as	  describing	  a	  relationship	  of	  identification	  rather	  than	  ‘ownership’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  possession.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  chapter	  6	  onwards,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘ownership’	  of	  the	  body	  or	  the	  self	  is	  fraught	  with	  all	  kinds	  of	  conceptual	  difficulty,	  first	  and	  foremost	  that	  ‘ownership’	  logically	  implies	  a	  form	  of	  non-­‐‑identity	  of	  ‘owner’	  and	  ‘owned’.	  This	  idea	  therefore	  feeds	  into	  an	  implicit	  mind/body	  dualism	  in	  which	  some	  kind	  of	  entity	  comes	   to	  be	  separated	  out	   from	  the	  whole	  person	  to	  become	  sovereign	  ‘owner’	  of	  the	  rest.	  Since,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  chapter	  5,	  I	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  such	  a	  dualistic	  view,	   it	  would	  be	   incorrect	   to	  say	  a	  person	   ‘owns’	   their	  body;	  rather,	  they	   are	   their	   body.	   I	   therefore	   take	   Butler’s	   remark	   here	   to	   refer	   to	   what	  Metzinger	  calls	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘internality’:	  	  “Phenomenological	  internality	  is	  consciously	  experienced	   ‘mineness’	   It	   is	  a	  characteristic	   feature	  of	  all	  contents	  integrated	   into	   the	   phenomenal	   level	   of	   self-­‐‑representation,	   continuously,	  automatically,	  and	  independently	  of	  any	  high-­‐‑	  level	  cognitive	  operations”	  (267).	  	  This	   is	   also	   why	   a	   claim	   to	   bodily	   integrity	   is	   “essential	   to	   so	  many	   political	  movements”	  (ibid),	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  undisturbed	  enjoyment	  of	  one’s	  own	  spatial	  expanse	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  given	  for	  many	  people.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  basic	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claim	  of	  the	  person	  to	  the	  space	  of	  his/her	  body	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  where	  it	  ends	  and	  the	  world	  begins	   is	  considered	  integral	   for	  consciousness.	  Metzinger	  emphasises	   that	   “a	   self-­‐‑model	   precisely	   emerges	   from	   drawing	   a	   self-­‐‑world	  boundary”	  (p	  313),	  and	  if	  this	  boundary	  becomes	  blurred	  or	  disrupted,	  the	  very	  experience	   of	   self	   is	   jeopardised.	   Violations	   of	   bodily	   integrity	   –	   for	   example	  through	  torture	  or	  rape	  –	  therefore	  have	  devastating	   long-­‐‑term	  consequences,	  precisely	  because	  the	  person’s	  taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted	  congruence	  with	  the	  bounded	  space	   of	   their	   body	   is	   (deliberately)	   shattered	   by	   the	   intrusion	   of	   another.	  Violence	  of	  this	  kind	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  ‘interpersonal	  colonialism’,	  in	  that	  it	  establishes	  the	  territorial	  rule	  of	  another	  in	  the	  space	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  to	  undo	  this	  intrusion	  and	  re-­‐‑establish	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  physical	  integrity	  can	  be	  a	  long	  and	  arduous	  process.	  	  	  The	  immediate	  space	  of	  the	  body	  is	  embedded	  in	  another	  layer	  of	  spatiality,	  not	  completely	  private,	  but	  also	  not	  quite	  public.	  This	  space	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘personal	  space’,	  i.e.	  the	  space	  within	  which	  any	  event	  is	  potentially	  of	  immediate	  consequence	   for	   embodied	   consciousness.	   Personal	   space	   in	   this	   sense	  constitutes	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  its	  violation	  is	  experienced	  as	  adverse	   since	   it	  potentially	  pre-­‐‑empts	   the	  violation	  of	   the	  actual	  body.	  The	  extent	  of	  what	   is	   considered	  personal	   space	  differs	  culturally	  and	   individually	  (see	  e.g.	   Sussman	  and	  Rosenfeld	  1982)22,	   but	   its	   invasion	  without	  good	  cause	  appears	   to	   be	   universally	   experienced	   as	   aggressive.	   Conversely,	   allowing	  another	  person	  to	  enter	  one’s	  personal	  space	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  trust	  that	  is	  usually	  reserved	  for	  intimate	  relationships,	  like	  those	  between	  friends	  or	  lovers.	  But	  personal	  space	  is	  not	  only	  defined	  in	  interpersonal	  terms	  –	  the	  immediate	  material	  environment	  also	  has	  a	  decisive	  influence	  on	  physical	  reproduction,	  for	  example	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  necessary	  rest	  and	  recuperation.	  I	  therefore	  use	  ‘personal	   space‘	   here	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   area	   that	   is	   included	   in	   a	   person’s	   ‘self-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  There	  exists	  an	  entire	  field	  of	  research	  into	  how	  persons	  define	  and	  experience	  physical	  proximity,	  called	  “proxemics”.	  Proxemists	  have,	  for	  example,	  developed	  detailed	  measurements	  of	  the	  precise	  distance	  that	  persons	  of	  different	  cultural	  and	  social	  backgrounds	  define	  as	  personal	  space,	  and	  suggest	  that	  uninvited	  invasions	  of	  whatever	  is	  thus	  defined,	  without	  a	  good	  reason,	  are	  universally	  experienced	  as	  adverse	  (see	  Hall	  et	  al	  1968;	  Worchel	  and	  Yohai,	  1979)	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domain’	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   provides	   the	   body	  with	   the	   safe	   space	   that	   it	   needs	   to	  function.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  space	  could	  be	  a	  person’s	  bed	  or	  sleeping	  area	  –	  this	  area	  is	  considered	  intimate	  and	  personal	  because	  in	  it,	  the	  sleeping	  body	  is	  at	  its	  most	  vulnerable	  and	  exposed,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  space	  for	  rest	  is	  a	  fundamental	  requirement	  of	  physical	  functioning	  (e.g.	  Pilcher	  et	  al,	  1996).	  	  	  In	  so	  far	  as	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  safe	  personal	  space	  is	  thus	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  of	  physical	  survival,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  constitute	  a	  symbolic	  extension	  of	  the	  self	  beyond	   its	   bodily	   boundaries.	   As	   I	   will	   discuss	   in	   chapter	   6,	   ‘dwelling‘,	   i.e.	  inhabiting	  a	  particular	  physical	  space,	  e.g.	  a	  house,	  therefore	  involves	  a	  variety	  of	  symbolic	  acts	  which	  serve	  to	  establish	  this	  relation.	  The	  arrangement	  of	  personal	  objects	  in	  a	  previously	  empty	  room,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  way	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  claims	  the	  room	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  their	  person,	  as	  ‘their	  room‘.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  due	   to	   the	   essential	   survival	   importance	   of	   safe	   personal	   space,	   the	   physical	  properties	   of	   this	   space	   become	   all	   the	  more	   important	   the	  more	   hostile	   the	  environment.	   ‘Shelter‘	   –	   usually	   understood	   as	   an	   arrangement	   of	   material	  objects	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  ward	  of	  the	  elements	  as	  well	  as	  hostile	  creatures	  –	  is	  thus	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  material,	  a	  cognitive/emotional	  and	  a	  social	  construct,	  and	  its	  absence	  threatens	  the	  embodied	  person	  in	  all	  three	  dimensions	  of	  his	  or	  her	  being.	  The	  absence	  of	  shelter	  –	  like	  the	  absence	  of	  food	  or	  air	  –	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  such	  immediate	  gravity	  that	  a	  person’s	  entire	  physical	  and	  psychic	  resources	  are	  mobilised	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  it,	  and	  until	  it	  is	  resolved,	  little	  else	  matters.	  	  The	   persuasive	   urgency	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   shelter	   (in	   a	   material,	   a	  cognitive/emotional	  and	  a	   social	   sense)	  was	  also	  at	   the	  core	  of	   squatting	  as	  a	  political	  practice23.	  Squatting	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  this	   lack	  by	  taking	  occupation	  of	  physical	  spaces,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  producing	  a	  sense	  of	  safety	  and	  containment	  for	  the	  residents,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  in	  the	  sense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	  claim	  is	  not	  uncontested,	  as	  some	  authors	  (e.g.	  	  Prujit,	  2013)	  list	  a	  number	  of	  different	  motivations	  for	  squatting,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  refer	  to	  an	  immediate	  survival	  need.	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  4,	  these	  ‘taxonomies’	  in	  my	  opinion	  introduce	  conceptual	  boundaries	  between	  rationales	  that	  are	  not	  in	  the	  same	  form	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  understandings	  of	  squatters	  themselves,	  nor	  by	  the	  actual	  material	  circumstances	  they	  refer	  to.	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of	   forming	   a	   relatively	   stable	   social	   ‘milieu‘	   which	   allowed	   for	   a	   sense	   of	  belonging.	  Squatters	  usually	  formed	  ‘crews‘	  of	  between	  three	  and	  ten	  people	  in	  order	  to	  occupy	  a	  building,	  and	  the	  size	  of	  consecutive	  spaces	  permitting,	  such	  crews	  could	  remain	  stable	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  ‘Crews‘	  could	  be	  organised	  around	  pre-­‐‑existing	   friendships,	  but	  most	  often	  were	  simply	   formed	  around	  a	  mutual	  need	  for	  shelter.	  It	  was	  possible	  to	  squat	  on	  one’s	  own,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  posed	  practical	  difficulties	  (for	  example	  since	  one	  person	  always	  had	  to	  be	  inside	  the	  squat	   to	   ensure	   legal	   possession,	   see	   chapter	   3)	   and	   was	   also	   considered	  dangerous	  in	  case	  of	  illegal	  eviction.	  Because	  of	  this	  dependence	  of	  crewmembers	  on	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil	  a	  fundamental	  physical	  and	  psychological	  need,	  the	   social	   ties	   within	   crews	   could	   become	   exceptionally	   strong,	   as	   has	   been	  demonstrated	  for	  different	  kinds	  of	  ‘survival	  groups‘	  (e.g.	  Torrance,	  1954).	  	  In	  so	  far,	  ‘crewing	  up‘	  for	  me	  was	  not	  only	  a	  necessary	  step	  in	  joining	  the	  ‘scene‘,	  it	  also	  to	  some	  degree	  determined	  my	  position	  as	  an	  observing	  participant,	  in	  putting	  me	   literally	   and	   figuratively	   into	   the	   same	   space	   as	  my	   ‘respondents‘.	  When	   I	  finally	  began	  my	  official	  ‘fieldwork’,	  my	  first	  concern	  was	  therefore	  to	  find	  myself	  some	  squat-­‐‑mates.	  	  	  Gavin	  was	  excited	  at	  the	  prospect	  of	  my	  moving	  to	  Bristol,	  however,	  since	  he	  had	  not	  always	  shown	  to	  be	  the	  most	  gifted	  at	  finding	  himself	  a	  good	  crew	  to	  live	  with,	  I	  was	  somewhat	  doubtful	  whether	  I	  should	  rely	  entirely	  on	  him	  to	  find	  me	  one.	  Another	  avenue	  had	  opened	  up	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Ralph,	  another	  Austrian	  migrant	  and	  fellow	  activist	  I	  had	  met	  a	  few	  months	  previously.	  When	  we	  first	  met,	  Ralph	  and	   I	  had	  sized	  each	  other	  up	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	   territorial	   suspicion	  (another	  Austrian	   on	  my	   turf??)	   and	   the	   sentimental	   excitement	   that	   sometimes	   grips	  exiles	  when	  encountering	  something	  associated	  with	  their	  ‘native’	  culture.	  Ralph	  had	  left	  Austria	  for	  much	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  me	  –	  boredom	  and	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  world	   had	   more	   to	   offer	   than	   the	   quaint,	   parochial	   tranquillity	   of	   our	   home	  country.	  We	  soon	  became	  friends,	  bonded	  over	  the	  traditional	  Austrian	  pursuit	  of	  raunzen	  (a	  mixture	  of	  badmouthing	  and	  complaining	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  just	  about	   anything)	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   knew	   enough	   activists	   in	   common	   back	  home	   to	   dissect	   their	   various	   flaws	   and	   shortcomings	   for	   hours	   on	   end.	   Our	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shared	   nationality	   elicited	   a	   kind	   of	   instinctual	   solidarity	   on	   either	   side;	   and	  when	  I	  told	  him	  I	  was	  going	  to	  move	  to	  Bristol,	  he	  took	  me	  under	  his	  wing	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course.	  When	  I	  finally	  arrived	  one	  sunny	  October	  afternoon,	  I	  only	  had	  to	  walk	  a	  few	  blocks	  from	  the	  Bus	  station	  into	  St	  Pauls	  to	  arrive	  at	  my	  new	  squat.	  Ralph	  had	  already	  gained	  the	  resident’s	  permission	  for	  me	  to	  move	  in	  with	  them	  indefinitely,	  which	  meant	  that	  he	  must	  have	  unconditionally	  vouched	  for	  me	  as	  a	  safe	   and	   sane	   person.	  He	   himself	   lived	   in	   the	   three-­‐‑story	   building	   along	  with	  seven	  other	  people	  who	  occupied	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  one-­‐‑	  and	  two	  bedroom	  flats.	  The	  remaining	  flat	  was	  inhabited	  by	  a	  middle	  aged	  Asian	  man	  who	  was	  hardly	  at	  home	  –	  I	  never	  established	  if	  he	  knew	  that	  no	  one	  else	  in	  the	  house	  was	  paying	  rent,	  but	  if	  he	  did,	  he	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  care.	  	  	  The	  five	  flats	  each	  consisted	  of	  a	  living	  room	  with	  kitchen	  area,	  a	  bedroom	  and	  a	  bathroom.	  Apparently	  the	  house	  had	  been	  accessed	  by	  means	  of	  an	  open	  window	  some	   months	   previously,	   and	   the	   remaining	   flats	   had	   then	   been	   opened	   by	  tunnelling	  through	  walls	  and	  ceilings	  until	  the	  doors	  could	  be	  opened	  from	  the	  inside	  to	  avoid	  the	  flat’s	  individual	  alarms.	  On	  the	  ground	  floor	  lived	  a	  couple	  in	  their	  late	  twenties	  with	  their	  dog,	  the	  first	  floor	  was	  occupied	  by	  Ralph	  and	  three	  other	  men	  and	  on	  the	  top	  floor	  lived	  another	  young	  man	  and	  two	  women.	  Since	  there	  were	  no	  more	  spare	   rooms,	   I	  was	   to	   share	  with	   someone	  else	  until	  one	  became	  available	  –	  after	   inspecting	   the	   impressive	  array	  of	  various	   species	  of	  mould	  in	  Ralph’s	  quarters,	  I	  opted	  for	  the	  living	  room	  of	  the	  top	  floor	  flat.	  I	  shared	  this	  flat	  with	  Joe,	  a	  friendly,	  perpetually	  smiling	  guy	  in	  his	  early	  twenties	  with	  a	  predilection	  for	  reggae	  music	  and	  ganja.	  Completely	  unfazed	  by	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  stranger	  in	  his	  living	  room,	  he	  bid	  me	  a	  warm	  welcome	  and	  treated	  me	  to	  a	  semi-­‐‑clean	  mattress	  that	  had	  just	  been	  collected	  from	  the	  streets	  in	  anticipation	  of	  my	  arrival.	   I	  had	  stayed	  with	  Gavin	  often	  enough	  to	  appreciate	  a	   functional	  mattress	  –	  or	  indeed,	  any	  other	  piece	  of	  furniture	  or	  equipment	  –	  found	  on	  the	  street	  as	  an	  asset	  rather	  than	  a	  health	  hazard,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  build	  myself	  a	  nest	  in	  a	  corner.	  It	  was	  located	  in	  the	  living	  room/kitchen,	  and	  people	  were	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  room	  continuously,	  giving	  me	  little	  sense	  of	  privacy.	  Despite	  the	  crammed	   conditions,	   however,	   this	   “most	   sordid	   of	   all	   havens,	   the	   corner”	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(Bachelard,	  1958/1994,	  137)	  functioned	  as	  my	  personal	  space,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  everyone	  –	  residents	  and	  visitors	  alike	  –	  kept	  a	  respectful	  distance.	  Nobody	  sat	  on	  my	  bed	  without	  invitation,	  none	  of	  my	  things	  were	  removed,	  and	  if	  I	  wanted	  to	  rest,	  people	  went	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  make	  noise	  somewhere	  else.	  	  	  There	   was	   a	   certain	   paradox	   involved	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	   personal	   space	   in	  squats.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   since	   the	   space	   was	   clearly	   none	   of	   the	   resident’s	  property	  (not	  even	  in	  the	  temporary	  sense	  of	  being	  rented),	  others	  could	  not	  be	  excluded	   from	   it	   on	   that	   basis.	   It	  was	   therefore	   acceptable	   practice	   to	   simply	  knock	  on	  the	  door	  of	  a	  squat	  and	  ask	  for	  temporary	  accommodation	  if	  one	  had	  just	  arrived	  in	  town	  or	  was	  in	  transition.	  Some	  squats	  used	  particular	  symbols	  on	  the	  outside	  of	  the	  building	  to	  indicate	  to	  informed	  passers-­‐‑by	  that	  they	  operated	  such	   a	   policy.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   squatters,	   as	   already	  discussed,	   had	  no	   less	  requirement	  of	  the	  inviolable	  personal	  space	  of	  a	  ‘home’	  than	  other	  people,	  and	  the	  continuous	  presence	  of	  strangers	  was	  sometimes	  seen	  as	  disruptive.	  Large	  enough	   spaces	   –	   such	   as	   the	   former	   social	   centre	   ‘The	   Factory’	   in	   St	   Paul’s	   –	  solved	  this	  issue	  by	  segregating	  residents	  and	  visitors	  on	  separate	  floors,	  smaller	  ones	  most	  often	  decided	  on	  an	  ad-­‐‑hoc	  basis	  if	  a	  visitor	  could	  be	  accommodated.	  In	  general,	  however,	  keeping	  an	  ‘open	  door’	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  expression	  of	  the	  political	  aims	  of	  the	  squatting	  movement.	  	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  my	  first	  few	  days	  in	  Bristol,	  I	  met	  the	  other	  residents	  of	  the	  house.	  There	  was	  Dan	  and	  Mary,	  the	  couple	  with	  the	  dog,	  mostly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  functional	   unit	   named	   ‘Danandmary’.	   The	   first	   floor	   inhabitants	   were	   T,	   who	  came	  from	  a	  north-­‐‑African	  country,	  which,	  as	  it	  was	  implied,	  he	  had	  had	  a	  very	  convincing	  reason	  to	  leave24,	  Drew,	  a	  very	  quiet	  man	  in	  his	  forties,	  and	  George,	  the	  house	  pariah.	  George	  appeared	  to	  live	  a	  precarious	  existence	  on	  his	  bunk	  in	  the	   living	   room,	   as	   he	   had	   previously	   upset	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   housemates	   with	  drunk,	  homophobic	  and	  sexist	  behaviour	  and	  there	  was	  an	  on-­‐‑going	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	   this	  was	  grounds	  enough	   to	  put	  him	  out	  on	   the	  street.	  Finally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  He	  left	  everyone	  guessing	  as	  to	  his	  immigration	  status,	  an	  issue	  that	  would	  later	  become	  relevant	  when	  during	  a	  large	  scale	  altercation	  his	  behaviour	  prompted	  the	  calling	  of	  the	  police,	  see	  chapter	  7.	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there	   were	   ‘the	   brothers’,	   two	   British-­‐‑Asian	   men	   in	   their	   late	   twenties	   who	  treated	  the	  house	  to	  Dubstep	  at	  high	  volumes	  and	  their	  newly	  acquired	  pit-­‐‑bull	  puppy	  (a	  hyperactive	  little	  monster	  that	  left	  turds	  all	  over	  the	  house,	  which	  made	  navigating	  the	  stairs	  at	  night	  a	  challenge)	  plus	  their	  sister	  who	  shared	  one	  of	  the	  top	  floor	  flats	  with	  another	  British	  girl	  named	  Therese.	  I	  had	  only	  a	  rudimentary	  ability	  at	  the	  time	  to	  guess	  British	  people’s	  class	  background	  by	  their	  accent	  and	  mannerisms,	  but	  as	  it	  turned	  out	  I	  was	  right	  in	  inferring	  that	  Therese	  came	  from	  a	  wealthy	  background,	  had	  a	  public	  school	  education,	  and	  was	  mainly	  living	  in	  a	  squat	  to	  make	  a	  point	  toward	  her	  parents25.	  	  	  The	   residents	   were	   a	   fairly	   representative	   sample	   of	   the	   composition	   of	   the	  Bristol	   ‘scene‘	   as	   a	  whole.	   Relatively	   balanced	   in	   terms	   of	   gender,	   the	   largest	  group	  of	  squatters	  was	  white	  and	  in	  part	  British,	  in	  part	  comprised	  of	  European	  migrants.	  A	  smaller	  sub-­‐‑group	  came	  from	  non-­‐‑European	  countries,	  and	  a	  sub-­‐‑set	  of	  those	  had	  no	  legal	  claim	  to	  remain	  in	  Britain.	  While	  a	  fair	  few	  squatters	  came	  from	  an	  Asian	  background,	  I	  met	  very	  few	  from	  British-­‐‑Caribbean,	  other	  Black	  British	  or	  African	  backgrounds,	  an	  issue	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  definitive	  explanation	  for.	  My	  suspicion	  –	  confirmed	  at	  least	  by	  one	  British-­‐‑Caribbean	  squatter	  I	  spoke	  to	  –	  is	   that	   Blacks	   in	   Britain	   experience	   a	   disproportionate	   amount	   of	   police	  repression	  as	  it	  is,	  and	  involving	  themselves	  in	  the	  squatter/activist	  scene	  would	  make	  them	  prime	  targets	  for	  police	  violence.	  In	  terms	  of	  ‘class‘,	  definitions	  were	  difficult,	  since,	  as	  I	  have	  mentioned	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  precisely	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  the	  ‘class‘	  people	  identified	  as	  differed	  widely.	  It	  was	  however	  obvious	  that	  only	   a	   small	   percentage	   were	   in	   a	   position	   to	   have	   access	   to	   other	   forms	   of	  accommodation,	  and	  thus	  squatting	  for	  most	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  material	  necessity.	  	  	  The	  person	   I	   bonded	  most	  with	   in	   the	  house,	   after	  Ralph,	  was	  Drew.	  My	   first	  impression	  of	  him	  had	  been	  of	  extreme	  shyness,	  as	  when	  he	  spoke	  at	  all,	  he	  did	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This	  does	  not	  imply,	  however,	  that	  because	  of	  her	  wealthy	  background	  Therese	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘voluntary’	  middle	  class	  squatter	  that	  is	  often	  invoked	  in	  public	  discourse	  to	  argue	  that	  squatters	  are	  not	  ‘really’	  homeless	  people.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  5,	  a	  boarding	  school	  education,	  this	  venerable	  institution	  of	  Britishness,	  produces	  its	  very	  own	  form	  of	  psychological	  abandonment,	  not	  at	  all	  unlike	  the	  experience	  of	  lacking	  a	  safe	  space	  which	  often	  precedes	  actual	  homelessness	  in	  the	  less	  well	  off	  (compare	  Duffell,	  2000,	  2014).	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so	  in	  a	  voice	  so	  low	  as	  to	  be	  barely	  audible.	  I	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  believe	  when	  Ralph	  told	  me	  that	  Drew	  had	  a	  completely	  different	  side	  to	  him	  and	  that	  I	  should	  mind	  my	  step	  with	  him	  as	  he	  could	  exhibit	  an	  explosive	  temper	  –	  to	  my	  mind,	  here	  was	  a	  kind	  and	  gentle	  person	  who,	  once	  he	  warmed	  up	  to	  conversation,	  possessed	  a	  subtle	   wit,	   a	   sophisticated	   political	   standpoint	   and	   heart-­‐‑warming	   common	  sense.	   I	   had	   decided	   to	   be	   upfront	   about	  my	   ethnographic	   activities	   from	   the	  start,	  in	  order	  to	  give	  people	  a	  chance	  to	  avoid	  me	  should	  they	  not	  approve,	  but	  as	  it	  turned	  out	  I	  was	  far	  more	  concerned	  by	  the	  potential	  ethical	  pitfalls	  of	  my	  status	  than	  anyone	  else.	  My	  studying	  anthropology	  was	  mainly	  regarded	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  eccentric	  hobby,	  especially	  since	  few	  knew	  what	  anthropology	  even	  was	  (and	  my	  attempts	  at	  explanation	  did	  little	  to	  elucidate	  the	  matter).	  Most	  often,	  I	  was	  teased	  for	  being	  a	  ‘useless	  intellectual’	  who	  would	  nevertheless	  kindly	  be	  fed	  when	  the	  revolution	  finally	  came.	  The	  few	  exceptions	  to	  this	  –	  of	  which	  Drew	  was	  one	  –	  believed	  that	  my	  research	  could	  in	  some	  way	  benefit	  squatter’s	  political	  cause.	  After	  observing	  me	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  days	  with	  an	  intelligent	  alertness	  that	  became	  somewhat	  unnerving,	  he	  began	  to	  strike	  up	  conversations	  about	  politics	  and	   direct	   action.	   I	   learned	   that	   he	   had	   studied	   biology	   at	   university	   before	  deciding	  to	  turn	  his	  back	  on	  mainstream	  society	  and	  apply	  himself	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  political	  projects	  –	  a	  story	  that,	  as	   I	  would	   later	   learn,	  was	  only	  half	   the	  truth.	  However,	  he	  was	  keen	   to	  get	   involved	   in	  some	  sort	  of	  political	  action,	  and	   for	  some	  reason	  saw	  my	  arrival	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so.	  Drew	  was	  among	  the	  few	  who	  received	  benefits	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  which	  he	  used	  to	  procure	  food	  for	  the	  entire	  house.	  Nearly	  every	  evening,	  we	  would	  come	  home	  to	  find	  he	  had	  prepared	  a	  full	  roast	  dinner	  or	  other	  meal	  which	  we	  would	  eat	  while	  watching	  films	  together,	  until	  people	  went	  to	  sleep	  and	  Drew	  passed	  out	  in	  his	  chair	  after	  having	  consumed	  impressive	  amounts	  of	  beer.	  	  	  Life	  in	  the	  house	  followed	  a	  daily	  rhythm	  that	  I	  soon	  got	  accustomed	  to.	  Mornings	  started	  late	  with	  the	  brewing	  of	  great	  amounts	  of	  strong	  coffee	  and	  breakfast	  of	  eggs	  and	  bacon	  in	  one	  of	  the	  living	  rooms.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  smell	  of	  coffee	  filled	  the	  house,	   residents	   would	   one	   by	   one	   come	   out	   of	   their	   rooms	   and	   sit	   around	  chatting	   and	   jugging	   caffeine	   until	   about	   midday.	   Then	   activity	   started	   and	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people	  left	  to	  go	  about	  their	  day’s	  business,	  most	  of	  which	  took	  place	  in	  one	  of	  the	   numerous	   squats	   and	   social	   spaces	   around	   Stokes	   Croft,	   to	   re-­‐‑converge	  around	   evening	   for	   another	   communal	   meal.	   After	   this,	   most	   evenings	   there	  would	  be	  a	  party	  or	  other	  social	  gathering	  in	  one	  of	  the	  squats,	  or	  we	  would	  sit	  around	  drinking,	  smoking	  and	  talking	  until	  the	  small	  hours	  of	  the	  morning.	  In	  all	  this,	  there	  was	  a	  pervasive	  sense	  of	  communality	  –	  it	  rarely	  occurred	  to	  anyone	  to	  segregate	  themselves	  and	  eat	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  rarely	  did	  people	  retreat	  to	  their	  rooms	  and	  close	  the	  door	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  undisturbed.	  The	  constant	  company	  was	  unfamiliar	  for	  me	  at	   first,	  but	   in	  an	  astonishingly	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  I	  got	  used	  to	  thinking	  of	  myself	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘we’.	  This	  ‘we’	  was	  not	  in	  the	  first	  instant	  a	  matter	  of	  identity,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  became	  ‘a	  squatter’	  as	  opposed	   to	   ‘an	   anthropologist’.	   Rather,	   the	   communal	   provision	   of	   food	   and	  shelter	  pointed	  to	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  interconnectedness:	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  we	  were	   all	   dependent	   on	   one	   another	   in	   order	   to	   preserve	   and	   reproduce	   our	  bodies.	  	  	  For	  the	  ‘Western’	  subject,	  the	  experience	  of	  dependency	  on	  others	  for	  physical	  survival	   is	   largely	  regarded	  as	  shameful	   (Butler,	  2004;	  see	  also	  Duffell,	  2014).	  Dependency	  is	  reserved	  for	  children,	  the	  very	  old,	  or	  those	  in	  ill	  health,	  for	  the	  ‘normal’	  adult,	  however,	  independence	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  pride	  but	  central	  to	  one’s	  understanding	  of	  oneself	  as	  an	  autonomous	  individual.	  In	  Capital,	  Marx	  goes	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  independence	  is	  fundamentally	  an	  illusion,	  created	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  relations	  of	  interdependence	  between	  humans,	  under	  capitalism,	  become	  mystified	  in	  projected	  relationships	  between	  objects	  (Marx,	  1867).	  Rarely,	  however,	  is	  the	  subject	  confronted	  with	  this	  illusion	  head	  on.	   Confrontation	   only	   occurs	   in	   situations	   when	   the	   social	   structures	   that	  mediate	   relationships	   between	   persons	   –	   the	   market,	   the	   state	   –	   no	   longer	  function,	  be	   it	  because	  an	  individual	  has	   lost	  access	  to	  them	  (such	  as	   in	  abject	  destitution)	  or	  because	  they	  have	  broken	  down	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  In	  situations	  like	  these,	   the	   subject	   realises	   that	   fulfilling	   his	   own	   needs	   as	   an	   ‘independent’	  
	   72	  
consumer	  is	  no	  longer	  possible,	  and	  the	  only	  path	  to	  survival	  is	  co-­‐‑operation	  with	  others26.	  	  	  	  The	   experience	   of	   such	   dependency,	   for	   the	   ‘autonomous’	   subject,	   is	   initially	  frightening.	  If	  the	  other	  has	  the	  power	  to	  raise	  the	  chances	  of	  one’s	  survival,	  then	  he	  or	  she	  ergo	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  lower	  them.	  Consequently,	  such	  dependency	  is	  rarely	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  anthropology,	  although	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  the	  time	   anthropologists	   are	   fed	   and	   sheltered	   by	   the	   people	   they	   study,	   and,	  especially	  in	  remoter	  areas,	  would	  be	  in	  serious	  trouble	  if	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case.	  Alas,	   to	   admit	   to	   such	   basic	   bodily	   dependency	   would	   not	   only	   topple	   the	  superiority	  of	  the	  ‘traditional’	  anthropologist,	  it	  would	  also	  put	  into	  question	  the	  capacity	   of	   the	   more	   progressive	   one	   to	   frame	   the	   interests	   of	   those	   who	  temporarily	  give	  him	   life	   as	   ‘subjective’.	  Writing,	   therefore,	   traditionally	   takes	  place	  after	  the	  anthropologist	  has	  returned	  from	  the	  field,	  and	  his	  autonomy	  from	  the	   people	   he	   has	   lived	   among	   is	   re-­‐‑affirmed.	   In	   the	   ‘fieldwork’	   situation,	  however,	   the	   denial	   of	   dependency	   is	   another	   aspect	   of	   the	   distortion	   I	   have	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  –	  a	  ‘disinterested’	  stance	  is	  after	  all	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  if	  one’s	  basic	  survival	  depends	  on	  the	  same	  conditions	  as	  the	  survival	  of	   the	  other.	  Part	  of	   the	   ‘life-­‐‑fieldwork’	  dichotomy	  is	  therefore	  the	  assumption	  that	  one’s	  basic	  needs	  are	  being	  met	  by	  some	  means	  outside	  of	  the	  field,	  and	  that	  the	  basic	  survival	  concerns	  of	  the	  other	  are	  separate	  from	  one’s	  own.	  	  	  If	  this	  separateness	  breaks	  down	  –	  by	  design	  or,	  as	  in	  my	  case,	  the	  constituent	  power	  of	  accident	  –	  the	  fieldwork	  situation	  shifts.	  The	  asymmetric	  investment	  I	  have	   described	   in	   chapter	   one	   gives	   way	   to	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   the	  anthropologist	  has	  at	  least	  as	  much	  at	  stake	  as	  the	  ‘native’,	  if	  not	  more	  (since	  the	  ‘native’	  may	   already	   be	   an	   expert	   at	   survival	   under	   the	   particular	   conditions,	  while	  the	  anthropologist’s	  dependency	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  or	  she	  lacks	  this	  knowledge).	  With	  this	  shift	  also	  comes	  a	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  utterances	  of	  the	  other	  are	  regarded	  –	  what	  could	  formerly	  be	  framed	  as	  merely	  somebody’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Or,	  in	  fact,	  the	  violent	  subjugation	  of	  others.	  This	  option	  was	  however	  generally	  not	  available	  to	  squatters,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  the	  sheer	  material	  means	  to	  dominate	  more	  than	  a	  handful	  of	  others	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  thus	  co-­‐‑operation	  was	  effectively	  left	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  option.	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subjective	   view	  on	   their	   situation,	   now	  becomes	   supremely	   important	   for	   the	  anthropologist,	   because	   it	   refers	   to	   his	   or	   her	   own	   condition	   as	   well.	   The	  assessment	  of	   another	   that	   ‘it	   is	   cold	  out’	   constitutes	   a	   ‘subjective’	   evaluation	  only	  if	  one	  has	  a	  warm	  place	  to	  stay	  in	  –	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  place,	  ‘it	  is	  cold	  out’	   is	   not	   a	   description	  of	   individual	   opinion	  but	   a	   vital	   piece	   of	   information	  relating	  to	  one’s	  own	  survival.	  The	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  squatting	  constitutes	  a	  legitimate	  response	  to	  being	  without	  shelter	  ceases	  to	  be	  ‘academic’	   if	  one	   is	  without	   shelter.	   The	   suspension	   of	   evaluative	   judgment	   that	   drives	   the	   ‘life-­‐‑fieldwork’	  dichotomy	   is	   therefore	  revoked,	  not	   for	  methodological	  or	   formally	  ethical	  reasons,	  but	  because	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anthropologist’s	  interest	  has	  shifted	  –	   the	   evaluative	   judgment	   of	   the	   other	   ceases	   to	  matter	   only	   as	   an	   object	   of	  inquiry,	   and	   begins	   to	   matter	   as	   a	   way	   of	   navigating	   one’s	   own	   embodied	  existence.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  evaluative	  judgment	  of	  the	  anthropologist	  and	  that	  of	  the	  other	  can	  therefore	  become	  aligned,	  in	  that	  they	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  same	  object	  or	  condition.	  	  	  This	  shift,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  does	  not	  yet	  produce	  empathic	  understanding	  in	  the	  sense	   I	  have	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter.	   It	  does,	  however,	  produce	   the	  conditions	  of	   possibility	   for	   this	   kind	  of	   understanding,	   in	   that	   it	   includes	   the	  anthropologist	  as	  a	  vulnerable,	  i.e.	  potentially	  affected	  actor.	  To	  be	  vulnerable	  in	  this	   sense	   means	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   fact	   that	   before	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	  autonomous,	  independent	  self,	  there	  is	  a	  basic	  level	  of	  interdependence	  between	  self	   and	   other	   on	   a	   bodily	   level,	   “the	   fundamental	   sociality	   of	   embodied	   life”	  (Butler,	  2004,	  28),	  which	  consists	  in	  “a	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  other	  that	  is	  part	  of	  bodily	  life…(and)…becomes	  highly	  exacerbated	  under	  certain	  social	  and	  political	  conditions,	  especially	  those	  in	  which	  violence	  is	  a	  way	  of	  life	  and	  the	  means	  to	  secure	  self-­‐‑defense	  are	  limited”	  (ibid,	  29).	  To	  experience	  and	  acknowledge	  this	  vulnerability	   can	   then	   become	   the	   basis	   upon	   which	   empathy,	   based	   on	  identification	   with	   the	   suffering	   of	   the	   other 27 	  becomes	   possible,	   as	   “an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  other	  therefore	  is	  ‘the	  same’	  as	  one’s	  own,	  or	  that	  the	  actors	  necessarily	  have	  to	  share	  exactly	  the	  same	  experience	  of	  injustice	  to	  understand	  each	  other.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  not	  the	  commensurability	  of	  oppression,	  but	  the	  shared	  condition	  of	  consciously	  experienced	  vulnerability	  to	  insult	  and	  violence.	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apprehension	   of	   common	   human	   vulnerability”	   from	   which	   can	   spring	   “the	  principle	  of	  protecting	  others	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  violence	  we	  have	  suffered”	  (ibid	  30).	  As	  Butler’s	  essay	  argues,	  the	  ‘Western’	  subject	  goes	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  undo	  and	  deny	  this	  basic	  vulnerability,	  and	  the	  anthropological	  self	  is	  no	  exception,	  in	  that	   it	   has	   made	   ‘invulnerability’	   (the	   illusion	   of	   disaffectedness)	   its	  epistemological	  position	  of	  choice.	  Joel	  Robbins’	  (2013)	  attack	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “anthropology	  of	  the	  suffering	  slot”	  might	  here	  be	  a	  case	  in	  point	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  agrees	  with	  Robbins’	  argument	  that	  anthropologists	  should	  cease	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  ‘suffering	  subject’,	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  they	  are	  by	  definition	  free	  to	  choose	  which	  position	  to	  take	  in	  the	  matter.	  	  	  	  
An	  Attack	  On	  One	  Is	  An	  Attack	  On	  All	  	  	  Butler	   suggests	   that	   the	   shared	   experience	   of	   vulnerability	   –	   in	   this	   context,	  caused	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  shelter	  –	  can	  engender	  “a	  sense	  of	  political	  community	  of	  a	  complex	  order,	  and	  it	  does	  this	  first	  of	  all	  by	  bringing	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  relational	  ties	  that	  have	   implications	   for	  theorizing	   fundamental	  dependency	  and	  ethical	  responsibility”	  (2004,	  22).	  Within	  the	  squatting	  scene,	  this	  sense	  of	  community	  was	  not	  so	  much	  of	  a	  theoretical	  than	  of	  a	  practical,	  material	  kind.	  Our	  crew	  did	  not	  only	  live,	  eat	  and	  sleep	  together	  but	  also	  had	  a	  shared	  project	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  ‘Smiling	  Chair’	  bookshop	  just	  a	  few	  corners	  down	  on	  Stokes	  Croft.	  ‘The	  Croft’,	  the	  street	  that	  leads	  from	  the	  city	  centre	  in	  north-­‐‑eastern	  direction	  up	  toward	  the	  up-­‐‑and-­‐‑coming	  Montpellier,	  was	  the	  main	  artery	  of	   ‘alternative’	  Bristol,	  and	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  squatting	  scene.	  At	  any	  one	  point	  there	  were	  at	   least	  four	  or	  five	  squats	  on	  Stokes	  Croft,	  among	  them	  the	  Smiling	  Chair,	  the	  Free	  Shop,	  a	  former	  motorcycle	   shop	   that	  was	  being	  used	  as	  an	  events	   space,	   and	  several	  housing	  squats,	   including	   the	   (in)famous	   ‘Telepathic	   Heights’,	   the	   eviction	   of	   which	  sparked	   the	  Bristol	   riots	   in	   201128.	   The	   Stokes	   Croft	   area	   had	   a	   longstanding	  reputation	   as	   the	   centre	   of	   alternative	   art	   and	   politics.	   Famous	   for	   its	   music	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  chapter	  11	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venues	   and	   an	   ever-­‐‑changing	   visual	   landscape	   of	   colourful	   shop-­‐‑fronts	  interspersed	  with	  graffiti	  by	  artists	  such	  as	  Banksy,	  it	  was	  home	  to	  an	  eclectic	  mix	  of	   punks,	   hipsters,	   students,	   artists	   and	   squatters.	   After	  what	  was	   commonly	  referred	  to	  by	  locals	  as	  a	  long	  period	  of	  ‘intentional	  neglect’	  by	  the	  council,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Cabot	  Circus	  shopping	  centre	  nearby	  had	  led	  to	  a	  steep	  rise	  in	  land	  values	  in	  the	  area,	  and	  when	  I	  arrived,	  the	  battle	  against	  the	  gentrification	  and	  ‘regeneration’	  of	  Stokes	  Croft	  was	  already	  well	  under	  way.	  	  	  There	   was	   a	   somewhat	   uneasy	   strategic	   alliance	   between	   local	   residents,	  shopkeepers	   and	   squatters	   in	   this	   conflict	   –	   although	   the	   enemy	   was	   clearly	  identified	  as	  the	  property	  developers	  who	  had	  secured	  contracts	  with	  Bristol	  City	  council	   to	   ‘improve’	   the	   area	   by	   building	   offices	   and	   flats,	   the	   squatters	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  class	  differences	  between	  them	  and	  the	  middle	  class	  ‘hipster’	  types	  who	  frequented	  cafes	  like	  the	  Canteen	  in	  the	  self-­‐‑managed	  Hamilton	  house.	  The	  most	  vocal	  community	  action	  group,	  the	  ‘People’s	  Republic	  of	  Stokes	  Croft’	  was	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Pretentious	  Republic’	  –	  a	  jibe	  that	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  the	  cultural	   flair	  of	  Stokes	  Croft	  was	  doubtlessly	  important,	  squatters	  had	  more	  at	  stake	  than	  others	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  gentrification.	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   rising	   interest	   in	   properties	   in	   the	   area	   meant	   an	   increase	   in	  Compulsory	  Purchase	  Orders	  (CPOs)29	  issued	  by	  the	  council	  for	  derelict,	  empty	  spaces	  –	  the	  very	  spaces	  that	  the	  squatters	  lived	  in	  and	  had	  often	  renovated	  and	  repaired	   in	   months	   of	   hard	   manual	   labour30 .	   On	   the	   other,	   there	   had	   been	  heightened	  police	  interest	  in	  the	  area,	  mainly	  targeting	  the	  street	  drinkers	  and	  rough	  sleepers	  at	  the	  bottom	  rung	  of	  the	  Stokes	  Croft	  food	  chain.	  It	  was	  generally	  assumed	  that	  ‘driving	  out	  the	  squatters’	  would	  be	  the	  council’s	  first	  step	  toward	  making	   the	  area	  more	   interesting	   for	   investors	  and	  homebuyers	  –	  a	  suspicion	  that	  would	  later	  prove	  only	  too	  accurate.	  	  The	  ‘Smiling	  Chair’	  was	  a	  small	  shop	  space	  with	  a	  bright	  pink	  front	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  the	  street,	  just	  across	  from	  the	  Free	  Shop.	  It	  provided	  zines	  and	  flyers,	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  A	  legal	  instrument	  that	  allows	  local	  authorities	  to	  buy	  property	  that	  has	  been	  abandoned	  or	  neglected	  without	  the	  owners	  consent	  30	  This	  was	  the	  eventual	  fate	  of	  ‘Classics’,	  the	  free-­‐‑shop	  I	  discuss	  further	  down.	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lending	  library,	  some	  books	  for	  sale,	  and	  tea	  and	  coffee	  in	  exchange	  for	  donations	  during	  the	  day;	  and	  doubled	  as	  a	  meeting	  room	  for	  various	  activist	  groups	  in	  the	  evenings.	  With	  the	  comfortable	  sofas	  and	  coffee	  for	  a	  few	  pence	  rather	  than	  the	  several	   pounds	   the	   ‘pretentious’	   Canteen	   charged	   for	   its	   lattes,	   it	   was	   also	   a	  favoured	   hangout	   and	   community	   hub	   for	   squatters.	   Several	  members	   of	   our	  crew	  were	  involved	  in	  running	  and	  maintaining	  the	  space,	  stocking	  the	  shelves	  and	   introducing	   the	   project	   to	   anyone	   new	   who	   stepped	   through	   its	   door.	  Although	  the	  space	  was	  in	  theory	  open	  to	  anyone,	  members	  of	  the	  general	  public	  only	  entered	  infrequently	  –	  the	  aesthetic	  of	  the	  shop	  front	  and	  the	  look	  of	  its	  usual	  patrons	  may	  have	  put	  them	  off.	  It	  was,	  however,	  a	  meeting	  place	  for	  squatters	  and	  their	  associates,	  and	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  normal	  day,	  one	  would	  meet	  at	  least	  one	  representative	  of	  every	  squat	  around	  the	  area	  there.	  As	  such,	  it	  served	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘village	  square’,	  a	  hub	  for	  information,	  gossip	  and	  rumours	  and	  a	  place	  where	  plans	   for	  actions	  and	  campaigns	  were	  devised.	  As	  my	  personal	   rhythm	  adjusted	  to	  that	  of	  my	  new	  crew,	  I	  found	  myself	  there	  most	  afternoons,	  showing	  my	  face	  as	  the	  new	  person	  in	  town	  and	  making	  myself	  useful.	  	  I	  had	  initially	  planned	  to	  spend	  most	  of	  my	  time	  in	  ‘Classics’,	  the	  Free	  Shop	  across	  the	  road,	  as	  I	  had	  previously	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  similar	  project	  in	  Vienna.	  This	  plan	  was	   soon	   abandoned,	   however,	  mainly	   because	  my	   conviction	   that	   Free	  Shops	   provide	   a	   viable	   model	   for	   an	   economic	   alternative	   to	   capitalism	   had	  somewhat	   waned.	   Essentially,	   Free	   Shops	   are	   spaces	   where	   items	   that	   have	  outlived	   their	   usefulness	   for	   their	   owner	   can	   be	   deposited	   and	   picked	   up	   by	  whoever	  needs	  them,	  free	  of	  charge.	  Numerous	  such	  projects	  exist	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  are	  generally	  based	  on	  a	  mixture	  of	  three	  arguments:	  an	  ecological	  one	  (waste	  reduction),	  a	  social	  one	  (providing	  for	  the	  poor	  and	  disadvantaged)	  and	  an	  economic	  one	  (wanting	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  viable	  economic	  alternative	  to	  the	  commodity	  economy).	  As	  a	  Marxist,	  it	  was	  this	  last	  argument	  that	  I	  was	  most	  interested	   in,	   as	   the	   intellectual	   underpinnings	   of	   Free	   Shop	   collectives	   often	  refer	  to	  some	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘gift	  economy’	  as	  derived	  from	  a	  more	  or	  less	  in-­‐‑depth	  reading	  of	  Mauss.	  The	  project	  I	  had	  helped	  to	  run	  in	  Vienna	  was	  no	  exception	  in	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upholding	  this	  presumed	  logic	  of	  a	  ‘gift	  economy’	  as	  the	  revolutionary	  alternative	  to	  commodity	  exchange.	  	  	  Yet,	   while	   Free	   Shops	   undoubtedly	   contribute	   to	   their	   local	   communities	   in	  redistributing	  goods	  and	  providing	  a	  commerce-­‐‑free	  space	  for	  socialising,	  I	  had	  a	  rising	  suspicion	  that	  the	  politicised	  concept	  of	  ‘gift	  economies’	  had	  turned	  into	  something	   like	   the	   economic	   equivalent	   of	   the	   ‘noble	   savage’	   –	   the	   imagined	  morally	  superior	  other	  of	   the	  (indeed)	  problematic	  commodity	  economy31.	   	   In	  practice,	  the	  donations	  to	  the	  Free	  Shop	  tended	  to	  come	  from	  people	  with	  more	  economic	  power	  and	  a	  relatively	  secure	  housing	  situation,	  while	  poorer	  patrons	  contributed	  comparably	  little	  and	  possibly	  benefitted	  relatively	  more.	  There	  is	  of	  course	   nothing	   wrong	  with	   this	   in	   principle	   –	   if	   translated	   into	   an	   economic	  doctrine	   however,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   it	   differs	   from	   traditional	   ideas	   of	  redistributive	  charity.	  Unless	  the	  question	  of	  private	  property	  is	  addressed	  –	  an	  issue	  notably	  absent	  in	  the	  politicised	  ‘gift	  economy’	  concepts	  and	  possibly	  the	  reason	   they	   tend	   to	   appeal	   to	  middle	   class	   liberals	   –	   an	   economic	  model	   that	  focuses	  entirely	  on	   the	   ‘sphere	  of	   circulation’32	  (Marx,	  1867,	   ch.	  3)	   is	  hardly	  a	  radical	  alternative	  to	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  Squatting,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  property	  directly,	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  buildings	  the	  squatters	  were	  occupying,	  and	  in	   the	   context	   of	   economic	   relations	   within	   the	   squats.	   Material	   goods	   came	  roughly	  in	  three	  categories:	  First,	  personal	  items	  such	  as	  sleeping	  bags,	  clothes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  There	  are	  in	  fact	  striking	  parallels	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘noble	  savage’	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  racist/colonialist	  implications.	  Several	  ‘gift	  economy’	  related	  email	  lists	  and	  blogs	  use	  the	  term	  ‘potlatch’	  as	  a	  vignette	  for	  ‘radical’	  gift	  giving,	  seemingly	  oblivious	  to	  its	  cultural	  context	  and	  history	  –	  as	  well	  as	  to	  its	  actual	  meaning,	  which	  is	  certainly	  very	  different	  from	  idyllic	  ‘gift	  giving’	  in	  a	  proto-­‐‑communist	  society.	  	  32	  In	  terms	  of	  classical	  anthropological	  theory,	  I	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  exchange	  is	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  the	  entire	  concept	  of	  ‘gift	  economies’	  –	  where	  actors	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  independent	  and	  separate,	  anything	  outside	  a	  ‘pool’	  economy	  must	  logically	  appear	  as	  a	  form	  of	  exchange,	  including	  gifts	  (see	  e.g.	  Sahlins,	  1972;	  Bourdieu,	  1977,	  10f).	  Structurally,	  these	  ‘gift-­‐‑exchange’	  models	  have	  everything	  in	  common	  with	  what	  Marx	  identifies	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  commodity	  fetishism:	  one	  substitutes	  relationships	  between	  people	  with	  relationships	  between	  things	  and	  then	  proceeds	  to	  behave	  as	  if	  the	  people	  were	  separate	  and	  the	  things	  were	  connected.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  established	  if	  this	  point	  of	  view	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  necessary	  distortion	  caused	  by	  the	  fetishistic	  consciousness	  of	  the	  anthropologist	  (see	  also	  discussion	  of	  reciprocity	  further	  down).	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mobile	  phones	  and	  laptops,	  books	  and	  objects	  of	  personal	  value.	  The	  individual	  ownership	  of	  these	  items	  was	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  disputed	  and	  they	  could	  normally	  be	  left	   in	  accessible	  places	  without	  being	  carried	  off.	  Second,	  communal	  items,	  which	  belonged	  to	  an	  entire	  crew	  or	  house,	  were	  used	  by	  all	  residents,	  and	  were	  often	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  salvage	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  eviction	  (these	  were	  things	  like	   tools,	   cookers,	  kitchen	   items,	  washing	  machines,	  amps,	  and	  occasionally	  a	  computer).	  And	  finally	   items	  that	  occupied	  a	  place	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  two	  –	  objects	  that	  were	  in	  principle	  communal	  but	  that	  somebody	  was	  presently	  using	  and	  that	  were	  therefore	   treated	  as	   if	   they	  were	  personal	   items	  until	   the	  person	   did	   not	   need	   them	   anymore.	   This	   applied	   to	   things	   like	   mattresses,	  heaters,	  small	  furniture,	  lighting	  and	  blankets.	  	  	  With	   the	   exception	  of	   personal	   items,	   distribution	  of	   things	  within	   –	   and	   to	   a	  lesser	  degree,	  between	  –	  squats	  followed	  a	  needs-­‐‑based	  logic.	  If	  an	  item	  was	  not	  in	  use,	  and	  would	  not	  be	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  it	  was	  generally	  accepted	  to	  ask	  for	  it	  or	  to	  give	  it	  away	  to	  someone	  who	  did	  need	  it.	  If	  a	  squat	  was	  short	  of	  a	  mattress	  due	  to	  a	  new	  inhabitant,	  and	  another	  squat	  had	  one	  spare,	  the	  mattress	  generally	  changed	  its	  location.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  to	  me	  that	  this	  could	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  gift-­‐‑giving	  scenario,	  I	  am	  however	  doubtful	  whether	  this	  concept	  applies	  here.	  Most	  objects	  were	  simply	  not	  regarded	  individual	  or	  collective	  property	  (in	  the	   sense	   of	   an	   inalienable	   association	   between	   object	   and	   owner	   which	  transcends	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  actual	  use)	  and	  thus	  fit	  to	  be	  ‘given	  away’	  by	  one	  individual	  or	  group	  to	  another.	  The	  situation	  was	  closer	  to	  a	  form	  of	  commons	  or	  pool	  of	  resources,	  which	  extended	  throughout	  the	  ‘scene’	  and	  sometimes	  beyond	  it	  to	  affiliated	  non-­‐‑squatters.	  	  Exchange	  of	  ‘goods’	  between	  squats	  developed	  a	  particular	  dynamic	  in	  times	  of	  evictions.	   Since	  vehicles,	  with	  which	   to	  move	   the	   contents	  of	   an	  entire	  house,	  were	  in	  short	  supply,	  many	  crews	  abandoned	  (or	  sometimes	  simply	  lost)	  a	  good	  part	   of	   their	  material	   possessions	  when	   they	  moved	   on.	   Since	   evictions	  were	  usually	  expected,	  crews	  would	  announce	  that	  there	  was	  ‘stuff	  to	  go’	  some	  days	  in	  advance,	  so	  other,	  temporarily	  more	  established,	  crews	  could	  pick	  it	  up.	  In	  one	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case	   an	   entire	   building,	   scheduled	   for	   demolition,	  was	   not	   only	   cleared	   of	   its	  inhabitants	  but	  also	  stripped	  of	  heaters,	  cookers,	  electric	  showers,	  fans,	  shower	  trays	   and	   washing	   basins,	   many	   of	   which	   reappeared	   as	   community	   assets	  throughout	  the	  scene.	  Even	  so,	  equipment	  like	  showers	  (for	  crews	  that	  squatted	  commercial	   properties)	   and	   washing	   machines	   were	   in	   short	   supply,	   which	  engendered	  a	  kind	  of	  cleanliness	  tourism	  between	  squats.	  I	  often	  walked	  from	  one	  end	  of	  town	  to	  the	  other	  to	  have	  a	  shower	  at	  Gavin’s	  squat,	  only	  to	  realise	  that	  the	  long	  walk	  home	  rendered	  the	  entire	  exercise	  redundant.	  	  	  Evictions	  were	  a	  regular	  part	  of	  everyday	   life	   for	  squatters.	  They	  came	   in	   two	  forms:	  legal	  ones,	  i.e.	  ones	  where	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  property	  had	  gone	  through	  the	  civil	  court	  system	  to	  obtain	  a	  possession	  order	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  Criminal	  Law	  Act	  197733.	  And	  illegal	  ones,	  in	  which	  owners	  attempted	  to	  take	  the	  law	  into	  their	  own	   hands	   and	   evict	   squatters	   by	   means	   of	   threats	   or	   violence.	   The	   former	  usually	  gave	  squatters	  time	  to	  prepare	  a	  legal	  defence,	  move	  their	  possessions	  in	  case	  the	  owner	  was	  given	  right	  (which	  nearly	  always	  happened	  eventually),	  or	  organise	  resistance.	  	  In	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  attacks	  by	  irate	  owners	  or	  ‘heavies’	  sent	  around	  by	  them	  could	  happen	  quickly	  and	  without	  warning,	  and	  were	  sometimes	  the	  reason	  crews	  lost	  all	  their	  belongings	  in	  chaotic	  escapes.	  These	  evictions	  were	  literally	   illegal,	  since	  the	   law	  forbid	  an	  owner	  to	   force	  his	  way	   into	  a	  squatted	  property	  or	  use	  violence	  to	  get	  the	  squatters	  out,	  but	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  property	  owners	  was	  unaware	  this	  was	  the	  case.	  	  For	   this	   reason,	   there	  was	  a	   system	  of	  eviction	  alerts	   in	  place	   that	   functioned	  much	  like	  a	  999	  call.	  If	  a	  crew	  found	  themselves	  under	  threat,	  the	  system	  allowed	  for	  the	  quick	  mobilisation	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  persons	  who	  would	  gather	  around	  the	  threatened	  squat	  to	  ‘show	  presence’	  and	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  attackers	  that	  their	  actions	  would	  not	  go	  unnoticed.	  Alerts	  could	  come	  any	  time	  day	  and	  night	  and	  usually	  resulted	  in	  all	  but	  one	  crew	  member	  jumping	  into	  clothes	  and	  boots,	  and	  cycling	  or	  running	  to	  the	  site	  of	  the	  attempted	  eviction	  (all	  but	  one	  because	  one	   person	   had	   to	   ‘squat-­‐‑sit’	   at	   all	   times	   since	   leaving	   the	   squat	   unattended	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Now	  amended	  by	  ‘Weatherly’s	  Law’	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meant	   losing	  all	   rights	  granted	  under	   the	   ‘squatter’s	   law’34).	   It	  usually	  did	  not	  take	  more	  than	  ten	  minutes	  for	  an	   ‘emergency	  crowd’	  of	  often	  masked	  up	  and	  deliberately	  menacing-­‐‑looking	  squatters	  to	  arrive	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  the	  besieged,	  and	  more	  often	  than	  not	  this	  convinced	  owner	  or	  heavies	  that	  the	  legal	  route	  to	  eviction	  may	  be	  more	  promising	  after	  all.	  Exceptions	  were	  cases	  when	  squatters	  realised	   they	   had	   entered	   a	   property	   owned	   by	   organised	   crime	   (which	  happened	  surprisingly	  often),	  in	  which	  case	  it	  was	  thought	  more	  prudent	  to	  just	  move	  on.	  	  	  The	  same	  strategy	  sometimes	  worked	  with	  legal	  evictions.	  When	  an	  owner	  won	  possession	   in	  court,	   they	  would	  usually	   send	  a	   legal	   representative	  or	  a	   court	  bailiff,	  sometimes	  accompanied	  by	  police,	  to	  take	  possession	  of	  the	  property	  and	  make	  it	  inaccessible	  by	  changing	  the	  locks.	  The	  reason	  this	  was	  often	  prevented	  is	  that	  the	  police	  did	  not	  seem	  very	  motivated	  to	  enforce	  such	  possession	  orders	  –	  after	  all	  they	  were	  a	  civil	  matter	  –	  and	  so	  it	  sometimes	  took	  as	  little	  as	  a	  small	  ‘Christmas	  market’	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  stalls	  right	  in	  front	  of	  the	  squat’s	  door	  to	  turn	  them	  away35.	  In	  other	  cases	  a	  squat	  would	  be	  abandoned	  to	  the	  ‘conquerors’,	  only	  to	   be	   re-­‐‑squatted	   hours	   later	   by	   means	   of	   a	   secret	   entrance	   that	   had	   been	  prepared	  before	  the	  squatters	  left.	  One	  such	  case	  was	  the	  motorcycle	  shop	  across	  the	  road	  from	  the	  Smiling	  Chair,	  which	  served	  as	  an	  events	  space	  for	  gigs	  and	  parties	  and	  would	  often	  see	  up	  to	  a	  hundred	  people	  celebrating	  until	  the	  early	  morning.	   It	   was	   evicted	   and	   re-­‐‑squatted	   a	   total	   of	   four	   times,	   since	   the	   roof	  proved	  just	  too	  easy	  to	  access,	  no	  matter	  how	  well	  the	  door	  was	  secured.	  	  	  The	  system	  of	  eviction	  alerts	  illustrates	  Butler’s	  argument	  that	  vulnerability	  can	  create	  community36.	  Few	  squatters	  were	  exempt	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  eviction,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  see	  chapter	  3	  35	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  occurred	  when	  police	  suspected	  that	  known	  political	  activists	  were	  inside	  a	  squat,	  in	  which	  case	  evictions	  were	  sometimes	  enforced	  with	  dogs,	  pepper	  spray	  and	  occasionally,	  a	  helicopter.	  36	  It	  would	  of	  course	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  theorise	  it	  under	  a	  paradigm	  of	  ‘reciprocity’	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  covert	  version	  of	  the	  social	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  individual	  self-­‐‑interests:	  squatters	  could	  then	  be	  seen	  to	  help	  each	  other	  because	  they	  expected	  that	  others	  would	  come	  to	  their	  aid	  when	  they	  were	  in	  trouble.	  This	  shows	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘reciprocity’	  –	  since	  it	  is	  formulated	  as	  an	  exchange,	  it	  presupposes	  the	  actors	  as	  independent	  beings	  who	  are	  connected	  only	  by	  the	  act	  of	  exchange	  itself.	  This	  is	  basically	  the	  extension	  of	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even	  those	  who	  had	  been	  in	  long	  term	  possession	  of	  their	  squats	  had	  no	  actual	  certainty	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  put	  out	  on	  the	  street	  on	  any	  given	  day.	  More	  commonly,	   crews	   were	   made	   to	   move	   on	   within	   the	   space	   of	   a	   few	   weeks,	  sometimes	  months.	  The	  stress	  of	  this	  enforced	  mobility,	  the	  occasional	  violence	  and	  the	  re-­‐‑occurring	  state	  of	  being	  without	  shelter	  let	  no	  one	  forget	  for	  long	  the	  dependency	  of	  his	  or	  her	  bodily	   integrity	  on	   the	  availability	  of	  a	  safe	  space	   to	  inhabit	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	   the	  requisite	  comrades	  on	   the	  other.	  To	  be	  a	  squatter,	   on	   one	   level,	   therefore	   meant	   to	   acknowledge	   this	   vulnerability	   in	  oneself	  (whether	  it	  was	  called	  that	  or	  not)	  and	  subsequently	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	   recognise	   it	   in	   others	   as	  well.	  While	   the	   “apprehension	   of	   common	  human	  vulnerability”	  (Butler,	  2004,	  30)	  thus	  created	  commonality,	  it	  also	  laid	  the	  basis	  for	  mutual	  aid,	   in	   that	  one’s	  own	  experience	  of	  vulnerability	  became	  precisely	  “the	  principle	  of	  protecting	  others	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  violence	  we	  have	  suffered”	  (22)	  and	  compels	  one	  to	  “treat	  the	  other...as	  deserving	  an	  ethical	  response	  from	  us”	  (30),	  that	  is,	  to	  treat	  him	  or	  her	  as	  an	  ethical	  subject.	  	  	  Butler	   explains,	   somewhat	   self-­‐‑consciously,	   that	   her	   theory	   of	   recognition	   is	  “perhaps	  a	  version	  of	  Hegel”	  but	  it	  is	  “also	  a	  departure,	  since	  I	  will	  not	  discover	  myself	  as	  the	  same	  as	  the	  ‘you’	  on	  which	  I	  depend	  in	  order	  to	  be”	  (2004,	  44).	  It	  is	  possibly	   an	   oversimplification	   of	   Hegel’s	   theory	   to	   conclude	   that	   his	   complex	  account	   of	   the	   sublation	   of	   dynamic	   contradictions	   results	   in	   them	   merely	  turning	   out	   to	   be	   “the	   same”37 .	   Nevertheless,	   Butler’s	   intuition	   that	   she	   has	  reformulated	  a	  Hegelian	  account	  of	  ethics	  deserves	  a	  closer	  look,	  since,	  as	  will	  become	   clear	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	  mutual	   recognition	   of	   one	   another	   as	  ethical	  subjects	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  squatter’s	  political	  and	  ethical	  practice.	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  return	  all	  the	  way	  to	  Hegel	  himself	  for	  this	  purpose,	  as	  a	  recent	  reappraisal	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  ethics,	  formulated	  by	  Axel	  Honneth	  (1996),	  provides	  an	  excellent	  basis	  for	  my	  discussion.	  Honneth	  takes	  as	  his	  starting	  point	  Hegel’s	  early	  theory	  of	  the	  social	  as	  a	  struggle	  for	  mutual	  recognition,	  which	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  commodity	  fetishism	  to	  things	  that	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  commodities,	  such	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  act	  of	  defending	  one	  another	  from	  violence.	  	  37	  Although	  it	  is	  also	  fair	  to	  point	  out	  that	  embodiment	  really	  does	  put	  limitations	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  Hegel’s	  system	  in	  the	  interpersonal	  realm,	  since	  humans	  simply	  cannot	  merge	  into	  a	  physical	  unity.	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Hegel’s	  his	  later	  work	  survives	  mainly	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  his	  famous	  Master-­‐‑Slave	  dialectic.	  Its	  central	  thesis	  is	  that	  people’s	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  of	  one	  another	  as	  (ethical)	  subjects	   leads	   to	  a	  state	  of	  moral	   tension	   in	  society,	  which	   in	   turn	  sparks	  political	  struggle	  and	  thus	  historical	  change.	  For	  Hegel	  the	  ideal	  state	  of	  society	   is	   one	   of	   ethical	   consensus	   (‘Sittlichkeit’)	   beyond	   state	   law	   or	  merely	  subjective	   moral	   convictions	   (Honneth,	   1996,	   13).	   He	   therefore	   sees	   the	  resolution	  of	  these	  struggles	  for	  recognition	  as	  a	  precondition	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘absolute	  ethical	  life’	  (ibid.).	  Honneth	  argues	  that	  between	  the	  early	  Jena	  period	  and	  the	  Phenomenology,	  Hegel	  undergoes	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  the	  interpersonal	  social	   to	   the	   inner	   structure	   of	   consciousness,	   with	   Lordship	   and	   Bondage	  arguably	   referring	   to	   the	   latter.	  While	   this	   has	   some	   important	   consequences	  (which	   I	   will	   discuss	   in	   later	   chapters),	   it	   has	   not	   kept	   numerous	   writers	  (including	  Kojève,	  Fanon	  and	  Jessica	  Benjamin,	  among	  others)	  from	  applying	  the	  logic	   of	   ‘Lordship’	   to	   social	   relations.	   In	   my	   view,	   this	   is	   not	   technically	   a	  misreading,	  since	  for	  Hegel,	  the	  structure	  of	  individual	  consciousness	  and	  that	  of	  
Geist	  as	  the	  universal	  collective	  consciousness	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  same	  (with	  the	  two	  mutually	  reproducing	  each	  other).	  Furthermore,	  given	  that	  Hegel	  took	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  the	  actually	  existing	  slave	  revolts	  of	  his	  time	  (Buck-­‐‑Morss,	  2009),	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  even	  though	  he	  uses	  Master	  and	  Slave	  as	  metaphors	  for	  parts	  of	  consciousness,	  the	  metaphor	  is	  in	  fact	  derived	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  real-­‐‑life	   relations	   of	   domination.	   In	   so	   far	   as	   these	   relationships	   become	  internalised	  (see	  Benjamin,	  1988/2013;	  Duffell	  2000,	  2014),	  the	  circle	  between	  intrapersonal	   and	   interpersonal	   relations	   of	   domination	   closes	   in	   the	   above	  sense.	  With	  this	  caveat,	  I	  will	  therefore	  follow	  the	  well-­‐‑trodden	  path	  of	  using	  the	  terminology	   of	   Lordship	   and	   Bondage	   to	   refer	   to	   interpersonal	   relations	   of	  domination.	  	  A	  similar	  observation	  is	  made	  by	  Marx,	  who	  remarks	  in	  a	  footnote	  in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   Capital:	   “In	   a	   sort	   of	   way,	   it	   is	   with	   man	   as	   with	  commodities.	  Since	  he	  comes	  into	  the	  world	  neither	  with	  a	  looking	  glass	  in	  his	  hand,	  nor	  as	  a	  Fichtian	  philosopher,	  to	  whom	  “I	  am	  I”	  is	  sufficient,	  man	  first	  sees	  and	  recognises	  himself	  in	  other	  men.	  Peter	  only	  establishes	  his	  own	  identity	  as	  a	  man	  by	  first	  comparing	  himself	  with	  Paul	  as	  being	  of	  like	  kind.	  And	  thereby	  Paul,	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just	  as	  he	  stands	  in	  his	  Pauline	  personality,	  becomes	  to	  Peter	  the	  type	  of	  the	  genus	  
homo”	  (1867)	  	  According	  to	  Hegel,	  recognition	  is	  crucially	  important	  because	  a	  subject’s	  identity	  as	  a	  particular	  subject	  (an	  autonomous	  individual,	  a	  ‘self’)	  is	  constructed	  within	  an	   inter-­‐‑subjective	   relation,	   and	   thus,	   the	   experience	   of	   oneself	   as	   a	   ‘self’	   is	  fundamentally	  dependent	  on	  recognition	  through	  another:	  	  	  “To	  the	  degree	  that	  a	  subject	  knows	  itself	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  another	  subject	  with	  
regard	   to	   certain	   of	   its	   (the	   subject’s)	   abilities	   and	   qualities	   and	   is	   thereby	  
reconciled	  with	  the	  other,	  a	  subject	  also	  always	  comes	  to	  know	  its	  own	  distinctive	  
identity	  and	   thereby	  comes	   to	  be	  opposed	  once	  again	   to	   the	  other	  as	   something	  
particular”	  (Honneth,	  1996,	  16f).	  	  	  Only	  in	  an	  encounter	  with	  an	  other	  can	  a	  self	  therefore	  experience	  itself	  as	  itself,	  i.e.	   a	   fully	   individuated	  person	   (compare	   to	   this	  Metzinger’s	   ‘phenomenal	   self	  model’	   as	   discussed	   above).	   Lack	   of	   recognition,	   or	   ‘misrecognition’38,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   constitutes	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   subject,	   since	   its	   existence	   as	   an	  autonomous39	  self	  is	  denied	  and	  it	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  certain	  of	  this	  existence	  itself.	  But	  if	  it	  is	  not	  an	  autonomous	  self,	  it	  follows	  that	  it	  is	  merely	  a	  function	  of	  the	  self	  of	  another,	  an	  object	  –	  denial	  of	  recognition	  therefore	  is	  what	  constitutes	  objectification	  or	  Verdinglichung40.	  This	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  a	  struggle,	  since	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  In	  the	  German	  original,	  Honneth	  speaks	  of	  ‘Missachtung’,	  which	  has	  been	  translated	  into	  English	  as	  ‘disrespect’.	  As	  German	  is	  my	  first	  language,	  I	  find	  this	  somewhat	  misleading	  -­‐‑	  my	  own	  translation	  would	  be	  closer	  to	  something	  like	  ‘malicious	  contempt’.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  its	  opposite,	  Achtung,	  with	  ‘respect’.	  For	  the	  German	  speaker,	  Respekt	  indicates	  a	  stance	  of	  cautious	  apprehension,	  and	  it	  is	  often	  invoked	  by	  authority	  figures	  when	  what	  they	  mean	  is	  ‘obedience’.	  Achtung	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  etymologically	  close	  to	  Achtsamkeit,	  deriving	  from	  a	  common	  root	  that	  means	  ‘awareness’.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  so	  much	  ‘respect’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  apprehension	  that	  the	  misrecognised	  lack,	  but	  Achtung,	  namely	  awareness	  of	  them	  as	  people	  who	  exist,	  who	  matter.	  	  39	  ‘Autonomous’	  here	  means	  ‘existing	  in	  oneself	  and	  for	  oneself’	  as	  opposed	  to	  existing	  merely	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  self	  of	  another’.	  ‘Autonomy’	  therefore	  does	  not	  mean	  an	  existence	  outside	  of,	  or	  unaffected	  by,	  social	  relations	  –	  on	  the	  contrary,	  Honneth/Hegel	  emphasise	  the	  crucial	  dependency	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  such	  a	  self	  on	  recognition	  and	  mirroring	  by	  an	  other.	  	  40	  I	  add	  the	  German	  word	  because	  it	  helps	  to	  underscore	  that	  ‘objectification’	  does	  not	  merely	  mean,	  as	  it	  is	  often	  used	  in	  everyday	  political	  discourse,	  the	  sexualisation	  of	  the	  (female)	  body,	  but	  points	  to	  a	  more	  encompassing	  regard	  of	  another	  person	  as	  a	  thing	  without	  a	  first	  hand	  perspective	  of	  his/her	  own.	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thus	  objectified	  self	  must	  then	  prove	  to	  the	  other	  that	  it	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  ‘someone’	  and	  not	  a	  ‘something’,	  a	  subject	  like	  the	  other	  and	  not	  just	  an	  object	  at	  the	  other’s	  disposal	  (compare	  also	  Fanon,	  1968,	  217).	  As	  Honneth	  argues,	  “The	  ‘grammar’	  of	  such	  struggles	  is	  ‘moral’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  feelings	  of	  outrage	  and	  indignation	  driving	   them	  are	  generated	  by	   the	   rejection	  of	   claims	   to	   recognition	  and	   thus	  imply	  normative	  judgments	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  social	  arrangements”	  (1996,	  xxi).	   The	  moral	   grammar	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   relation	   is	   therefore	   the	   grammar	   of	  dissent	  –	  a	  grammar	  in	  which	  the	  speaker	  constitutes	  him	  or	  herself	  in	  the	  very	  act	  of	  speaking	  against	  an	  other	  who	  expects	  him	  or	  her	  to	  remain	  a	  silent	  tool.	  Speaking	   –	   through	  words	   and	   actions	   –	   however,	   involves	   the	   kind	   of	   active	  relating	  to	  the	  world	  that	  with	  Metzinger	  we	  have	  above	  called	  the	  ‘phenomenal	  model	  of	  the	  intentionality	  relation’	  (PMIR).	  The	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Hegelian	  subject	  is	  therefore	  precisely	  that	  it	  involves	  a	  functioning	  intentionality	  relation,	  namely	  the	  ability	  to	  relate	  to	  the	  world	  with	  intention	  and	  direction,	  precisely	  the	  ability	  that	  a	  mere	  object	  does	  not	  posses.	  In	  order	  to	  ‘prove’	  that	  one	  is	  a	  subject,	  one	  therefore	  has	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  one’s	  directedness	  at	  the	  world	  is	  ‘real’,	  that	  one’s	   desire	   can	   produce	   an	   effect,	   that	   one	   is	   indeed	   self-­‐‑	   and	   not	   other-­‐‑determined	  -­‐‑	  hence	  why	   in	  Lordship	   the	   ‘slave’	  eventually	  manages	  to	   liberate	  himself	  through	  his	  labour	  –	  laboring	  on	  the	  world	  enables	  him	  to	  develop	  and	  experience	  the	  intentionality	  relation	  that	  the	  Master	  has	  denied.	  	  	  My	  point	  here	  –	  and	  the	  reason	  I	  have	  brought	  Metzinger	  into	  this	  discussion	  –	  is	  that	  the	  concepts	  Honneth,	  Hegel	  and	  the	  other	  theorists	  we	  will	  encounter	  in	  the	  following	   chapters	   use	   to	   describe	   ethical	   relations	   are	   not	   merely	   poetic	  metaphors.	  They	  correspond	  to	  material,	  physical	  processes	  through	  which	  our	  bodies	  and	  brains	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  psychophysical	  processes	  we	  experience	  as	  our	  ‘selves’.	  When	  Hegel	  speaks	  of	  a	  ‘struggle	  to	  the	  death’	   then	   this	   can	   therefore	   be	   understood	   quite	   literally	   –	   a	   self	   who	   is	  objectified	   and	   enslaved,	   that	   is,	  whose	   intentionality	   relation	   to	   the	  world	   is	  severely	  impeded,	  may	  eventually	  stop	  functioning	  altogether.	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  this	  point	  in	  chapter	  12.	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Recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  dynamic	  processes	  by	  which	  people	  either	  create	  or	  undo	  each	  other,	  each	  developing	  its	  own	  inner	  necessity.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	   being	   recognised	   by	   an	   other,	   a	   person	   can	   develop	   a	  “practical	  relation-­‐‑to-­‐‑self”	  (Honneth,	  1996,	  xii),	  which	  in	  turn	  enables	  him	  or	  her	  to	   give	   recognition	   back	   to	   the	   other.	   In	   this	   sense,	   people	   always	   mutually	  mediate	  each	  other’s	  experience	  of	  full	  personhood.	  Crucially,	  recognition	  must	  necessarily	   be	   reciprocal,	   since	   only	   a	   person	   who	   has	   been	   recognised	   as	   a	  subject	  is	  able	  to	  reciprocate	  in	  kind.	  In	  this	  mutual	  relation	  of	  recognition	  lies,	  for	  Hegel,	  the	  key	  to	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  freedom	  (a	  freedom	  for	  each	  other,	  as	  opposed	   to	  a	  Hobbesian	   idea	  of	   the	   freedom	  of	  atomised	   individuals	  
from	   each	   other).	   Because	   persons	   can	   only	   co-­‐‑create	   one	   another	   as	   free	  subjects,	  a	  communicative	  sphere	  is	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  freedom.	  This	  relationship	  of	  mutual	  co-­‐‑creation	  is	  also	  discussed	  by	  Butler	   (2004):	   “to	  ask	   for	  recognition,	  or	   to	  offer	   it,	   is	  precisely	  not	   to	  ask	   for	  recognition	   for	   what	   one	   already	   is.	   It	   is	   to	   solicit	   a	   becoming,	   to	   instigate	   a	  transformation,	  to	  petition	  the	  future	  always	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other.	  It	  is	  also	  to	  stake	   one's	   own	   being,	   and	   one's	   own	   persistence	   in	   one's	   own	   being,	   in	   the	  struggle	  for	  recognition”	  (44)	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  master/slave	  model	  illustrates	  what	  happens	  when	  this	  mutual	   recognition	   fails:	   the	   result	   is	   a	   relationship	   of	   domination	   and	  submission,	  in	  which	  one	  party	  attempts	  to	  force	  the	  other	  to	  respect	  them	  while	  at	   the	   same	   time	   refusing	   them	   recognition.	   However,	   in	   denying	   the	   slave	  recognition	  as	  an	  autonomous	  subject,	  the	  master	  has	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reduced	  the	  slave	  to	  a	  person	  whose	  recognition	  of	  the	  master	  is	  worthless.	  In	  dominating	  the	  other,	  the	  master	  thus	  destroys	  the	  possibility	  of	  recognition	  for	  himself;	  in	  other	  words,	  in	  enslaving	  the	  other	  he	  has	  relinquished	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  own	  freedom.	  Freedom,	  for	  Hegel,	  therefore	  must	  be	  thought	  as	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	  liberation,	  since	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  be	  submissive	  and	  free,	  but	  equally	  impossible	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to	  dominate	  and	  be	  free	  –	  the	  master’s	  “existential	  impasse”	  (Kojève,	  1947/1980,	  19)	  therefore	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  always	  also	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  slave41.	  	  	  	  Honneth	   argues	   that	   recognition	   and	   misrecognition	   are	   basic	   dynamics	   of	  human	  relating	  that	  can	  affect	  a	  person	   in	  different	  dimensions	  of	   their	  being.	  Overt	   physical,	   emotional	   or	   sexual	   abuse	   therefore	   count	   as	   forms	   of	  misrecognition,	  as	  do	  the	  denial	  of	  rights,	  insults	  or	  general	  disregard.	  Honneth	  identifies	  three	  ‘levels’	  of	  identity	  formation	  through	  social	  relations,	  which	  he	  refers	   to	   as	   self-­‐‑confidence,	   self-­‐‑esteem	   and	   self-­‐‑respect.	   They	   are	   produced	  within	   three	  associated	  domains	  of	   the	   social:	   close	   relationships/friendships,	  which	   affirm	   a	   person’s	   basic	   needs	   and	   physical/emotional	   existence;	  institutionalised	  relations,	  which	  affirm	  the	  universal	  autonomy	  and	  dignity	  of	  persons	  (e.g.	  legal	  relations);	  and	  relations	  of	  solidarity,	  which	  affirm	  each	  person	  in	   his	   or	   her	   particularity.	   Each	   follows	   a	   particular	   mode	   of	   recognition,	  corresponding	   to	  different	  dimensions	  of	   the	   ‘personality’:	   emotional	   support,	  cognitive	  respect	  and	  social	  esteem.	  	  Each	  makes	  a	  demand	  for	  recognition	  at	  a	  different	   level	  of	   the	  social,	  and	  each	  corresponds	   to	  particular	  expressions	  of	  disrespect,	   such	   as	   abuse,	   rape	   and	   torture	   on	   the	   level	   of	   self-­‐‑confidence	  (physical/emotive	  existence);	  exclusion	  and	  denial	  of	  rights	  on	  the	  level	  of	  self-­‐‑esteem	   (universal	  personhood);	   and	   insult	   or	  denigration	  on	   the	   level	   of	   self-­‐‑respect	   (particular	   individuality)	   (Honneth,	   1996,	   129)	   Honneth,	   slightly	  confusingly,	  contrasts	  misrecognition	  on	  the	  physical	  level	  though	  such	  acts	  as	  abuse	   and	   rape	   with	   the	   form	   of	   recognition	   he	   terms	   ‘emotional	   support’.	   I	  would	  argue	  that	   the	  kind	  of	  mutual	  respect	   that	   leads	  people	  to	  respect	  each	  other’s	   physical	   integrity	   amounts	   to	   more	   than	   just	   ‘emotional’	   support,	   it	  means	   specifically	   also	   practical	   respect	   for	   the	   embodiedness	   of	   the	   other.	  	  Honneth	  may	  here	  simply	  conflate	  embodiment	  and	  emotion	  (as	  the	  experience	  of	  embodiment),	  but	  his	  formulation	  could	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  that	  a	  physical	  assault	  is	  on	  the	  same	  level	  of	  gravity	  as	  hurting	  somebody’s	  feelings.	  I	  therefore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  dynamic	  of	  misrecognition	  is	  therefore	  something	  like	  a	  ‘race	  to	  the	  bottom’	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  emancipation.	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explicitly	  include	  physical	  integrity	  as	  one	  level	  of	  recognition/misrecognition	  in	  my	  further	  discussion.	  	  	  	  	  Recognition,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  affirming	  one	  another’s	  social	  or	  cultural	  identity	  –	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  most	  basic	  mode	  of	  acknowledging	  or	  disregarding	   one	   another’s	   physical,	   emotional	   and	   cognitive	   integrity 42 .	   As	  Butler	   above,	   Honneth	   specifically	   acknowledges	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  experience	  of	  ‘ownership’	  of	  embodied	  space	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  identity	  of	  self	  and	  body,	  and	  of	  having	  secure	  boundaries	  –	  misrecognition	  therefore	  often	  involves	  a	  disregard	  for	  the	  boundaries	  of	  another’s	  spatial	  self,	  and	  a	  colonisation	  of	  their	  ‘inner	  space’	  by	  another.	  Thus	  disregarding	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  another	  person’s	  body,	  in	  Butler’s	  terms,	  then	  connects	  to	  a	  disregard	  for	  one’s	  own	  vulnerability,	  and	  in	  chapter	  5	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  such	  a	  stance	  is	  produced	  in	  the	   ‘Western’	  subject.	  Crucially,	   the	  “apprehension	  of	  common	  human	  vulnerability”	  (Butler,	  2004,	  30)	  and	   thus	   the	  recognition	  of	  each	  other	  as	  ethical	  subjects,	   in	  such	  a	  stance	  becomes	  impossible	  –	  a	  situation	  not	  unlike	  the	  ‘cognitive	  distortion’	  of	  Bourdieu’s	  anthropologist.	  	  One	  –	  in	  its	  simplicity	  intriguing	  –	  consequence	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  ethics	  is	  that	  fundamentally,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  types	  of	  human	  relationships	  –	  those	  based	  on	  recognition,	  and	  those	  based	  on	  misrecognition.	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  make	  use	  of	   this	  very	  opposition	  to	  explore	  what	  happens	  when	  they	  come	  to	  bear	  on	  what	  since	  Lefebvre	  (1974/1991)	  has	  been	  called	  the	  “social	  production	  of	  space”	  –	  namely	  the	  construction	  of	  spatial	  arrangements	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  simultaneously	  reflect	  and	  reproduce	  particular	  social	  (and	  for	  my	  purposes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Honneth	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘integrity’	  without	  a	  strict	  definition.	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  interpreted	  in	  two	  ways:	  it	  could	  refer	  to	  a)	  the	  intactness	  of	  a	  person’s	  physical,	  emotional	  and	  cognitive	  boundaries	  and	  b)	  the	  ‘integration’	  of	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  person	  into	  a	  consistent,	  unbroken	  whole	  (see	  chapters	  5,	  11).	  Arguably,	  the	  notion	  of	  respecting	  a	  person’s	  ‘boundaries’	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  describe	  an	  atomistic	  view	  of	  social	  relations,	  in	  which	  persons	  are	  clearly	  separated	  and	  bounded	  against	  each	  other.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  take	  this	  reading	  as	  necessarily	  at	  odds	  with	  a	  more	  intersubjective	  notion	  of	  individuality,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  recognition	  of	  other	  as	  other	  (autonomous	  and	  separate	  from	  self)	  is	  a	  crucial	  step	  within	  recognition.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  Jessica	  Benjamin	  (1988)	  notes,	  the	  ‘internal’	  integration	  of	  the	  person	  to	  a	  point	  where	  he/she	  is	  not	  in	  contradiction	  with	  him/herself	  is	  equally	  important	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  full	  subjectivity	  (see	  chapter	  11).	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here,	   ethical)	   relations.	   Before	   embarking	   on	   this	   discussion,	   however,	   I	   will	  return	  once	  more	  to	   the	  anthropologist’s	  relation	  to	  his	   ‘subjects’,	  particularly	  homeless	  ones,	  and	  ask	  not	  so	  much	  what	  the	  anthropological	  literature	  has	  had	  to	  say	  about	  homelessness,	  but	  what	  the	  literature	  about	  homelessness	  tells	  us	  about	  anthropology.	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“Ok,	  so	  who	  needs	  a	  space?”	  Joe’s	  eyes	  scan	  the	  small	  circle	  of	  about	  two-­‐‑dozen	  
bodies	  he	  is	  currently	  presiding	  over.	  A	  few	  hands	  go	  up.	  
	  
Joe	  points	  his	  biro	  at	  a	  young	  man	  who	  is	  indecisively	  perched	  on	  a	  chair	  between	  
the	  circle	  and	  the	  door.	  As	  attention	  shifts	  to	  him,	  he	  sits	  up	  and	  clears	  his	  throat.	  	  
	  
“Hi,	  I’m	  Andy”	  he	  says	  “I	  heard	  about	  this	  in	  the	  bookshop.	  I’ve	  been	  evicted	  from	  
my	  place	  two	  weeks	  ago.	  Now	  I	  sleep	  on	  my	  mate’s	  couch	  but	  I	  can’t	  stay	  there.	  
The	  people	  in	  the	  bookshop	  said	  I	  should	  try	  coming	  here.”	  
	  
“Have	  you	  squatted	  before?”	  Joe	  asks.	  Andy	  shakes	  his	  head.	  “Anyone	  got	  space?”	  
	  
For	  a	  short	  moment,	  the	  room	  is	  alive	  with	  non-­‐‑verbal	  communication.	  Glances	  
wander	  from	  Andy	  to	  other	  participants,	  faces	  are	  made	  and	  hands	  waved.	  Andy	  
shifts	  uncomfortably	  as	  he	  is	  aware	  he	  is	  being	  sized	  up	  but	  does	  not	  know	  what	  
rules	  he	  is	  being	  judged	  by.	  From	  where	  I’m	  sitting,	  I	  can	  tell	  he	  won’t	  have	  it	  too	  
difficult	  –	  he	  is	  in	  his	  early	  twenties,	  looks	  fairly	  together	  and	  does	  not	  show	  any	  
obvious	  signs	  of	  alcohol	  or	  drug	  abuse.	  He	  should	  be	  easy	  to	  house.	  
	  
Eventually	  Liz,	  who	  is	  sitting	  with	  a	  small	  delegation	  of	  her	  squat-­‐‑mates,	  speaks	  
up.	  “We	  have	  plenty	  of	  space.	  It	  needs	  a	  lot	  of	  fixing	  though.	  You	  any	  good	  with	  
fixing	  roofs?”	  
	  
The	  question	  is	  asked	  half-­‐‑jokingly,	  as	  if	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  roof-­‐‑fixing	  is	  not	  the	  
make-­‐‑or-­‐‑break	  condition	  of	  this	  offer,	  but	  Andy	  nods	  enthusiastically.	  “Sure,	  I’m	  
not	   too	   bad	   with	   tools,	   I	   can	   give	   it	   a	   go”.	   He	   seems	   relieved	   to	   have	   found	  
something	  to	  contribute	  that	  will	  ensure	  his	  accommodation.	  Liz	  smiles	  and	  nods	  
“cool,	  you	  come	  with	  us	  after	  this”.	  	  
	  
“Great”	  says	  Joe	  “next?”	  Figure	  5:	  Fieldnote	  2	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Chapter	  Three:	  Making	  Truth	  Claims	  Like	  You	  Mean	  It	  
	  
	  
For,	  after	  all,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  that	  two	  
and	  two	  make	  four?	  Or	  that	  the	  force	  of	  
gravity	   works?	   Or	   that	   the	   past	   is	  
unchangeable?	   If	   both	   the	   past	   and	   the	  
external	  world	  exist	  only	  in	  the	  mind,	  and	  
if	   the	  mind	   itself	   is	   controllable	   –	  what	  
then?	  George	  Orwell	  	  	  In	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  question	  of	  empathic	  understanding	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  capacity	  to	  understand	  what	  a	  particular	  situation	  another	  human	   is	   in	  means	   from	   their	   own	   perspective	   –	   for	   the	   kind	   of	   insight	   that	  participant	  observation	  as	  a	   fieldwork	  method	   is	   supposed	   to	  produce.	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  assumptions	  of	  disaffectedness	  and	  invulnerability	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  impact	  the	  flourishing	  or	  suffering	  of	  another	  cause	  the	  ‘cognitive	  distortion’	   which,	   according	   to	   Bourdieu,	   prevents	   anthropologists	   from	  experiencing	  ‘the	  field’	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  fundamentally	  affected.	  In	  more	  general	  terms,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  detachment	  also	  informs	  what	  we	  could	  now	  refer	  to	  as	  an	  ‘ethical	  distortion’,	  in	  that	  it	  precludes	  people’s	   ability	   to	  mutually	   recognise	   each	  other	   as	   ethical	   subjects,	   and	   thus	  leads	  to	  relationships	  characterised	  by	  what	  with	  Honneth	  (1996)	  I	  have	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘misrecognition’.	  Before	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  more	  in-­‐‑depth	  discussion	  of	  how	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  inform	  the	  production	  of	  space,	  I	  want	  to	  return	  once	   more	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   anthropologist	   and	   his/her	  respondents.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this	  course	  of	  action:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  doctoral	  thesis	  is	  normally	  expected	  to	  contain	  a	  chapter	  covering	  the	  ‘literature	  review’.	  In	  my	  case,	  this	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  fairly	  complex	  task,	  since	  the	  question	  would	  be	  which	  of	  the	  many	  literatures	  I	  am	  drawing	  on	  should	  be	  included.	  In	  order	  not	   to	  entirely	  neglect	  convention,	   I	  have	   therefore	  decided	   to	  opt	   for	  a	  review	  of	   the	   literature	   on	  homelessness,	   not	   least	   because	   this	   allows	  me	   to	  critically	   contrast	  my	   ethnographic	   data	   –	   namely	  what	   homeless	   people	   say	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about	  themselves	  –	  with	  what	  scholars	  from	  a	  number	  of	  disciplines	  have	  said	  about	   them.	  The	   ‘literature	  review’	   I	  undertake	   in	   this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next	   is	  therefore	   not	   so	  much	   comprehensive	   as	   structural:	   I	  will	   introduce	   types	   or	  kinds	  of	  literature	  about	  homelessness,	  and	  discuss	  in	  what	  way	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  replicate	  or	  critique	  the	  methodological	  quandaries	  I	  have	  raised	  so	  far.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  doctoral	  theses	  are	  also	  supposed	  to	  contain	  some	  account	  of	  their	  epistemological	  premises,	  although	  especially	  in	  ethnographic	  writing	  these	  are	  often	  left	  implicit.	  This	  relative	  lack	  of	  enthusiasm	  for	  epistemological	  debate	  is	  understandable	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  ethnography	  is	  based	  in	  one	  of	  just	  two	  possible	  paradigms	  –	  a	  positivist,	   ‘scientifically’	  oriented	  one,	  or	  a	  critical,	  ‘poststructuralist’	  one	  	  –	  	  and	  the	  reader	  can	  often	  tell	  from	  the	  back	  cover	  which	  of	  them	  he	  or	  she	  is	   looking	  at.	  However,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  following,	  both	  these	   paradigms	   produce	   particular	   problems	   when	   applied	   to	   the	   study	   of	  ‘homelessness’.	  I	  will	  therefore	  spend	  some	  more	  time	  discussing	  what	  position	  I	  am	  taking,	  and	  why	  this	  question	  matters.	  	  	  I	   have	   argued	   in	   chapter	   two	   that	   when	   the	   normative	   detachment	   that	  distinguishes	  the	  anthropologist’s	  stance	  from	  that	  of	  the	  ‘native’	  breaks	  down	  –	  for	   example	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   an	  unintended	  experience	  of	   shared	  vulnerability	  between	  anthropologist	  and	  ‘native’	  –	  the	  result	  can	  be	  a	  practical	  alignment	  of	  evaluative	   judgment	   that	   suspends	   this	   distortion.	   However,	   that	   such	  experiences	  are	  most	  often	  unintended,	  accidental,	  and	  perceived	  as	  undesirable	  (as	   illustrated	   by	   notions	   such	   as	   ‘going	   native’),	   points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  anthropology	  in	  general	  considers	  this	  type	  of	  normative	  alignment	  somewhat	  gauche.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  discipline	  has	  gone	  to	  considerable	  lengths	  to	  not	  only	  keep	  Bourdieu’s	  distortion	  intact,	  but	  has	  utilised	  whatever	  epistemological	  and	  meta-­‐‑theoretical43	  positions	   it	  has	  encountered	  within	   the	  past	  hundred	  years	  chiefly	  to	  cement	  it.	  ‘Meta-­‐‑theory’	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  term	  that	  flows	  freely	  from	  ethnographer’s	   pens,	   as	   too	   often	   we	   identify	   with	   statements	   such	   as	   Dell	  Hymes’:	  “the	  justification	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  anthropology	  is	  to	  find	  out	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Meta-­‐‑theory:	  “theories	  about	  the	  foundational	  assumptions	  and	  preconditions	  of	  science.	  Critical	  realism,	  phenomenology,	  hermeneutics	  and	  positivism	  are	  metatheories	  building	  on	  different	  ontologies	  and	  epistemologies”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  118)	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the	  world,	  not	  produce	   third-­‐‑rate	  philosophers”44.	   However,	   I	  will	   argue	  here	  that	   meta-­‐‑theoretical	   assumptions	   have	   a	   decisive	   influence	   on	   what	  anthropologists	  can	  and	  do	  find	  out	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  our	  ethical	  obligation	  towards	  our	  respondents	  that	  we	  should	  strive	  to	  be	  at	  least	   second-­‐‑rate	   philosophers	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   questioning	   our	   own	  epistemological	   biases.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   therefore	   introduce	   a	   meta-­‐‑theoretical	  paradigm	  based	  in	  Critical	  Realism	  (CR)45,	  and	  demonstrate	  why	  in	  my	  view	  such	  a	  paradigm	  is	  an	  important	  prerequisite	  for	  an	  adequate	  analysis	  of	   ethnographic	   data,	   also	   and	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   inequality	   and	  ‘marginalisation’.	  	  Let	  us	  start	  with	  the	  scene	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  It	  took	  place	  in	  late	  2010,	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  BHAM	  (Bristol	  Housing	  Action	  Movement),	  which	  used	  to	  happen	   every	   Monday	   night	   in	   a	   squatted	   shop	   space	   near	   Stokes	   Croft.	  According	  to	  its	  official	  website,	  BHAM	  is	  “a	  non-­‐‑heirarchical	  (sic)	  collective	  of	  squatters	  and	  their	  supporters.	  We	  help	  provide	  housing	  and	  other	  support	  for	  homeless	  people“.	   	  During	  my	   fieldwork,	  BHAM	  was	   the	  public	   face	  of	  Bristol	  squatting	  –	  unless	  one	  was	  already	  part	  of	  the	  scene,	  it	  was	  the	  first	  point	  of	  entry	  for	   new	   squatters	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   served	   as	   a	   communication	   and	  coordination	   platform	   for	   existing	   crews	   and	   individual	   activists.	   BHAM	  meetings	   covered	   a	   number	   of	   issues,	   from	   the	   individual	   (such	   as	   allocating	  newly	   homeless	   persons	   to	   groups	   or	   supporting	   them	   in	   getting	   their	   own	  squat)	  to	  the	  collective	  (as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  campaigning,	   lobbying	  and	  providing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Via	  faculty	  website	  at	  https://anthropology.virginia.edu/faculty/inmemoriam/profile/dellhymes	  45	  Critical	  Realism	  (and	  in	  a	  later	  development,	  Dialectical	  Critical	  Realism),	  has	  been	  developed	  since	  the	  1970	  by	  Roy	  Bhaskar	  and	  others	  (Margaret	  Archer,	  Andrew	  Collier,	  Andrew	  Sayer,	  etc.)	  as	   an	   intervention	   in	   debates	   on	   the	   scientific	   method	   that	   were	   seen	   marked	   by	   dualisms	  (universal	  vs	  particular,	  positivism	  vs	  hermeneutics,	  theoretical	  vs	  empirical	  etc.)	  and	  went	  along	  with	  a	  perceived	  gap	  between	   theory	  of	   science	  and	  social	   science	  practice	   (Danermark	  et	   al,	  2002,	  4).	  Its	  proponents	  addressed	  metatheoretical	  issues	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  scientific	  method	  that	  have	  informed	  the	  formation	  of	  Anthropology	  since	  its	  inception,	  in	  particular	  the	  tension	  between	  a	  Nomothetic	  approach	  (i.e.	  trying	  to	  ascertain	  general	  laws	  by	  applying	  and	  developing	  abstract	  theoretical	  models)	  and	  an	  Idiographic	  approach	  (i.e.	  the	  description	  of	  social	  reality	  in	  all	  its	  complexity	  and	  diversity)	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  6ff).	  The	  challenge	  for	  Critical	  Realists	  was	   to	   find	   out	   whether	   there	   can	   be	   a	   metatheoretical	   approach	   that	   can	   reconcile	   these	  dichotomies.	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information).	  The	  meetings	  served	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  pooling	  of	  skills,	  tools,	  and	  information,	  from	  warning	  each	  other	  about	  problematic	  persons	  within	  the	  scene,	   to	   discussing	   current	   developments	   in	   the	   housing	  market.	   Despite	   its	  non-­‐‑hierarchical	   approach,	   BHAM	  meetings	   were	   usually	   presided	   over	   by	   a	  number	   of	   ‘old-­‐‑timers’,	   most	   of	   them	   men	   in	   their	   40s	   or	   50s.	   Joe,	   whose	  experience	  made	  him	  especially	  apt	  at	  moderating	  meetings	  with	  such	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  topics,	  was	  widely	  considered	  the	  heart	  and	  soul	  of	  the	  group.	  Himself	  not	   a	   squatter,	   he	   nevertheless	   devoted	   a	  majority	   of	   his	   time	   to	   organising,	  spreading	  information	  and	  mediating	  conflicts	  within	  the	  scene.	  He	  led	  through	  meetings	  with	  calm	  and	  routine	  and	  when,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  he	  asked	  for	  donations,	   a	   small	   heap	  of	   coins	   unfailingly	   formed	   at	   his	   feet.	   The	  donations	  went	  towards	  tools,	  equipment	  or	  necessary	  repairs	  for	  all	  who	  needed	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  into	  publicising	  written	  materials.	  	  	  Meetings	   usually	   opened	  with	   taking	   stock	   of	   existing	   spaces,	   acknowledging	  new	   ones	   and	   flagging	   up	   those	   that	   were	   threatened	   by	   eviction.	   After	   this	  followed	  a	  phase	  of	  distributing	  tools	  and	  skills	  –	  who	  needs	  what	  and	  who	  can	  provide	  it	  –	  before	  attention	  shifted	  to	  the	  newcomers	  who	  turned	  up	  practically	  every	  week.	  BHAM	  was	  a	  well-­‐‑known	  institution,	  and	  on	  most	  nights	  there	  was	  at	   least	   one	   anxious	   and	  disoriented	  person,	   newly	  homeless	   or	   just	   about	   to	  become	  homeless,	  who	  came	  for	  help.	  Some	  did	  not	  immediately	  want	  to	  squat	  and	  were	  looking	  for	  information	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  landlords	  and	  courts,	  others	  were	  all	  too	  eager	  to	  join	  the	  squatters	  and	  many	  expressed	  explicitly	  political	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  to	  enter	  squatting	  rather	  than	  entering	  the	  official	  system	  of	  homelessness	   prevention	   provided	   by	   the	   council.	   Some	   were	   coming	   from	  within	   that	   system,	   having	   lived	   in	   hostels	   and	   B&Bs,	   but	   found	   themselves	  disempowered	  and	  socially	  isolated	  in	  these	  places	  (a	  frequent	  experience	  that	  has	   been	   described	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   homelessness,	   e.g.	   Hutson,	   1999;	  Rosengard	  et	  al,	  2002).	  Squatting	  seemed	  preferable	  to	  them,	  because	  it	  provided	  social,	  instead	  of	  just	  material,	  security	  as	  well	  as	  a	  greater	  scope	  for	  agency	  and	  self-­‐‑determination.	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BHAM’s	  motto	  –	  ‘opening	  doors	  for	  the	  homeless	  since	  1984’	  –	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  squatters	  did	  not	  necessarily	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  ‘homeless’.	  Although	  in	  precarious	  occupation,	  the	  act	  of	  squatting	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  was	  seen	  to	  remedy	  the	  lack	  of	  shelter,	  and	  thus	  turn	  a	  homeless	  person	  into	  a	  squatter.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	   notion	   coincided	   with	   the	   definition	   provided	   by	   the	   Housing	   Act	   1996,	  which	  states	  that	  	  	  „A	  person	  is	  homeless	  if	  he	  has	  no	  accommodation	  available	  for	  his	  occupation,	  in	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  elsewhere,	  which	  he—(a)	  is	  entitled	  to	  occupy	  by	  virtue	  of	  
an	  interest	  in	  it	  or	  by	  virtue	  of	  an	  order	  of	  a	  court,	  (b)	  has	  an	  express	  or	  implied	  
licence	  to	  occupy,	  or	  (c)	  occupies	  as	  a	  residence	  by	  virtue	  of	  any	  enactment	  or	  rule	  
of	   law	   giving	   him	   the	   right	   to	   remain	   in	   occupation	   or	   restricting	   the	   right	   of	  
another	  person	  to	  recover	  possession“	  (legislation.gov.uk)	  	  Since	  section	  6	  of	   the	  Criminal	  Law	  Act	  1977	  (short	   ‘section	  6‘,	  see	  chapter	  6)	  made	  it	  a	  criminal	  offence	  for	  a	  landlord	  to	  force	  entry	  to	  premises	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  person	  in	  occupation46,	  this	  effectively	  amounted	  to	  a	  fulfilment	  of	  condition	  c);	  and	  squatters	  were	  thus	  technically	  no	  longer	  legally	  homeless	  once	  they	  occupied	  a	  squat47.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  ‘opening	  of	  doors’	  pointed	  to	  the	  symbolic	  meaning	  of	  the	  door	  as	  a	  threshold	  at	  which	  a	  political	  identity	  is	  transformed	  through	  an	  act	  of	  disobedience	  and	  appropriation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  term	  ‘homeless’	  and	  its	  replacement	  with	  ‘squatter’	  corresponded	  to	  a	  practical	  refusal	  to	  accept	  the	  condition	  of	  being	  without	  shelter,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  take	  action	  to	  resolve	  this	  state	  of	  affairs.	  The	  crowbar,	  ubiquitous	  component	  of	  squatting-­‐‑related	  art	  and	  imagery,	  thus	  was	  both	  a	  tool	  of	  this	  overcoming	  and	  a	  weapon	  in	  what	  was	  seen	   as	   a	   political	   struggle.	   “We	   are	   committed	   to	   the	   opening	   of	   community	  spaces	  and	   to	  solidarity	  with	  existing	  social	   centres.	  We	  campaign	  against	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	  was	  also	  the	  legal	  reason	  that	  one	  person	  always	  had	  to	  be	  ‘squat-­‐‑sitting’	  47	  In	  practice,	  however,	  squatters	  who	  chose	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  council	   for	  help	  with	  housing	  were	  usually	  regarded	  homeless	  (although	  this	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  being	  eligible	  for	  help	  yet),	  since	  the	  protection	  of	  section	  6	  was	  correctly	  assumed	  to	  be	  only	  temporary.	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privatisation	  of	  public	  land	  and	  housing	  and	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  public	  space“,	  the	  BHAM	  flyer	  continues,	  “whilst	  commercial	  property	  developers	  are	  continuing	  to	  evict	  squatters	  from	  buildings	  that	  have	  sometimes	  been	  left	  empty	  for	  10	  years	  or	   more	   in	   the	   Bristol	   area	   the	   rising	   tide	   of	   people	   being	   made	   homeless	  continues	  to	  increase…Squatting	  is	  one	  of	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  housing	  crisis”.	  	  Even	  before	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law’,	  this	  view	  was	  far	  from	  uncontested.	  For	  example	  Crisis,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  national	  homeless	  charities,	  states	  on	  its	  website:	  	  
“Squatting	  is	  relatively	  common	  for	  single	  homeless	  people	  with	  39	  per	  cent	  having	  
squatted	   at	   some	   point…Most	   homeless	   people	  who	   squat	   try	   other	   avenues	   for	  
resolving	  their	  housing	  problems	  before	  turning	  to	  squatting.	  While	  a	  few	  describe	  
the	  squats	  as	  in	  a	  reasonable	  condition	  and	  have	  positive	  experiences	  living	  in	  them,	  
this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  many.	  The	  conditions	  in	  squats	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  discern	  
from	   rough	   sleeping;	  with	   dereliction,	   discomfort,	   and	   life	  with	   no	   amenities	   or	  
furniture	  typical.”48	  (Crisis	  online,	  06.	  2013)	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  homeless	  charity,	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  ill	  advised	  to	  advertise	   squatting	   as	   any	   kind	   of	   ‘solution’,	   if	   only	   due	   to	   the	   potentially	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  revenue.	  What	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  the	  differing	  views	  of	  BHAM	   and	   Crisis,	   however,	   is	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   squatting	   and	  homelessness	  was	  far	  from	  clear.	  What	  one	  side	  saw	  as	  a	  practical	  act	  of	  self-­‐‑help	  that	   turned	   homeless	   people	   into	   something	   else,	   the	   other	   saw	   as	   an	   act	   of	  desperation	   that	   continued	   the	   state	   of	   homelessness,	   and	  prevented	   persons	  from	  receiving	  help.	  It	  is	  situations	  like	  these	  –	  in	  which	  ‘truth	  claims’	  made	  by	  a	  particular	   group	   of	   respondents	   substantially	   differ	   from	   claims	   that	   are	  commonly	  made	   about	   these	   people	   –	   that	   questions	   of	  meta-­‐‑theory	   become	  practically	  relevant	  for	  ethnography.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  This	  description	  is	  then	  followed	  by	  a	  quotation	  from	  a	  supposed	  squatter	  that	   involves	  rat	  infestations	  and	  used	  needles	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‘Activist’	  groups	  like	  BHAM	  confront	  the	  anthropologist	  with	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  ‘truth	  claims’:	  they	  identify	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  oppression	  or	  injustice,	  and	  frame	  their	  practice	  as	  a	  struggle	  that	  is	  meant	  to,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  overcome	  this	  condition.	  To	  return	  to	  the	  dilemma	  of	  Bourdieu’s	  anthropologist,	  this	  situation	  essentially	  leaves	  the	  ethnographer	  with	  two	  options:	  either	  to	  sympathise	  with	  the	  ‘native’	  interpretation	  although	  one	  cannot	  verify	  it,	  or	  to	  reject	  it	  and	  offer	  an	  alternative	  one	  based	  in	  the	  anthropologist’s	  own	  cultural	  background.	  Both	  of	   these	   subject	   positions	   have	   been	   alternately	   argued	   for	   or	   against	   by	  anthropologists,	  but	  whichever	  one	   is	  chosen,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	   truth	  claim	   is	   taken	   seriously	   or	   not	   remains	   dependent	   on	   the	   respective	   subject	  position	  –	  whose	  interpretation	  is	  given	  precedence	  is	  then	  mainly	  a	  matter	  of	  taste	  and	  political	  leanings.	  What	  this	  situation	  does	  not	  provide,	  however,	  is	  the	  possibility	   of	   examining	   both	   the	   truth	   claim	   of	   the	   other,	   and	   the	  anthropologist’s	  ‘outsider’	  point	  of	  view,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  independent	  reality	  of	  that	  which	  the	  claim	  purports	  to	  be	  about.	  For	  example,	  in	  discussing	  the	  causes	  of	  homelessness,	  a	  squatter	  may	  claim	  that	  speculation	  in	  the	  housing	  market	  is	  to	  blame	  for	  this	  problem.	  The	  ethnographer	  can	  accept	  this	  explanation,	  or	  reject	  it	  and	  substitute	  another.	  They	  will,	  however,	  not	  be	  able	   to	  adequately	   judge	  whether	  any	  of	   these	  explanations	   is	  actually	  correct,	  unless	   they	  assume	  that	  ‘the	   housing	  market’	   is	   a	   really	   existing	   entity,	  which	  may	   be	   examined	   as	   to	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  really	  does	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  homelessness.	  This	  may	  appear	  self-­‐‑evident,	   but	   as	   I	   will	   discuss	   below,	   unless	   ethnography	   is	   based	   in	   a	  specifically	  realist	  paradigm,	  it	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  taken	  for	  granted.	  	  	  What	  is	  therefore	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  meta-­‐‑theoretical	  debate,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  anthropology	  and	  specifically	  this	  thesis,	  is	  not	  just	  an	  abstract	  argument	  about	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   social	   and	   natural	   world.	   Included	   in	   these	   discussions	   are	  important	   methodological	   and	   political	   questions,	   which	   are	   pressing	   for	  anthropology	  in	  particular	  because	  of	  how	  intimately	  it	  becomes	  involved	  in	  the	  lives	  and	  struggles	  of	   its	   ‘others’.	  The	  alignment	  of	  evaluative	   judgment	  I	  have	  previously	   discussed	   requires	   that	   what	   the	   judgment	   is	   about	   has	   a	   reality	  independent	  from	  whoever	  is	  making	  the	  judgment.	  As	  Andrew	  Sayer	  puts	  it:	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  “When	  we	  use	  terms	  like	  ‘domination’,	  ‘oppression’	  or	  ‘exploitation’49	  we	  imply	  that	  
some	  harm,	   injustice	  or	   suffering	   is	  objectively	  done,	  not	  merely,	  as	   subjectivism	  
implies,	  that	  observers	  don’t	   like	  what	  they	  refer	  to	  and	  are	  upset	  by	  them.	  They	  
allude	   to	   damage	   and	   suffering	   that	   we	   have	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   exist	  
objectively,	  indeed	  exist	  even	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  recognise	  them	  (for	  example,	  presumably	  
sexism	  actually	  inhibited	  women’s	  flourishing	  before	  it	  was	  identified	  as	  doing	  so)”	  (2005,	  11)	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  anthropologist	  wants	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  what	  his	  or	  her	  interlocutors	  say	  refers	  to	  actually	  existing	  reality,	  i.e.	  if	  it	  is	  true	  (a	  question	  all	  the	  more	  pressing	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  mutual	  dependency,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two),	  then	  there	  must	  be	  a	  possibility	  that	  it	  is50.	  The	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  developing	  a	  shared	  conceptualisation	  of	  reality	  requires	  that	  there	  is	  something	  that	  both	  parties	  can	  agree	  about,	  even	  if	   they	  come	  from	  different	  cultural	  or	  epistemological	  backgrounds.	  This	  problem	  becomes	  especially	  pressing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  narratives	  of	  oppression	  and	  suffering,	  since	  if	  it	  is	  not	  assumed	  that	  a	  claim	  of	  being	  oppressed	  is	  at	  least	  potentially	  true,	  anthropology	  will	  not	  only	  inevitably	   misrepresent	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   other	   in	   terms	   of	   Bourdieu’s	  distortion,	  but	  also	  lose	  any	  and	  all	  possibility	  of	  becoming	  itself	  an	  emancipatory	  practice.	   To	   relegate	   claims	   to	   suffering	   and	   oppression	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  In	  my	  personal	  experience,	  these	  terms	  have	  a	  remarkable	  propensity	  to	  produce	  a	  collective	  rolling	  of	  eyes	  in	  audiences	  of	  an	  anthropological	  and	  general	  social	  science	  background,	  often	  followed	  by	  “what	  is	  ‘oppression’	  even	  supposed	  to	  mean?”	  That	  these	  words	  have	  become	  unpopular	  to	  the	  point	  of	  appearing	  anachronistic	  may	  have	  to	  do	  with	  their	  importance	  in	  discourses	  such	  as	  Marxism,	  second-­‐‑wave	  feminism	  and	  others,	  which	  have	  lost	  traction	  in	  current	  academia,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  academic	  language	  shares	  some	  properties	  with	  Orwell’s	  Newspeak,	  in	  which	  “a	  heretical	  thought…should	  be	  literally	  unthinkable,	  at	  least	  so	  far	  as	  thought	  is	  dependent	  on	  words…this	  was	  done	  partly	  by	  the	  invention	  of	  new	  words,	  but	  chiefly	  by	  eliminating	  undesirable	  words	  and	  stripping	  such	  words	  as	  remained	  of	  unorthodox	  meanings,	  and	  so	  far	  as	  possible	  of	  all	  secondary	  meaning	  whatever”	  (1989,	  174)	  50	  If,	  for	  example,	  a	  respondent	  tells	  the	  anthropologist	  that	  he	  is	  affected	  by	  witchcraft,	  then	  there	  must	  be	  something	  that	  ‘witchcraft’	  actually	  refers	  to,	  even	  if	  the	  anthropologist	  would	  describe	  it	  in	  different	  culturally	  specified	  terms	  (e.g.	  ‘psychological	  manipulation’).	  If	  this	  assumption	  cannot	  be	  made,	  then	  ‘witchcraft’	  becomes	  either	  a	  case	  of	  ignorant	  superstition	  (such	  as	  was	  traditionally	  ascribed	  to	  native	  beliefs	  by	  colonial	  anthropology),	  or	  it	  becomes	  something	  so	  specific	  to	  the	  cultural	  epistemology	  of	  the	  ‘native’	  that	  the	  anthropologist	  cannot	  ever	  assume	  to	  understand	  it	  (this	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  the	  case	  in	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  ‘multiple	  ontologies’,	  see	  chapter	  4)	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subjective,	   as	   Sayer	   argues,	   produces	   a	   particularly	   insidious	   form	   of	  misrecognition	  –	  one	  in	  which	  I	  treat	  my	  interlocutor	  as	  somebody	  who	  can,	  by	  definition,	  not	  be	  saying	  anything	  relating	  to	  his	  or	  her	  objective	  situation	  in	  the	  world,	  in	  other	  words,	  one	  who	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  telling	  the	  truth.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  when	  this	  form	  of	  misrecognition	  comes	  to	  bear	  on	  studies	  of	  homelessness,	  the	  result	  is	  not	  just	  epistemological	  confusion	  but	  a	  downright	  silencing	  of	  the	  very	  voices	  that	  anthropologists	  purportedly	  want	  to	  make	  heard.	  	  	  	  
The	  Possibility	  Of	  Truth	  	  	  	  Let	  us	  now	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  this	  process	  of	  silencing	  is	  executed	  on	  an	  epistemological	  level,	  even	  when	  anthropologists	  explicitly	  claim	  to	  be	  doing	  the	  opposite,	  and	  what,	  if	  anything,	  a	  critical	  realist	  paradigm	  can	  do	  to	  help	  with	  this	  situation.	  We	  will	  do	  so	  by	  means	  of	  drawing	  on	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  has	  come	  to	  constitute	  ‘homelessness	  studies’.	  Not	  all	  of	  this	  literature	  is	  written	  by	  anthropologists,	  but	  nevertheless	  it	  provides	  some	  excellent	  examples	  of	  the	  very	  same	   kinds	   of	   distortions	   and	   fallacies	   that	   routinely	   undermine	   the	   good	  intentions	  of	  ‘critical	  anthropology’.	  	  Of	  course	  it	  must	  be	  said	  that	  outside	  a	  few	  regrettable	   exceptions	   (e.g.	   Ravenhill’s	   ‘Culture	   of	  Homelessness’	  which	   I	  will	  discuss	   further	   down),	   the	   study	   of	   homelessness	   and	   the	   study	   of	   ‘culture’	  arguably	   have	   different	   aims.	   Where	   anthropology	   traditionally	   aimed	   to	  understand	   how	   particular	   cultures	   work	   from	   an	   ‘insider’s’	   point	   of	   view,	  ‘homelessness	   studies’,	   while	   employing	   some	   of	   anthropology’s	   methods,	  frames	  its	  object	  in	  entirely	  different	  terms.	  Homelessness,	  such	  is	  the	  tenor,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	   investigated	  as	   it	   is	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  solved.	  	  Research	   therefore	   has	   a	   legitimate	   interest	   to	   uncover	   the	   causes	   of	  homelessness	  and	  make	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  it	  can	  be	  eliminated.	  	  	  On	   the	   positive	   side,	   this	   preoccupation	   assigns	   a	   purpose	   to	   the	   practice	   of	  inquiry	  that	  legitimately	  transcends	  a	  sheer	  ‘thirst	  for	  knowledge’	  (which,	  in	  the	  worst	   of	   cases,	   is	   driven	   –	   and	   funded	   –	   by	   an	   interest	   in	   domination	   and	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exploitation).	   Even	   the	   most	   politically	   conservative	   explanations	   for	  homelessness	  are	  based	  on	  at	  least	  a	  performative	  commitment	  to	  its	  elimination	  (although	  the	  method	  of	  elimination	  may	  be	  debatable).	  This	  means	   that	  such	  research	  has	  a	  defined	  practical	  purpose	  and	  thus	  is	  inherently	  normative	  and	  at	  least	  potentially	  critical	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  However,	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  
explicitly	  so,	  and	  thus	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  about	  ‘how	  the	  world	  should	  be’	  in	  order	  to	  end	  homelessness	  are	  often	  left	  unexplained.	  	  	  On	   the	   downside,	   there	   are	   inherent	   limitations	   in	   the	   kind	   of	   question	   such	  inquiry	  can	  ask.	  The	  disciplinary	  institutional	  context	  that	  research	  takes	  place	  in	  determines	  to	  an	  extent	  how	  far	  the	  net	  can	  be	  cast	  in	  the	  search	  of	  potential	  causes	   for	   a	   problem.	   There	   are	   certain	   questions	   –	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   private	  property	  being	  one	  of	  them51	  –	  that	  can	  only	  be	  asked	  within	  ‘reasoned	  debate’	  with	   great	   difficulty,	   and	   have	   to	   be	   shrouded	   in	   either	   the	   most	   abstract	  theoretical	  detachment	  or	  precisely	  the	  relegation	  of	  evaluative	  judgment	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	   ‘subjective’	   I	  have	  pointed	  to	  above.	  Thus,	  an	  explanation	  such	  as	  BHAM’s	  “People	  are	  motivated	  to	  squat	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  simple	  need	  for	  space	  and	  shelter,	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  resist	  a	  system	  that	  allows	  property	  to	  lie	  empty	  while	  there	  is	  social	  need	  for	  it“	  (flyer)	  must	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  relegates	  it	  to	  the	   status	   of	   a	   subcultural	   trope,	   an	   expression	   of	   ideology,	   or	   a	   discursive	  metaphor.	  In	  order	  to	  liberate	  such	  claims	  from	  this	  epistemological	  straitjacket,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  a	  meta-­‐‑theoretical	  framework	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  such	  claims	  are	  least	  potentially	  about	  something	  other	  than	  the	  speaker’s	  personal	  sensitivities.	  As	  I	  have	  said	  above,	  I	  consider	  Critical	  Realism	  a	  suitable	  basis	   for	   such	   an	   endeavour,	   and	   I	   will	   therefore	   here	   give	   the	   briefest	   of	  introductions	  to	  what	  it	  is,	  before	  turning	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  can	  do	  for	  us.	  	  	  At	  the	  core	  of	  Critical	  Realist	  meta-­‐‑theory	  is	  its	  model	  of	  a	  stratified	  and	  emergent	  reality.	  ‘Stratified’	  means	  that	  CR	  assumes	  different	  ‘levels’	  of	  reality,	  which	  are	  more	   or	   less	   accessible	   to	   empirical	   investigation.	   Bhaskar	   (1978/2013,	   56)	  speaks	   of	   three	   ‘ontological	   domains’:	   the	   Empirical,	   the	   Actual	   and	   the	   Real.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  See	  also	  chapters	  9	  and	  10	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Simply	  speaking,	  the	  Empirical	  domain	  refers	  to	  that	  which	  can	  be	  experienced,	  the	  Actual	  is	  that	  which	  happens	  whether	  we	  experience	  it	  or	  not,	  and	  the	  Real,	  finally,	   is	   the	   domain	   of	   what	   Bhaskar	   calls	   ‘powers	   and	  mechanisms’:	   those	  events	  that	  cause	  things	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  empirical	  to	  happen,	  and	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  accessible	  to	  empirical	  investigation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  reality	  is	  ‘emergent’	  in	  that	  powers	  and	  mechanisms52	  found	  in	  the	  deeper	  strata	  combine	   in	   particular	  ways	   to	   bring	   forth	   phenomena	   in	   the	   higher	   strata	   in	  qualitatively	  new	  combinations.	  Of	  course,	  some	  anthropologists	  may	  bristle	  at	  the	   notion	   of	   ‘causation’	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   describing	   social	   phenomena.	   The	  word	  invokes	  a	  crude	  empiricism	  which	  anthropology	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  buried	  along	  with	  its	  colonial	  past.	  However,	  within	  a	  Critical	  Realist	  framework,	  ‘causes’	  are	   conceptualised	   not	   as	   deterministic	   cause-­‐‑effect	   relationships,	   but	   as	  interrelated	  and	  mutually	  constituting	  ‘mechanisms’	  that	  concurrently	  influence	  social	  objects.	  Since	  social	  systems	  are	  necessarily	  ‘open’	  systems	  (as	  opposed	  to	  experimental	   settings,	   which	   are	   by	   definition	   ‘closed	   systems’),	   mechanisms	  rarely	  act	  in	  isolation,	  but	  rather,	  mutually	  re-­‐‑enforce	  or	  weaken	  one	  another.	  	  It	  therefore	   becomes	   possible	   to	   speak	   of	   powers	   and	   structures	   that	  make	   the	  emergence	  of	  certain	  social	  phenomena	  more	  or	  less	  likely,	  without	  assuming	  a	  straightforward	  causal	  relationship	  that	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  agency	  or	  variation	  in	  outcome.	  By	  way	  of	  an	  example:	  if	  one	  assumes	  that	  the	  housing	  market	  is	  one	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underlie	  the	  emergence	  of	  homelessness,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  saying	  ‘the	  housing	  market	  causes	  homelessness’.	  The	  housing	  market	  does	   not	   causally	   determine	   homelessness,	   rather,	   in	   combination	   with	   other	  powers	  and	  mechanisms,	  it	  creates	  a	  tendency	  for	  homelessness	  to	  emerge	  that	  is	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  amplified	  or	  extenuated	  by	  other	  mechanisms	  (such	  as	  e.g.	  state	  intervention	  or	  kinship	  structures).	  	  	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  this	  notion	  of	  causation	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  claims	  of	  our	  respondents	  as	  to	  why	  they	  do	  what	  they	  do	  in	  a	  fresh	  light.	  Here,	  however,	  I	  am	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  the	  potential	  factual	  accuracy	  of	  such	  claims,	  that	  is,	  with	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘truth’.	  Since	  the	  ubiquitous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘powers	  and	  mechanisms’	  see	  chapter	  four	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linguistic	  turn	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  this	  word	  has	  practically	  disappeared	  from	  anthropological	  writing,	  except	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  subjective	  claims	  of	  actors	  to	  be	  telling	  it.	  As	  Sayer	  (2005)	  argues,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  ‘disastrous’,	  not	  only	  for	   the	   project	   of	   arriving	   at	   any	   kind	   of	   rational	   understanding	   of	   the	   social	  world,	   but	   first	   and	   foremost	   for	   those	   situations	   in	   which	   our	   interlocutors	  confront	  us	  with	  politicised	  expressions	  of	  pain,	  suffering	  and	  oppression.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  anthropology,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  other	  discipline,	  must	  be	  vigilant	  to	  the	  implications	  the	  idea	  of	  truth	  has	  in	  a	  world	  where	  not	  just	  the	  relationship	   between	   anthropology	   and	   some	  of	   its	   interlocutors,	   but	   also	   (at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  time)	  that	  between	  these	  interlocutors	  and	  their	  social	  world,	  is	  one	  of	  hierarchical	  power	  relations.	  After	  all,	  the	  reason	  the	  category	  of	  ‘truth’	  has	  come	  into	  disrepute	  in	  the	  first	  place	  is	  because	  anthropologists,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  with	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  white,	  Western	  “Rational	  Man	  Project”	  (Duffell,	  2014),	  have	  in	  the	  past	  tended	  to	  claim	  exclusive	  ownership	  to	  it.	  I	  will	  therefore	  use	  the	  word	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Critical	  Realists	  apply	  it:	  Truth	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  that	  is	  “practically	  adequate	  to	  the	  world”	  (Sayer	  1992,	  p70).	  The	  idea	  of	  practical	  adequacy	  allows	  one	  to	  speak	  of	  ‘truth’	  not	  as	  absolute,	  totalising	  knowledge,	  but	  rather	  addresses	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  interpretations	  of	  the	  social	  world	  are	  more	  adequate	  to	  what	  it	  actually	  looks	  like	  than	  others.	  The	  job	  of	  inquiry,	  then,	  is	  to	  find	  out	  which	   interpretations	  those	  are,	  by	  way	  of	  what	  Critical	  Realism	  calls	  “explanatory	   critique”	   (Bhaskar,	   1987/2009),	  which	   I	  will	   discuss	   in	   the	   next	  chapter.	  	  	  Critical	  Realism	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  both	   foundationalist	  and	  antifoundationalist	  positions	   in	  Social	  Science53,	  and	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	   tension	  between	  these	  two	  positions	  that	  in	  a	  politicised	  form	  underlies	  anthropology’s	  perpetual	   ‘crisis’.	   	   In	   social	   and	   cultural	   anthropology,	   positivist,	   empiricist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  ‘Foundationalism’	  refers	  to	  a	  position	  that	  regards	  as	  ‘scientific’	  strictly	  that	  which	  is	  empirically	  observable	  and	  tries	  to	  deduce	  general	  laws	  from	  empirical	  data.	  ‘Antifoundationalist’,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  those	  positions	  that	  emphasize	  the	  locality	  and	  contextuality	  of	  knowledge	  and	  reject	  totalizing	  and	  universalist	  claims	  made	  by	  objectivist	  science.	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‘science’	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  something	  to	  be	  avoided	  at	  all	  cost54	  –	  after	  all,	  the	  naïve	  optimism	   about	   the	   empirical	   accessibility	   of	   the	   ‘native’s	   point	   of	   view’	   that	  informed	  early	  anthropological	  endeavours	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  misguided	  (not	  least	  because	   of	   critique’s	   like	   Bourdieu’s),	   and	   the	   impetus	   to	   discover	   the	  transcultural	   ‘universal	   laws’	   of	   human	   society	   has	   consequently	   all	   but	  crumbled	  under	  the	  force	  of	  constructivist	  critiques.	  The	  case	  of	  anthropology	  underscores,	   perhaps	   in	   a	   particularly	   painful	   way,	   how	   closely	   objectivist	  approaches	   to	   science	  were	   tied	   in	   with	   the	   colonial	   project	   of	   imposing	   the	  principles	   of	   ‘Western’	   rationality	   as	   superior	   to	   and	   inclusive	   of	   all	   possible	  other	  views	  of	  the	  world.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  discipline’s	  embracing	  of	  the	  ‘crisis	  of	  objectivism’	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  nearly	  unsolvable	  double	  bind	  of	  trying	  to	  say	  something	  worthwhile	  while	  avoiding	  universalist	  claims	  to	  ‘truth’,	  and	  has	  thus	  has	  left	  anthropologists	  caught	  uncomfortably	  between	  a	  positivist	  rock	  and	  a	  subjectivist	  hard	  place.	  	  	  A	  great	  example	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  the	  controversy	  between	  Mary	  Madden	  and	  the	  authors	  of	  Braving	  the	  streets:	  the	  anthropology	  of	  homelessness,	  Irene	  Glasser	  and	   Rae	   Bridgman,	   in	   the	   journal	   Critique	   of	   Anthropology.	   Glasser	   and	  Bridgman 55 	  claim	   to	   deliver	   nothing	   short	   of	   “the	   best	   information	   on	  homelessness	  garnered	  throughout	  the	  world”	  (Glasser	  and	  Bridgman,	  1999,	  xi),	  specifically	  stressing	  a	  “native	  or	  ‘emic’	  point	  of	  view	  as	  anthropologists	  refer	  to	  it”	  (ibid).	  They	  discuss	  at	  length	  various	  definitions	  of	  the	  term	  “homeless”	  and	  who,	   by	   circumstance	   or	   self-­‐‑appointment,	   may	   fall	   under	   this	   category,	   and	  profess	  that	  “through	  the	  utilization	  of	  extended	  fieldwork,	  a	  holistic	  approach	  and	   cross-­‐‑cultural	   perspectives,	   anthropologists	   attempt	   to	   understand	   what	  drives	  individuals	  to	  life	  on	  the	  streets	  and	  to	  shelters,	  and	  what	  prevents	  them	  from	  gaining	  permanent	  and	  secure	  housing”	  (6),	  eventually	  concluding	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  A	  slightly	  different	  picture	  emerges	  in	  the	  ‘biological’	  and	  ‘cognitive’	  branches	  of	  the	  discipline,	  leading	  to	  a	  rather	  regrettable	  intra-­‐‑disciplinary	  split	  between	  ‘positivists’	  and	  ‘constructivists’	  55	  Who	  place	  their	  work	  in	  a	  tradition	  of	  anthropological	  research	  on	  poor	  ‘subcultures’	  in	  North	  America	  such	  as	  Spradley’s	  You	  Owe	  Yourself	  a	  Drunk,	  Elliot	  Liebow’s	  Tally’s	  Corner	  and	  Carol	  Stack’s	  All	  Our	  Kin	  (Glasser	  and	  Bridgman,	  1999)	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“careful	  and	  extensive	   fieldwork,	  and	  a	  philosophy	  of	  cultural	  relativism,	   that	   is,	  
understanding	  how	  each	  element	  of	  a	  culture	  fits	  into	  the	  larger	  cultural	  context	  
without	   passing	   moral	   judgements,	   form	   the	   intellectual	   underpinnings	   of	  
anthropological	  homelessness	  research	  today”	  (ibid.)	  and	  „the	  insider’s	  approach	  
attempts	  to	  avoid	  the	  a	  priori	  categories	  of	  other	  disciplines,	  and	  therefore	  enables	  
us	  to	  see	  the	  world	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  homeless	  themselves“.	  (7)	  	  Glasser	  and	  Bridgman	  exhibit	  an	  astonishing	  degree	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  potential	  of	  ethnographic	  research	  to	   ‘directly	  access’	   the	  reality	  of	  homelessness	   ‘through	  the	   eyes	   of	   the	   homeless’.	   Their	   approach	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Rosaldo’s	   (1993)	  figure	  of	  the	  ‘Lone	  Ethnographer’	  who	  sets	  out	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  retrieve	  the	  objective	  and	  timeless	  truth	  of	  the	  native	  and	  turn	  it	  into	  an	  objectified	  museum	  piece	  to	  be	  archived.	  The	  supposed	  aim	  of	  their	  ethnography	  (to	  unearth	  ‘what	  drives	   individuals	   to	   life	   on	   the	   street’)	   betrays	   an	   unreflected	   ideological	  complicity	  with	  individualising	  explanations	  of	  homelessness,	  and	  thus	  arguably	  manages	  to	  fulfil	  Rosaldo’s	  criterion	  of	  “complicity	  with	  imperialism”	  (31)	  while	  geographically	   remaining	   at	   home.	   In	   reifying	   homelessness	   as	   an	   objective	  phenomenon	   that	   is	   the	   same	   ‘throughout	   the	   world’	   Glasser	   and	   Bridgman	  provide	  a	  shining	  example	  of	   the	  sort	  of	  universalizing	  and	  totalizing	   thinking	  that	  has	  brought	  anthropology	  into	  disrepute,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  justifying	  their	  lack	  of	   ‘moral	   judgment’	  with	  what	  they	  call	   ‘cultural	  relativism’,	  thereby	  also	   illustrating	   how	   moral	   relativism	   can	   become	   a	   smokescreen	   for	   the	  cognitive	  distortion	  of	  disaffectedness.	  	  	  	  The	  constructivist	  answer	   is	  exemplified	   in	  Mary	  Madden’s	  scathing	  review	  of	  
Braving	  the	  Streets.	  Invoking	  an	  intellectual	  tradition	  from	  Saussure	  via	  Foucault	  to	   Said,	   she	   reminds	   us	   that	   “‘The	   homeless’	   and	   ‘the	   street’	   are	   constructed	  categories	   with	   culturally	   and	   historically	   specific	   meanings“	   (Madden,	   2003,	  290)	  and	  accuses	  Glasser	  and	  Bridgman	  of	  „positioning	  the	  normalized	  viewing	  ‘I’	   as	   gazing	   on	   and	   attempting	   to	   understand	   the	  Other”,	   so	   that	   “their	  work	  uncritically	  reproduces	  aspects	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  inherent	  in	  the	  history	  of	   ethnography”	   (293).	   Madden	   discusses	   at	   length	   Glasser	   and	   Bridgman’s	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romanticising	  notions	  of	  the	  street	  homeless	  as	  modern	  ‘nomads’,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  author’s	   presumed	   commitment	   to	   ‘fixing’	   the	   issue	   of	   homelessness	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  apparatus	  that	  produces	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  “In	   Foucauldian	   terms,	   the	   human	   sciences	   do	   not	   simply	   constitute	   a	   site	   from	  
which	   to	   comment	   or	   act	   on	   the	   operations	   of	   the	   state	   but	   form	  a	   crucial	   and	  
integral	   part	   of	   its	   functioning.	   Therefore	   Glasser	   and	   Bridgman’s	   work	   has	  
disciplinary	  power	  in	  another	  unacknowledged	  sense.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  the	  
formation	  of	  the	  homeless	  subject	  as	  Other“	  (294).	  	  Madden’s	   response	   is	   rooted	   in	   a	   tradition	   that,	   coming	   from	   a	   Nietzschean	  perspectivism,	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  objective	  appreciations	  of	  reality,	  since	  all	  such	  appreciations	  come	  from	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  view.	  This	  point	  of	  view,	   as	   Foucault	   has	   said,	   is	   never	   ‘neutral’	   but	   reflects	   ubiquitous	   power	  relations	  within	  society	  and	  thus	  any	  statement	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  reality	  must	  be	  examined	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  rooted	  in	  and	  perpetuates	  such	  power	  relations.	  In	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  scientific	  method	  in	  general,	  this	  point	  of	  view	  is	  exemplified	  in	   perspectives	   such	   as	   that	   of	   Richard	   Rorty,	   who	   asserts	   that	   since	   all	  knowledge	  is	  dependent	  on	  perspective,	  there	  is	  no	  transcendental	  or	  ‘God’s	  eye’	  perspective	   from	   which	   objective	   reality	   can	   be	   accessed	   (Rorty,	   1979).	  Consequently,	  all	  descriptions	  of	  reality	  are	  relative,	  contextual,	  and	  ultimately	  reducible	  to	  what	  Rorty	  terms	  “language	  games”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  9).	  	  	  At	   first	  glance,	   this	  epistemological	  argument	  appears	   to	   relieve	  anthropology	  from	  its	  objectivist	  baggage	  and	  provide	  it	  with	  a	  more	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  which	  the	  interpretations	  and	  experiences	  of	  the	  Other	  are	  no	  more	  or	  less	  valid	  than	  those	  of	  the	  anthropologist.	  It	  corresponds	  with	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘fourth	  moment’	  or	  crisis	   of	   representation	   in	   anthropology	   that	   called	   for	   a	   more	   reflexive	   and	  relativistic	   approach	   to	   anthropological	   research56.	   Questions	   of	   positionality	  and	  authorship	  came	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  anthropological	  debate	  and	  the	  entire	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  see	  Geertz,	  1988;	  Clifford&Marcus,	  1986;	  Marcus&Fischer,	  1986;	  etc	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project	  of	  anthropological	  representation	  of	  the	  Other	  was	  critically	  examined,	  both	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   conceptual	   misapprehension	   of	   ‘cultures’	   as	   bounded	  wholes,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  such	  totalizing	  accounts.	  As	  Said	  puts	  it,	  anthropologists	  had	  acted	  “to	  shut	  and	  block	  out	  the	  clamor	  of	  voices	  on	   the	   outside	   asking	   for	   their	   claims	   about	   empire	   and	   domination	   to	   be	  considered”	   (Said,	   1979,	   219).	   Against	   an	   anthropological	   practice	   that	   had	  silenced	  all	  voices	  other	  than	  the	  authoritative	  one	  of	  the	  anthropologist,	  and	  had	  thus	   helped	   to	   dominate	   the	   ‘colonial	   other’	   through	   representation,	   the	  constructivist	  paradigm	  appeared	  to	  make	  space	  for	  the	  ‘voices	  on	  the	  outside’	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  	  On	  second	  glance,	  however,	  this	  approach	  creates	  at	  least	  as	  many	  problems	  as	  it	  purports	  to	  solve.	  For	  one	  thing,	  a	  strong	  constructivism	  turned	  into	  political	  critique	   has	   an	   inevitable	   tendency	   to	   invalidate	   itself	   by	   way	   of	   its	   own	  categorical	  logic.	  If	  social	  categories	  are	  indeed	  the	  product	  of	  speech	  acts	  then	  the	   constructivist	   standpoint,	   in	   critiquing	   a	   power	   differential	   it	   has	   itself	  postulated,	  is	  doing	  precisely	  what	  it	  criticises,	  namely	  categorically	  constructing	  a	   subjugated	   other 57 .	   In	   more	   practical	   terms,	   however,	   the	   relativistic	   and	  pluralistic	  position	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  give	  (back)	  a	  voice	  to	  anthropology’s	  ‘other’	  can	  just	  as	  well	  be	  seen	  to	  do	  the	  exact	  opposite.	  Here	  is	  another	  example	  from	  the	  anthropology	  of	  homelessness:	  	  	  Robert	  Desjarlais	  Shelter	  Blues	  –	  Sanity	  and	  Selfhood	  among	  the	  homeless	  (1997),	  coming	  from	  a	  similarly	  Foucauldian	  background	  as	  Madden,	  takes	  great	  care	  to	  critically	  engage	  popular	  images	  of	  the	  homeless	  as	  the	  grotesque,	  undisciplined,	  dirty	   other	   of	   civilised	   society58.	   However,	   his	   subsequent	   analysis	   of	   shelter	  resident’s	  lives	  and	  interactions	  with	  state	  and	  bureaucracy,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  architecture	   surrounding	   them,	   frames	   their	   experience	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘language	  games’	   and	   ‘constructions	   of	   self-­‐‑representations’	   that	   produce	   accounts	   like:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  As	  it	  has	  been	  remarked,	  taken	  to	  its	  most	  extreme,	  constructivism	  invariably	  proceeds	  to	  deconstruct	  itself	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002)	  58	  A	  move	  that	  is	  at	  least	  a	  little	  ambiguous	  since	  it	  appears	  to	  imply	  that	  in	  reality	  the	  homeless	  are	  pretty,	  hardworking	  and	  clean-­‐‑washed	  just	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  us	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“(T)hey	  often	  alluded	  to	  some	  private	  feeling	  or	  personal	  trouble,	  but	  primarily	  for	  practical	  reasons:	  by	  noting	  a	  pain	  or	  oppression,	  the	  complaints	  could	  effect	  a	  reality	  to	  which	  one's	  audience	  might	  feel	  compelled	  to	  respond.“	  (Desjarlais,	  1997,	  189).	  While	  Desjarlais	  thus	  fully	  acknowledges	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  ‘homelessness’	  as	  a	  category	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  homeless	  voices	  in	  principle,	  the	  ‘pain	   and	   oppression’	   that	   these	   voices	   communicate,	   for	   him	   becomes	   just	  another	   discursive	   strategy	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   selfhood,	   and	   is	   ultimately	  reduced	  to	  the	  status	  of	  attention	  seeking.	  I	  do	  not	  in	  any	  way	  want	  to	  imply	  that	  this	   is	   Desjarlais’	   intention	   –	   rather,	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   within	   his	   meta-­‐‑theoretical	  paradigm,	  he	  has	  very	  little	  alternative.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  above,	  within	  a	  meta-­‐‑theoretical	  framework	  that	  “lower-­‐‑cases”	  notions	   such	  as	   ‘truth’	   or	   ‘reason’	   (Rabinow,	  1992,	  7),	   statements	   that	  people	  make	  about	  social	  reality	  inevitably	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  subjective,	  performative	  and,	  ultimately,	  as	  strategies	  of	  domination	  of	  whatever	  relationship	  they	  may	  be	  uttered	  within.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  	  “flourishing	  or	  suffering	  are	  no	  more	  than	  what	  prevailing	  ways	  of	  thinking	  define	  
them	   as,	   regardless	   of	   how	   they	   relate	   to	   our	   capabilities	   and	   susceptibilities	   –	  
indeed,	  the	  latter	  are	  themselves	  deemed	  to	  be	  voluntaristically	  constructed.	  On	  this	  
view,	  concepts	  of	  oppression,	  or	  violation,	  or	  abuse	  are	  incomprehensible,	  for	  there	  
is	  nothing	  independent	  of	  the	  practices	  to	  which	  they	  refer	  that	  can	  be	  damaged	  by	  
them:	  the	  damage	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  beholder”	  (Sayer,	  2005,	  11)	  This,	  then,	  is	  where	  a	  strong	  constructivism	  spectacularly	  backfires	  in	  terms	  of	  representing	   people	   in	   general	   and	   marginalised	   or	   oppressed	   people	   in	  particular.	   Granted,	   the	   anthropologist	   has	   been	   stripped	   of	   his/her	   claim	   to	  know	  the	   ‘truth	  of	   the	  native’	  –	  but	  so	  has	   the	  native.	  The	  notion	  of	   ‘language	  games’	   implies	   that	   whatever	   is	   said	   is	   a	   strategic	   intervention	   in	   a	   power	  dynamic	  rather	  than	  a	  (potential)	  statement	  about	  reality,	  and	  that	  in	  principle,	  no	   statement	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   refer	   to	   anything	   outside	   of	   the	   discursive	  situation.	   The	   ‘pain	   and	   oppression’	   these	   people	   allege	   therefore	   cannot	   be	  assumed	  to	  be	  an	  account	  of	  actually	  existing	  misery,	  because	  in	  this	  paradigm	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there	  is	  no	  concept	  of	   ‘actually	  existing’.	   It	   is	  debatable	  whether	  this	  approach	  does	   anything	   to	   alleviate	   the	   totalising	   claims	   of	   anthropology	   to	   know	   the	  ultimate	  truth	  of	  its	  respondents	  –	  Desjarlais	  appears	  confident	  that	  in	  dissecting	  his	  interlocutor’s	  discursive	  strategies,	  he	  knows	  what	  they	  are	  up	  to.	  But	  instead	  of	  presenting	  his	  account	  as	  the	  ‘ultimate	  truth’	  of	  homelessness	  (as	  Glasser	  and	  Bridgman	  do),	  he	  implicitly	  denies	  that	  such	  truth	  can	  even	  exist.	  In	  terms	  of	  a	  politically	  engaged	  anthropology,	  this	  is	  highly	  problematic	  in	  that	  it	  silences	  not	  only	   the	   ‘oppressor’	  but,	  even	  more	  effectively,	   the	   ‘oppressed’.	   It	  undermines	  any	   possibility	   of	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   circumstances	   that	  homeless	   people’s	   situation	   arises	   from,	   because	   there	   is	   no	   common	  denominator	  of	  a	   ‘reality’	   that	   their	  complaints	  may	  objectively	  refer	   to.	   If	  we	  assume,	  however,	  that	  homelessness	  is	  (for	  example)	  the	  product	  of	  an	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  in	  society,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  critically	  address	  this	  circumstance	  –	  to	  pull	  the	  ‘epistemological	  rug’	  out	  from	  under	  precisely	  those	  political	  arguments	  which	  (by	  virtue	  of	  being	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  this	  relation)	  would	   have	   reason	   to	   criticise	   it,	   seems	   at	   best	   ill	   informed,	   and	   at	   worst,	  malicious.59	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this	  dilemma,	  a	  Critical	  Realist	  framework	  first	  and	  foremost	  can	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  the	  project	  of	  an	  anthropology	  that	  takes	  seriously	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  a	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  political	  claims	  of	  the	  other	  can	  be	  heard.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  assuming	  that	  while	  “all	  knowledge	  is	  fallible,	  not	  all	  knowledge	  is	  equally	  fallible”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  17),	  that	  is,	  claims	  about	  reality	  (particularly	  the	  reality	  of	  supposed	  oppression)	  are	  not	  merely	  subjective	  constructions,	  but	  at	  least	  potentially	  correspond	  to	  something	  that	  exists.	  By	  assuming	  that	  reality	  has	   ‘ontological	   depth’	   (Bhaskar,	   1978)	   and	   that	   social	   phenomena	   are	   the	  product	  of	  powers	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  observable,	  but	  can	  be	   accessed	   through	   the	   method	   of	   retroductive	   argument	   (i.e.	   asking	   the	  question	  ‘what	  would	  have	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  this	  to	  be	  the	  outcome?’),	  CR	  thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  It	  seems	  significant	  to	  me	  that	  historically,	  the	  emergence	  of	  constructivist	  approaches	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  coincides	  with	  the	  point	  at	  which	  various	  oppressed	  groups	  (women,	  people	  of	  colour,	  the	  ’colonial	  subaltern’)	  first	  began	  to	  make	  their	  own	  voices	  heard.	  It	  is	  a	  bit	  as	  if	  we	  were	  saying:	  ‘first	  we	  professed	  to	  know	  the	  absolute	  truth	  about	  you,	  but	  now	  that	  you’ve	  joined	  the	  debate	  let’s	  just	  say	  all	  is	  relative‘.	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opens	  up	  a	  space	  in	  which	  political	  claims	  like	  BHAM’s	  can	  be	  examined	  beyond	  the	   level	   of	   mere	   performativity.	   While	   this	   epistemological	   move	   is	   not	   a	  political	  analysis	  per	  se,	  it	  provides	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  political	  analysis	  can	  be	  examined	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  accuracy.	  To	  assume	  the	  ontological	  possibility	   of	   truth	   thus	   is	   not	   only	   crucial	   for	   any	   kind	   of	   (social)	  scientific	  inquiry,	  it	  is	  even	  more	  crucial	  for	  the	  emancipatory	  projects	  of	  those	  whose	  voices	  have	  gone	  from	  ignored	  to	  relativised.	  	  	  Before	  moving	  on	  to	  a	  more-­‐‑in	  depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘powers	  and	  mechanisms’	  that	  shaped	  the	  lives	  of	  squatters,	  let	  me	  briefly	  consider	  the	  problem	  of	  structure	  and	  agency60	  and	  the	  CR	  ‘solution’	  as	  far	  as	  they	  are	  relevant	  for	  my	  discussion	  here.	  While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  text	  to	  discuss	  the	  great	  volume	  of	  work	  on	   this	   issue	   in	  detail,	   and	  demonstrate	  how	   the	  CR	  model	  differs	   from	  other	  approaches	  (see	  e.g.	  Archer,	  1995;	  Bhaskar,	  2014),	  the	  question	  of	  agency	  and	  its	  relationship	   to	   structural	   conditions	   is	   arguably	   a	   crucial	   aspect	   of	   a	   critical	  analysis	  of	  squatting.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  both	  academic	  and	  political	  discussions	  of	  homelessness	  are	  frequently	  suspended	  in	  an	  uneasy	  balance	  between	  interpretations	  that	  favour	  individualising	  and	  those	  that	  favour	  collective,	  structurally	  oriented	  explanations.	  While	  the	  relationship	  between	   these	   two	   factors	   is	   a	   topic	   of	   academic	   interest,	   it	   is	   also	   and	  most	  importantly	  one	  with	  potentially	  grave	  consequences	  for	  policy	  and	  practice,	  and	  thus	   the	   lives	   of	   actual	   homeless	   people.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   squatter’s	   own	  paradoxical	   attitude	   to	   their	  practice	   illustrates	   the	   same	  problematic:	   groups	  like	   BHAM	   vocally	   emphasised	   the	   necessity	   of	   identifying	   and	   resolving	  structural	   problems	   that	   lead	   to	   rising	   homelessness,	   such	   as	   economic	  inequality,	   patterns	   of	   property	   ownership,	   etc.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   though,	   the	  abovementioned	   difference	   they	   made	   between	   a	   homeless	   person	   and	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  As	  I	  have	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  inflationary	  use	  of	  ‘agency’	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  ‘having	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  world’	  has	  unfortunately	  led	  to	  the	  concept	  being	  watered	  down	  to	  the	  point	  of	  meaning	  everything	  and	  nothing.	  I	  therefore	  think	  that	  it	  could	  be	  useful,	  especially	  when	  talking	  about	  
people’s	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  around	  them,	  to	  reframe	  ‘agency’	  around	  something	  like	  Metzinger’s	  PMIR,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  (let	  alone	  reframe	  the	  ‘agency/structure’	  problem	  along	  these	  lines)	  is	  certainly	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  I	  will	  therefore	  in	  the	  following	  stick	  with	  ‘agency’.	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squatter	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  precisely	  not	  remaining	  helpless	  and	  passive	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  structural	  dynamics	  was	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  self-­‐‑understanding.	  Poignantly,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  squatter	  and	  a	  homeless	  person	  is	  precisely	  that	  the	  squatter	  is	  a	  homeless	  person	  who	  musters	  enough	  agency	  to	  go	  out	  and	  solve	  his	  housing	  problem	  through	  direct	  action.	  Charities	   like	  Crisis	  are	  certainly	  critical	  of	  this	  type	  of	  agency,	  since	  in	  their	   view	   it	   prevents	   people	   from	   getting	   the	   kind	   of	   help	   they	   consider	  appropriate.	   Squatters	   themselves,	   however,	   frequently	   felt	   that	   the	   official	  system	   took	   their	   agency	   away	   and	   stripped	   them	  of	   their	   choices,	   and	  many	  were	  more	  comfortable	  taking	  their	  housing	  situation	  into	  their	  own	  hands.	  They	  were	  often	  extremely	  critical	  of	  the	  ways	  ‘society’	  had	  caused	  their	  problems,	  and	  simultaneously	  took	  great	  pride	  in	  their	  (often	  remarkable)	  abilities	  to	  not	  only	  survive	  but	  to	  thrive	  under	  these	  difficult	  circumstances.	  In	  order	  not	  to	  discount	  
either	  their	  political	  analysis	  or	  their	  claim	  to	  agency,	  the	  question	  must	  therefore	  be:	  what	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two?61	  	  The	   CR	   account	   of	   structure	   and	   agency	   is,	   essentially,	   an	   attempt	   to	   find	   an	  alternative	  to	  a	  Durkheimian	  model,	  which	  sees	  social	  objects	  as	  “possessing	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own,	  external	  to	  and	  coercing	  the	  individual“	  (Bhaskar,	  2014,	  31)	  and	  a	   Weberian	   one	   in	   which,	   „social	   objects	   are	   seen	   as	   the	   results	   of	   (or	   as	  constituted	  by)	  intentional	  or	  meaningful	  human	  behaviour“	  (ibid.).	  CR,	  however,	  also	  rejects	  what	  it	  calls	   ‘central-­‐‑conflationist’	  approaches	  such	  as	  put	  forward	  by	   Berger	   and	   Luckmann	   (1991)	   and	   also	   in	   a	   modified	   form	   by	   Giddens	  (1979)62,	  since	  these,	  according	  to	  Bhaskar,	  conflate	  individual	  and	  social	  factors	  without	  sufficiently	  accounting	  for	  the	  mode	  of	  mediation	  between	  the	  two.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  The	  same	  dilemma	  plays	  out	  in	  other	  contexts,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  discussion	  about	  prostitution/sex-­‐‑work,	  where	  a	  gulf	  extends	  between	  interpretations	  that	  see	  it	  as	  a	  structural	  institution	  of	  oppression	  and	  those	  that	  focus	  on	  women’s	  choice	  and	  agency	  (Anderson/Andrijasevic,	  2008).	  While	  one	  side	  insists	  that	  focusing	  on	  agency	  is	  cynical	  and	  victim-­‐‑blaming,	  the	  other	  objects	  to	  being	  denied	  agency	  and	  choice	  and	  being	  treated	  as	  helpless	  and	  powerless.	  The	  problem	  is	  simply	  not	  resolvable	  without	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  structure/agency	  dilemma	  more	  generally	  62	  Fitzpatrick	  (2005)	  sees	  the	  CR	  model	  as	  equivalent	  to	  Giddens’	  theory	  of	  structuration,	  although	  Bhaskar	  explicitly	  denies	  this.	  He	  sees	  Giddens	  as	  a	  proponent	  of	  what	  he	  terms	  a	  ‘central-­‐‑conflationist	  theory’	  which	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  account	  for	  the	  specific	  factor	  of	  mediation.	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CR	  model,	  therefore,	  holds	  that	  individuals	  and	  society	  mutually	  constitute	  and	  reproduce	  each	  other	  in	  a	  dialectically	  mediated	  form:	  	  “People	   do	   not	   create	   society.	   For	   it	   always	   pre-­‐‑exists	   them	   and	   is	   a	   necessary	  
condition	   for	   their	   activity.	   Rather,	   society	  must	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	   ensemble	   of	  
structures,	   practices	  and	   conventions	  which	   individuals	   reproduce	  or	   transform,	  
but	  which	  would	  not	  exist	  unless	  they	  did	  so…Society,	  then,	  provides	  the	  necessary	  
conditions	   for	   intentional	   human	   action,	   and	   intentional	   human	   action	   is	   a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  it.”	  (2014,	  36-­‐‑7)	  	  ‘Dialectically	  mediated’	  means,	   in	   simple	   terms,	   that	   two	   factors	   are	  mutually	  constitutive,	  mutually	  exclusive	  and	  stand	   in	  a	  relative	  power	  relation	   to	  each	  other	  that	  results	  in	  a	  conflictual,	  dynamic	  tension	  (i.e.	  dynamic	  contradiction).	  As	  Bhaskar	  emphasises,	  while	  individuals	  and	  society	  mutually	  constitute	  each	  other,	  there	  is	  also	  an	  “ontological	  hiatus”	  (1978,	  40)	  between	  them,	  since	  society	  in	  its	  developed	  form	  is	  also	  independent	  of	  and	  prior	  to	  individual	  action.	  This	  means	  that	   individuals	  both	  transform	  and	  reproduce	  society,	  but	   they	  do	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  ‘create’	  it,	  since	  it	  also	  always	  predates	  them63	  (see	  also	  Archer,	  1995)	   –	   while	   the	   dynamic	   tension	   between	   individuals	   and	   society	   drives	   a	  continuous	   historical	   movement	   toward	   change,	   it	   is	   therefore	   also	   always	  hampered	  and	  slowed	  down	  by	  different	  kinds	  of	  historical	  ‘baggage’.	  	  	  In	   practical	   terms,	   this	   model	   gives	   us	   an	   opportunity	   to	   account	   for	   both	  structure	  and	  agency,	  while	  simultaneously	  recognising	   that	   ‘agency’	  does	  not	  necessarily	   equal	   ‘completely	   unrestrained	   freedom	   to	   act	   in	   any	   way	   one	  pleases’.	   	   I	   would	   therefore	   suggest	   –	   although	   due	   to	   limited	   space	   I	   cannot	  expand	  on	  the	  idea	  here	  -­‐‑	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  squatting	  (but	  potentially	  also	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  debates)	  it	  could	  be	  helpful	  to	  further	  develop	  concepts	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  “Society	   is	  both	   the	  everpresent	  condition	   (material	   cause)	  and	   the	   continually	   reproduced	  
outcome	  of	  human	  agency.	  And	  praxis	  is	  both	  work,	  that	  is,	  conscious	  production,	  and	  (normally	  unconscious)	  reproduction	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  production,	  that	  is	  society.	  One	  could	  refer	  to	  the	  former	  as	  the	  duality	  of	  structure,	  and	  the	  latter	  as	  the	  duality	  of	  praxis”	  (Bhaskar,	  1978,	  37,	  emph.	  orig.).	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as	  “coerced	  agency”	  as	  suggested	  by	  Hartman	  (1997,	  7).	  This	  would	  be	  a	  form	  of	  agency,	  which,	  while	   exerted	   by	   an	   individual	   voluntarily	   and	   deliberately,	   is	  produced,	  enforced	  and	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  structural	  conditions	  the	  person	  lives	   under.	   Squatters	   could	   then	   still	   be	   seen	   as	   homeless	   people	  who	   exert	  agency	   through	   direct	   action	   –	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	  identify	  this	  form	  of	  agency	  as	  one	  which	  would	  not	  exist	  if	  structural	  factors	  –	  from	   the	  housing	  market	   to	   austerity	  politics	   –	  did	  not	   conspire	   to	  produce	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  this	   form	  of	  agency	  becomes	  necessary,	  reasonable	  and,	   for	  some,	  unavoidable.	  Like	  Marx’	  ‘doubly	  free’	  worker,	  who	  is	  free	  to	  sell	  his	  labour	  power	  in	  any	  way	  he	  wants,	  but	  is	  not	  free	  to	  not	  sell	  it,	  a	  squatter	  could	  then	  be	  seen	   as	   a	   homeless	   person	   who	   takes	   their	   fate	   into	   their	   own	   hands	   –	   but	  arguably	   would	   not	   have	   to	   do	   so	   if	   they	   were	   not,	   for	   structural	   reasons,	  homeless	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  fact	  of	  homelessness	  therefore	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  a	  form	  of	  agency	  and	  a	  range	  of	  choices	  that,	  without	  it,	  would	  not	  be	  necessary,	  beneficial	  or	  even	  meaningful	  –	  the	  freedom	  to	  act	  is	  here	  therefore	  a	  coerced	  form	  of	  freedom.	  This	  way,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  see	  agency	  not	  as	  the	  absolute	  other	  of	  structural	  affectedness,	  but	  as	  its	  necessary	  outcome	  –	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  potentially	  its	  transformation.	  	  	  I	  hope	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter	  it	  has	  become	  clearer	  why	  I	  am	  taking	  what	  is	  possibly	  the	  scenic	  route	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  construction	  of	  space’,	  taking	  a	  critical	  look	  at	  the	  foundations	  of	  anthropological	  inquiry	  in	  the	  process.	  On	   the	  one	  hand	   this	   is	   simply	   a	   –	  perhaps	   transparent	   –	   attempt	   to	  strategically	  enlist	  meta-­‐‑theory	  in	  order	  to	  endow	  my	  respondent’s	  claims	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  world	  with	  as	  much	  ontological	  gravity	  as	  possible.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	   of	   course,	   that	   everything	   they	   say	   about	   the	  world	   and	   their	  place	   in	   it	   is	   necessarily	   factually	   correct	   –	   like	  myself,	   the	   squatters	   could	  of	  course	  be	  wrong	  about	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like.	  But	  I	  would	  rather	  present	  their	  (and	  my	   own)	   accounts	   here	   as	   true	   and	   have	   them	   shown	   to	   be	   false,	   than	  presenting	  them	  as	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  proven	  true	  or	  false	  because	  it	  is	  merely	  somebody’s	  personal	  opinion,	  related	  to	  nothing	  in	  particular.	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  perhaps	  less	  obviously,	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  an	  ethics	  of	  recognition	   depends	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   the	   ‘ontologically	   real’,	   because	   if	  people	  are	  supposed	  to	  recognise	  each	  other	  as	  subjects,	  then	  ‘subject’	  (however	  defined)	   must	   refer	   to	   something	   that	   a)	   objectively	   exists	   and	   b)	   is	  interpersonally	  recognisable.	  Conversely,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  truth,	  then	  there	  can	  be	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  misrecognition,	  because	  there	  is	  nothing	  there	  that	  could	  be	  misrecognised.	  My	  fellow	  subject	  could	  then	  jump	  up	  and	  down	  in	  front	  of	  me	  until	  she	  goes	  blue	  in	  the	  face,	  demanding	  her	  humanity	  to	  be	  recognised,	  and	  I	  could	  just	  shrug	  and	  reply	  “what	  is	  this	  ‘humanity’	  you’re	  talking	  of?”	  (I	  am	  being	  only	  slightly	  hyperbolic,	  as	  my	  above	  examples	  demonstrate).	  In	  chapter	  8,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  very	  effect	  is	  all	  but	  unintentional	  –	  it	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  what	  a	  particular	   kind	   of	   epistemic	   stance	   is	   designed	   to	   do,	   both	   individually	   and	  socially.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  however,	  I	  want	  to	  assure	  my	  reader	  that	  we	  are	  well	  under	  way	  to	  the	   ‘moral	  construction	  of	  space’	  –	  we	  have	   just	  constructed	  the	  discursive	  space	   in	  which	  we	  are	  going	   to	  hear	  what	   the	  squatters	  had	   to	  say	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  their	  political	  practice,	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  reasons	  and	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  goals.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  structural	  reasons	  for	  squatting	  and	  the	  political	  aims	  of	  squatters,	  and	   establish	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘ethical	   patterns’,	  which	  we	  will	   then	   identify	   as	  informing	  different	  spatial	  configurations.	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Chapter	  Four:	  Causes	  and	  Reasons	  
	  
	  
The	  thing	  worse	  than	  rebellion	  is	  the	  
thing	  that	  causes	  rebellion.	  Frederick	  Douglass	  	  	  	  So	  far,	  I	  have	  sketched	  the	  outline	  of	  an	  ethics	  based	  on	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  shared	  vulnerability,	  and	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  model	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  both	  of	  the	  anthropological	  fieldwork	  relationship,	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  that	  political	  actors	  like	  squatters	  form	  among	  each	  other.	  Parallel	  to	  this	  discussion,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  realist	  paradigm	  –	  here,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  Critical	  Realism	  –	  is	  an	  important	   theoretical	   tool	   for	   an	   anthropology	   that	   wants	   to	   avoid	   the	  universalising/totalising	  mistakes	  of	  the	  past,	  without	  resigning	  itself	  to	  a	  mere	  “hermeneutic	   representation	   of	   practices”	   (Bourdieu,	   1977,	   1).	   Finally,	   I	   have	  promised	  that	  I	  will	   identify	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  we	  have	  begun	  to	  call	  ‘recognition’	  and	  ‘misrecognition’	  come	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  space.	  This,	  of	  course,	  raises	  some	  general	  questions.	  How	  would	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  human	  relating	  –	  that	  between	  mutually	  recognising	  subjects,	  or	  that	  between	  a	  subject	  and	  a	  (misrecognised)	  object	  –	  translate	  into	  a	  specific	  spatial	  configuration?	  If	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘space	  of	  recognition’	  or	  a	  ‘space	  of	  misrecognition’,	  then	  how	  and	  why	  does	  it	  happen	  that	  an	  abstract	  relational	  structure	  manifests	   itself	   as	   a	   concrete	   spatial	   arrangement?	   In	  more	   general	  terms,	   how	   does	   it	   happen	   that	   any	   kind	   of	   ethical	   configuration	   –	   what	   in	  everyday	  discourse	  is	  often	  called	   ‘values’	  –	  translates	   into	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  interpersonal	  (and	  thus	  political)	  practice?	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  questions,	  I	  will	  in	  this	  chapter	  look	  at	  squatting	  as	  a	  practical	  form	  of	  what	  Critical	  Realism	  calls	  ‘explanatory	  critique’:	  	  “In	  its	  basic	  form	  an	  explanatory	  critique	  demonstrates	  that,	  if	  we	  can	  show	  a	  belief	  
to	   be	   both	   false	   and	   necessary64,	   that	   is,	   explain	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   underlying	   social	  
causes,	   then	   inference	   to	   the	   negative	   evaluation	   of	   its	   sources	   and	   the	   positive	  
evaluation	  of	  action	  oriented	  to	  removing	  them	  is	  mandatory.	  It	  thus	  unites	  criticism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  i.e.	  under	  the	  given	  circumstances	  unavoidable	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of	   beliefs	   with	   analysis	   of	   the	   social	   causes	   of	   their	   inadequacy”	   (Bhaskar,	  1987/2009	  xxvii).	  	  	  ‘Explanatory	  critique’	  therefore	  means	  to	  identify	  what	  causes	  a	  false	  belief	  (such	  as,	  speaking	  from	  a	  squatter’s	  perspective,	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  private	  property	  trump	  the	  interests	  of	  people	  without	  shelter),	  and	  then	  to	  proceed	  to	  remove	  these	  causes,	  so	  that	  more	  ‘practically	  adequate’	  beliefs	  can	  emerge.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  ‘explanatory	  critique’	  can	  be	  practical	  rather	  than	  theoretical	  –	  for	  example,	  BHAM,	  whom	  we	  have	  met	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  did	  not	  only	  address	  false	  beliefs	  about	  homelessness	  –	  it	  directly	  addressed	  what	  it	  considered	  false	  states	  of	  being,	  caused	  by	  specific	  underlying	  social	  phenomena	  (see	  Collier	  1994,	  and	  below).	  	  What	  is	  important	  about	  this	  concept	  is	  that	  it	  points	  to	  the	  connection	  between	   ‘causes’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   ‘the	   kinds	   of	   phenomena	   that	   make	   other	  phenomena	  happen’,	  and	  ‘causes’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘the	  political	  aims	  and	  goals	  that	  people	  believe	  should	  come	  to	  replace	  the	  status	  quo’.	  	  	  For	   the	   squatters,	   and	  many	   other	   political	   movements,	   the	   critique	   of	   social	  conditions	  implied,	  at	  least	  by	  extension,	  some	  kind	  of	  normative	  project	  of	  what	  things	  should	  be	  like	  instead.	  This	  alternative	  model	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  detailed	  political	   programme	   or	   utopian	   master	   plan,	   but	   evolved,	   somewhat	   akin	   to	  Adorno’s	  ‘ethics	  of	  resistance’	  (Finlayson,	  2002),	  from	  the	  negation	  of	  that	  which	  is	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  cause	  it	  to	  be	  like	  that.	  The	  mode	  of	  explanatory	  critique	  therefore	  provides	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  how	  evaluative	  judgment	  comes	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  action	  –	  and	  this	  is	  exactly	  the	  question	  I	  will	  have	  to	  address	  when	  arguing	  how	  patterns	  of	  ethical	  relating	  translate	  into	  practices	  of	  constructing	  space.	  I	  will	  therefore	  in	  this	  chapter	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  causes	  of	  squatting	  –	  both	  in	   the	   sense	  of	   ‘what	  makes	   it	  happen’	   and	   ‘what	  does	   it	   try	   to	  achieve’	   –	   and	  specifically,	  at	  what	  constitutes	  the	  mode	  of	  translation	  between	  the	  two.	  In	  so	  far	  as	   the	   squatters	   defined	   their	   practice	   as	   reaction	   to	   the	   condition	   of	  homelessness,	   I	   will	   start	   with	   providing	   a	   general	   overview	   of	   the	   kinds	   of	  explanations	  that	  ‘homelessness	  studies’	  have	  provided	  for	  this	  issue,	  and,	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter,	  examine	  how	  squatter’s	  own	  interpretations	  differed	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from	  them.	  This	  will	  eventually	  bring	  us	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘ethical	  patterns’	  and	  thus,	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  people’s	  ideas	  about	  ‘the	  good’	  shape	  the	  production	  of	  space.	  	  
	  That	  the	  aims	  of	  squatting	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  social	  ills	  is	  not	  a	  new	  insight.	  Prujit	  (2013)	  for	  example	  offers	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  squatting	   projects	   that	   lists	   five	   “configurations”:	   deprivation-­‐‑based	   squatting;	  squatting	   as	   an	   alternative	   housing	   strategy;	   entrepreneurial	   squatting;	  conservational	   squatting	   and	   political	   squatting	   (2013,	   21).	   Each	   of	   these	  corresponds	  to	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  social	  problems	  –	  lack	  of	  affordable	  living	  space	   for	   the	   poor,	   danger	   to	   sites	   of	   cultural	   significance,	   etc.	   –	   and	   employs	  different	  strategies	  to	  amend	  those.	  For	  example	  in	  ‘deprivation	  based	  squatting’,	  there	  is	  	  	  “an	   organizational	   pattern	   that	  makes	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   activists	   and	  
squatters…the	  activists	  open	  up	  buildings	  for	  the	  squatters	  and	  support	  them….the	  
central	  demand	  in	  this	  configuration	  does	  not	  involve	  structural	  change,	  but	  instead	  
focuses	   on	   helping	   the	   squatters	   obtain	   (temporary)	   leases	   or	   alternative	  
accommodation”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  In	   ‘political	  squatting’,	   in	  contrast,	  “squatting	  is	  not	  a	  goal	  in	  its	  own	  right;	  it	   is	  attractive	  because	  of	  its	  high	  potential	  for	  confrontations	  with	  the	  state…because	  here	  the	  involvement	  in	  squatting	  is	  driven	  by	  an	  ulterior	  anti-­‐‑systemic	  political	  motive”	  (44).	  Prujit’s	  data	  comes	  mainly	  from	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  possible	   that	   these	   clear	   distinctions	   apply	   in	   the	   Dutch	   context.	   In	   the	   UK	  however,	   and	   Bristol	   in	   particular,	   while	   all	   of	   these	   configurations	   could	   be	  observed,	  projects	  could	  rarely	  be	  assigned	  to	  just	  one	  category65.	  Prujit	  contends,	  “conceptually,	  squatting	  projects	  are	  the	  units	  of	  analysis.	  A	  squatting	  project	  can	  only	   belong	   to	   a	   single	   configuration,	   but	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   squatting	   projects	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Although,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  6,	  Bristol	  squatters	  did	  refer	  to	  some	  squats	  as	  more	  ‘political’	  than	  others,	  what	  they	  usually	  meant	  was	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  removing	  a	  housing	  need,	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  these	  squats	  also	  subscribed	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  political	  ideology,	  most	  often	  Anarchism.	  What	  they	  certainly	  did	  not	  mean	  was	  that	  their	  only	  motivation	  for	  squatting	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  throw	  bricks	  at	  the	  establishment.	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belonging	   to	   different	   configurations	   to	   share	   the	   same	   building”	   (21).	   Thus	  defined,	  there	  is	  no	  place	  in	  his	  model	  for	  hybrid	  configurations	  within	  projects	  or	   for	   a	   diverse	   array	   of	   sub-­‐‑units	   such	   as	   crews	   (not	   always	   congruent	  with	  squats),	   families/couples	   or	   individuals.	   Equally,	   Prujit's	   highly	  compartmentalised	  model	  does	  not	  account	  for	  changes	  over	  time,	  such	  as	  when	  for	   example	   a	   former	   ‘deprivation-­‐‑squat’	   becomes	  more	   stable	   and	   thus	  more	  politicised.	  BHAM	  itself	  was	  most	  obviously	  a	  combination	  of	  ‘deprivation	  based’	  and	  ‘political’	  squatting,	  since	  its	  members	  helped	  ‘the	  homeless’,	  but	  also	  wanted	  to	  affect	  systemic	  change.	  Most	  importantly,	  BHAM	  saw	  no	  theoretical	  or	  practical	  contradiction	  between	  one	  and	  the	  other,	  since	  for	  them,	  the	  sustained	  practice	  of	  helping	  others	  obtain	  shelter	  was	  a	  way	  of	  affecting	  structural	  change66.	  	  	  The	  difficulty	  with	  Prujit’s	  taxonomy	  of	  squats	  is	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways	  a	  mirror	  image	  of	   the	   difficulty	   in	   defining	   in	   what,	   exactly,	   constitutes	   homelessness.	   The	  literature	   virtually	   blossoms	   with	   neatly	   compartmentalised	   descriptions	   of	  types	   of	   homeless	   people,	   definitions	   which	   (usually	   in	   a	   policy-­‐‑oriented	  manner)	   try	   to	   establish	   a	   list	   of	   positive	   criteria	   that	   must	   be	   present	   for	  someone	  to	  fall	  into	  one	  category	  or	  the	  other.	  In	  this	  way,	  authors	  have	  arrived	  at	  various	  taxonomies	  of	  ‘rough	  sleepers’,	  the	  ‘precariously	  housed’,	  the	  ‘hidden	  homeless’	  etc.,	  and	  there	  is	  on-­‐‑going	  lively	  debate	  about	  who	  should	  be	  included	  in	  what	  category	  and	  why.	  The	  multitude	  and	  heterogeneity	  of	  definitions	  has	  led	  some	   scholars	   to	   suggest	   that:	   “...there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   homelessness,	   but	  instead	  a	  range	  of	  heterogeneous	  characteristics	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  symptoms	   that	   we	   term	   ‘homelessness’”	   (Williams,	   2001,	   1).	   Williams	   is	   of	  course	  not	  suggesting	  that	  there	  are	  no	  people	  without	  shelter,	  merely	  that	  the	  categories	  used	   to	  describe	   them	  are	   so	  numerous	  and	  contradictory	  as	   to	  be	  practically	  useless.	  He	  does,	  however	  (Williams	  2003),	  compare	  ‘homelessness’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  persistent	  impulse	  among	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  squatter	  (notably	  the	  one	  who	  writes	  academic	  books)	  to	  distance	  ‘political’	  squatting	  from	  the	  kind	  that	  has	  “no	  other	  motivation	  than	  to	  remedy	  a	  desperate	  situation,	  secretly	  and	  in	  silence”	  (Cattaneo	  et	  al,	  2014,	  3).	  I	  am	  not	  entirely	  sure	  what	  is	  behind	  this	  impetus,	  but	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  is	  a	  variety	  on	  the	  theme	  of	  denying	  	  and	  projecting	  vulnerability,	  neediness	  and	  dependency;	  making	  these	  traits	  ‘other’	  to	  one’s	  own	  autonomous	  macho-­‐‑activist	  habitus.	  In	  Bristol,	  I	  have	  observed	  this	  kind	  of	  attitude	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  individual	  squatters,	  but	  it	  was	  by	  no	  means	  generally	  accepted.	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to	   ‘Greekness’	   in	   order	   to	   argue	   that	   ‘homelessness’	   is	   essentially	   an	   empty	  category,	  which	  only	  exists	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  identification	  of	  those	  subject	  to	  it.	  Fitzpatrick	   (2005,	   see	   also	  below)	   challenges	   this	   assumption	  by	  arguing	   that	  	  “homelessness…	  is	  not	  a	  cultural	  phenomenon	  but	  rather	  a	  signifier	  of	  objective	  material	  and	  social	  conditions,	  and	  as	  such	  intersubjective	  recognition	  is,	  I	  would	  argue,	  less	  central	  to	  its	  existence”	  (p12)	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  homelessness	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  identity.	  The	  conflation	  of	  ‘objective	  material	  conditions’	  with	  (socially	  constructed)	   cultural	   categories	   is	   an	   example	   of	   what	   CR	   refers	   to	   as	   the	  ‘epistemic	  fallacy’.	  In	  Bhaskar’s	  original	  terms,	  the	  epistemic	  fallacy	  “consists	  in	  the	  view	  that	  statements	  about	  being	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  or	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  statements	   about	   knowledge;	   i.e.	   that	   ontological	   questions	   can	   always	   be	  transposed	   into	   epistemological	   terms.	   The	   idea	   that	   being	   can	   always	   be	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  being,	  that	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  philosophy	  to	  ‘treat	  only	  of	   the	  network,	  and	  not	  what	   the	  network	  describes’	   (Wittgenstein,	  
Tractatus	  Logico-­‐‑Philosophicus,	  §	  6.35,	  footnote	  in	  orig.)	  results	  in	  the	  systematic	  dissolution	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  world	  (which	  I	  shall	  here	  metaphorically	  characterize	  as	  an	  ontological	  realm)	  independent	  of	  but	  investigated	  by	  science”	  (Bhaskar,	  1978/2013,	  p	  26f).	  	  	  In	  collapsing	  ontology	  (what	  is)67	  into	  epistemology	  (i.e.	  what	  and	  how	  we	  can	  know	  about	  what	   is),	   social	   scientists	  end	  up	  producing	   ‘flat’68	  accounts	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Another	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  fallacy	  in	  anthropology	  is	  the	  recent	  debate	  on	  ‘multiple	  ontologies’	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  so	  called	  ‘ontological	  turn’	  (e.g.	  Holbraad	  et	  al,	  2014,	  Holbraad,	  2012,	  Henare	  et.al.	  2007).	  As	  commentators	  such	  as	  Heywood	  (2012)	  note,	  this	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘ontology’	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  its	  use	  in	  analytical	  philosophy:	  “Holbraad	  and	  others	  use	  the	  word	  ‘ontology’	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  connotations	  of	  ‘reality’	  and	  ‘being’	  it	  brings	  with	  it;	  yet	  they	  neglect	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  insisting	  on	  the	  ‘reality’	  of	  multiple	  worlds	  commits	  you	  to	  a	  meta-­‐‑ontology	  in	  which	  such	  worlds	  exist”	  (Heywood,	  2012,	  146;	  for	  a	  similar	  critique	  see	  Laidlaw,	  2012).	  Although	  such	  a	  meta-­‐‑ontology	  is	  not	  per	  se	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  it	  is	  usually	  not	  what	  these	  anthropologists	  refer	  to.	  Rather,	  they	  want	  to	  emphasise	  that	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  world	  various	  actors	  hold	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  so	  incommensurable	  that	  they	  appear	  to	  refer	  to	  different	  ‘worlds’.	  Since	  these	  theorists	  are,	  however,	  still	  concerned	  with	  
interpretations	  of	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like,	  they	  are	  still	  operating	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  epistemology,	  i.e.	  what	  they	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘multiple	  ontologies’	  is,	  from	  a	  CR	  perspective,	  actually	  multiple	  epistemologies	  with	  very,	  very	  different	  premises.	  The	  ‘ontological	  turn’	  therefore	  appears	  to	  entail	  a	  more	  extreme	  version	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  radical	  perspectivism	  that	  (as	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  three)	  constitutes	  anthropology’s	  perpetual	  ‘crisis’	  and	  against	  which	  my	  CR	  model	  is	  explicitly	  formulated.	  68	  ‘Flatness‘	  refers	  to	  the	  conflation	  of	  a	  statistical	  co-­‐‑occurrence	  with	  an	  account	  of	  causation,	  which,	  according	  to	  CR,	  requires	  an	  account	  of	  ‘ontological	  depth‘,	  i.e.	  the	  assumption	  that	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social	  world	  in	  which	  ‘homelessness’	  is	  not	  a	  specific	  material	  phenomenon	  (such	  as	  humans	  being	  without	  shelter),	  but	  simply	  whatever	  combination	  of	  factors	  we	  choose	  to	  call	  ‘homelessness’69.	  	  	  The	   difficulty	   ‘homelessness	   research’	   has	   in	   establishing	   a	   clear	   definition	   of	  ‘homelessness’	  repeats	  itself	  on	  the	  level	  of	  explaining	  its	  causes.	  Traditionally,	  explanations	  of	  homelessness	  have	  been	  suspended	  between	  those	  that	  focused	  on	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  those	  that	  focus	  on	  structural	  factors.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  individualist	  kind	  is	  Megan	  Ravenhill’s	  The	  Culture	  of	  Homelessness	  (2008).	  Ravenhill	   uses	   the	   word	   ‘culture’	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   survival	   practices	   of	  homeless	  people	  are	  actually	  to	  blame	  for	  homelessness.	  Ravenhill’s	  discussion	  of	   the	   ‘roots’	   of	   homelessness	   focuses	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   factors	   in	   the	  individual	   lives	   of	   her	   subjects,	   as	   if	   there	  was	   ‘no	   such	   thing	   as	   society’,	   and	  indeed	  the	  language	  she	  uses	  seems	  to	  be	  borrowed	  directly	  from	  a	  Conservative	  Party	  manifesto.	  She	  identifies	  adverse	  childhood	  experiences	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  causes	  of	  “rooflessness”	  (Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  preferred	  term	  for	  the	  homeless),	  along	  with	  “institutionalization,	  prostitution,	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  abuse,	  personality	  disorders	  –	  as	  well	  as	  more	  mundane	  problems	  such	  as	  the	  breakdown	  of	  adult	  relationships	  and	  tragic-­‐‑comically	  trivial	  barriers	  to	  resettlement”	  (xvii),	  plus	  the	  fact	  that	  homeless	  people	  become	  accustomed	  to	  their	  predicament	  remarkably	  quickly.	   The	   titling	   ‘culture’	   of	   homelessness	   to	   her	   then	   are	   those	   social	  relationships	   that	   people	   on	   the	   street	   form	   and	   that,	   in	   her	   view,	   provide	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  causes	  and	  mechanisms	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Real	  produce	  what	  science	  can	  measure	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  co-­‐‑occurrence	  of	  categories	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Empirical.	  69	  The	  problem	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  that	  in	  working	  backwards	  from	  a	  descriptive	  category,	  as	  is	  the	  usual	  mode	  of	  social	  science	  research	  (e.g.	  in	  deciding	  to	  research	  ‘homelessness’	  or	  a	  particular	  ‘culture’)	  one	  has	  already	  pre-­‐‑defined	  a	  sample.	  On	  discovering	  that	  this	  sample	  has	  heterogeneous	  characteristics,	  one	  then	  has	  to	  explain	  these	  differences.	  This	  approach	  is	  methodologically	  opposed	  to	  one	  which,	  as	  I	  have	  done	  in	  this	  ethnography,	  starts	  with	  a	  loosely	  defined	  sample	  and	  looks	  for	  common	  elements	  or	  patterns	  which	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  the	  sample	  has	  some	  degree	  of	  inner	  coherence	  (similarly	  to	  a	  Grounded	  Theory	  approach,	  see	  Glaser/Strauss,	  1967).	  I	  have,	  for	  example,	  adopted	  the	  phrase	  ‘persons	  who	  have	  no	  fixed	  address’	  to	  characterise	  my	  respondents,	  since	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  most	  prominent	  common	  element	  uniting	  them.	  But	  even	  this	  wide	  definition	  still	  encompasses	  a	  wildly	  different	  array	  of	  people	  from	  an	  equally	  wide	  array	  of	  backgrounds,	  who	  were	  linked	  by	  a	  network	  based	  on	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  explanatory	  critique,	  resulting	  in	  direct	  action.	  To	  explain	  what	  these	  people	  have	  in	  common	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  co-­‐‑occurring	  characteristics	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  sociological	  categories)	  would	  therefore	  be	  missing	  the	  point	  of	  their	  association	  as	  they	  understand	  it.	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subcultural	  social	  context	  that	  they	  find	  hard	  to	  escape:	  “if	  we	  are	  serious	  about	  preventing	  and	  resolving	  rooflessness	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  homeless	  culture,	  in	  attracting	  and	  holding	  members”	  (145).	  After	  providing	  an	  exhaustive	  taxonomy	  of	  these	  seductive	  subcultural	  currents,	  she	  asserts	  that	  what	   she	   calls	   the	   “homeless	   industry”	   (namely	   shelters,	   social	   work	   and	  charities)	  plays	  a	  crucial	  part	  in	  keeping	  these	  ‘cultures’	  alive	  and	  well70.	  	  	  On	   the	  other	  end	  of	   the	   individual	  vs.	   structure	  spectrum	   is	  Kathleen	  Arnold’s	  
Homelessness,	  Citizenship	  and	  Identity	  (2004).	  Arnold	  analyses	  homelessness	  as	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  problem:	  “Homelessness	  represents	  the	  extreme	  case	  of	  (…)	   economic	  marginalization	   and	   thus	   is	  worth	   exploring	   for	  what	   it	   tells	   us	  about	  political	  economic	  norms,	  the	  status	  of	  democracy,	  and	  the	  deployment	  of	  prerogative	   power	   in	   the	  modern	   nation-­‐‑state“	   (3).	   Arnold	   does	   not	   so	  much	  attempt	  to	  ‘explain’	  homelessness	  as	  she	  uses	  the	  issue	  to	  launch	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  citizenship	  and	  the	  nation	  state,	  which,	  in	  her	  view,	  are	  instrumental	  in	  producing	  it:	  	  	  “The	   forces	   that	   homeless	   people	   deal	   with	   are	   disenfranchisement	   and	   social	  
‘death’,	   degrading	   myths	   and	   stereotypes,	   punitive	   treatment	   by	   case-­‐‑workers,	  
deficient	   school	   systems	   that	   perpetuate	   illiteracy	   and	   jobless-­‐‑ness,	   and	   most	  
importantly,	   the	   loss	   of	   rights	   as	   a	   citizen,	   and	   thus,	   as	   a	   human	   that	   these	  
individuals	  suffer.	  Perhaps	  some	  people	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  homelessness,	  but	  
in	   this	   milieu,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   tell.	   And	   why	   should	   they	   suffer	   such	   dire	  
consequences?”	  (ibid)	  	  The	  latter	  question	  –	  although	  asked	  here	  in	  a	  more	  rhetorical	  fashion	  –	  is	  indeed	  pertinent,	  and	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  suggest	  a	  few	  possible	  answers.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  Arnold’s	  and	  Ravenhill’s	  approaches	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  exemplary	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	   arguments	  about	   the	   causes	  of	  homelessness	  –	  and,	  by	  extension,	  about	  what	  should	  be	  done	  to	  end	  it	  –	  made	  by	  political	  and	  social	  groups	  on	  the	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  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  British	  Conservative	  Party’s	  attitude	  to	  ‘rooflessness’,	  see	  chapters	  9	  and	  10	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left	  and	  right	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  For	  example	  BHAM,	  who	  would	  certainly	  want	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  anything	  to	   the	  right	  of	   the	  political	  centre,	  makes	  an	  explicit	   connection	   between	   “commercial	   property	   developers”,	   the	   “housing	  crisis”	  and	  “the	  rising	  tide	  of	  people	  being	  made	  homeless”,	  and	  campaigns	  not	  only	  for	  housing	  for	  its	  individual	  membership,	  but	  also	  “against	  the	  privatisation	  of	  public	   land	  and	  housing	  and	   for	   the	  defence	  of	  public	   space”.	   In	   its	   roughly	  socialist	   outlook,	   BHAM	   acknowledges	   that	   individual	   trajectories	   into	  homelessness	  can	  vary,	  but	  that	  nevertheless	  the	  basic	  fault	  lies	  with	  the	  social	  system	  rather	  than	  with	  individual	  actors.	  In	  contrast,	  after	  Westminster	  council	  attempted	   (unsuccessfully)	   to	  ban	   soup	   runs	   for	   the	  homeless	   in	  2011,	  Daniel	  Astaire	  of	  Westminster	  Council	   (Conservatives)	  was	   reported	  as	   saying:	   “Soup	  runs	  have	  no	  place	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  It	  is	  undignified	  that	  people	  are	  being	  fed	  on	  the	  streets.	  They	  actually	  encourage	  people	  to	  sleep	  rough	  with	  all	  the	  dangers	  that	   entails.	  Our	  priority	   is	   to	   get	  people	  off	   the	   streets	   altogether.	  We	  have	   a	  range	   of	   services	   that	   can	   help	   do	   that” 71 	  (emphasis	   mine).	   In	   claiming	   that	  donated	   food	   “keeps	   people	   on	   the	   street	   longer“	   (ibid),	   Astaire	   appeared	   to	  mirror	   Ravenhill’s	   claim	   that	   homeless	   ‘culture’	   is	   to	   blame	   for	   encouraging	  people	  to	  sleep	  rough72.	  	  Outside	  of	  these	  extremes,	  research	  on	  homelessness	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  undergone	  a	  historical	   transformation	   from	   ‘individualistic’	   to	   ‘structural’	   explanations	  (Fitzpatrick	   2005).	   Since	   the	   1960s,	   explanations	   that	   located	   the	   causes	   of	  homelessness	   in	   individual	  deficiency	  or	  pathology	  were	   increasingly	   replaced	  with	   macro-­‐‑structural	   explanations.	   A	   number	   of	   studies	   now	   investigated	  structural	   factors	   such	   as	   poverty	   and	   housing	   shortages	   as	   explanations	   (e.g.	  Drake,	  O’Brien,	  &	  Beiuyck	  1981),	  but	  were	  somewhat	  troubled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  individual	  factors	  that	  frequently	  accompany	  homelessness	  were	  still	  ostensibly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/news/housing-­‐‑management/westminster-­‐‑seeks-­‐‑to-­‐‑ban-­‐‑rough-­‐‑sleeping/6513857.article,	  accessed	  14.6.2012,	  see	  also	  http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/mar/17/homeless-­‐‑rough-­‐‑sleeping-­‐‑free-­‐‑food-­‐‑bylaw,	  accessed	  14.6.2012,	  for	  a	  list	  of	  prominent	  signatories	  in	  protest	  against	  this	  proposition	  72	  This	  argumentative	  figure	  crops	  up	  time	  after	  time	  in	  right-­‐‑wing	  discussions	  of	  poverty	  and	  welfare	  regimes,	  since	  any	  kind	  of	  help	  for	  the	  economically	  disadvantaged	  is	  seen	  to	  undermine	  their	  motivation	  to	  pull	  themselves	  up	  by	  their	  bootstraps.	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present.	   As	   a	   result,	   a	   position	   emerged	   that	   Fitzpatrick	   terms	   the	   “new	  orthodoxy”	   in	  homelessness	   research,	  namely	  a	   stance	   that	  attempts	   to	  weave	  together	   both	   individual	   and	   structural	   explanations	   while	   emphasising	   the	  overall	   primacy	   of	  macro-­‐‑structural	   factors	   (4)73.	   The	   basic	   tenet	   of	   the	   ‘new	  orthodoxy’	   is	   that	   while	   structural	   factors	   cause	   homelessness,	   people	   with	  additional	   issues	  are	  more	  vulnerable	   to	   these	   factors,	  and	   thus	  more	   likely	   to	  become	  homeless.	  As	  Fitzpatrick	  discusses,	  this	  position	  remains	  uncomfortable	  in	   so	   far	   as,	   while	   more	   practically	   adequate	   than	   purely	   individualistic	   or	  structural	   explanations,	   it	   is	   theoretically	   unsound	   in	   that	   it	   still	   relies	   on	   an	  agency/structure	  dichotomy	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  discredited74.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  poses	  the	  problem	  that	  some	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  contributing	  to	  homelessness	  cannot	  be	  slotted	  neatly	  into	  one	  category	  or	  the	  other.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   as	   Fitzpatrick	   holds,	   ‘new	   orthodox’	   accounts	   also	   lack	   a	   clear	  definition	  of	  what	   they	  mean	  by	   ‘causation’.	  She	  therefore	  proposes	  to	  adopt	  a	  Critical	  Realist	  framework	  for	  the	  study	  of	  homelessness	  and	  outlines	  what	  such	  an	  analysis	  could	  look	  like.	  As	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  dialectic	  account	   of	   structure/agency	   favoured	   by	   CR	   means	   that	   in	   this	   context,	   the	  question	   must	   be	   how	   the	   individual	   and	   social	   factors	   that	   go	   along	   with	  homelessness	  are	  mutually	  constituting	  and	  constituted,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  how	  one	  translates	  into	  the	  other.	  As	  Fitzpatrick	  shows,	  this	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  a	  (positivist)	  mere	  assumption	  of	  statistical	  co-­‐‑occurrence	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  substance	  abuse	  or	  mental	   illness,	  but	  rather,	  asks	   the	  question	  what	  could	  be	  responsible	   for	   the	   fact	   that	  substance	  abuse,	  mental	   illness	  and	  homelessness	  frequently	   occur	   together.	   It	   also	   has	   a	   different	   theoretical	   thrust	   than	  interpretative	   approaches	   to	   homelessness,	   in	   that	   its	   focus	   is	   not	   on	   the	  meanings	  people	  assign	  to	  this	  condition,	  but	  its	  real	  properties75.	  	  	  The	   dialectic	   account	   of	   the	   agency/structure	   problem	   therefore	   holds	   some	  implications	  as	  to	  how	  the	  question	  of	  causes	  (here,	  of	  homelessness)	  should	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  see	  also	  Dant	  &	  Deacon	  1989,	  Fitzpatrick	  1998,	  Kennett	  &	  Marsh	  1999,	  Fitzpatrick,	  Kemp	  &	  Klinker	  2000	  74	  see	  also	  Neale	  1997,	  Pleace	  1998,	  2000,	  Stones	  2001	  75	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  meaning	  is	  any	  less	  relevant,	  it	  is	  just	  a	  different	  debate.	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approached	  more	   specifically.	   ‘Causation’	   is	  not	   something	   anthropology	  often	  speaks	   about,	   which	   may	   in	   part	   be	   due	   to	   the	   association	   of	   the	   term	   with	  positivist	  models	  of	  unilateral	  determination.	  A	  positivist	  framework,	  generally	  speaking,	   attempts	   to	   discover	   (statistical)	   regularities	   in	   data	   in	   order	   to	  establish	  potential	  cause-­‐‑effect	  relationships.	  Critical	  Realists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  rather	   than	  assuming	   that	  a	  mere	  co-­‐‑occurrence	  between	   factors	  constitutes	  a	  satisfactory	  explanation,	  delve	  into	  the	  ontological	  depth	  of	  the	  Real	  	  “to	  ask	  what	  ‘makes	   it	   happen’,	   what	   ‘produces’,	   ‘generates’,	   ‘creates’	   or	   ‘determines’	   it,	   or,	  more	  weakly,	  what	  ‘enables’	  or	  ‘leads	  to’	  it”	  (Sayer,	  1992,	  104).	  These	  questions	  are	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   social	   objects	   and	   structures	   have	   causal	  powers	   “which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   activated	   (and	   produce	   ‘‘actual’’	   effects)	  depending	  on	  conditions“	  (Fitzpatrick,	  2005,	  3)76.	  Thus	  it	  could	  for	  example	  be	  said	   that	   the	   housing	   market	   may	   have	   the	   causal	   power	   to	   bring	   forth	  homelessness,	  but	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  actually	  does	  so	  depends	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  factors.	   Causal	   powers	   thus	   are	   potentialities	   inherent	   in	   social	   objects	   and	  relations,	   which	   need	   to	   be	   examined	   in	   ensemble	   with	   other	   objects	   and	  relations	  to	  see	  whether	  their	  causative	  potential	  unfolds.	  	  	  “Realist	  explanations	  of	  actual	  social	  events	  and	  phenomena	  are	  not	  ‘mono-­‐‑causal’	  
and	   deterministic,	   but	   rather	   ‘complex’	   (with	   intricate	   feedback	   loops	   linking	  
multiple	  causal	  mechanisms);	  ‘emergent’	  (from	  this	  complexity	  new	  properties	  may	  
emerge	  which	  cannot	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  individual	  components);	  and	  ‘non-­‐‑linear’	  
(small	  changes	  in	  these	  complex	  relationships	  can	  bring	  about	  sudden	  and	  dramatic	  
outcomes)”	  (ibid.)	  	  Fitzpatrick	   then	  outlines	  how	  a	  CR	   framework	  approaches	   the	  question	  of	   the	  causes	   for	  homelessness	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  emergent	  powers	  of	   social	  objects.	   In	  accordance	  with	  the	  CR	  model	  of	  a	  stratified	  reality,	  such	  explanations	  will	  have	  to	   view	   homelessness	   as	   emergent	   from	   the	   combined	   potentiality	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Intriguingly,	  as	  Fitzpatrick	  demonstrates	  in	  her	  discussion	  of	  feminist	  approaches	  to	  homelessness,	  this	  model	  can	  also	  account	  for	  assumed	  causal	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  ‘patriarchy’	  even	  in	  the	  light	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  appears	  to	  contradict	  it,	  since	  the	  assumption	  of	  emergent	  and	  mutually	  constituting	  causes	  can	  account	  for	  variations	  in	  outcome	  without	  having	  to	  abandon	  the	  entire	  explanatory	  framework	  (see	  Fitzpatrick,	  2005,	  14).	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mechanisms	   that	   underlie	   it.	   These	   causal	   mechanisms	   may	   exist	   on	   various	  levels	   and	   interact	   with	   each	   other	   in	   complex	   and	   non-­‐‑linear	   ways	   that	   can	  produce	  varying	  outcomes	  depending	  on	  particular	  circumstances.	  This	  means	  that	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   seemingly	   same	   set	   of	   circumstances	   produces	  different	  outcomes	  (e.g.	  people	  with	  substance	  abuse	   issues	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  become	   homeless,	   but	   not	   all	   people	   with	   substance	   abuse	   issues	   become	  homeless)	  do	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  explanatory	  model	  is	  flawed,	  only	  that	  there	   are	   potentially	   other	   mechanisms	   at	   work	   which	   can	   account	   for	   the	  disparity.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  so	  powerful	  that	  they	  routinely	  override	  others,	  especially	  when	  a	  mechanism	  that	  has	  previously	  kept	   another	   in	   check	   (say,	   the	   welfare	   system	   has	   helped	   to	   ameliorate	   the	  effects	  of	  the	  housing	  market)	  becomes	  weaker	  (e.g.	  austerity	  weakens	  this	  effect	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  housing	  market	  to	  cause	  homelessness	  comes	  into	  its	  full	  force).	  	  Why	  is	  this	  important	  for	  our	  discussion	  here?	  First	  and	  foremost,	  it	  avoids	  the	  problem	  of	  having	  to	  clearly	  distinguish	  between	  individual	  and	  structural	  factors	  in	  accounting	  for	  homelessness,	  and	  opens	  up	  a	  space	  of	  interpretation	  in	  which	  one	  and	  the	  same	  mechanism	  can	  account	  for	  effects	  on	  both	  levels.	  This	  model	  is	  thus	   structurally	   closer	   to	   the	   interpretations	   of	   squatters	   themselves.	   For	  example,	   the	   co-­‐‑occurrence	   of	   seemingly	   disparate	   configurations	   such	   as	  ‘deprivation-­‐‑based	  squatting’	  and	  ‘political	  squatting’,	  rather	  than	  appearing	  as	  a	  coincidental	  overlap	  of	  unrelated	  issues,	  becomes	  understandable	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  addressing	  the	  same	  underlying	  causes	  –	  namely	  the	  absence	  of	  shelter	  –	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  social.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  concept	  of	  emergent	  powers	  can	  help	   to	   formulate	   a	   definition	   of	   homelessness	  which	   avoids	   the	   difficulty	  associated	  with	  a	  category	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  positive	  criteria,	  as	  discussed	   above.	   In	   arguing	   that	   a)	   homelessness	   is	   an	   objective,	   material	  condition	  that	  b)	  emerges	  from	  particular	  causal	  mechanisms	  which	  act	  on	  both	  the	   individual	  and	  the	  social	  structure;	   the	  focus	  of	  analysis	  has	  shifted	  from	  a	  particular	   configuration	   of	   statistical	   variables	   that	   constitute	   the	   ‘homeless	  person’,	   to	   the	   configuration	   of	   material	   and	   (by	   extension)	   ideological	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mechanisms	   that	   ‘produce’	   him	   or	   her.	   	   ‘Homelessness’	   can	   then	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  condition	  of	  spatial	  abjection	  that	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  combined	  powers	  of	  those	  mechanisms	  which	  cause	  a	  person	  to	  experience	  a	   lack	  of	  shelter	  –	  this	  can	  be	  housing	  policy	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense,	  but,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  also	  patterns	  of	  ‘human	  territoriality’	   (Sack,	   1986)	   influenced	   by	   gender,	   race	   and	   class;	   processes	   of	  colonisation	   and	   displacement;	   forms	   of	   violence	   that	   disrupt	   a	   person’s	  embodiment	  and	  so	  on.	  A	   ‘homeless	  person’	  then	  is	  somebody	  who	  is,	   in	  some	  way	  or	  other,	  affected	  by	  these	  mechanisms	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  experience	  lack	  of	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  –	  and,	  as	  will	  become	  obvious	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  this	  definition	   is	   by	   far	   not	   restricted	   to	   those	   that	   public	   policy	   will	   regard	   as	  ‘homeless’.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  idea	  of	  causation	  as	  driven	  by	  underlying	  emergent	  potentialities	  can	  also	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  squatters	  translated	  evaluative	  judgment	  into	  action	  –	  specifically,	   into	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  space.	  	  	  	  
From	  Values	  To	  Relational	  Patterns	  	  	  Above,	  I	  have	  indicated	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  explanatory	  critique	  has	  a	  cognitive	  and	  a	  practical	  dimension.	  The	  cognitive	  one,	  as	  described	  above,	  refers	   to	   the	  identification	   and	   rejection	   of	   necessary	   false	   beliefs.	   The	   practical	   or	   ‘needs-­‐‑based’	  one,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  starts	  from	  the	  identification	  of	  lack	  or	  suffering,	  and	  demands	  that	  this	  state	  should	  be	  removed	  (Sayer,	  1997,	  475;	  see	  also	  Collier	  1994).	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  practical	  political	  project,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  identifies	  a	   form	  of	  suffering	  and	  makes	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  to	  remove	   it,	   is	  engaged	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  form	  of	  reasoning.	  Squatters,	  for	  example,	  in	  specifying	  who	   and	  what	   squatting	   is	   for,	   also	   name	   the	   conditions	  which,	   in	   their	   view,	  make	  squatting	  necessary	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  	  
“Squatting	   is	   a	   solution	   to	   homelessness,	   empty	   properties	   and	   speculation.	   It	  
provides	   homes	   for	   those	   who	   can’t	   get	   public	   housing	   and	   who	   can’t	   afford	  
extortionate	  rents.	  Squatting	  creates	  space	  for	  much-­‐‑needed	  community	  projects.	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Squatting	  means	  taking	  control	  instead	  of	  being	  pushed	  around	  by	  bureaucrats	  and	  
property	  owners”	  (Advisory	  Service	  for	  Squatters,	  1996,	  1)77	  	  This	  short	  paragraph	  contains	  a	  number	  of	  evaluative	  judgments	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  homelessness	  and	  –	  implicitly	  –	  makes	  suggestions	  for	  their	  removal.	  I	  do	  not	  so	  much	  want	   to	   discuss	   the	   precise	   suggestions	   at	   this	   point,	   but	   look	   at	   the	  specific	   mode	   of	   reasoning	   involved.	   Squatters	   here	   identify	   a	   number	   of	  problems	  –	  lack	  of	  public	  housing,	  excessive	  rents,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  public	  space	  –	   and	   simultaneously	   propose	   that	   direct	   action	   in	   the	   form	   of	   squatting	   is	   a	  solution	   to	   these.	   The	   mode	   of	   explanatory	   critique	   inherent	   in	   this	   kind	   of	  argument	  means	   that	   the	   identification	  of	   a	   less-­‐‑than-­‐‑desirable	   state	  of	   affairs	  directly	   translates	   into	  some	  kind	  of	   recommendation	   for	  action	   (although	   the	  precise	  kind	  of	   action	  may	  be	   subject	   to	  debate).	  To	  view	  political	   claims	  as	   a	  mode	  of	  explanatory	  critique,	  therefore,	  means	  to	  take	  seriously	  and	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  evaluative	  judgment	  inherent	  in	  them,	  that	  is,	  to	  engage	  with	  them	  as	  explicitly	  ethical.	  	  	  Anthropologists	   (e.g.	   Laidlaw,	   2013;	   Csordas,	   2013;	   Robbins	   2012;	   Lambek,	  2010),	  as	  well	  as	  sociologists	  such	  as	  Sayer	  (2011),	  have	  recently	  commented	  on	  the	   necessity	   for	   social	   science	   in	   general	   and	   anthropology	   in	   particular	   to	  acknowledge	  the	  moral	  dimension	  of	  social	  life	  as	  central	  to	  inquiry.	  Sayer	  holds	  that	   “social	   science’s	  difficulties	   in	  acknowledging	   that	  people’s	   relation	   to	   the	  world	   is	   one	   of	   concern”	   (2011,	   1)	   leads	   to	   precisely	   the	   kind	   of	   ‘cognitive	  distortion’,	  to	  again	  use	  Bourdieu’s	  term,	  that	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  tackle	  in	  the	  first	  two	  chapters.	  Lambek	  concurs:	  “the	  people	  (anthropologists)	  encounter	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  what	  they	  consider	  right	  or	  good,	  are	  being	  evaluated	  according	  to	  criteria	  of	  what	  is	  right	  and	  good,	  or	  are	  in	  some	  debate	  about	  what	  constitutes	  the	  human	  good”	  (2010,	  1).	  But,	  as	  Laidlaw	  remarks,	  “until	  recently	  morality	  has	  been,	  depending	  on	  how	  one	  looks	  at	  it,	  either	  only	  intermittently	  or	  uncertainly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  The	  Advisory	  Service	  for	  Squatters	  is	  a	  London-­‐‑based	  squatter’s	  organisation	  that	  provides	  legal	  and	  practical	  support	  ‘for	  squatters	  and	  other	  homeless	  people’.	  It	  distributes	  the	  ‘Handbook	  for	  Squatters’,	  a	  comprehensive	  manual	  for	  squatting	  within	  legal	  parameters.	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an	   object	   of	   anthropological	   analysis”	   (2013,	   3).	   	   In	   drawing	   together	   existing	  approaches,	  Laidlaw	  observes	  that	  	  	  	  “Anthropologists	   interested	   in	   moral	   life	   have	   found	   virtue	   ethics	   more	   readily	  
congenial	   than	   any	   other	   style	   or	   school	   in	   modern	   moral	   philosophy.	   Virtue	  
ethicists	   think	   that	  an	  understanding	  of	  morality	   requires	  an	  account	  of	   specific	  
qualities	   of	   character,	   such	   as	   courage,	   generosity,	   elegance,	   piety,	   prudence,	  
weakness,	  vulgarity,	  impertinence,	  or	  cruelty	  (they	  differ	  in	  their	  lists	  of	  virtues	  and	  
vices)”	  (Laidlaw,	  2013,	  47)	  	  Laidlaw	  notes	  the	  ‘striking’	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  current	  in	  anthropology	  has	  been	  influenced	   by	   the	   work	   of	   Alasdair	   McIntyre,	   and	   discusses	   at	   length	   the	  problematic	  implications	  of	  this	  approach	  (53ff)78.	  Among	  other	  things,	  he	  calls	  into	  question	  McIntyre’s	  assertion	   that	   submission	   to	  authority	  within	  specific	  ‘traditions’	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  state	  of	  social	  harmony	  characterised	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  moral	   conflict,	   and	   demonstrates	   that	   fragmentation	   and	   contradiction	   are	  ubiquitous	   features	   of	   moral	   life	   	   (75ff).	   Laidlaw	   therefore	   suggests	   to	  alternatively	   approach	   virtue	   ethics	   through	   the	   work	   of	   Foucault,	   whom	   he	  regards	   as	   widely	   misinterpreted	   as	   leaving	   no	   possibility	   for	   conceptions	   of	  freedom	  or	  truth	  (92)	  and	  as	  prioritising	  the	  self	  as	  locus	  of	  the	  ethical	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  social	  (114,	  see	  also	  Oksala,	  2005).	  On	  the	  latter	  point,	  Laidlaw	  states:	  	  	  “Foucault	   is	   quite	   clear	   that,	   although	   the	   fact	   of	   reflection	   is	  what	  grounds	   the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  relation	  either	  to	  the	  self	  or	  to	  others,	  and	  therefore	  that	  in	  that	  sense	  
the	  relation	  to	  the	  self	  is	  ‘ontologically	  prior’...it	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  case	  that	  ‘in	  the	  
practice	  of	   the	  self,	   someone	  else,	   the	  other,	   is	  an	   indispensable	  condition	   for	   the	  
form	  that	  defines	  the	  practice’”	  (2013,	  92).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  A	  major	  challenge	  to	  virtue	  ethics	  is	  the	  position	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘situationist’.	  It	  centrally	  holds	  that	  whatever	  virtues	  a	  person	  embodies	  is	  not	  as	  relevant	  for	  their	  actual	  ethical	  conduct	  than	  the	  specific	  situation	  they	  act	  within	  (see	  e.g.	  Kamtekar,	  2004).	  This	  opposition	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  variant	  of	  the	  agency-­‐‑structure	  problem	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3.	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To	  be	  an	  ‘indispensable	  condition‘	  for	  the	  self-­‐‑formation	  of	  an	  other,	  however,	  is	  not	   the	   same	   as	   to	   be	   in	   a	   relation	   in	   which	   self	   and	   other	   are	   mutually	  constituting	  and	  constituted	  subjects.	  While	  the	  difference	  may	  seem	  relatively	  minor,	   it	   has	   serious	   consequences	   for	   the	   conception	   of	   ethics	   as	   relational.	  Within	  this	  model,	  there	  is	  for	  example	  no	  a	  priori	  reason	  that	  others	  should	  not	  simply	   come	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   instruments	   –	   i.e.	   objects	   –	   serving	   the	   continuous	  development	  of	  one’s	  own	  character,	  whatever	  one	  holds	  that	  to	  be.	  One	  of	  my	  respondents	  made	  this	  point	  quite	  succinctly	  when	  she,	  approached	  by	  members	  of	  a	  Christian	  organisation	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  homeless,	  replied:	  “Why	  should	  I	  help	   you	   to	   get	   into	   heaven?	   Get	   there	   on	   your	   own”.	   In	   her	   estimation,	   the	  Christians	  were	  not	  interested	  in	  her	  for	  her	  own	  sake,	  but	  were	  trying	  to	  enlist	  her	  as	  a	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  ethical	  demands	  of	  their	  religion.	  While	  thus,	  as	  Oksala	  (2005)	  argues,	  “Foucault	  does	  not	  advocate	  blatant	  egoism”	  (194),	  the	  focus	  of	  ethical	  consideration	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  self	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  rule	  out	  blatant	  egoism	  –	  of	  the	  spiritual	  or	  the	  worldly	  kind	  –	  either.	  I	  therefore	  think	   that	  a	  model	  of	  ethics	   that	  explicitly	  and	  centrally	  addresses	  a	  relational	  mode	   of	   subject-­‐‑formation,	   such	   as	   exemplified	   in	   Honneth’s	   recognition	  approach,	   can	   help	   to	   contextualise	   the	   practices	   of	   self-­‐‑formation	   Laidlaw	  discusses	  as	  processes	  of	  mutual	   subject	  constitution,	   in	  which	  people	  are	  one	  another’s	   condition	   of	   possibility.	   This	   shifts	   the	   locus	   of	   the	   ethical	   from	   the	  configuration	  of	  the	  self	  to	  the	  configuration	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  other	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  one	  can	  only	  be	  a	  good	  person	  if	  one	  has	  the	  right	  kinds	  of	  relationships	   with	   others	   (for	   Honneth,	   these	   are	   relationships	   of	   mutual	  recognition),	  regardless	  of	  what	  virtues	  one	  may	  possess.	  This	  is	  therefore	  one	  reason	  why	   I	  have	  chosen	  here	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘relational	  patterns’	  rather	  than	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  identity	  or	  selfhood.	  	  The	   influence	   of	   virtue	   ethics	   –	   understood	   as	   the	   building	   of	   some	   kind	   of	  ‘character’	  by	  developing	  or	  acquiring	  attributes	  considered	  virtuous	  –	  also	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  way	  anthropologists	  look	  at	  the	  causes	  for	  moral	  practice.	  Lists	  of	  virtues	  and	  vices	  such	  as	  Laidlaw	  cites	  above	  –	  courage,	  generosity,	  piety	  etc.	   –	   can,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   be	   seen	   as	   simply	   terms	   for	   attributes	   that	   are	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desirable	  or	  undesirable	  in	  persons	  because	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  self	  (and,	  consequently,	  the	   kind	   of	   social	   relations)	   their	   possession	   brings	   forth.	   This	   reading	  would	  certainly	  resonate	  with	  the	  everyday	  sense	   in	  which	  we	  use	  these	  words	  –	   if	  a	  person	  is	  considered	  ‘generous’,	  then	  this	  means	  by	  implication	  that	  they	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  inclined	  to	  give	  to	  others.	  However,	  this	  reified	  account	  of	  virtues	  as	   ‘things’	   one	   can	   possess	   or	   acquire	   contributes	   to	   the	   objectified	   and	  objectifying	  account	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  self-­‐‑formation	  implies.	  David	  Graeber	   (2001)	   for	   example	   demonstrates	   that	   anthropological	   debates	  about	  ‘values’	  follow	  a	  similar	  pattern	  as	  those	  about	  economic	  ‘value’,	  which,	  at	  least	  in	  a	  Marxian	  account,	  is	  considered	  the	  ultimate	  of	  reified	  social	  relations.	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  projects	  I	  am	  discussing	  here,	  this	  view	  also	  impedes	  to	  some	  degree	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  ‘causes’	  –	  namely	  political	  ends	  and	  goals	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  explanatory	  critique,	  and	  thus,	  of	  ethics.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  let	  me	  return	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  squatters,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  to	  respond	  to	  eviction	  alerts	  by	  assembling	  at	  the	  property	  in	  question	  and	  trying	  to	  turn	  away	  bailiffs	  and	  police.	  As	  Laidlaw	  points	  out,	  virtue	  ethics	  does	  at	  first	  glance	  appear	  well	  suited	  to	  discuss	  this	  kind	  of	  situation,	  since	  it	  can	  neither	  be	  sufficiently	   explained	   by	   a	   purely	   utilitarian	   notion	   of	   ‘reciprocity’,	   nor	   by	  adherence	   to	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   rules,	   as	   implied	   in	   a	   deontological	   approach.	  However,	   the	  above	   idea	  of	  self-­‐‑formation	  by	  acquiring	  particular	  virtues	  does	  not	  quite	  seem	  to	  capture	  the	  situation	  either.	  Squatters	  certainly	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  distress	  calls	  in	  a	  self-­‐‑reflective	  attempt	  to	  ‘do	  the	  right	  thing’	  or	  ‘become	  a	  good	   person’,	   nor	   did	   they	   regard	   the	   others	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   hone	   their	  courage,	   generosity	   or	   other	   admirable	   trait	   (although	   these	   values	   certainly	  existed	  within	  the	  scene).	  There	  was,	  of	  course,	  a	  degree	  of	  bragging	  going	  on	  after	  such	   actions	   –	   “did	   you	  hear	  what	   I	   said	   to	   that	   cop??”	   –	  which	   indicates	   that	  people	  did	  take	  successful	  resistance	  as	  a	  means	  to	  enhance	  their	  self-­‐‑image	  (and	  why	   shouldn’t	   they).	   But	   to	   say	   that	   this	   post-­‐‑hoc	   incorporation	   of	   a	   more	  ‘courageous’	  version	  of	  oneself	  was	  the	  motivating	  force	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  call	  in	  the	  first	  place	  would	  just	  mean	  a	  return	  to	  an	  utilitarian	  paradigm	  in	  which	  one	  (to	  paraphrase	  Bourdieu)	  maximises	  one’s	  ‘virtue	  capital’	  by	  helping	  others.	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  To	   discuss	   ethical	   reasoning	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘virtues’	   or	   ‘values’,	   therefore,	   has	   a	  tendency	  to	  derail	  the	  interpretation	  of	  causes	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  virtue	  or	  value	  itself	  comes	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  ethical	  action	  in	  both	  our	  senses.	  Squatters	  could	  for	   example	   be	   seen	   to	   protect	   each	   other	   because	   they	   are,	   or	   aspire	   to	   be,	  ‘courageous’,	   with	   ‘courage’	   being	   both	   the	   cause	   of	   action	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘what	  makes	   them	   do	   it’	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   goal	   they	   hope	   to	   achieve.	   To	   frame	  squatter’s	  actions	  in	  these	  terms	  means,	  however,	  that	  their	  reasons	  and	  aims,	  as	  
they	   themselves	   formulate	   them,	   become	  merely	   secondary	   phenomena	   to	   the	  project	  of	  self-­‐‑formation,	  or	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  becoming	  an	  ethical	  subject	  (this	  problem	  remains	  also	  when,	  as	  Laidlaw	  (103)	  suggests,	  one	  considers	  collective	  ethical	  subjects).	  Their	  own	  explanatory	  critique	  of	  social	  reality	  thus	  becomes	  merely	  circumstantial	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ‘ethical	  proper’,	  and	  is	  therefore	  prone	  to	  be	  relegated	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ‘political’,	  feeding	  into	  a	  discourse	  that	  treats	  these	  two	  categories	  as	  separate	  conceptual	  spheres	  (see	  also	  critically:	  Laidlaw,	  2013,	  44).	  	  	  Of	  course,	  few	  anthropologists	  would,	  in	  practice,	  subscribe	  to	  such	  a	  narrowly	  reifying	  notion	  of	  ‘virtues’	  or	  ‘values’,	  and	  instead	  realise	  that	  these	  categories	  are,	  ultimately,	   abstractions	   of	   social	   relations	   (see	   e.g.	   Graeber,	   2001).	   I	   want	   to	  argue,	  however,	   that	   in	  order	  to	  adequately	  speak	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  political	  action,	   it	   is	   worth	   picking	   these	   abstractions	   apart	   into	   their	   interpersonal	  configuration,	  and	   to	  examine	  what	  kind	  of	  social	   relation	   they	  refer	   to.	   In	   the	  above	   example,	   we	   would	   then	   see	   that	   a	   squatter	   who	   was	   considered	  particularly	  ‘courageous’	  (in	  squatter	  parlance:	  ‘on	  it’)	  in	  an	  illegal	  eviction	  was	  one	  who	  simultaneously	  protected	  others	  from	  violence	  and	  challenged	  whatever	  forces	   were	   perpetrating	   the	   attack.	   Moreover,	   the	   more	   the	   person	   risked	  physical	  harm	  in	  this	  confrontation,	  the	  more	  ‘on	  it’	  they	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  afterwards.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘courage’	  or	  ‘being	  on	  it’	  in	  this	  context	  therefore	  referred	   to	   a	   twofold	   social	   relation:	   one,	   a	   relation	   of	   solidarity	   with	   other	  squatters	   (as	   discussed	   previously,	   meaning	   identification	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	  recognition	  of	  mutually	  shared	  vulnerability)	  and	  two,	  one	  of	  resistance	  to	   the	  
	   130	  
forces	   that	   were	   threatening	   these	   others	   (i.e.	   a	   dis-­‐‑identification	   with	   the	  aggressor).	   Adding	   to	   this	   was	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   a	   squatter	   risked	   being	  injured,	  i.e.	  ‘courage’	  in	  this	  context	  involved	  not	  so	  much	  a	  display	  of	  belligerent	  invulnerability,	  but	  quite	  the	  opposite:	  what	  elicited	  admiration	  was	  that	  in	  taking	  a	  risk,	   the	  person	  had	  simultaneously	  affirmed	  their	  vulnerability,	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  let	  that	  stop	  them.	  	  	  This	  last	  sense	  is	  closest	  to	  what	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  relation-­‐‑to-­‐‑self	  in	  the	  sense	  Laidlaw	  discusses,	  in	  that	  ‘courage’	  here	  involves	  the	  overcoming	  of	  fear	  and	  thus	  a	   certain	   amount	   of	   ‘work	   on	   oneself’.	   The	   first	   two,	   however,	   can	   only	   be	  adequately	  understood	  in	  the	  broad	  context	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  movement	  they	  were	  based	   in,	  which	   explicitly	   named	   structures	   of	   domination	   and	   injustice	   as	   its	  
raison	  d’ȇtre	  and	  tried	  to	  align	  its	  practices	  with	  its	  beliefs.	  This	  alignment	  is	  not	  automatic	  –	   it	   is	  of	  course	  perfectly	  possible	   for	  a	  political	  movement	  to	  act	   in	  ways	  that	  directly	  contradict	  its	  own	  purported	  values.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  if	  and	  when	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  however,	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  deduct	  what	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations	  should	   logically	  follow	  from	  these	  values,	   i.e.	  to	  apply	  a	  form	  of	  immanent	  explanatory	  critique.	  To	  do	  this,	  and	  this	  is	  my	  point	  here,	  statements	  about	  social	  relations	  must	  be	  interpreted	  within	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  evaluation	   of	   the	   particularly	   relational	   character	   of	   what	   is	   being	   discussed.	  Instead	   of	   ‘virtues’	   or	   ‘values’,	   I	   will	   therefore	   speak	   about	   relational	   ‘ethical	  patterns’,	   as	   the	   units	   of	   analysis,	  without	  wanting	   to	   imply	   that	   ‘virtues’	   are,	  ultimately,	  anything	  else.	  	  	  The	   idea	   of	   normative	   patterns,	   that	   is,	   of	   recurring	   configurations	   in	   ethical	  relations,	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  both	  in	  individual	  and	  in	  collective	  behaviour,	  is	  long	  familiar	  to	  anthropology	  and	  to	  social	  science	  in	  general.	  Ruth	  Benedict	  	  (1934)	  uses	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘patterns’79	  to	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  configurations	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Rosaldo	  (1993)	  is	  critical	  of	  Benedict’s	  approach,	  since,	  as	  he	  argues,	  the	  assumption	  of	  discrete	  ‘patterns’	  between	  or	  within	  cultures	  leaves	  no	  room	  for	  “zones	  of	  difference”	  or	  “cultural	  borderlands”	  (27f).	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  no	  ‘culture’	  consists	  of	  only	  one	  single	  pattern,	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  to	  me	  what	  the	  ‘differences’	  in	  these	  ‘zones’	  should	  consist	  in,	  if	  not	  precisely	  in	  the	  meeting	  and	  interaction	  of	  different	  patterns	  of	  thought	  and	  practice.	  In	  my	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the	   individual	   and	   within	   the	   larger	   cultural	   context:	   "A	   culture,	   like	   an	  individual,	   is	   a	  more	  or	   less	   consistent	  pattern	  of	   thought	   and	  action"	   (46).	  A	  pattern	   in	   this	   sense	   can	   therefore	   be	   observed	   on	   several	   different	   levels	   of	  scale,	  from	  the	  individual	  person	  to	  the	  entirety	  of	  a	  ‘culture’.	  Specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  ethics,	  Max	  Weber	  described	  ‘charismatic	  authority’,	  as	  “resting	  on	  devotion	  to	  the	  exceptional	  sanctity,	  heroism	  or	  exemplary	  character	  of	  an	  individual	  person	  
and	  of	  the	  normative	  pattern	  or	  order	  revealed	  or	  ordained	  by	  him”	  (Weber	  1978,	  215,	  emphasis	  mine).	  Individuals	  here	  appear	  as	  phenomenological	  expressions	  of	   a	   deeper	   structural	   logic,	   which	   their	   acts	   are	   seen	   as	   both	   revealing	   and	  bearing	  witness	  to80.	  Talcott	  Parsons	  adopts	  this	  notion	  in	  ‘Actor,	  Situation	  and	  Normative	  Pattern’,	  where	  he	  asserts:	  	  	  “From	  the	  cognitive	  point	  of	  view,	  situational	  objects	  can	  always	  be	  described	  in	  
terms	  of	  existential	  propositions…A	  normative	  pattern,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not,	  
from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   actor,	   ‘exist’	   in	   the	   same	   sense.	   The	   propositions	  
involved	  may,	  to	  be	  sure,	  describe	  a	  ‘state	  of	  affairs’.	  But	  so	  far	  as	  their	  significance	  
is	  normative,	   it	   is	  not	  asserted…that	  this	  exists...but	  that	   it	  ought	   to	  exist…What	  
exists	  is	  the	  normative	  pattern,	  an	  ‘ideal’	  entity,	  not	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  to	  which	  it	  
refers”	  (Parsons,	  1939/2011,	  41,	  emphasis	  orig.)	  	  Normative	   patterns,	   for	   Parsons,	   therefore	   refer	   to	   a	   part	   of	   the	   collective	  imaginary,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  form	  ideal	  ‘blueprints’	  for	  patterns	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  actors	  believe	  ought	  to	  exist.	  Although	   ‘ideal’	  here	  refers	  to	  an	  element	  of	  transcendence	  of	   the	  present	   situation	   in	   a	  normative	   sense,	   no	  metaphysical	  quality	   of	   this	   kind	  of	   pattern	   is	   implied	   –	   analogous	   to	  Weber’s	   ideal	   type,	   a	  normative	  pattern	  is	  a	  heuristic	  device	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  human	  behaviour	  based	  on	  an	  oversimplified,	  abstracted	  description	  of	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  that	  does	  not,	  in	  this	  simplified	  form,	  occur	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Normative	  patterns	  are	  thus	  abstractions	  for	  the	  social	  relations	  actors	  believe	  ought	  to	  exist.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  view,	  the	  assumption	  of	  recurring	  cultural	  patterns	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  therefore	  does	  not	  suggest	  homogeneity	  or	  ‘boundedness’.	  	  80	  ‘Bearing	  witness	  to’	  is	  meant	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  ‘revelation’	  of	  the	  pattern	  through	  the	  person	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  pattern.	  Note	  the	  parallel	  to	  religion.	  
	   132	  
	  According	  to	  Parsons,	  normative	  patterns	  contain	  a	  transcendental	  element	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  always	  point	  to	  an	  ideal,	  not-­‐‑yet-­‐‑realised	  situation.	  However,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   I	  will	  use	  the	  concept	  here,	   this	   transcendental	  element	   is	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  such	  patterns	  –	  they	  also	  form	  part	  of	  actually	  existing	  social	  relations	  and	  inform	  embodied	  practice	  in	  so	  far	  as	  this	  practice	  is	  meant	  to	  establish	  the	  desired	  ideal	  state	  of	  affairs	  the	  pattern	  refers	  to.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  idea	  of	   ‘prefigurative	  politics’,	   i.e.	   the	   idea	   that	  political	  action	  should	  anticipate	  an	  ideal	  ‘post-­‐‑liberation’	  state	  by	  actors	  behaving	  as	  if	  they	  were	  already	  free.	  Actors	  here	   attempt	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   actual	   situation	   and	   the	   ideal	  situation	  by	   (at	   least	   temporarily)	  behaving	  as	   if	   the	   transcendental	   state	  had	  already	  been	  achieved	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  squatters	  who	  arguably	  behave	  as	  if	   humans	  were	   already	  more	   important	   than	   property).	   Similarly	   to	  Weber’s	  charismatic	   authority,	   actors	   thus	   both	   reveal	   a	   transcendental	   ideal	   order	   of	  things,	  and	  testify	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  order	  can	  become	  embodied	  reality.	  	  	  Drawing	   all	   this	   together,	   it	   has	   perhaps	   already	   become	   apparent	   that	   the	  structural	   patterns	   we	   have	   called	   ‘recognition’	   and	   ‘misrecognition’	   can	   be	  understood	  as	  normative	  patterns	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Weber	  and	  Parsons.	  The	  reason	  I	  have	  explicitly	  identified	  them	  as	  such	  is	  that	  in	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  make	   an	   argument	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   Ruth	   Benedict,	   and	   try	   to	   identify	   these	  patterns	  on	  different	  scales	  –	  from	  the	  micro-­‐‑level	  of	  the	  embodied	  individual	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  to	  the	  meso-­‐‑level	  of	   interpersonal	  relations	  in	  the	  home,	  and	  finally	  the	  macro-­‐‑level	  of	  culture,	  in	  those	  that	  follow.	  I	  am	  going	  into	  this	  much	  detail	  because,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  next,	   in	  this	  way	  it	  will	  become	  possible	  to	  view	  ‘recognition’	   not	   just	   as	   a	   cultural	   metaphor	   or	   abstract	   descriptor	   of	   social	  relationships,	   but	   as	   something	   that	   affects	   the	   concrete	   relationships	   of	  embodied	   persons	   on	   an	   individual	   and	   collective	   level.	   By	   pursuing	   these	  patterns	   through	   different	   human	   scales,	   I	   therefore	   hope	   to	   bolster	   my	  argument	  that	  they	  are	  ‘real’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Critical	  Realism	  –	  they	  are	  concrete	  causal	   mechanisms	   that	   can	   be	   observed	   from	   the	   neural	   firing	   patterns	   of	  individual	  brains	  to	  the	  large	  historical	  streams	  of	  land	  ownership;	  from	  gender	  
	   133	  
relations	  to	  the	  territorial	  conflicts	  of	  differently	  ‘raced’	  groups	  of	  people.	  In	  the	  next	   chapter,	   I	   will	   therefore	   have	   a	   look	   at	   how	   these	   patterns	   come	   to	   be	  embodied	  by	  individual	  ethical	  actors.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Ethical	  Bodies	  	  
	  
	  
Revolution	  is	  but	  thought,	  carried	  into	  action	  Emma	  Goldman	  
	  
	  In	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  I	  have	  established	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  relational	  ethics	  based	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition,	  and	  have	  argued	  that	  based	  on	  a	  Critical	  Realist	  account	  of	  causation,	  the	  resulting	  ‘ethical	  patterns’	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  mechanisms	  underlying	  the	  emergence	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  political	  practice.	  Further,	  I	  have	  claimed	  that	  these	  patterns	  can	  be	  encountered	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  scale,	  from	  the	  individual	  body/mind81	  to	  the	  macro-­‐‑level	  of	  culture.	  All	  this	  may	  have	  left	  my	  reader	  slightly	  puzzled:	  how	  can	  a	  ‘pattern’,	  that	  is,	  an	  abstract	  relational	  structure,	  ‘cause’	  anything?	  And	  how	  and	  where	  would	  we	  be	  able	  to	  locate	   such	   a	   pattern	   in	   actual	   people’s	   lives,	   individual	   or	   collective?	   In	   this	  chapter,	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  these	  questions	  by	  showing	  in	  what	  way	  the	  patterns	  we	  have	  discussed	  manifest	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual,	  embodied	  person.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  the	  most	  congenial	  approach	  for	  this	  purpose	  comes	  from	  psychoanalysis,	  in	  particular	  the	  kind	  of	  approach	  known	  as	  ‘object	  relations’,	   and	   I	  will	   introduce	   some	  of	   the	  main	   tenets	   of	   this	   kind	  of	   theory	  below.	   First	   however,	   I	  want	   to	   address	   a	   related	  question,	   namely:	   how	   is	   it	  possible	   that	  morality	   –	   relational	   or	   otherwise	   –	   comes	   to	   be	   ‘embodied’	   by	  individual	  actors	  at	  all?	  I	  will	  have	  a	  brief	  look	  at	  how	  anthropologists	  of	  morality	  have	   approached	   this	   matter,	   and	   suggest	   an	   outlook	   that	   can	   reconcile	   the	  problem	  of	  how	  ‘embodiment’	  and	  ‘ethical	  choice’	  can	  be	  thought	  together.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  the	  question	  of	  an	  embodied	  relational	  ethics,	  and	  demonstrate	  how	  this	  idea	  will	  inform	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  ethnographic	  narrative.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  ‘Body/mind’	  is	  my	  reluctant	  phrasing	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  a	  human	  person,	  incorporating	  both	  the	  aspect	  of	  embodiment	  and	  that	  which	  is	  commonly	  regarded	  as	  ‘mental’.	  In	  writing	  the	  two	  words	  together,	  I	  want	  to	  emphasise	  that	  although	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  imply	  any	  kind	  of	  strong	  mind/body	  dualism	  (see	  below),	  there	  is	  to	  my	  knowledge	  not	  yet	  an	  adequate	  term	  by	  which	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  complete	  ensemble	  that	  comprises	  the	  person	  in	  both	  dimensions.	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  word	  ‘mind’	  in	  quotes,	  since	  even	  when	  talking	  about	  ‘psychological’	  phenomena,	  ‘mind’	  cannot	  meaningfully	  be	  separated	  from	  body	  and	  brain.	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I	   have	   suggested	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘emancipatory	  critique’	  implies	  that	  the	  ‘causes’	  for	  social	  ills	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘causes’	  of	  political	  action,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  the	  same	  mechanisms	  that	  produce	  one	  also	  produce	  the	  other.	  From	  an	  activist’s	  perspective,	  what	  happens	  here	  is	  that	  a	  negative	  evaluative	  judgment	  of	  social	  relations	  translates	  into	  a	  form	  of	  direct	   action,	   which	   attempts	   to	   practically	   install	   a	   different	   form	   of	   social	  relations	  instead.	  The	  question	  is	  now,	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  perception,	  ethical	  judgment	  and	  practice	  to	  at	  least	  potentially	  become	  ‘ethically	  aligned’,	  in	  other	  words,	  how	  is	  an	  ethical	  pattern	  of	  relating	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  social	  ‘taken	  inside	  the	   body’	   and,	   depending	   on	   evaluation,	   either	   reproduced	   or	   replaced	   with	  another	  one?	  In	  the	  example	  from	  the	  Advisory	  Service	  for	  Squatter’s	  assessment	  that	  “bureaucrats	  and	  property	  owners”	  are	  “pushing	  people	  around”,	  how	  does	  this	  perception	  translate	  into	  ‘this	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  undesirable’	  and	  then	  ‘let	  us	  act	   in	   a	   way	   that	   implements	   something	   different’?	   The	   emphasis	   on	   direct	  (embodied)	  action	  means	  that	  the	  process	  of	  translation	  cannot	  be	  based	  purely	  in	  ‘reason’	  or	  ‘thought’,	  but	  that	  in	  some	  way	  an	  evaluative	  judgment	  of	  perceived	  social	   relations	   turns	   into	   an	   embodied	   practice	   of	   either	   reproducing	   these	  social	   relations	  or	   replacing	   them	  with	  different	  ones.	   In	  order	   to	  understand	  how	  that	  is	  possible,	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  ask	  how	  ethics	  ‘gets	  into	  people’,	  that	  is,	  how	  what	  I	  have	  called	  ethical	  patterns	  come	  to	  be	  embodied.	  	  	  This,	   of	   course,	   relates	   to	   the	   wider	   question	   of	   how	   culture	   comes	   to	   be	  embodied,	  and	  therefore	  requires	  a	  model	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  social	  forms	  into	  embodied	  dispositions.	  The	  best-­‐‑known	  model	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  here	   is	   certainly	   Bourdieu’s	   ‘habitus’	   (1977),	   which	   seeks	   to	   explain	   how	  embodied	   practice	   is	   constituted	   by,	   and	   simultaneously	   reproduces,	   social	  structure.	  However,	  as	  Moore	  (2007a)	  remarks,	  habitus	  leans	  strongly	  toward	  a	  determination	  of	  individual	  disposition	  by	  the	  social,	  and	  thus	  Bourdieu	  “cannot	  adequately	   theorize	   individual	   experiences,	   desires,	   motivations	   and	   self-­‐‑awareness”	  (34).	  Similarly	  Laidlaw	  (2013)	  and	  Mattingly	  (2012)	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  habitus	  is	  a	  relatively	  ‘closed’	  category	  which,	  because	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  general	   theory	   it	   is	   embedded	   in,	   does	   not	   leave	  many	   options	   for	   behaviour	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outside	   of	   ultimately	   economistic	   relations	   of	   capital	   maximisation.	   Other	  authors	   like	   Sayer	   (2005)	   and	   Ignatow	   (2009)	   believe	   that	   habitus	   is	  ‘redeemable’	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study	  of	  ethics,	  albeit	  through	  a	  considerable	  departure	  from	  Bourdieu’s	  original	  formulation.	  The	  question	  is	  therefore:	  how	  would	  habitus	  have	  to	  be	  conceptualised	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  embodiment	  of	  social	   roles	   and	   structures	   and,	   simultaneously,	   the	   possibility	   of	   ethical	  judgment?	  Or,	  in	  broader	  terms,	  how	  can	  the	  embodiment	  of	  culture	  –	  and	  thus	  of	  ethics	  –	  be	  framed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  accommodates	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  come	  to	   ‘unconsciously’	   embody	   particular	   dispositions,	   and	   yet	   believe	   and	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  make	  ethical	  choices?	  	  	  The	  problem	  of	  how	  embodied	  dispositions	  and	  ethical	   choice	  can	  be	   thought	  together	  has	  preoccupied	  a	  number	  of	  anthropologists82.	  I	  will	  briefly	  consider	  the	   arguments	   of	   Faubion	   (2010,	   2011)	   and	   Zigon	   (2007,	   2008,	   2010),	   as	  exemplary	   of	   attempts	   (albeit	   somewhat	   differing	   ones)	   to	   reconcile	   the	  ‘unreflective’	   embodiment	   of	   morality	   with	   the	   ‘reflective’	   element	   of	   ethical	  choice,	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  what	  I	  see	  as	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  debate.	  Zigon	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘morality’	  and	  ‘ethics’	  in	  defining	  morality	  as	  “a	  kind	  of	  habitus	  or	  an	  unreflective	  and	  unreflexive	  disposition	  of	  everyday	  social	  life.	  This	  embodied	  morality,	  is	  not	  thought	  out	  beforehand,	  nor	  is	  it	  noticed	  when	  it	  is	  performed.	  It	  is	  simply	  done.	  It	  is	  one’s	  everyday	  embodied	  way	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world”	  (2008,	  17).	  	  For	  Zigon,	  morality	  therefore	  is	  what	  allows	  people	  to	  act	  in	  ways	   they	  consider	  appropriate	   in	  everyday	   life,	  without	  having	   to	   constantly	  question	  themselves.	  What	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  “ethical	  moment”	  (165)	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   occurs	   when	   this	   unreflective	   state	   is	   disrupted	   and	   a	   person	   has	   to	  consciously	  reflect	  upon	  what	  response	  to	  take	  to	  an	  event,	  in	  order	  to	  then	  be	  able	  to	  return	  to	  their	  previous,	  unreflective	  state.	  “Thus,	  this	  moment	  of	  ethics	  is	  a	  creative	  moment,	   for	  by	  performing	  ethics,	  persons	  create,	  even	  if	  ever	  so	  slightly,	  new	  moral	  selves	  and	  enact	  new	  moral	  worlds”	  (ibid).	  Similarly,	  Faubion	  distinguishes	   between	   “themitical	   normativity”,	   that	   is,	   routine	   and	   everyday	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  for	  example	  Parish,	  1994;	  Mattingly	  1998;	  Lambek,	  2000,	  2010;	  Faubion	  2001,	  2011;	  Laidlaw,	  2002;	  Robbins	  2004,	  2007	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embodied	   moral	   being,	   and	   dynamic	   moments	   of	   crisis	   which	   disrupt	   this	  homoeostasis:	  “The	  scene	  of	  crisis	  is	  a	  scene	  of	  the	  unfamiliar	  or	  of	  disturbance,	  in	  which	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  disruption	  or	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  reproduction	  of	  routine	  is	  also	  the	  impetus	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  (2011,	  81f)”	  	  The	  dilemma	  these	  accounts	  refer	  to	  is	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  people	  “are	  able	  to	  act	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   morally	   appropriate	   most	   of	   the	   time	   without	   ever	  considering	   their	   actions”	   (Zigon,	   2008,	   164)	   while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	  Mattingly	   (2012)	   remarks,	   “to	   consider	   the	   complexities	   of	   everyday	   moral	  practice,	  one	  needs	  something	  more	  than	  an	  unconscious	  moral	  habitus”	  (306),	  that	   is,	   some	  way	   in	  which	   this	   habitus	   can	   be	   temporarily	   transcended.	   The	  question	   is,	   if	   ethical	   dispositions	   can	   become	   quasi-­‐‑automatic	   behavioural	  patterns,	  then	  precisely	  how	  and	  why	  do	  people	  in	  some	  cases	  consciously	  reflect	  on	   their	   ethics	   and	   act	   in	   ways	   that	   transcend	   or	   even	   contradict	   this	  ‘programming’?	  In	  my	  view,	  a	  good	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  stems	  from	  the	  implicit	  mind/body	  dualism83	  that	  underlies	  these	  debates.	  ‘Embodiment’	  is	  here	  simply	  equated	  with	  ‘unconscious	  and	  unreflective’	  dispositions,	  which	  are	  “not	  thought	  out	  beforehand,	  nor	  (…)	  noticed	  when	  (…)	  performed”	  but	  “simply	  done”	  (Zigon,	  2008,	  17),	  while	  ethical	  choice	  is	  seen	  to	  involve	  at	  least	  some	  degree	  of	  ‘free	  will’	  and	  thus	  by	  implication	  involves	  the	  ‘mind’.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  true	  that	  people	  do	  not	  constantly	  consciously	  deliberate	  about	  what	  the	  ethically	  sound	  course	  of	  action	  would	  be	  in	  a	  given	  situation,	  although	  some	  certainly	  do	  so	  more	  than	  others.	  But	  this	  can	  hardly	  be	  a	  question	  of	  ‘embodiment’	  –	  after	  all,	  a	  consciousness	  that	  makes	  an	  ethical	  choice	  would	  have	  to	  be	  equally	  ‘embodied’,	  unless	  we	  should	  imagine	  it	  floating	  in	  space.	  Yet,	  whatever	  entity	  these	  authors	  see	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  ethical	  choice	  seems	  to	  be	  somehow	  separate	  from	  the	  body,	  at	  least	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  manage	  to	  raise	  itself	  above	  its	  automated	  routines.	  	  The	  debates	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Mind/body	  dualism	  refers	  to	  the	  idea,	  deriving	  from	  Descartes,	  that	  body	  and	  mind	  are	  two	  different	  substances,	  i.e.	  that	  ‘mind’	  is	  opposed	  to	  ‘matter’.	  	  This	  concept	  has	  been	  widely	  criticised	  by	  a	  number	  of	  theories	  put	  forward	  in	  philosophy,	  cognitive	  science	  and	  the	  neurosciences,	  which	  all	  hold	  that	  phenomena	  of	  the	  ‘mind’	  cannot	  be	  meaningfully	  separated	  from	  their	  biological	  basis	  in	  the	  body	  and	  the	  brain	  (see	  e.g.	  Lakoff	  &	  Johnson,	  1980;	  Lakoff	  &	  Johnson,	  1999;	  Lakoff	  &	  Nunez,	  2000;	  Clark,	  1997;	  Edelman,	  2004;	  Damasio,	  1999,	  Clark,	  2001,	  Churchland	  1988,	  Dennett	  1993).	  Such	  explanations	  are	  called	  ‘Monist’	  because	  they	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  ‘substance’	  namely	  matter,	  and	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘spirit’	  or	  ‘soul’.	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‘embodied’	   morality	   therefore	   contain	   an	   implicit	   assumption	   of	   distance	  between	   the	  body	  and	   the	  consciousness	   that	   inhabits	   it,	   as	   if	   the	  body	  was	  a	  vehicle	  running	  on	  autopilot,	  which	  only	  occasionally	  has	  to	  be	  re-­‐‑directed	  by	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  conscious	  mind.	  This	  duality	  of	  ‘driver’	  and	  ‘driven’	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways	   resembles	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Master	   and	   Bondsman,	   in	   that	   the	   mind	   as	  conscious	  subject	  encounters	   the	  body	  as	  a	  mindless	  automaton	   that	  bumbles	  through	  the	  world	  by	  force	  of	  sheer	  habit.	  This	  implicit	  dichotomy	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  to	  some	  extent	  responsible	  for	  the	  perpetual	  problematic	  of	  how	  to	  reconcile	  embodied	  dispositions	  and	  conscious	  choice.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  will	  here	  suggest	  a	  slightly	  different	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  ‘body’	  and	  ‘mind’,	  before	  returning	  to	  the	  question	  how	  ethical	  patterns	  ‘get	  into’	  either.	  	  	  Instead	  of	  imagining	  body	  and	  mind	  as	  two	  separate	  entities,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  viewing	  them	  as	  two	  layers	  of	  an	  emergent	  system.	  I	  take	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘emergence’	  from	  Critical	  Realism,	  where	  it	  is	  used	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  (see	  chapter	  4)	  of	  phenomena	  combine	  to	  bring	  forth	  other	  phenomena.	  As	  we	  have	  already	   touched	   upon,	   Critical	   Realists	   view	   the	   world	   as	   ‘stratified’,	   that	   is,	  organised	   in	   layers	  of	   increasing	   complexity84.	  When	   thinking	   about	   a	  human	  being,	  for	  example,	  one	  can	  identify	  some	  very	  basic	  ‘layers’,	  which	  can	  be	  fully	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  and	  chemistry.	  The	  causal	  powers	  of	  these	  layers	  then	  combine	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  bring	  forth	  a	  more	  complex	  structure,	  which	  we	   call	   the	   organic	   body.	   The	   layer	   of	   the	   body	   is	   therefore	  
emergent	  from	  the	  layers	  of	  chemical	  and	  physiological	  processes,	  it	  depends	  on	  them,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  a	  more	  complex,	  higher	  order	  phenomenon	  in	  its	  own	  right,	   i.e.	   it	   is	  ontologically	   irreducible	   to	   just	  chemistry	  or	  physics.	   In	   the	  same	  way,	  the	  kind	  of	  phenomenon	  we	  call	  a	  ‘mind’	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  combined	  causal	  powers	  of	  the	  biological	  body,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  a	  higher,	  more	  complex	  order	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  body	  or	  the	  brain:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  To	  be	  precise,	  the	  world	  is	  not	  organized	  in	  layers,	  but	  since	  we	  can	  only	  conceive	  of	  the	  world	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  our	  systems	  of	  cognitive	  categorization,	  and	  since	  these	  systems	  are	  organized	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  divide	  the	  world	  into	  ‘layers’	  (which	  we,	  not	  coincidentally,	  assign	  to	  the	  different	  scientific	  disciplines),	  Critical	  Realists	  generally	  assume	  that,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  communicability,	  we	  can	  just	  as	  well	  treat	  the	  world	  as	  if	  it	  consisted	  of	  layers	  –	  provided	  we	  do	  not	  commit	  the	  epistemic	  fallacy	  and	  assume	  that	  this	  is	  ‘really’	  what	  it	  looks	  like.	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  “When	  the	  properties	  of	  underlying	  strata	  have	  been	  combined,	  qualitatively	  new	  
objects	   have	   come	   into	   existence,	   each	   with	   its	   own	   specific	   structures,	   forces,	  
powers	   and	  mechanisms.	   The	   start	   of	   this	   new	   and	   unique	   occurrence	   is	   called	  
emergence,	   and	   it	   is	   thus	   possible	   to	   say	   that	   an	   object	   has	   ‘emergent	   powers’”	  (Danermark	  et	  al,	  2002,	  60,	  emphasis	  orig.).	  	  What	  ‘emergence’	  can	  do,	  in	  short,	  is	  to	  give	  us	  a	  model	  to	  work	  with	  in	  which	  ‘body’	   and	   ‘mind’	   are	   still	   meaningfully	   separable	   if	   we	   want	   to	   talk	   about	  phenomena	  that	  specifically	  affect	  each	  stratum,	  yet	  it	  does	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  two	   are	   separately	   operating	   entities.	   The	   question	   whether	   something	   is	  ‘embodied’	  or	  ‘en-­‐‑minded’	  is	  then,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  moot	  –	  it	  is	  always	  in	  some	  form	  present	  on	  both	  levels.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  will	  still	  be	  possible	  to	  speak	  about	  ‘unconscious’	  versus	   ‘conscious’	  processes,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  assume	  that	  one	  is	   located	  in	  the	  body	  and	  the	  other	  somewhere	  else.	   I	  am	  also	  discussing	  emergence	  here	  because	  further	  down,	  and	  in	  some	  of	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	   make	   reference	   to	   cognitive	   theories	   which	   see	   ‘mind’	   as	   a	   natural,	  biologically	   based	   phenomenon.	   Such	   accounts	   are	   sometimes	   critiqued	   as	  ‘reductive’	  or	  ‘sterile’	  (e.g.	  Prokhovnik,	  2002,	  154),	  since	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  “reduce	  all	  phenomena,	  including	  human	  agency,	  to	  molecular,	  mechanistic	  explanations”	  which	  “reduce	  the	  body	  to	  materialism”	  	  (ibid).	  I	  cite	  Prokhovik	  as	  an	  example	  for	  what	  I	  see	  as	  a	  general	  communication	  failure	  between	  cognitive	  science	  and	  the	  social	   and	   cultural	   sciences:	   to	   look	   for	   material	   explanations	   for	   mental	  phenomena	   is	   first	  and	  foremost	  a	  strategy	  to	  dissolve	  the	  kind	  of	  mind/body	  dualism	  that	  logically	  requires	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  ‘spirit	  substance’	  or	  ‘soul’	  as	  the	  ‘mind’	  component.	  To	  see	  ‘mind’	  in	  terms	  of	  materialism	  therefore	  does	  not	  imply	  reducing	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   the	   mental	   to	   ‘molecular	   explanations’,	   but	  merely	   to	   see	   consciousness	   as	   an	   emergent	   function	   of	   biology.	   To	   say,	   for	  example,	  that	  ‘mental’	  events	  appear	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  material	  body	  in	  the	  form	  of	   neural	   firing	   patterns	   does	   not	   automatically	   imply	   that	   therefore,	  neurobiology	  on	  its	  own	  can	  explain	  things	  like	  ‘love’	  or	  ‘racism’.	  Daniel	  Dennett,	  whom	   Prokhovnik	   accuses	   of	   ‘reductivism’,	   for	   example	   explicitly	   refers	   to	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different	   emergent	   ‘domains’	   of	   the	   mind/body	   continuum,	   and	   nowhere	  suggests	   that	   they	   should	   be	   collapsed	   into	   each	   other	   (Dennett,	   1989).	  Prokhovnik	   demonstrates	   the	   necessity	   of	   such	   a	   position	   herself,	   when	   she	  speaks	  of	  the	  ‘interrelatedness’	  of	  body	  and	  mind	  and	  of	  ‘interaction’	  and	  ‘acting	  in	   concert’	   between	   them,	   thus	   still	   implying	   two	   different	   but	   ‘related’	  categories.	  Anything	  other	  than	  ‘materialism’	  inevitably	  maintains	  dualism,	  and	  thus	  an	  idealist	  (proto-­‐‑religious)	  element	  that	  I	  personally	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to.	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   structurally	   similar	  model	  has	  been	   introduced	   in	   anthropology	  by	  Maurice	  Bloch,	  who	  offers	  a	  ‘layered’	  model	  of	  the	  ‘natural	  phenomenon’	  he	  (in	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  ambiguous	  terms	  as	  ‘person’	  ‘self’	  or	  ‘subject’)	  simply	  calls	  ‘the	  blob’	  (2011).	  Bloch	   is	  not	  so	  much	  concerned	  with	  ethics	  as	  he	   is	  with	  bridging	   the	  disciplinary	   gap	  between	   cognitive	   science	   and	  anthropology,	   since	   “cognitive	  scientists	  and	  social	  scientists	  may	  have	  been	  talking	  of	  different	  things	  with	  the	  same	  words,	  but	  both	  really	  want	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  blob”	  (14).	  He	  therefore	  sets	  out	  to	  mediate	  in	  the	  “apparently	  irresoluble	  conflict	  between	  the	  universalists	  and	  the	  culturalists“	   (3),	  by	  proposing	  a	  model	  which	  can	  account	   for	  cultural	  difference,	  while	  taking	  seriously	  the	  species-­‐‑specific	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  enculturation85.	  The	  result	  is	  visualised	  as	  a	  layered,	  pyramid-­‐‑shaped	  structure,	  organised	  into	  several	  different	  ‘strata’	  of	  the	  body/mind.	  At	  the	  bottom,	  there	  is	  a	  layer	  named	  the	  ‘core	  self’,	  which	  incorporates	  “1)	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  and	  location	  of	  one’s	  body,	  2)	  a	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  author	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions”	  (7).	  Above	  that	  is	  the	  “minimal	  self”,	  which	  involves	  a	  sense	  of	  temporality,	  but	  no	  coherent,	  reflexive,	  narrative	  consciousness.	  These	  two	  basic	  levels	  of	  the	  blob	  are,	   according	   to	   Bloch,	   shared	   between	   humans	   and	   non-­‐‑human	   animals.	  Beyond	  them	  is	  the	  level	  of	  the	  “narrative	  self”,	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  autobiographic	  memory	  and	  “significantly	  involves	  reflexive	  interaction	  with	  others	  so	  that	  the	  self	  can	  become,	  in	  Mead’s	  words	  ‘an	  object	  to	  one’s	  self	  in	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Sayer	  (2011):	  „Sociology	  and	  anthropology	  lean	  towards	  (culturalist	  explanations)	  and	  are	  often	  extremely	  wary	  of	  any	  invocations	  of	  ‘human	  nature’;	  and	  for	  good	  reason,	  as	  we	  are	  cultural	  beings,	  albeit	  ones	  who	  can	  easily	  mistake	  our	  cultural	  specificity	  for	  some	  general	  human	  nature.	  But	  not	  everything	  is	  capable	  of	  cultural	  variation	  –	  you	  can’t	  teach	  a	  stone	  or	  insect	  a	  language	  or	  acculturize	  it,	  and	  it	  can’t	  feel	  French	  or	  Muslim	  –	  so	  we	  must	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  nature	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  cultural	  variation.”	  (7)	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relation	   to	   other	   individuals’”	   (cited	   in	   Bloch,	   2011,	   9).	   Finally,	   Bloch	   argues,	  there	   is	   a	   level	   of	   meta-­‐‑representations,	   which	   involve	   the	   conscious	  representation	  of	   the	  self	   through	  public	   ‘performance’	  of	  one’s	  narrative	  self.	  This	  layer	  is,	  as	  Bloch	  discusses,	  not	  present	  in	  all	  cultural	  contexts.	  	  The	  important	  point	  of	  this	  model	  is	  that	  it	  is	  organised	  in	  a	  way	  that	  implies	  an	  emergent	  structure:	  	  	  “the	  narrative	  self	  is	  continuous	  with	  the	  primate-­‐‑wide	  requirements	  of	  the	  minimal	  
self	  and	  the	  minimal	  self	   is	  continuous	  with	  the	  living-­‐‑kind-­‐‑wide	  requirements	  of	  
the	  core	  self.	  Similarly	  the	  narrative	  self	  is	  continuous	  with	  the	  minimal	  self	  which	  
will	  itself	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  core	  self.	  We	  are	  psychologically	  and	  physically	  one”	  (15).	  	  	  The	  species-­‐‑specific	  levels	  of	  consciousness	  of	  a	  ‘blob’	  –	  those	  ‘layers’	  that	  non-­‐‑human	  animals	  don’t	  share	  –	  therefore	  emerge	  from	  lower,	  more	  general	  and	  less	  complex	  ones,	  and	  the	  higher	  levels	  logically	  depend	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  lower	  ones.	  	  By	  moving	  up	  through	  the	  strata,	  Bloch	  argues	  further,	  the	  experiences	  of	  self	   move	   from	   the	   ‘private’	   or	   personal	   toward	   the	   public	   and	   social.	   The	  influence	  of	  ‘culture’	  on	  the	  self	  thus	  becomes	  stronger	  the	  higher	  one	  gets,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  part	  of	  the	  ‘blob’	  that	  is	  not	  touched	  by	  it:	  	  “We	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  private	  is	  untouched	  by	  the	  cultural	  while	  
the	   public,	   caught	   up	   in	   social	   discourse,	   is	   entirely	   cultural.	   This	   would	   be	  
misleading	  because	  it	  would	  forget	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  blob	  through	  its	  various	  
levels.	  The	  blob	  is	  a	  process.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  binary	  contrast	  but	  one	  of	  more	  
or	  less.	  In	  other	  words,	  like	  icebergs,	  the	  blob	  is	  90%	  submerged	  but	  the	  exposed	  
part	  has	  no	  real	  independent	  existence	  from	  the	  submerged	  part	  and	  vice	  versa86”	  (ibid).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  The	  ‘tops’	  of	  the	  blob-­‐‑icebergs,	  Bloch	  argues,	  are	  not	  separate	  but	  connected	  via	  social	  relations.	  One	  can	  therefore	  examine	  a	  blob	  ‘vertically’	  (in	  examining	  an	  individual	  person	  from	  their	  social	  role	  down	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  ‘sub-­‐‑conscious’	  embodied	  existence),	  such	  as	  is	  traditionally	  the	  approach	  in	  cognitive	  science,	  or	  ‘horizontally’,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  connections	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  Blobs	   are	   therefore	   simultaneously	   interconnected	  and	   separate,	   and	   it	   is	   not	  possible	   to	  draw	  a	  clear	   line	  between	   ‘nature’	  and	   ‘culture’87.	  Blobs,	   therefore,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  conscious	  bodies	  which	  possess	  the	  emergent	  power	  to	  bring	  forth	  culture,	  and	  are	  simultaneously	  shaped	  by	  it.	  They	  can	  do	  so	  because	  the	  different	  layers	   of	   the	   blob	   contain	   particular	   powers	   and	   mechanisms,	   which	   in	  combination	  allow	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  respective	  higher	  strata.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  our	  discussion	  of	  ethics,	  a	  model	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  useful	  in	  attempting	  to	  reconstruct	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  ‘black	  box’	  of	  habitus	  when	  ‘culture’	  becomes	  ‘embodied’.	   As	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   chapter	   3,	   society	   pre-­‐‑empts	   the	   concrete	  individual	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	   always	   already	   given.	   This	   means	   that	   whatever	  ‘blueprints’	  for	  social	  relations	  come	  to	  be	  taken	  inside	  the	  body/mind,	  they	  first	  have	  to	  be	  presented	  to	  the	  individual	  through	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  world.	  This	  insight	  will	  not	  be	  new	  to	  anyone	  interested	  in	  psychoanalysis,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  tenet	   of	   practically	   all	   psychotherapeutic	   approaches	   that	   people	   learn	   about	  ways	  of	  relating	  to	  one	  another	  through	  the	  relationships	  formed	  and	  observed	  in	  the	  environment	  of	  early	  childhood.	  As	  particularly	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘object	  relations’	  school	  of	  psychoanalysis	  hold,	  different	  kinds	  of	  relational	  patterns	  in	  this	  way	  come	  to	  be	  ‘stored’	  inside	  the	  body/mind	  as	  dyadic	  structures	  (‘object	  relations’),	  which	  form	  the	  “basic	  building	  blocks	  of…	  consciousness”	  (Kernberg	  2002,	  12)	  and	  can	  subsequently	  be	  activated	  and	  applied	  to	  relationships	  in	  later	  life.	  	  In	  combination	  with	  an	  emergent	  model	  of	  embodied	  consciousness,	  these	  psychoanalytic	  concepts	  could	  therefore	  be	  cleared	  from	  the	  suspicion	  that	  they	  ‘only’	  describe	  phenomena	  in	  the	  ‘mind’,	  and	  can	  thus	  give	  us	  quite	  a	  good	  idea	  both	  of	  how	  ‘blueprints’	  for	  social	  relations	  –	  also	  and	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  ethics	  –	  can	  come	  to	  be	  ‘embodied’.	  Moreover,	  psychoanalysts	  have	  developed	  detailed	  accounts	   of	   what	   these	   patterns	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   look	   like	   in	   a	   specific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  between	  blobs,	  as	  is	  usually	  regarded	  the	  sphere	  of	  anthropological	  inquiry.	  The	  challenge,	  according	  to	  Bloch,	  is	  to	  integrate	  these	  two	  modes	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  blob	  in	  a	  coherent	  theory.	   87	  Bloch	  concludes	  therefore	  that	  “that	  because	  of	  culture	  there	  are	  no	  purely	  generic	  humans”	  (p	  15),	  a	  view	  also	  expressed	  by	  Moore	  (2007a)	  who	  asserts	  that	  “humans	  are	  not	  biological	  entities	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  acquire	  culture,	  but	  biologically	  cultural	  beings”	  (p	  9),	  see	  also:	  Toren	  (1999),	  Ingold	  (1991)	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cultural	  context.	  I	  will	  therefore	  present	  here	  some	  theoretical	  tools	  borrowed	  from	  psychoanalysis,	  which	  will	  become	  relevant	  for	  our	  further	  discussion.	  	  	  ‘Object	  relations	  theory‘	  is	  a	  relatively	  wide	  and	  heterogeneous	  field,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  within	  the	  scope	  of	   this	   text	   to	  do	   justice	   to	   the	   individual	  schools	  or	  theorists,	  or	  to	  give	  a	  fair	  account	  of	  the	  (important	  and	  substantial)	  differences	  between	  them.	  I	  will	  therefore	  limit	  myself	  to	  introducing	  the	  positions	  of	  three	  theorists,	  namely	  W.R.D.	  Fairbairn	  (1952/1994),	  Donald	  Winnicott	  (1965/1971,	  1990)	   and	   Jessica	   Benjamin	   (1988,	   1990,	   1998,	   2013).	   Unsurprisingly,	   these	  three	   theorists	   disagree	   in	   important	   respects,	   and	   where	   necessary	   for	   my	  discussion	   I	   will	   point	   out	   their	   differences.	   Nevertheless,	   all	   three	   have	  presented	   theories	   that	   are	   highly	   compatible	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   ethics	   of	  recognition	  –	  Honneth,	  from	  whom	  I	  have	  borrowed	  the	  idea	  of	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition,	   draws	   on	   Winnicott	   and	   Benjamin,	   and	   his	   concepts	   can	  therefore	  be	   seen	   to	  be	  developed	   in	  part	   from	   the	   theories	   of	   these	   authors.	  Additionally,	  I	  bring	  in	  Fairbairn,	  because	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  below,	  his	  preference	  of	  a	   structural	  model	  of	   ‘dissociation‘	   to	   the	  dominant	  model	  of	   ‘repression‘	  will	  become	  relevant	  for	  my	  discussion	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  	  	  Object	  relations	  theories,	  which	  Benjamin	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “intersubjective	  view”	  (1988,	   18),	   share	   in	   common	   an	   important	   departure	   from	   Freud’s	   original	  formulation	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  namely	  “the	  original	  Freudian	  model,	  which	  takes	  as	  its	  starting	  point	  the	  instinctual	  drives“	  (Greenberg,	  1983,	  20)	  While	  Freud’s	  theory	  located	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  psyche	  in	  the	  individual,	  the	  “relational/structure	  model”	  (ibid.)	  object	  relations	  theorists	  propose	  sees	  these	   dynamics	   as	   inherently	   interpersonal.	   Fairbairn,	   basing	   his	   theory	  explicitly	  in	  the	  ideas	  of	  Hegel	  (see	  Peireira	  and	  Scharff,	  2002,	  2),	  goes	  perhaps	  furthest	  in	  rejecting	  the	  drive/structure	  model.	  Freud,	  as	  is	  well-­‐‑known,	  sees	  the	  psyche	  as	  a	  tripartite	  structure	  consisting	  of	  Id,	  Ego	  and	  Super-­‐‑Ego,	  whereby	  the	  libidinal	  or	  aggressive	  impulses	  of	  the	  Id	  have	  to	  be	  mastered	  and	  controlled	  by	  the	  Ego	  and	  later	  in	  development,	  the	  Super-­‐‑Ego.	  Therefore,	  “for	  Freud	  and	  his	  followers,	   the	   child’s	   interaction	  partners	  were	   initially	   significant	  only	   to	   the	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degree	  to	  which	  they	  acted	  as	  the	  objects	  of	  libidinal	  charges	  stemming	  from	  the	  intrapsychic	   conflict	   between	   unconscious	   instinctual	   demands	   and	   gradually	  emerging	  ego-­‐‑controls”	  (Honneth,	  1996,	  96).	  Fairbairn	  and	  other	  object	  relations	  theorists	  argue	  against	  this	  model	  that	  rather	  than	  seeking	  out	  others	  merely	  as	  a	  means	  to	   the	  end	  of	  resolving	  psychic	   tension	  (the	   ‘pleasure	  principle’),	   it	   is	  these	   others	   themselves	   that	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   libidinal	   impulses,	   i.e.	   libido	   is	  ‘object-­‐‑seeking’	   (Peireira	   and	   Scharff,	   2002,	   3).	   Fairbairn	   thus	   uses	   the	   term	  ‘object	   relations’	   to	   emphasise	   that	   what	   is	   internalised	   during	   psychic	  development	  	  	  “is	  not	  an	  object	  but	  an	  object	  relation	  or,	  better	  yet,	  a	  series	  of	  object	  relations	  –	  
that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  child	  experiences	  a	  series	  of	  relationships	  with	  people	  who	  are	  
important	  to	  the	  child	  and	  then	  internalises	  that	  experience	  through	  identification	  
in	  order	  to	  build…	  psychic	  structure.	  (Fairbairn)	  viewed	  the	  mind	  as	  organised	  by	  
splits	  into	  several	  sub-­‐‑systems,	  each	  of	  these	  composed	  by	  the	  relationship	  between	  
a	  self	  component	  and	  an	  object	  component”	  (ibid.	  5,	  emphasis	  orig.)	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  dynamic	  of	  ego	  and	  id,	  for	  Fairbairn	  it	  is	  therefore	  the	  dynamic	  between	   different	   conceptions	   of	   self-­‐‑in-­‐‑relation-­‐‑to-­‐‑object	   that	   structure	   the	  mind.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  he	  views	  the	  internal	  structuration	  of	  the	  psyche,	  which	  Freud	  had	  seen	  as	  necessary,	  as	  actually	  a	  sign	  of	  pathology:	  while	  some	  versions	  of	  the	  original	  self-­‐‑to-­‐‑object	  relation	  remain	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  personality	  (what	  Fairbairn	   calls	   the	   ‘central	   self’),	   other	   constellations	   have	   to	   be	   repressed	  because	  their	  implications	  are	  too	  painful	  or	  overwhelming,	  and	  thus	  result	  in	  a	  splitting	  of	  the	  self	  (‘dissociation’)	   into	  sub-­‐‑systems	  formed	  by	  specific	  self-­‐‑to-­‐‑object	  configurations.	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible	  for	  the	  self	  to	  contain	  ‘blueprints’	  for	  different	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations	  (e.g.	  a	  libidinal	  self	  to	  an	  exciting	  object,	  an	  aggressive	   ego	   to	   a	   rejecting	   object	   etc.),	   and	   for	   these	   blueprints	   to	   be	  structurally	  separated	  by	  the	  mechanism	  of	  dissociation,	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  come	  into	  consciousness	  at	  the	  same	  time.	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A	   similar	   approach	   is	   represented	   in	   the	   work	   of	  Winnicott,	   whose	   brand	   of	  object	   relations	   theory	   informs	   Honneth’s	   exposition	   of	   recognition	   and	  misrecognition	   as	   sociological	   categories.	   Honneth	   particularly	   draws	   on	  Winnicott’s	  insight	  that	  the	  earliest	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  other	  is	  not	  a	  one-­‐‑way	   relation	   in	   which	   the	   infant	   treats	   the	   ‘mother’ 88 	  merely	   as	   an	  instrument	   for	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   its	   physiological	   needs.	   Rather,	   it	   has	   to	   be	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  both	  the	  child	  and	  the	  ‘mother’	  through	  a	  gradual	  process	  of	  recognising	  each	  other	  as	  independent	  beings,	  i.e.	  as	  subjects.	  When	  Winnicott	  talks	  about	  the	  stages	  of	  maturation	  in	  the	  life	  of	  a	  young	   child,	   he	   therefore	   does	   not	   mean	   only	   the	   maturation	   of	   the	   child	  him/herself	   “but	   rather	   of	   each	   of	   the	   states	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  ‘mother’	  and	  child”	  (Honneth,	  1996,	  99).	  Winnicott	  sees	  maturation	  as	  a	  form	  of	  increasing	  differentiation	  from	  a	  basic	  state	  of	  unity	  between	  child	  and	  ‘mother’,	  in	  which	  both	  nevertheless	  remain	  connected	  by	  mutual	  interdependence.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this,	  the	  child	  has	  to	  learn	  to	  test	  the	  ‘mother’s’	  boundaries	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  that	  she	  is	  a	  separate	  being	  and	  not	  under	  the	  child’s	  immediate	  control	  –	  for	  Winnicott,	  this	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  positive	  learning	  process.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  is	  structurally	  similar	  to	  the	  process	  in	  which	  the	  Hegelian	  subject	  enters	  into	  a	  ‘struggle’	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  other	  is	  an	  independent	  consciousness	  and	  thus	  a	  possible	  source	  of	  recognition.	  	  	  Jessica	  Benjamin,	  finally,	  adds	  to	  this	  picture	  a	  feminist	  analysis	  that	  refines	  the	  above	  on	  several	  key	  points.	  She	  challenges	  “the	  assumption	  that	  we	  grow	  out	  of	  relationships	  rather	  than	  becoming	  more	  active	  and	  sovereign	  within	  them,	  that	  we	  start	  in	  a	  state	  of	  dual	  oneness	  and	  wind	  up	  in	  a	  state	  of	  singular	  oneness”	  (1988,	   16,	   emph.	   orig.).	   Rather,	   Benjamin	   argues,	   infant/mother	   relationships	  are	  never	  completely	  symbiotic	  but	  contain	  from	  the	  start	  the	  necessity	  to	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  by	  taking	  an	  active	  interest	  in	  others	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  oneself:	  “the	  issue	  is	  not	  how	  we	  become	  free	  of	  the	  other,	  but	  how	  we	  actively	  engage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Like	  Honneth,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘mother’	  in	  quotes	  to	  emphasize	  that	  while	  it	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  biological	  mother	  who	  fulfils	  this	  role,	  this	  is	  a	  cultural	  convention	  rather	  than	  a	  strict	  necessity	  of	  early	  development.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  ‘mother’	  can	  therefore	  also	  be	  fulfilled	  by	  the	  father	  or	  another	  primary	  caretaker.	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and	  make	  ourselves	  known	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  other”	  (18).	  Benjamin	  therefore	  proposes	   that	   a	   sense	  of	   self	   and	  of	   the	   efficacy	  of	   one’s	   actions	   comes	   about	  through	   affirmation	   by	   an	   other,	   i.e.	   through	   recognition:	   “recognition	   is	   thus	  reflexive,	  it	  includes	  not	  only	  the	  other’s	  confirming	  response,	  but	  also	  how	  we	  find	   ourselves	   in	   that	   response”	   (20).	   Benjamin	   emphasises	   that	   the	   need	   for	  recognition	   is	  mutual,	   i.e.	   “the	   child	   has	   a	   need	   to	   see	   the	  mother,	   too,	   as	   an	  independent	  subject,	  not	  simply	  as	  the	  ‘external	  world’	  or	  an	  adjunct	  of	  his	  ego”	  (22).	   The	   fact	   that	   both	   traditional	   psychoanalysis	   as	   well	   as	   wider	   cultural	  discourse	  have	  mostly	   framed	   the	  mother	   in	   terms	  of	   an	  object	   rather	   than	  a	  subject	   (which	   ultimately	   stems	   from	   her	   subjugated	   subject	   position	   as	   a	  woman)	  for	  Benjamin	  then	  is	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  obstacles	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  capacity	  for	  mutual	  recognition	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  form,	  not	  subject-­‐‑object,	  but	  subject-­‐‑subject	   relations.	  Benjamin,	   too,	  explicitly	   refers	   to	  Hegel	   to	  argue	  that	  what	  is	  being	  ‘internalised’	  in	  early	  development	  is	  not	  so	  much	  ‘objects’	  but	  the	  specific	  quality	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  a	  relation	  that	  can	  be	  either	  characterised	  by	  mutual	  recognition,	  or	  by	  misrecognition	  and	  thus	  result	  in	  relations	  characterised	  by	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  domination	  and	  submission.	  	  	  	  
Lost	  In	  (State)	  Space	  	  	  While	  it	  is	  thus	  widely	  accepted	  in	  both	  psychotherapy	  and	  everyday	  discourse	  that	  people	  ‘internalise’	  representations,	  it	  is	  by	  far	  not	  as	  clear	  how	  one	  should	  imagine	   this	   works.	   Psychoanalysis	   –	   and	   its	   application	   for	   other	   fields	   –	   is	  generally	  hampered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  often	  not	  clear	  how	  its	  postulates	  have	  been	   arrived	   at,	   what	   kinds	   of	   phenomena	   they	   describe,	   and	   where	   these	  phenomena	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  located.	  For	  example,	  if	  people	  ‘internalise	  object	  relations’,	  then	  what	  are	  these	  things	  made	  of	  and	  where	  do	  people	  keep	  them?	  These	  questions	  are	  not	  naïve	  –	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  ‘mind’	  is	  indeed	  inseparable	  from	  ‘brain’,	  then	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  mind	  must	  ultimately	  be	  compatible	  with	  a	  naturalistic	  view	  of	  embodied	  consciousness.	  Unfortunately,	  attempts	  to	  marry	  psychoanalytic	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  of	  the	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brain	   have	   so	   far	   not	   been	   particularly	   successful,	   causing	   some	   scholars	   to	  answer	   the	   question	   “are	   psychoanalysis	   and	   neuropsychology	   compatible?”	  (Wilson,	  2014)89	  with	  ‘no.’90	  Nevertheless,	  if	  object	  relations	  theories	  are	  indeed	  of	  any	  relevance	  for	  the	  study	  of	  embodied	  morality,	  then	  we	  will	  have	  to	  develop	  some	  kind	  of	   idea	  of	  how	  the	   ‘embodied’	  part	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  supposed	  to	  work	  in	  actual	  brains.	  	  	  A	  promising	  approach	   for	   this	  purpose,	   in	  my	  view,	   comes	   from	   the	  cognitive	  science	  perspective	  known	  as	  ‘connectionism’.	  Very	  briefly,	  connectionist	  –	  also	  known	  as	  ‘parallel	  distributed	  processing’	  –	  models	  view	  mental	  phenomena	  as	  emergent	   processes	   of	   the	   activity	   of	   interconnected	   neural	   networks.	   One	  consequence	  of	   this	   is	   that	  the	   ‘classic’	  computational	  view	  of	  consciousness	  –	  that	   is,	   of	   ‘mind’	   as	  a	  quasi-­‐‑linguistic	   symbol-­‐‑processing	  machine,	  much	   like	  a	  modern	  computer	  –	  is	  replaced	  with	  “sophisticated	  pattern-­‐‑completion	  devices	  exploiting	   very	   high-­‐‑dimensional	   (supralinguistic)	   modes	   of	   information	  storage”	   (Clark	  et	   al,	  1996,	  4).	  As	  Andy	  Clark	   (1996)	  argues,	   in	   the	   context	  of	  moral	  cognition,	  this	  means	  that	  rather	  than	  arriving	  at	  moral	  judgment	  through	  the	   application	   of	   particular	   language-­‐‑like	   rule-­‐‑systems91 ,	   brains	   operate	   by	  judging	  particular	  moral	  instances	  according	  to	  their	  relative	  similarity	  to	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  screamingly	  ludicrous	  examples	  of	  psychoanalytic	  interpretation	  Wilson	  (a	  neuropsychologist)	  has	  encountered	  in	  her	  practice	  (see	  Wilson,	  2014),	  her	  view	  is	  understandable.	  Her	  discussion	  elucidates	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  some	  anthropologists	  have,	  on	  occasion,	  interpreted	  ‘culture’	  in	  self-­‐‑serving	  and	  biased	  ways,	  some	  proponents	  of	  psychoanalysis	  have	  done	  the	  same	  to	  the	  psyche.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Melanie	  Klein,	  generally	  credited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  figures	  of	  Object	  Relations.	  Klein’s	  theory	  includes	  for	  example	  the	  assertion	  that	  in	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  life,	  the	  inner	  experience	  of	  the	  infant	  is	  dominated	  by	  imagery	  of	  murderous	  rage,	  cannibalism,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  invade	  and	  plunder	  the	  mother’s	  body	  and	  devour	  her	  whole	  (Klein,	  1946,	  8f;	  1997,	  128f).	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  simply	  that	  even	  if	  it	  were	  true,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  Klein	  or	  anyone	  else	  to	  know	  it	  is	  the	  case	  –	  all	  we	  can	  really	  know	  about	  this	  early	  age	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  child	  lives	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  symbiosis	  with	  the	  ‘mother’	  and	  gradually	  learns	  to	  distinguish	  between	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘non-­‐‑I’.	  Klein’s	  therapeutic	  ‘methods’	  of	  sexually	  traumatizing	  children	  have	  rightfully	  been	  described	  as	  ‘sheer	  terrorism’	  (Deleuze/Guattari,	  1988/2000,	  45),	  and	  her	  assertion	  that	  the	  adult	  psyche	  is	  characterized	  by	  either	  a	  ‘depressive’	  or	  a	  ‘schizoid’	  position	  is	  aptly	  reflected	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  her	  own	  children/victims,	  one	  of	  whom	  is	  suspected	  of	  having	  committed	  suicide,	  while	  the	  other	  purportedly	  hated	  Ms	  Klein’s	  guts	  (Nicholas,	  2003,	  156).	  It	  thus	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  ‘Terrible	  Mother’	  (Stephen,	  2006,	  192)	  of	  Klein’s	  theory	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  projection	  of	  her	  own	  self	  (see	  also	  Duffell,	  2000,	  2114).	  90	  The	  aversion	  appears	  to	  be	  mutual	  –	  on	  the	  few	  occasions	  I	  have	  presented	  psychoanalytically	  informed	  scholars	  with	  the	  considerations	  outlined	  above,	  the	  reaction	  was	  flat	  out	  rejection	  of	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  ‘brains’.	  	  91	  Similar	  to	  deontological	  theories	  of	  morality	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these	  theories	  call	  ‘prototypes’.	  	  A	  ‘prototype’	  is	  a	  particular	  neural	  firing	  pattern	  that	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  brain	  in	  the	  course	  of	  learning	  through	  the	  observation	  of	  concrete	   instances	   (‘exemplars’),	   from	   which	   the	   statistically	   most	   salient	  features	   are	   extracted.	   For	   example,	   the	   prototype	   for	   ‘pet’	   is	   coded	   through	  extracting	  the	  most	  typical	  features	  of	  all	  pets	  a	  person	  has	  encountered	  (number	  of	   legs,	  biting	  rate,	  etc.),	  and	  new	  instances	  of	  animals	  are	  recognised	  as	   ‘pets’	  depending	  on	  their	  relative	  proximity	  to	  the	  prototype	  (ibid)92.	  	  	  ‘Proximity’	  refers	  to	  the	  relative	  distance	  of	  instants	  to	  a	  prototype	  within	  what	  is	   called	   a	   ‘representational	   state	   space’.	   This	   is	   a	   multi-­‐‑dimensional	  mathematical	   space	   produced	   by	   the	   activation	   patterns	   of	   different	   kinds	   of	  neural	  units.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  for	  example	  colours	  can	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  3-­‐‑dimensional	  ‘colour	  cube’	  by	  applying	  three	  coordinates,	  a	  prototype	  is	  specified	  in	   the	   state	   space	   according	   to	   the	   coordinates	   defined	   by	   the	   activation	   or	  inhibition	  of	  specific	  neural	  networks.	  ‘Plotting’	  an	  instant	  near	  a	  prototype	  then	  means	   to	   represent	   it	   as	   a	   vector,	   that	   is,	   the	   mathematical	   expression	   of	   a	  tendency	  or	  movement.	  Recognising	  a	  dog	  as	  a	  ‘pet’	  therefore	  mean	  representing	  the	  dog	  as	  a	  movement	  of	  a	  certain	  distance	  towards	  the	  coordinates	  that	  specify	  ‘petness’93.	   In	   the	   same	  way,	   representing	  moral	   instants	   in	   the	   brain	  works	  through	  plotting	  them	  in	  relative	  proximity	  to	  previously	  encoded	  prototypes	  of	  morally	  ‘good’	  exemplars	  (Clark,	  1996).	  Some	  theorists	  (e.g.	  Churchland,	  1989b,	  1996)	  argue	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  state-­‐‑space	  representation	  could	  be	  how	  ‘virtues’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  A	  dog	  is	  therefore	  judged	  a	  better	  instant	  of	  a	  ‚pet’	  than	  a	  snake,	  although	  both	  can	  be	  ‚pets’	  (Clark,	  1996,	  110).	  This	  should	  remind	  us	  of	  Weber’s	  ‘ideal	  types’,	  and	  indeed	  as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see	  it	  is	  the	  same	  thing	  expressed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  cognitive	  science.	  93	  One	  reason	  I	  am	  very	  enthusiastic	  about	  this	  model	  is	  that	  it	  could	  possibly	  help	  to	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  difficulties	  that	  plague	  academic	  and	  political	  discourse.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  frequently	  asserted	  that	  the	  feminist	  understanding	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  binary	  power	  relation	  is	  inadequate,	  since	  in	  real	  life,	  people	  do	  not	  express	  gender	  according	  to	  a	  strict	  binary,	  but	  most	  fall	  somewhere	  in	  between	  (e.g.	  Moore,	  2007a).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  has	  become	  standard	  practice	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘masculinities’	  or	  ‘femininities’,	  plural	  rather	  than	  the	  singular,	  thus	  diluting	  the	  force	  of	  (‘second	  wave’)	  feminist	  critique.	  A	  model	  like	  the	  above	  state-­‐‑space	  representation	  could	  however	  lead	  to	  a	  view	  of	  gender	  that	  sees	  individual	  expressions	  not	  necessarily	  as	  faithful	  representations	  of	  the	  ideal-­‐‑type	  (i.e.	  the	  most	  polarized	  expression	  possible),	  but	  as	  tendencies	  or	  movements	  towards	  the	  extreme.	  For	  example,	  an	  individual’s	  ‘masculine’	  gender	  expression	  could	  then,	  in	  theory,	  be	  mathematically	  expressed	  as	  a	  vector	  in	  the	  representational	  state-­‐‑space	  of	  ‘gender’,	  i.e.	  a	  term	  specifying	  a	  movement	  of	  ‘x	  distance	  towards	  masculinity	  prototype’.	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come	   to	   be	   encoded	   in	   the	   brain	   and	   subsequently	   inform	   moral	   judgment.	  However,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  our	  previous	  discussion,	  it	  could	  be	  equally	  said	  that	  the	  prototypes	  Churchland	  calls	   ‘virtues’	   are	  actually	  what	  we	  have	  called	   ‘ethical	  patterns’,	  or	  what	  psychoanalysis	  calls	  ‘object	  relations’.	  	  The	  state-­‐‑space	  model	  of	  moral	   learning	  can	  therefore	  give	  us	  an	   idea	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   the	   ‘internalisation’	   of	   relational	   patterns	   –	   our	   two	   modes	   of	  ‘recognition’	  and	  ‘misrecognition’	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  two	  different	  prototypes	  for	  how	   to	   relate	   to	   other	   people,	   encoded	   in	   the	   brain	   through	   exposure	   during	  development.	  Despite	  the	  reluctance	  of	  cognitive	  scientists	  and	  psychoanalysts	  to	   consider	   each	   other’s	   contributions,	   it	   could	   therefore	   be	   said	   that	  psychoanalysis	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  a	  phenomenological	   ‘map’	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  prototypes	  that	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  encoded	  in	  a	  brain	  socialised	  within	  a	  particular	  cultural	  context.	  If	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  can	  indeed	  be	   seen	   as	   two	   competing	   patterns	   of	   basic	   ethical	   relations,	   then	   they	   are	  therefore,	   in	  this	  view,	  both	  completely	   ‘embodied’	  as	  neural	  firing	  patterns	  in	  the	   brain94.	   	   The	   abovementioned	   question	   of	   ‘choice’	   in	  matters	   of	  morality	  could	   then	   be	   reframed	   as	   a	   question	   of	  what	   DesAutels	   (1996)	   calls	   ‘gestalt	  shifts’,	  namely	  cognitive	  shifts	  between	  different,	  incommensurable	  prototypes	  (131).	  	  However,	  as	  Held	  (1996)	  remarks,	  cognitive	  science	  on	  its	  own	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  choose	  to	  shift	  from	  one	  pattern	  to	  the	  other,	  or	  
why	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  –	  for	  this,	  we	  need	  cultural	  and	  social	  explanations	  (77).	  While	  I	  have	  therefore	  outlined	  the	  state-­‐‑space	  model	  of	  moral	  cognition	  in	  order	  to	   demonstrate	   that	   object	   relations	   accounts	   need	   not	   necessarily	   be	  ‘unscientific’	  or	  ‘metaphysical’,	  I	  will	  stay	  in	  the	  psychoanalytic	  idiom	  for	  a	  little	  longer,	  and	  consider	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  psychoanalysis	  has	  framed	  the	  concrete	  process	   of	   coding	   the	   ‘data-­‐‑architecture’	   of	   the	  mind.	  We	  will	   then	   revisit	   the	  connectionist	  view	  of	  ethics	  in	  chapter	  11.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  See	  also	  related	  discussion:	  Gilligan	  (1987),	  Flanagan/Jackson	  (1990),	  Gilligan/Attanucci	  (1988),	  Flanagan	  (1991)	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We	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  in	  a	  psychoanalytic	  view,	  a	  pattern	  of	  recognition	  is	  coded	  within	  the	  very	  first	  interactions	  of	  an	  infant	  with	  its	  environment.	  It	  forms	  the	   prototype	   of	   an	   ethical	   relation	   that	   emphasises	   mutuality	   and	   shared	  subjecthood,	  or	  if	  one	  so	  wants,	  shared	  humanity.	  Its	  opposite	  –	  misrecognition	  –	   then	   is	   the	  prototype	   for	  what	  Nick	  Duffell	   (2014)	   refers	   to	  as	   “dump	   truck	  ethics”	  (71).	  This	  type	  of	  relation	  is	  characterised	  by	  what	  psychoanalysis	  calls	  ‘defense	  mechanisms’,	  namely	  ‘splitting’	  and	  ‘projection’,	  which	  can	  characterise	  both	   the	   psychic	   structure	   of	   particular	   individuals,	   and	   those	   of	   collective	  entities	  like	  ‘classes’.	  ‘Splitting’	  is	  the	  psychological	  manoeuvre	  by	  which	  a	  person	  externalises	   aspects	  of	   the	   self	   that	   they	   regard	  as	  unacceptable,	   and	  projects	  these	  aspects	  onto	  another	  person.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	   ‘white	   male	   western	   subject’,	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   two,	   to	   deny	   and	  externalise	   his	   own	   vulnerability	   and	   dependency,	   ‘dumping	   it’	   on	   somebody	  else,	  and	  then	  denigrating	  that	  person	  for	  ‘being	  that’.	  Ironically,	  as	  Duffell	  points	  out,	  this	  manoeuvre	  achieves	  the	  precise	  opposite	  –	  it	  makes	  the	  ‘autonomous’	  and	  ‘invulnerable’	  subject	  dependent	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  people	  who	  come	  to	   carry	   his	   disowned	   aspects	   for	   him	   and	   thus	   come	   to	   be	   identified	   as	   ‘the	  vulnerable	  other’.	  	  	  “Whatever	  does	  not	  count	  as	  rational	  –	  women,	  children	  and	  foreigners,	  especially	  
indigenuous	   peoples	   –	   is	   made	   into	   an	   object	   of	   derision	   and	   loathing.	   It	  
subsequently	  morphs	  into	  an	  object	  of	  fear	  because	  it	  is	  unfamiliar	  and	  unworthy	  
of	  curiosity;	  in	  consequence,	  these	  objects	  lose	  their	  subjectivity	  and	  then	  have	  to	  be	  
dominated	  rather	  than	  related	  to”	  (2014,	  7)	  	  	  Splitting	   and	   projection	   can	   thus	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   most	   concrete	  manifestations	   of	   the	   pattern	   of	  misrecognition,	   since	   here,	   the	   other	   literally	  becomes	  an	  ‘object’	  –	  a	  mere	  function	  of	  the	  subject’s	  self.	  	  	  An	   important	   prerequisite	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   psychological	   ‘outsourcing’	   is	   the	  mechanism	  of	  dissociation,	  which	  we	  have	  touched	  upon	  above.	  Dissociation,	  as	  we	  learn	  from	  Fairbairn,	  means	  that	  internalised	  object	  relations	  (or	  prototypes)	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come	   to	   be	   compartmentalised	   and	   separated	   from	   each	   other,	  with	   some	   of	  them	   not	   or	   only	   partially	   available	   for	   conscious	   reflection.	   This	   means	   in	  practice	  that	  the	  ‘splitting	  off’	  of	  undesirable	  parts	  of	  the	  self,	  which	  on	  the	  one	  hand	   results	   in	   externalisation,	   continues	  within	   the	   individual,	   resulting	   in	   a	  compartmentalised	  and	  fragmented	   inner	  experience	  that	   lacks	  cohesion.	  This	  inner	  fragmentation	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  flip	  side	  of	  the	  externalisation	  of	  one	  part	  of	  an	  object	  relation	  –	  here,	  a	  conflictual	  dyadic	  relation	  encountered	  in	  the	  social	  environment	  is	  ‘taken	  inside’	  and	  left	  there	  in	  the	  same	  conflictual	  form.	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  the	  many	  forms	  in	  which	  psychoanalysts	  have	  tried	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  reconcile	  ‘masculine’	  and	  ‘feminine’	  aspects	  of	  the	  psyche,	  which	  by	  general	  consensus	  a	  person	  forms	  by	  internalising	  models	  of	  ‘masculinity’	  and	  ‘femininity’	  encountered	  in	  childhood.	  In	  a	  patriarchal	  society,	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  genders	  must	  be	  experienced	  as	  hierarchical	   and	   conflictual,	   and	   thus	   the	  same	   conflict	   will	   encounter	   the	   individual	   ‘on	   the	   inside’	   when	   masculine	  aspects	  of	  the	  psyche	  are	  pitched	  against	   ‘feminine’	  ones.	  Hegel,	  ever	  the	  keen	  observer	   of	   the	   human	   mind,	   remarks	   on	   this	   point:	   “It	   shows	   an	   excessive	  tenderness	  for	  the	  world	  to	  remove	  contradiction	  from	  it	  and	  then	  to	  transfer	  the	  contradiction	  to	  reason,	  where	   it	   is	  allowed	  to	  remain	  unresolved”	  (Science	  of	  Logic,	   1812,	   §	   529).	   By	   taking	   a	   social	   conflict	   inside	   the	  mind	   and	   leaving	   it	  
unresolved,	  the	  person	  thus	  forms	  a	  prototype	  of	  a	  conflictual	  relation,	  resulting	  in	  a	  psychic	  structure	  in	  which	  different	  prototypes	  are	  quite	  literally	  at	  war	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	  In	   consequence,	   such	   a	   person	   is	   thus	   capable	   of	   ‘gestalt	   shifting’	   between	  contradictory	   prototypes,	   i.e.	   expressing	   vastly	   different	   and	   logically	  incompatible	   attitudes	   at	   different	   times,	   sometimes	   exhibiting	   a	   personality	  structure	  akin	  to	  the	  emblematic	  ‘Dr	  Jekyll	  and	  Mr	  Hyde’.	  In	  chapter	  11	  we	  will	  encounter	  a	  real-­‐‑life	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  personality	  organisation,	  and	  we	  will	  see	   how	   this	   internal	   fragmentation	   produces	   a	   very	   specific	   form	   of	   spatial	  practice.	  This	  kind	  of	  space,	  which	  later	  we	  will	  come	  to	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘Secure	  Space’	  to	   distinguish	   it	   from	   the	   ‘Safe	   Space’	   of	   shared	   vulnerability,	   is	   the	  material	  representation	  of	  a	  self	  that	  is	  rigidly	  and	  violently	  defended,	  and	  therefore	  prone	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to	  becoming	  what	   I	  will	   call	  a	   ‘territorial	  dominant’.	  But	  while,	  as	  we	  will	   see,	  some	  squatters	  were	  prone	  to	  slipping	  into	  this	  role,	  it	  is	  more	  characteristic	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  mind-­‐‑set	  squatters	  formulated	  their	  practice	  against.	  This	  mind-­‐‑set	  has	  been	  described	  by	  a	  great	  number	  of	  authors,	  but	   in	  the	  context	  of	  British	  culture,	  none	  has	  portrayed	  it	  more	  aptly	  than	  the	  abovementioned	  Nick	  Duffell.	  I	   will	   therefore	   here	   draw	   on	   his	   work	   at	   more	   length,	   to	   show	   how	   the	  embodiment	   of	   ethical	   patterns	   –	   in	   this	   case,	   of	  misrecognition	   –	  works	   in	   a	  concrete	  cultural	  context.	  	  	  Duffell	  identifies	  himself	  as	  a	  ‘psychohistorian’,	  i.e.	  he	  applies	  the	  concepts	  and	  explanatory	   models	   of	   psychoanalysis	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   culture	   and	  politics.	  The	  great	  merit	  of	  his	  work,	  in	  my	  view,	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  does	  not	  simply	  use	  psychoanalysis	  as	  a	  hermeneutic	  device	  to	  ‘read	  culture	  as	  text’,	  but	  draws	  on	  evidence	  which	  one	  could	  without	  much	  effort	  call	  ethnographic.	  He	  looks	   back	   on	   several	   decades	   of	   psychotherapeutic	  work	  with	   a	   very	   special	  client	   group:	  members	   of	   the	   British	   ruling	   class	  who	   have	   gone	   through	   the	  educational	   system	   of	   elite	   boarding	   schools,	   and	   whom	   he,	   borrowing	   from	  Schaverien	  (2011)	  refers	  to	  as	  “boarding	  school	  survivors”.	  Duffell	  is	  therefore	  one	   of	   the	   few	  who	  has	   access	   to	   a	  wealth	   of	   ethnographic	   data	   on	   the	   inner	  dynamics	  of	  British	  men	  who	  have	  been	  systematically	  groomed	  to	  rule,	  and	  the	  psychological	   and	   emotional	   distortions	   this	   kind	   of	   upbringing	   entails.	  Compassionately	   yet	   critically,	   he	   describes	   the	   ruling	   class	   ideology	   these	  schools	   instil	   in	   young	   boys	   through	   emotional	   and	   physical	   violence,	   by	  fostering	  a	  masculinity	  based	  on	  hyper-­‐‑rationality,	  entitlement,	  lack	  of	  emotion	  or	  empathy,	  bullying,	  misogyny	  and	  a	  seething	  contempt	  for	  anyone	  and	  anything	  seen	  as	  weak,	  vulnerable	  or	  dependent.	  British	  boarding	  schools,	  in	  this	  account,	  are	  human	  factories	  for	  the	  production	  of	  the	  prototypical	  ‘white	  male	  western	  subject’	  of	  chapter	  two,	  a	  subject	  that	  is	  not	  just	  a	  cultural	  stereotype,	  but	  in	  the	  persons	  of	  concrete	  political	   leaders	  comes	   to	  actually	  rule	  society.	  Writing	   in	  2014,	  Duffell	   points	   out	   that	  more	   than	  half	   of	   the	   current	   cabinet	   –	   the	   very	  politicians	  whose	  policies	  my	  squatter	  respondents	  were	  up	  against,	  among	  them	  David	  Cameron,	  Boris	  Johnson,	  George	  Osborne	  and,	  indeed,	  Mike	  Weatherley	  –	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went	  through	  a	  boarding	  school	  education,	  and,	  if	  Duffell	  is	  to	  be	  believed,	  have	  been	  severely	  psychologically	  damaged	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	  The	  manufacturing	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  begins	  with	  removing	  boys	  as	  young	  as	  5	  or	  6	  from	  their	  families	  and	  placing	  them	  in	  a	  closed,	  all-­‐‑male	  institution,	  where	  they	   emotionally	   have	   to	   fend	   for	   themselves.	   The	   sudden	   separation	   from	  parents	  and	  siblings	  causes	  trauma	  for	  the	  young	  children,	  even	  more	  so	  since	  they	   are	   given	   the	   confusing	  message	   that	   it	   is	   a	   ‘privilege’	   that	   will	   be	   “the	  making	  of	  them”	  (the	  title	  of	  one	  of	  Duffell’s	  books).	  Inside	  the	  institution,	  they	  enter	  a	  hierarchical	  system	  not	  unlike	  that	  of	  a	  prison,	  in	  which	  older	  boys	  are	  encouraged	  to	  bully	  younger	  ones	  (for	  example	   in	   the	  still	  existing	  practice	  of	  ‘fagging’,	   in	   which	   older	   boys	   are	   allowed	   to	   use	   younger	   ones	   as	   personal	  servants),	  and	  every	  sign	  of	  weakness	  or	  neediness	  can	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	  verbal	  or	  physical	  attack.	  The	  child	  therefore	  “has	  no	  other	  choice	  but	  to	  repress	  feelings	  and	  to	  refuse	  to	  identify	  himself	  as	  the	  one	  who	  has	  such	  emotions”	  in	  order	  not	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  “vulnerable	  amongst	  the	  other	  little	  boys	  who	  are	  busy	  toughening	  up”	  (2014,	  79).	  The	  boy	  soon	  realises	  that	  the	  cardinal	  sin	  in	  such	  an	  environment	  is	  coming	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘the	  wrong	  one’:	  the	  one	  who	  cries,	   who	   makes	   a	   mistake,	   who	   says	   something	   stupid	   or	   who	   misses	   his	  mother.	   Consequently,	   the	   social	   dynamics	   in	   the	   school	   are	   governed	   by	  constant	  attempts	  to	  not	  be	  ‘that	  one’	  –	  fuelled	  by	  an	  institutional	  system	  full	  of	  Kafka-­‐‑esque	  rules,	  which	  constantly	  and	  relentlessly	  compares	  students	  to	  each	  other	   and	   thus	   fosters	   incessant	   competition	   in	   every	   aspect	   of	   life.	   While	  corporal	  punishment	  by	  staff	  has	  been	  outlawed	  in	  recent	  years	  (in	  1999	  –	  i.e.	  after	  current	  members	  of	  government	  graduated),	  physical	  and	  sexual	  abuse	  by	  staff	  and	  older	  boys	  still	  occur	  (174	  f).	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   psychologically	   survive	   in	   this	   environment,	   the	   young	  boys	  must	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  splitting	  and	  dissociation	  as	  defences	  against	  being	  ‘the	  wrong	  one’,	  in	  other	  words,	  undesirable	  attributes	  such	  as	  vulnerability,	  weakness	  and	  victimhood	  must	  be	  ‘dumped	  on’	  somebody	  else.	  While	  initially,	  this	  may	  be	  the	  ‘softer’	  boys	  who	  are	  thus	  turned	  into	  scapegoats,	  the	  all-­‐‑male,	  (almost)	  all-­‐‑white	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environment	   also	   ensures	   that	  women	   and	   people	   of	   colour	   remain	   available	  targets	   for	   projection	   (see	   also	   Schaverien,	   2004,	   696	   f).	   The	   result	   is	   the	  internalisation	   of	   object	   relations	   between	   a	   hyper-­‐‑rational,	   over-­‐‑entitled	   and	  emotionally	  numbed	  self,	  and	  it’s	  split-­‐‑off	  and	  projected	  ‘others’.	  This	  points	  to	  the	   relationship	  between	  pattern-­‐‑prototypes	  and	  what	  with	  Metzinger	   (2004)	  we	  have	  called	  the	  ‘phenomenal	  self-­‐‑model’	  (chapter	  2)	  –	  some	  prototypes	  are	  thus	  incorporated	  into	  the	  self-­‐‑model	  while	  others	  are	  rejected.	  Psychoanalysis	  calls	  this	  ‘identification’	  and	  it	  means	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  basic	  categorisation	  of	  prototypes	  as	  ‘I’	  or	  ‘non-­‐‑I’.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  ‘non-­‐‑I’	  self-­‐‑prototypes	  from	  ‘returning’	   and	   causing	   havoc	   in	   the	   psyche,	   the	   really	   existing	   others	   who	  embody	  them	  have	  to	  be	  controlled,	  dominated	  or	  simply	  kept	  away.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  boarding	  school	  education	  is	  practically	  a	  guarantee	  that	  a	  boy	  will	  internalise	  a	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	  –	  and	  then	  come	  to	  re-­‐‑enact	  the	  precise	  same	  pattern	  in	  his	  later	  public	  and	  personal	  life.	  	  	  Duffell	  details	   the	  history	  of	  boarding	  schools	  as	   “an	   industrial	  process	  with	  a	  military	  ethic”	  (2014,	  1)	  producing	  ‘Rational	  Men’	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  Empire,	  and	  argues	  that	  to	  this	  day,	  British	  society	  reflects	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  splitting	  and	  projection	  that	   its	  rulers	  are	  forced	  to	  acquire	   in	  the	   ‘hothouses’	  of	  public	  schools.	  We	  will	  encounter	  some	  of	  his	  arguments	  in	  later	  chapters,	  when	  we	  will	  see	   how	   the	   attitudes	   he	   describes	   come	   to	   play	   out	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   national	  politics.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  I	  want	  to	  take	  two	  insights	  from	  his	  work:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  that	  the	  pattern	  of	  relating	  we	  have	  called	  ‘misrecognition’	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	   mind	   that	   has	   become	   accustomed	   to	   using	   dissociation,	   splitting	   and	  projection	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  itself	  against	  attributes	  that	  it	  has	  come	  to	  view	  as	  dangerous,	  because	  in	  the	  violent,	  hyper-­‐‑masculine	  environment	  it	  is	  formed	  in,	  they	  could	  make	  it	  the	  target	  of	  attack.	  And	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  that	  dissociation	  –	  whether	   as	   an	   individual	   or	   as	   a	   collective	  phenomenon	  –	   results	   in	   an	   inner	  division	   that	  pitches	   the	   self	   against	   itself.	  Dissociation	   is	   therefore	   a	  modern	  term	  for	  that	  which	  Hegel	  arguably	  actually	  meant	  with	  his	  Master/Bondsman	  analogy	   –	   after	   all,	   for	   him	   it	   is	   primarily	   a	   dynamic	   found	  within	   the	   human	  ‘spirit’.	   Here,	   the	   self	   has	   come	   into	   contradiction	   with	   itself,	   resulting	   in	   a	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struggle	  in	  which	  one	  aspect	  comes	  to	  rule	  over	  the	  other,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Duffell’s	  clients	  have	  had	  to	  learn	  to	  control	  the	  ‘soft’	  and	  vulnerable	  parts	  of	  themselves	  by	  subjecting	  them	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  an	  overbearing,	  hyper-­‐‑rational	  bully	  of	  a	  mind95.	   In	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  unbearable	  psychic	  tension	  of	   this	  state	  of	  affairs,	   the	  subject	   then	  externalises	  one	  half	  of	   the	  contradiction,	   thus	  making	  another	  human	  into	  either	  his	  master	  or	  his	  slave,	  turning	  an	  inner	  contradiction	  into	   an	   interpersonal	   one,	   and	   creating	   a	   relationship	   characterised	   by	  dominance	  and	  submission.	  This	  way,	  it	  has	  now	  perhaps	  become	  a	  little	  more	  transparent	   what	   I	   mean	   when	   I	   say	   that	   ethical	   patterns	   can	   be	   found	   on	  different	  levels	  of	  ‘scale’	  –	  they	  are,	  quite	  literally,	  transferred	  via	  projection	  from	  inside	   an	   individual	   body/mind	   into	   interpersonal	   relations,	   and,	   through	   the	  cumulative	   effect	   of	   millions	   of	   dyadic	   relations,	   eventually	   come	   to	   form	  ‘patterns	  of	  culture’	  (Benjamin	  1934).	  	  	  So	   what	   does	   this	   tell	   us	   about	   the	   abovementioned	   question	   of	   embodied	  dispositions	  versus	  ethical	  choice?	  What	  we	  take	  from	  the	  emergent	  model	  above	  is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   continuum	   between	   body	   and	   mind,	   and	   that	   any	   cultural	  content	   –	   including	   ‘object	   relations’	   or	   patterns	   –	   is	   therefore	   present	   on	   all	  ‘levels’	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  Whether	  something	  is	  ‘conscious’	  or	  not	  is	  therefore	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  to	  what	  degree	  it	  is	  embodied,	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  to	  what	  degree	  it	  is	  split	  off	  from	  conscious	  awareness.	  This	  means,	  consequently,	  that	  if	  a	  particular	  prototype	  (for	  example	  vulnerability)	  becomes	  a	  ‘no-­‐‑go-­‐‑zone’	  for	  identification,	  i.e.	  is	  split	  off	  within	  the	  ‘mind’,	  then	  this	  split	  will	  affect	  the	  whole	  person	  in	  so	  far	  that	  it	  also	  entails	  splitting	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘body’	  from	  awareness.	  Psychoanalysts	  refer	  to	  this	  fact	  when	  they	  speak	  about	  distressed	  people	  having	  to	  ‘come	  back	  into	  their	  bodies’	  or	  similar,	  as	  splitting	  means	  that	  the	  person	  has	  subjectively	  declared	   part	   of	   their	   body	   ‘non-­‐‑I’.	   In	   extreme	   cases,	   this	   can	   lead	   to	  psychosomatic	  disorders,	   such	   as	   Freud	   famously	  diagnosed	   in	  his	   ‘hysterics’.	  Instead	  of	  seeing	  the	  body	  as	  a	  reservoir	  for	  unconscious	  ‘dispositions’	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Compare	  to	  this	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  implicit	  mind/body	  dualism	  in	  the	  ‘embodied	  ethics’	  debate	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  body,	  with	  its	  habitual	  and	  ‘unreflected’	  responses	  is	  here	  made	  into	  the	  other	  of	  the	  rational,	  reflective	  mind,	  thus	  writing	  the	  Master/Bondsman	  split	  into	  the	  ‘ethical	  body’	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mind	   as	   consciously	   reflecting	   ‘driver’,	   we	   can	   therefore	   look	   at	   the	   whole	  ensemble	  as	  involving	  a	  number	  of	  splits,	  which	  each	  have	  a	  ‘body’	  and	  a	  ‘mind’	  component.	   	   An	   ‘unreflected	  moral	   habitus’	   is	   therefore	   nothing	   other	   than	   a	  person	   operating	   within	   the	   pattern	   that,	   due	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   their	  environment,	   appears	   to	   be	   the	  most	   ‘workable’	   solution	   –	   Duffell’s	   boarding	  school	  survivors	   for	  example	  are	  actively	  encouraged	  to	  develop	  a	   ‘habitus’	  of	  superiority	  and	  entitlement	  and	  to	  objectify	  and	  dominate	  others.	  	  	  A	   ‘moment	   of	   ethical	   crisis’	   then	   occurs	   when	   the	   pattern	   one	   is	   habitually	  enacting	   becomes	   unworkable.	   This	  would	   for	   example	   be	   the	   case	  when	   the	  dominated	  and	  objectified	  other	  begins	  to	  make	  a	  convincing	  case	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	   in	   fact	   a	   human	   subject.	  When	   the	  dominating	   self	   can	  no	   longer	  deny	   this	  possibility,	  the	  defence	  mechanisms	  that	  have	  kept	  the	  disowned	  parts	  of	  the	  self	  safely	   away	  break	  down,	   and	   the	   subject	   is	   confronted	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   that	  which	  it	  has	  tried	  its	  best	  to	  ‘dump	  on’	  somebody	  else	  is	  actually	  part	  of	  its	  own	  system.	   For	   the	   ‘invulnerable’	   subject,	   this	   would	   mean	   to	   accept	   that	  vulnerability	   is	  not	   just	  part	  of	   the	   reviled	  other,	  but	   that	   the	   loathed	   thing	   is	  actually	   its	  own	   vulnerability,	   including	   all	   the	   fear	   and	   insecurity	   that	   comes	  with	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  its	  tendency	  split	  and	  project,	  the	  subject	  thus	  has	  to	   take	   the	   disowned	   aspect	   back	   inside	   itself,	   and	   there	   mediate	   it	   with	   its	  opposite	   in	   a	   kind	  of	   ‘inner	   sublation’.	   This	   is	   normally	   a	   painful	   and	  difficult	  process	   for	   the	   person	   involved,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   it	   is	  most	   often	  virulently	   resisted.	   However,	   the	   inner	   fragmentation	   and	   impoverished	  experience	  that	  goes	  along	  with	  dissociation	  is	  effectively	  what	  cuts	  the	  subject	  off	  from	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  thus	  real	  relationships,	  and	  the	  suffering	  caused	  by	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  the	  reason	  outwardly	  privileged	  men	  end	  up	  on	  couches	  such	  as	  Nick	  Duffell’s.	  If	  we	  speak	  about	  ‘ethical	  choice’	  therefore,	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  not	  so	  much	  ‘what	  enables	  a	  person	  to	  transcend	  their	  embodied	  dispositions’	  but	  ‘what	  embodied	  and	  ‘en-­‐‑minded’	  dispositions	  does	  the	  person	  have	  available	  to	  them,	  and	  how	  can	  they	  learn	  to	  switch	  from	  a	  mutually	  harmful	  to	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  one?’	  Ethical	   choice,	   in	   this	  view,	   is	   therefore	  not	   so	  much	   imposed	  upon	  the	  flesh	  by	  the	  despotic	  decree	  of	  the	  sovereign	  mind,	  but	  consists	  in	  the	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ability	  of	   the	  body/mind	   to	  access	  a	   repertoire	  of	  different	  prototypes,	  and	   to	  seek	  out	  relations	  which	  bring	  forward	  beneficial	  rather	  than	  harmful	  ones.	  	  	  This	  finally	  brings	  me	  back	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  virtue	  ethics	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  Although	   I	  have	  argued	   that	   ‘values’	   can	  ultimately	  be	   seen	  as	  abstractions	  of	  social	  relations,	  the	  above	  discussion	  also	  illustrates	  why	  an	  exclusive	  reliance	  on	  ‘values’	  or	   ‘virtues’	   in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  building	  a	   ‘character’	  can	  be	  a	  slippery	  slope.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  unless	   the	   relational	  dynamics	  of	   that	  which	  a	   ‘value’	  refers	  to	  are	  considered,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  value	  such	  as	  ‘courage’	  or	  ‘honesty’	  goes	  along	  with	  a	  splitting	  manoeuvre	  in	  which	  an	  other	  is	  made	   into	  the	   ‘coward’	  or	   ‘liar’.	   In	   fact,	   it	  appears	   that	   the	   ‘character	  building’	  experience	   of	   boarding,	   as	   Duffell	   describes	   it,	   relies	   almost	   entirely	   on	   this	  principle.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  ‘character’	  that	  is	  thus	  acquired	  is	  internally	  fragmented,	  with	  the	  different	  parts	  not	  communicating	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  coherent	  inner	  experience,	  so	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  person	  can	  become	  a	  master	  at	  “the	  art	  of	  (simultaneous)	  sincerity	  and	  duplicity”	  (2000,	  72).	  The	  kind	  of	  men	  Duffell	  describes	  therefore	  certainly	  have	  a	   ‘character’	  –	   in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  have	  been	   moulded	   into	   “a	   representative	   of	   the	   school,	   a	   faithful	   servant	   to	   his	  country	  and	  class,	  one	  who	  has	  put	  away	  childhood	  and	  the	  fussiness	  of	  feelings	  forever,	   bound	   for	   leadership	   and	   success”	   (2000,	   35),	   they	   have	   certainly	  thoroughly	   absorbed	   the	   values	   of	   their	   environment.	   What	   they	   lack	   is	   the	  opposite	   of	   internal	   fragmentation	   –	   the	   kind	   of	   inner	   mediation	   that	   in	   the	  context	   of	   ethics	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘integrity’ 96 .	   As	   a	   result,	   “they	   find	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  This	  problem	  already	  features	  in	  Plato’s	  Gorgias,	  where	  Socrates	  says:	  	  “it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  me	  that	  my	  lyre	  or	  a	  chorus	  I	  direct	  were	  out	  of	  tune	  and	  loud	  with	  discord,	  and	  that	  most	  men	  should	  not	  agree	  with	  me	  and	  contradict	  me,	  rather	  than	  that	  I,	  being	  one,	  should	  be	  out	  of	  tune	  with	  myself	  and	  contradict	  myself”	  (Gorgias,	  482	  b-­‐‑c).	  More	  recently,	  Metzinger	  (2004)	  affirms:	  “The	  classical	  notion	  of	  ‘virtue’	  can	  now	  be	  interestingly	  reinterpreted,	  namely,	  in	  terms	  of	  increasing	  the	  internal	  and	  social	  consistency	  of	  the	  self-­‐‑model,	  for	  example,	  in	  terms	  of	  functionally	  integrating	  cognitive	  insight,	  emotional	  self-­‐‑modeling,	  and	  actual	  behavioral	  profile.	  Traditional	  notions	  like	  ‘intellectual	  integrity’	  and	  ‘moral	  integrity’	  now	  suddenly	  possess	  new	  and	  obvious	  interpretations,	  namely,	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  person	  having	  a	  highly	  consistent	  self-­‐‑model.	  Ethical	  behavior	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  most	  direct	  way	  of	  maximizing	  the	  internal	  coherence	  of	  the	  self-­‐‑model”	  (632).	  Compare	  also	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘multiplex’	  self	  e.g.	  in	  Hardcastle/Flanagan,	  1999	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authenticity	   and	   intimate	   relationships	  beyond	   them,	   and	   their	   suffering	   goes	  quite	   unacknowledged”	   (2014,	   xiii).	   In	   acquiring	   a	   ‘character’	   through	   the	  banishment	   of	   vulnerability,	   they	   have	   abandoned	   the	   possibility	   of	   mutual	  recognition	  of	  shared	  humanity,	  and	  thus,	  the	  possibility	  to	  come	  together	  to	  give	  each	  other	  shelter.	  “Boarding	  children,	  despite	  the	  advantage	  of	  their	  prestigious	  schools,	  grow	  up	  amongst	  their	  peers	  and	  never	  really	  come	  home	  again”	  (ibid),	  and	  perhaps	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  that	  some	  of	  them	  as	  adults	  appear	  to	  go	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  make	  somebody	  else	  ‘the	  homeless	  one’.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  now	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  and	  what	  it	  means	  for	  homeless	  people,	  those	  with	  and	  without	  privilege.	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Chapter	  Six:	  Hope	  	  	  
We	  live	  fixations,	  fixations	  of	  happiness.	  	  
We	  comfort	  ourselves	  by	  reliving	  
memories	  	  
of	  protection.	  Gaston	  Bachelard	  	  	  Now	  that	  we	  know	  what	  ‘ethical	  patterns’	  are	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  an	  individual	  person	  as	  well	  as	  a	  collective,	  it	  is	  time	  we	  finally	  asked	  what	  all	  of	  this	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ‘social	  production	  of	  space’.	  In	  previous	  chapters,	  we	  have	  already	  encountered	   the	  notion	  of	   space	   in	  a	   conventional	   sense	  –	  as	  a	   three-­‐‑dimensional	   expanse	   that	   contains	   and	   envelopes	   objects,	   bodies	   and	   ‘selves’.	  	  But	  of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  look	  at	  space,	  as	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  (1974)	  has	   famously	   argued,	   but	   rather,	   space	   is	   also	   and	   especially	   a	   social	  phenomenon.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   this	   means	   that	   humans	   shape	   their	   physical	  environment	  in	  profound	  ways,	  and	  on	  Earth,	  there	  is	  little	  space	  that	  has	  not	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other	  been	  moulded	  by	  human	  intervention.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  a	  more	   abstract	   sense,	   physical	   space	   also	   contains	  what	   one	   could	   see	   as	   its	  fourth	  dimension	  –	  namely	   the	   invisible	  matrix	  of	   interrelatedness	   that	   spans	  between	  human	  bodies.	  Massey	  (2005)	  therefore	  identifies	  space	  as	  “the	  product	  of	   interrelations…constituted	   through	   interactions,	   from	   the	   immensity	   of	   the	  global	  to	  the	  intimately	  tiny…predicated	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  plurality…(and)	  always	   under	   construction”	   (9).	   Space,	   in	   this	   view,	   is	   the	   product	   of	   social	  relations,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  space	  is	  a	  social	  relation.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	   I	  will	  discuss	  what	   this	  means	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  relational	  ethics	   I	  have	  described,	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  spaces	  our	  two	  relational	  ‘modes’	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  produce.	  Since	  we	  are	  discussing	  homelessness,	  let	  me	  start	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  space	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  ‘home’	  the	  homeless	  ostensibly	  lack.	  	  As	  Andrea	  Dworkin	  notes,	  older	  dictionaries	  of	  the	  English	  language	  show	  under	  the	  entry	  ‘hope’	  a	  version	  of	  the	  following:	  “’a	  piece	  of	  enclosed	  land,	  e.g.,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  marshes	  or	  wasteland’;	  or	   ‘a	  small	  enclosed	  valley’;	  or	   ‘an	  inlet,	  small	  bay,	   haven’”	   (2000,	   1).	   Deriving	   from	   the	   Old	   English	   word	   ‘hop’,	   ‘hope’	   is	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therefore	   part	   of	   the	   name	   of	  many	   places,	   such	   as	   ‘Stanhope’,	   ‘Wollhope’	   or	  ‘Salershope’,	  and	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  first	  Domesday	  book97	  remarked	  that	  in	  it,	  ‘hope’	  “signifyeth	  a	  vally”	  (Fenton,	  2006,	  5).	  The	  historical	  connection	  between	  concepts	  of	  place	  and	  the	  anticipation	  of	  good	  things	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  English	  language:	  as	  Dworkin	  notes,	  “in	  Hebrew,	  too…the	  words	  for	  hope	  and	  for	  a	  small	  enclosure	   derived	   from	   the	   same	   root”	   (ibid).	   Although	   this	   use	   of	   the	   word	  ‘hope’	   has	   become	   obsolete	   in	   modern	   language,	   the	   connection	   it	   invokes	  between	   belonging	   and	   optimism	  points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   to	   have	   hope	   for	   the	  future,	   one	  must	   be	   securely	   located	   in	   the	   present.	   It	   therefore	   recalls	  what	  Mallet	  (2004)	  calls	  the	  idea	  of	  “home	  as	  a	  haven”	  (70),	  that	  is,	  a	  refuge,	  a	  secure	  and	   safe	   space,	   differentiated	   from	   the	   insecure	   and	   dangerous	   outside,	   and	  therefore,	   a	   place	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   sheltered	   self	   to	   project	   itself	   into	   a	  welcoming	  and	  inviting	  future.	  	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  ‘home’	  as	  a	  safe	  haven	  or	  place	  longing	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  uncontested.	   Numerous	   critics	   have	   attacked	   the	   “idealized	   view	   of	   home	  perpetuated	   by	   such	   ideas“	   (Mallet,	   2004,	   71),	   prompting	   Moore	   (2007b)	   to	  assert:	  “Home	  has	  to	  be	  discussed	  without	  the	  idealistic	  rosy	  glow	  that	  typified	  earlier	   debates.	   For	   many,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   secure,	   free,	   safe,	   or	   regenerative	  space…Home	  as	  a	  romantic	  space	  is	  not	  the	  reality	  of	  most	  people”	  (148,	  see	  also	  Douglas,	   1991).	   Dworkin,	   never	   given	   to	   euphemism	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  oppression	  of	  women,	  sums	   it	  up:	   “home	  may	  be	   the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  woman’s	  prison:	  women	  may	  be	  locked	  inside	  or	  not	  permitted	  to	  egress	  or	  too	  injured	  to	  be	  able	  to	  leave;	  women	  may	  be	  tortured	  or	  burned	  alive	  there;	  women	  may	  be	  menial,	  brutalised,	  servants;	   legal	  chattel;	   sexual	  chattel;	   reproductive	  chattel”	  (2000,	  9).	  Especially	  for	  women	  and	  children,	  but	  also	  for	  some	  men,	  ‘home’	  is	  therefore	  a	  contradictory	  concept	  that	  points	  to	  “a	  tension	  between	  individuals'	  perception	  of	  what	  relationships	  within	  the	  home	  should	  be	  like	  and	  what	  they	  are	  really	  like”	  (Moore,	  2007b,	  149)98.	  Moore’s	  phrasing,	  however,	  points	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  The	  first	  Domesday	  book	  is	  a	  record,	  compiled	  in	  1086	  under	  William	  the	  Conqueror,	  documenting	  the	  structure	  of	  land	  ownership	  throughout	  the	  British	  Isles.	  It	  remained	  the	  only	  record	  of	  land	  ownership	  patterns	  in	  Britain	  until	  the	  19th	  century,	  when	  the	  second	  Domesday	  was	  compiled,	  a	  record	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  10.	  	  98	  See	  also:	  Despres,	  1991;	  Moore,	  2000;	  Somerville,	  1997	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fact	  that	  statements	  about	  ‘home’	  –	  the	  ideal	  haven	  or	  the	  really	  existing	  prison	  –	  are	  most	  often	  statements	  about	  social	  relations,	  either	  those	  that	  exist	  or	  those	  that	  one	  believes	  ought	  to	  exist,	  and	  thus,	  those	  one	  hopes	  for.	  	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  appear	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  different	  versions	  of	  ‘home’	  –	  one	  that	  is	  a	  haven	  and	  one	  that	  is	  a	  prison.	  As	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  guess,	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  following	  that	  ‘home’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘haven’	  implies	  ethical	  relations	  of	  mutual	  recognition,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  recognition	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  space	  that	  fulfils	  its	  function	  as	  providing	  shelter.	  Its	  opposite	  –	  home	  as	  a	  place	  of	  oppression	  and	  torment	  –	  then	  would	  be	  one	  form	  that	  misrecognition	  can	  take	  in	  a	  spatial	  sense.	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  two,	  i.e.	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  
is	  and	  the	  ought	  of	   ‘home’,	  could	   then	  be	  seen	  as	   the	  kernel	  of	  an	  explanatory	  critique,	  and	  thus	  potential	  transformation,	  of	  ‘home’	  –	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  of	  the	  really	   existing	   places.	   What	   I	   hope	   to	   achieve	   with	   this	   is	   not	   only	   an	  approximation	  of	   ‘home’	  as	  a	  space	  structured	  by	  ethical	  patterns,	  but	  also	  an	  understanding	  of	  ‘homelessness’	  as	  a	  paradoxical	  condition,	  in	  which	  patterns	  of	  misrecognition	   in	   really	   existing	   homes	   lead	   to	   the	   symbolic	   and	   material	  absence	  of	  	  ‘home’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  ‘haven’	  or	  ‘refuge’.	  Recognition	  and	  its	  absence	  therefore	  structure	  not	  only	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  homeless	  people	  are	  part	  of,	  but	   they	   centrally	   structure	   the	   spaces	   they	   traverse	   between	   exposure	   and	  shelter.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   last	   chapter,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   ethical	   relations	   (‘object	   relations’)	  structure	  not	  only	   the	   social,	  but	  also	   the	   ‘inner	   space’	  of	   the	   self.	  This	  would	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  connection	  between	  the	  structure	  of	  ‘inner	  space’	  and	  that	  of	  ‘outer	  space’,	  an	  idea	  that	  has	  been	  explored	  by	  Bachelard,	  who	  argues	  that	  space,	  and	  particularly	  the	  space	  of	  the	  ‘home’,	  is	  an	  a	  priori	  condition	  of	  the	  development	  of	  psychic	  structure.	  “Before	  he	  is	  ‘cast	  into	  the	  world’,	  as	  claimed	  by	  certain	  hasty	  metaphysics,	  man	  is	  laid	  in	  the	  cradle	  of	  the	  house”	  (1958/1994,	  7),	  Bachelard	  argues,	  and	  therefore,	  “a	  great	  many	  of	  our	  memories	  are	  housed	  (…)	   a	   psychoanalyst	   should,	   therefore,	   turn	   his	   attention	   to	   this	   simple	  localisation	  of	  our	  memories”	  (ibid,	  8,	  see	  also	  Cooper	  1976).	  Bachelard	  coins	  the	  
	   162	  
term	   ‘topoanalysis’	   for	   the	   reading	  of	   the	  psyche	   through	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  spaces	   it	   inhabits:	   “topoanalysis,	   then,	  would	   be	   the	   systematic	   psychological	  study	  of	  the	  sites	  of	  our	  intimate	  lives”	  (ibid.).	  Somewhat	  similarly	  to	  Winnicott,	  whom	  I	  have	  introduced	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  Bachelard	  sees	  the	  original	  state	  of	  being	  as	  a	  state	  of	  oneness	  and	  wholeness,	  from	  which	  ‘man’	  is	  only	  reluctantly	  forced	  to	  depart	  in	  the	  process	  of	  differentiation.	  Bachelard	  thus	  protests	  against	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  consciousness	  which	  privileges	  the	  state	  of	  being	  ‘cast	  into	  the	  world’	  before	  the	  state	  of	  ‘being	  at	  home’	  in	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  ‘cradle’.	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  anticipates	  the	  above	  debates	  in	  which	  the	  ideal	  ‘home’	  is	  contrasted	  with	  the	   really	   existing	   ‘home’,	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   state	   of	  wholeness	   that	   ‘home’	  implies	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘hope’	  were	  once	  so	  intimately	  connected.	  In	   a	   similar	   vein	   Dovey	   (1985)	   notes:	   “yearning-­‐‑for-­‐‑home	   is	   ‘about’	   being-­‐‑at-­‐‑home”	  (10),	  that	  is,	  the	  is	  and	  the	  ought	  are	  connected	  by	  a	  memory	  –	  even	  the	  faintest	  one	  –	  of	  what	  ‘being	  at	  home’	  could	  and	  should	  feel	  like.	  Between	  being	  and	  yearning,	  then,	  stands	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  cast	  out,	  not,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  8,	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  universal	  human	  condition,	  but	  rather,	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  specific	  social	  relations	  which	  make	  the	  ideal	  state	  of	  being-­‐‑at-­‐‑home	   impossible.	   For	   squatters,	   this	   experience	  was	   a	   common	   one,	  crystallised	  at	  times	  of	  eviction,	  when	  “being	  is	  cast	  out,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  thrown	  out,	  outside	   the	   being	   of	   the	   house”,	   so	   that	   the	   thus	   expelled	   wind	   up	   in	   “a	  circumstance	   in	  which	   the	   hostility	   of	  men	   and	   of	   the	   universe	   accumulates”	  (Bachelard,	  ibid,	  7).	  	  	  The	  first	  eviction	  I	  was	  personally	  affected	  by	  occurred	  a	  few	  months	  after	  my	  arrival	  in	  Bristol,	  when	  the	  time	  for	  our	  squat	  in	  St	  Pauls	  was	  finally	  up.	  For	  the	  past	   several	  months,	   our	  door	  had	  been	   sporting	   the	  ubiquitous	   ‘Section	  6’,	   a	  photocopied	  piece	  of	  paper	  that	  informed	  the	  world	  at	  large	  of	  our	  legal	  right	  to	  possession	  of	  the	  space	  we	  inhabited	  (see	  overleaf).	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Section  6  Criminal  Law  Act  1977  As  amended  by  Criminal  Justice  and  Public  
Order  Act  1994  TAKE  NOTICE  
THAT  we  live  in  this  property,  it  is  our  home  and  we  intend  to  stay  here.  
THAT  at  all  times  there  is  at  least  one  person  in  this  property.  
THAT  any  entry  or  attempt  to  enter  into  this  property  without  our  permission  is  
a  criminal  offence  as  any  one  of  us  who  is  in  physical  possession  is  opposed  
to  entry  without  our  permission.  
THAT   if  you  attempt   to  enter  by  violence  or  by   threatening  violence  we  will  
prosecute  you.  You  may  receive  a  sentence  of  up  to  six  months  imprisonment  
and/or  a  fine  of  up  to  £5,000.  
THAT   if   you   want   to   get   us   out   you   will   have   to   take   out   a   summons   for  
possession  in  the  County  Court  or  in  the  High  Court,  or  produce  to  us  a  written  
statement  or  certificate  in  terms  of  S.12A  Criminal  Law  Act,  1977  (as  inserted  
by  Criminal  Justice  and  Public  Order  Act,  1994).  
THAT  it  is  an  offence  under  S.12A  (8)  Criminal  Law  Act  1977  (as  amended)  to  
knowingly   make   a   false   statement   to   obtain   a   written   statement   for   the  
purposes  of  S.  12A.  A  person  guilty  of  such  an  offence  may  receive  a  sentence  
of  up  to  six  months  imprisonment  and/or  a  fine  of  up  to  £5,000.  
Signed,  The  Occupiers  
N.B.  Signing  this  Legal  warning  is  optional.  It  is  equally  valid  whether  or  not  it  
is  signed  Figure	  6:	  'Section	  6'	  notice	  	  Source:	  Advisory	  Service	  for	  Squatters	  Handbook	  2009	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Putting	  a	  physical	   ‘Section	  6’	  on	   the	  door	  was	  not	  a	   requirement	   for	   the	   legal	  possession	  of	  a	  squat,	  yet	  nearly	  every	  squat	  had	  one	  or	  several	  attached	  to	  its	  entries.	   The	   paper	   served	   several	   purposes,	   from	   warning	   the	   novice	   squat-­‐‑landlord	  not	  to	  take	  the	  law	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  hands,	  to	  conveniently	  identifying	  the	   building	   as	   a	   squat	   to	   friendly	   passers-­‐‑by.	   Perhaps	  most	   importantly,	   the	  Section	   6	   served	   as	   a	   magical	   seal	   of	   sorts,	   a	   paper	   wall	   that	   separated	   and	  protected	   the	   squat’s	   inside	   from	   its	   outside,	   banning	   the	   bureaucratic	   state	  apparatus	  by	  the	  power	  of	  its	  own	  legalese.	  	  The	  protective	  seal	  of	  the	  Section	  6	  could	  only	  be	  broken	  by	  one	  of	  two	  things	  –	  one	  was	  the	  police,	  armed	  with	  their	  own	  magic	  paper	  by	  the	  name	  of	  ‘warrant’.	  The	  other	  manifested	  one	  cold,	  wet	  morning	  at	  our	  front	  door,	  as	  if	  served	  by	  an	  invisible	   hand:	   a	   summons	   to	   attend	   possession	   proceedings	   at	   Bristol	  Magistrates	   Court.	   The	   envelope,	   announced	  with	   the	   dreaded	  words	   ‘we	   got	  papers!’,	   was,	   as	   usual,	   addressed	   to	   ‘persons	   unknown’	   (a	   common	   trope	   of	  squatter	  humour,	  e.g.	  when	  the	  prototypical	  squatter	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  one	  ‘Mr	  Percy	  Unknown’).	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  attached	  to	  the	  door,	  rather	  than	  inserted	  through	  the	  letterbox,	  did	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  our	  success	  in	  court.	  The	  serving	  of	  ‘papers’	  followed	  meticulously	  detailed	  regulations,	  and	  the	  slightest	  deviation	  –	  such	  as	  serving	  them	  not	  on	  but	  through	  the	  door	  -­‐‑	  could	  give	  squatters	  a	  lever	  to	  have	  court	  adjourned;	  and	  could	  thus	  mean	  a	  few	  more	  weeks	  of	  safety	  for	  the	  squat	  (while	  causing	  considerably	  more	  cost	  for	  the	  owner).	  Whoever	  had	  served	  the	  papers	  appeared	  to	  be	  well	  aware	  of	   this	  and	  had	  made	  a	  point	  of	  putting	  them	  right	  over	  our	  ‘Section	  6’	  like	  a	  bureaucratic	  trump	  card.	  Inside	  the	  clear	  plastic	  was	  a	  letter	  informing	  us	  of	  the	  date	  and	  time	  we	  were	  to	  appear	  before	  a	  judge,	  who	  would	  decide	  whether	  we	  could	  stay	  in	  the	  building	  or	  had	  to	  move	  on.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  experience	  of	  such	  court	  proceedings,	  chances	  that	  this	  event	  would	  turn	  out	  in	  our	  favour	  were	  estimated	  around	  zero.	  	  	  	  The	  immediate	  effect	  of	  ‘papers’	  was	  that	  even	  though	  the	  inevitable	  eviction	  was	  still	  weeks	  away,	  the	  social	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  house	  shifted.	  With	  the	  magic	  seal	  of	  the	  Section	  6	  broken,	  the	  outside	  had	  asserted	  its	  right	  to	  the	  inside	  space,	  and	  the	   resulting	   change	   in	   atmosphere	   manifested	   itself	   in	   a	   peculiar	   kind	   of	  
	   165	  
carelessness.	   Cleaning	   and	   tidying	   became	   a	   thing	   of	   the	   past,	   and	   the	   house	  began	  to	  increasingly	  resemble	  the	  kind	  of	  desolate	  hovel	  that	  the	  yellow	  press	  likes	  to	  make	  squats	  out	  to	  be.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  energy	  now	  had	  to	  go	  into	  finding	  a	  new	  space,	  but	  the	  sudden	  drop	  in	  cleanliness	  seemed	  to	  point	  to	  more	  than	  just	  a	  lack	  of	  time.	  People	  spent	  less	  and	  less	  time	  in	  the	  house,	  dropping	  their	  things	  where	  they	  stood,	  and	  there	  were	  no	  longer	  nice	  roast	  dinners	  and	  film	  nights.	  I	  later	  came	  to	  think	  of	  this	  phase	  as	  ‘last-­‐‑days-­‐‑of-­‐‑squat-­‐‑mood’,	  as	  I	  observed	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  in	  most	  other	  squats	  when	  eviction	  was	  inevitable.	  It	  was	  as	  if	  people	  severed	  their	  emotional	  connection	  with	  the	  building,	  shrinking	  back	  into	  their	  physical	  bodies	  after	  they	  had	  briefly	  extended	  their	  selves	  to	  encompass	  the	  space	  they	  were	  inside	  of.	  The	  building	  was	  no	  longer	  expected	  to	  provide	  safety	  and	  comfort,	  and	  was	  thus	  treated	  little	  differently	  from	  a	  public	  space.	  	  	  The	  arrival	  of	   court	  papers	   therefore	  marked	   the	  precise	  point	  when	   the	  common	   theoretical	  distinction	  between	  a	  ‘house’	  and	  a	  ‘home’	  became	  practical	  for	  us.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  squatters	  did	  not	  generally	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  homeless,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  insisting	  that	  squatting	  was	  a	  form	  of	  political	  action	  for	  or	  by	  the	  homeless.	  In	  part,	  as	  was	  already	  said,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  to	  take	  action	   and	   appropriate	   a	   space	   is	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   a	   remedy	   for	   homelessness.	  Dovey	  (1985)	  appears	  to	  agree:	  “paralleling	  the	  distinction	  between	  house	  and	  home	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   house	   as	   property	   and	   the	   home	   as	  appropriated	   territory“	   (16).	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   ‘home’	   is	   therefore	   produced	  through	  practices	  of	  the	  appropriation	  of	  physical	  space,	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  house	  into	  a	  home	  thus	  occurs	  at	  the	  precise	  same	  moment	  that	  a	  homeless	  person	  turns	  into	  a	  squatter.	  Intriguingly	  (for	  a	  German	  speaker),	   ‘property’	  in	  the	   English	   language	   has	   two	   meanings	   –	   it	   can	   refer	   to	   buildings	   and	   land	  (property	  1),	  or	  it	  can	  refer	  to	  private	  property	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  (legal)	  claim	  to	  possession	  (property	  2).	   	  Depending	  on	  how	  one	  chooses	  to	   interpret	  Dovey’s	  statement,	  ‘property’	  and	  ‘appropriated	  territory’	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  distinct,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  squat,	  as	  a	  practical	  contradiction.	  The	  territory	  of	  a	  squat	  is	  always	  appropriated	  in	  spite	  of	  and	  against	  property	  2.	  The	  process	  of	  appropriation	  that	  makes	  a	  homeless	  person	   into	  a	  squatter,	  and	  a	  squat	   into	  a	   ‘home’,	   therefore	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consists	  both	  in	  a	  transformation	  of	  property	  1,	  and	  a	  simultaneous	  negation	  of	  property	   2.	   Conversely,	  making	   a	   squatter	   homeless	   begins	  when	   property	   2	  asserts	   its	   right	   to	   property	   1,	   thus	   re-­‐‑appropriating	   whatever	   territory	   has	  temporarily	  been	  liberated,	  and	  negating	  the	  ‘home’	  that	  has	  been	  created.	  I	  will	  discuss	   the	   peculiar	   consequences	   of	   this	   linguistic	  merger	   at	  more	   length	   in	  chapters	  9	  and	  10.	  	  	  Ensuring	  access	  to	  a	  building	  was	  only	  the	   first	  step	   in	  this	  process	  –	  as	   I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  once	  the	  space	  was	  taken,	  its	  transformation	  into	  a	  ‘home’	  entailed	  a	  number	  of	  different	  practices	   through	  which	  the	   formerly	  homeless	  came	  to	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  at	  home.	  Conversely,	  there	  was	  a	  reverse	  process,	  one	  by	  which	   a	   squatter	   could	   be	   turned	   into	   a	   homeless	   person,	   and	   physically	  removing	  his/her	  body	  from	  the	  building	  was	  equally	  only	  the	  last	  step	  in	  this	  transformation.	  While	  we	  were	  still	  physically	  resident	  in	  the	  building,	  ‘papers’	  therefore	  marked	   the	  beginning	  of	  homelessness	   for	  us,	  not	  only	   in	  a	   legal	  or	  policy	   sense	  –	   in	   this	   sense	  we	  were	  homeless	   all	   along	  –	  but	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  emotional	  and	  social	  quality	  of	  ‘home’	  that	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  here.	  	  	  A	  ‘home’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  mere	  house,	  consists	  of	  many	  layers	  of	  relationality	  and	  experience	  (e.g.	  Bowlby	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Wardhaugh,	  1999;	  Somerville,	  1992)	  and	  can	  thus	  refer	  to	  “not	  only	  a	  physical	  place	  but	  also...a	  center	  of	  activities,	  source	  of	  identity,	  belonging	  from	  the	  past,	  a	  goal	  for	  personal	  and	  social	  development,	  an	  abstract	  state	  of	  being,	  and	  a	   legal	  concept”	  (Moore,	  2007b,	  145).99	  A	  squat	  could	   be	   a	   home	   in	   all	   of	   these	   senses,	   but	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	  was	   considered	   an	  alternative	   to	   homelessness,	   its	   primary	   function	   was	   to	   protect	   vulnerable	  bodies	  from	  harm.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  abovementioned	  interpretation	  of	  ‘home	  as	  a	  haven’	  was	  among	  the	  chief	  concerns	  of	  squatters,	  for	  whom	  the	  danger	  of	  ‘romanticising’	  the	  concept	  was	  decidedly	  secondary	  to	  the	  imminent	  need	  for	  shelter.	   After	   all,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   homeless	   person,	   the	   dialectic	   of	  ‘inside’	  and	  ‘outside’	  that	  guides	  much	  of	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  (see	  Dovey,	  1985,	  16)	  can	  make	  all	  the	  difference	  between	  life	  and	  death.	  I	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  literature	  review	  of	  these	  debates	  see	  e.g.	  Mallet	  (2004)	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hardly	  make	  this	  point	  more	  succinctly	  than	  a	  2012	  University	  of	  Sheffield	  study	  in	  collaboration	  with	  charity	  Crisis:	  	  	  
“It	   is…shocking	   comparing	   homeless	   people’s	   chance	   of	   dying	   compared	   to	   the	  
general	  population.	  At	  the	  ages	  of	  16-­‐‑24,	  homeless	  people	  are	  at	  least	  twice,	  and	  
possibly	  nearly	  three	  times	  (depending	  on	  scenario),	  as	  likely	  to	  die	  as	  their	  housed	  
contemporaries;	  for	  25-­‐‑34	  year	  olds	  the	  ratio	  increases	  to	  four	  to	  five	  times,	  and	  at	  
ages	  35-­‐‑44,	  to	  five	  to	  six	  times.	  Even	  though	  the	  ratio	  falls	  back	  as	  the	  population	  
reaches	  middle	  age,	  45-­‐‑54	  year	  olds	  are	  still	  three	  to	  four	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  die	  
than	  the	  general	  population,	  and	  55-­‐‑64	  year	  olds	  one	  and	  a	  half	   to	  nearly	   three	  
times…As	  these	  findings	  clearly	  indicate,	  being	  homeless	  is	  incredibly	  difficult	  both	  
physically	   and	   mentally	   and	   has	   significant	   impacts	   on	   people’s	   health	   and	  
wellbeing.	  Homelessness	  leads	  to	  very	  premature	  mortality	  and	  increased	  mortality	  
rates.	  Ultimately,	  homelessness	  kills”.	  (Thomas,	  2012,	  8f)	  
	  Homeless	  charities	  therefore	  routinely	  advise	  not	  to	  sleep	  rough	  if	  at	  all	  possible	  because	  it	  is	  “dangerous	  and	  traumatising”	  (Shelter),	  and	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  homeless	  are	  at	  a	  disproportionate	  risk	  of	  suffering	  all	  kinds	  of	  violent	  assault	  on	  the	   street.	   In	   a	   2004	   survey	   of	   homeless	   people	   in	   England,	   “52%	   had	  experienced	   violence	   in	   the	   past	   year,	   in	   contrast	   to	   4%	   of	   the	   general	  population”	   (Newburn	   and	   Rock,	   2004,	   6)100.	   An	   “alarming	   amount”	   of	   these	  attacks	  was	   found	   to	  be	   committed	  by	   the	   “general	   public”,	   especially	   against	  rough	   sleepers,	   whose	   presence	   in	   public	   space	   makes	   them	   vulnerable	   to	  “unexpected	   and	  disturbing”	   (ibid.)	   levels	   of	   violence.	   In	   addition,	   67%	  of	   the	  homeless	   had	   suffered	   theft	   (general	   population	   1.4%),	   and	   43%	   damage	   to	  property	  (g.	  p.	  7%).	  The	  authors	  therefore	  conclude:	  	  	  “Homeless	  people	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  crime,	  but	  the	  research	  suggests	  that	  
in	  fact	  they	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  victims	  than	  they	  are	  perpetrators.	  Our	  findings	  
paint	  a	  portrait	  of	  ongoing	  abuse	  and	  harassment	  creating	  situations	  of	  extreme	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  See	  also	  Luhrmann,	  2008;	  Bourgois,	  1998	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vulnerability	  for	  homeless	  people,	  particularly	  in	  public	  settings.	  Almost	  two-­‐‑thirds	  
reported	  having	  been	  insulted	  publicly	  whilst	  sleeping	  rough	  and	  distressingly	  one	  
tenth	  said	  that	  someone	  had	  urinated	  on	  them”	  (ibid,	  7)	  	  In	  addition	  to	  physical	  violence,	  homeless	  women	  are	  at	  a	  disproportionate	  risk	  of	   sexual	  assault.	   In	  one	  study,	  9	  per	  cent	  of	  homeless	  women	  reported	  being	  raped	  within	  the	  last	  month	  (Wenzel/Koegel/Gelberg,	  2000),	  another	  found	  an	  incidence	  of	  13%	  within	  one	  year	  (Wenzel,	  et	  al.,	  2000),	  and	  yet	  another	  puts	  the	  lifetime	  risk	  of	  violent	  abuse	  for	  homeless	  women	  with	  a	  mental	  illness	  “so	  high	  (97%)	  that	  rape	  and	  physical	  battery	  are	  normative	  experiences”	  (Goodman	  et	  al,	  1995).	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  “homeless	  people	  are	  over	  9	  times	  more	  likely	   to	  commit	  suicide	   than	  the	    general	  population”	  (Crisis,	  2011,	  2),	  or,	   to	  break	  it	  down	  by	  gender,	  56%	  of	  homeless	  men	  and	  78%	  of	  homeless	  women	  report	  suicidal	  ideation,	  and	  28%	  of	  men	  and	  57%	  of	  women	  have	  attempted	  to	  follow	  through	  (Eynan	  et	  al,	  2002).	  While	  homelessness	  therefore	  shortens	  the	  average	  lifespan	  to	  47	  years	  (compared	  to	  77	  years	  in	  the	  general	  population),	  for	  women	  this	  figure	  is	  even	  lower	  –	  only	  43	  years	  (Crisis,	  2011,	  2).	  	  Although	   ‘homelessness’	   can	   therefore	   indicate	  a	   lack	  of	   ‘home’	   in	  many	  of	   its	  dimensions	   –	   as	   a	   source	   of	   personal	   identity	   for	   example,	   or	   as	   the	   legal	  entitlement	  to	  occupy	  space	  –	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  space	  that	  is	  relatively	  free	  from	  the	  constant	  risk	  of	  being	  beaten	  up,	  raped,	  insulted,	  mugged	  or	  urinated	  upon,	  or	  of	  dying	   from	   cold,	   illness	   or	   suicide	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   pressing	   problem	  homeless	  persons	  are	  faced	  with.	  This	  version	  of	  ‘home’	  corresponds	  to	  what	  in	  chapter	   two	   I	   have	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   space	   that	   is	   necessary	   for	   immediate	  physical	   survival,	   i.e.	   a	  place	  where	  one’s	   ‘spatial	   self’	   is	  undisturbed	  and	   free	  from	  threat,	  a	  place,	  therefore,	  where	  the	  embodied	  self	  has	  good	  reason	  to	  feel	  safe101.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  space	  is	  a	  compelling	  necessity,	  en	  par	  with	  food	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101It	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  truism	  that	  ultimately,	  there	  is	  no	  completely	  safe	  space,	  since	  even	  in	  the	  most	  ideal	  of	  settings,	  the	  physical	  world	  sometimes	  intervenes	  in	  unpredictable	  and	  dangerous	  ways	  (think	  e.g.	  of	  natural	  disasters	  or	  a	  sudden,	  grave	  health	  condition).	  However,	  my	  point	  here	  is	  not	  a	  contemplation	  of	  the	  general	  existential	  insecurity	  of	  human	  life,	  but	  of	  the	  insecurity	  of	  concrete,	  embodied	  lives,	  for	  whom	  existential	  threat	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  possibility	  but	  a	  realistic	  prospect.	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and	  air,	   that	  the	  ability	  to	  claim	  such	  a	  space,	  however	  small,	   is	  a	  condition	  of	  physical	  and	  psychological	  survival.	  A	  definition	  of	   ‘homelessness’	  along	   these	  lines	   could	   therefore	  well	  be:	  homeless	   is	  who	  has	  no	  entitlement	   to	  any	   safe	  space,	  whose	  body	  is	  always,	  by	  definition,	  out	  of	  place,	  and	  therefore	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  removed,	  assaulted	  or	  invaded.	  	  	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘home’	  as	  a	  safe	  space	  is	  reflected	  in	  Dovey’s	  definition:	  “home	  is	  demarcated	   territory	  with	  both	  physical	  and	  symbolic	  boundaries	   that	  ensure	  that	  dwellers	  can	  control	  access	  and	  behavior	  within.	  To	  be	  at	  home	  is	  to	  know	  where	  you	  are;	  it	  means	  to	  inhabit	  a	  secure	  center	  and	  to	  be	  oriented	  in	  space“	  (1985,	  3).	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  following,	  safety	  and	  security	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  thing,	  and	  in	  the	  conceptualisation	  I	  will	  outline,	  refer	  to	  very	  different	  patterns	  of	  spatial	  relating.	  Nevertheless,	  Dovey’s	  claim	  that	  “home	  is	  a	  place	  of	  security	  within	  an	  insecure	  world,	  a	  place	  of	  certainty	  within	  doubt,	  a	  familiar	  place	   in	   it	   strange	  world,	   a	   sacred	   place	   in	   a	   profane	  world...	   It	   is	   a	   place	   of	  autonomy	  and	  power	  in	  an	  increasingly	  heteronomous	  world	  where	  others	  make	  the	  rules“	  (ibid.	  	  10)	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘home’	  (the	  ideal,	  if	  not	  the	  actually	  existing	  one)	  is	  always	  also	  a	  place	  where	  the	  continuous	  existence	  and	  integrity	  of	   the	   body/mind	   is	   secure	   enough	   to	   warrant	   an	   optimistic	   outlook	   on	   the	  future,	  that	  is,	  hope.	  It	  therefore	  speaks	  of	  the	  connection	  of	  ‘home’	  with	  what	  has	  been	  called	  ‘ontological	  security’,	  namely	  “a	  centrally	  firm	  sense	  of	  [one’s]	  own	  and	  other	  people’s	  reality	  and	   identity”	  mediated	  by	  one’s	  experience	  of	  one’s	  “presence	   in	   the	   world	   as	   a	   real,	   alive,	   whole,	   and...[temporally]	   continuous	  person”	  (Laing,	  1973/2010,	  39).	  Giddens,	  expanding	  on	  the	  idea,	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  confidence	  and	  trust	   in	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  worlds	  as	  well	  as	  one’s	  own	  sense	  of	  self	  (Giddens,	  1991,	  374f)	  and	  finally	  Cassell	  argues	  that	  it	  is:	  “a	  psychological	  state	  that	  is	  equivalent	  to	  feeling	  ‘at	  home’	  with	  oneself	  and	  the	  world,	   and	   is	   associated	   with	   the	   experience	   of	   low	   or	   manageable	   levels	   of	  anxiety”	  (Cassell,	  1993,	  14).	  	  	  Ontological	   security	   is	   thus	   characterised	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   real	   or	   perceived	  threat	   to	   the	   trusted	  structure	  of	  reality	  and	  the	  self,	  and	  to	   the	  aliveness	  and	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wholeness	   of	   body	   and	   mind.	   Honneth	   (1996)	   echoes	   this	   in	   his	   idea	   that	  recognition	  involves	  respectful	  awareness	  of	  the	  physical,	  mental	  and	  emotional	  integrity	  and	  inviolability	  of	  the	  person	  –	  one	  could	  say	  that	  recognition	  involves	  affirming	  that	  the	  other	  person	  is	  safe,	  at	  least	  from	  oneself.	  ‘Ontological	  security’	  is	   therefore	   a	   different	   way	   of	   defining	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	   struggle	   for	  recognition	  –	  the	  state	  of	  being	  that	  arises	  when	  one’s	  personal	  integrity	  on	  all	  levels	  of	  one’s	  existence	  is	  being	  recognised.	  Homelessness,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involves	  a	  near	  permanent	  state	  of	  ontological	  insecurity,	  as	  a	  person’s	  physical	  and	  mental	  survival	   is	  under	  constant	   threat,	  not	   least,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	   from	  those	   around.	   However,	   Honneth’s	   definition	   of	   misrecognition	   as	   a	   form	   of	  “practical	  maltreatment	  in	  which	  a	  person	  is	  forcibly	  deprived	  of	  any	  opportunity	  freely	  to	  dispose	  over	  his	  or	  her	  own	  body”	  (132)	  at	   least	  partially	  misses	  the	  mark	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   misrecognition	   that	   involves	   the	   forcible	  deprivation	  of	  the	  person	  of	  a	  safe	  space.	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  is	  precisely	  not	  the	  possibility	   to	   “freely	  dispose”	  over	  one’s	  body	   (which,	   once	   again,	   implies	  some	  kind	  of	  dualism	  between	  ‘disposer’	  and	  ‘disposed’),	  but	  the	  possibility	  to	  be	  an	  embodied	  person	  and	  remain	  unharmed.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	  already	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  one	  
has	  a	  body	  or	  is	  a	  body	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  of	  grammatical	  pedantry.	  It	  points	  to	  some	  very	  profound	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  embodied	  consciousness	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  body,	  self	  and	  mind;	  and	  since	  we	  are	  here	  discussing	  the	  self	  as	  a	  spatial	  phenomenon,	  a	  difference	  in	  conceptions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	   the	   self	   and	   its	   space.	   Brace	   (1997)	   summarises	   the	   distinction	   in	  contrasting	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘territorial	  self’,	  the	  product	  of	  a	  Hobbesian	  war	  of	  all	  against	  all,	  with	  that	  of	  a	  spatial	  self	  which	  does	  not	  reign	  over	  a	  territory	  so	  much	  as	   it	   inhabits	  what	   Brace	   calls	   a	   “domain”	   (137).	   Brace	   traces	   the	   distinction	  between	  spatiality	  and	  territoriality	  back	  to	  the	  17th	  century	  and	  the	  writings	  of	  Hobbes	  and	  Winstanley.	  Hobbes,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  imagined	  the	  ‘state	  of	  nature’	  as	   a	   violent	   and	   deeply	   unpleasant	   affair,	   in	   which	   every	   self	   –	   individual	   or	  collective	  –	  has	  to	  assume	  that	  every	  other	  is	  out	  to	  get	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  self	  has	  to	  establish	  a	  kind	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  “encloses	  the	  self,	  trying	  to	  create	  a	  fortress	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from	  within	  which	   to	   resist	   invasion	   from	   the	   outside”	   (139).	   This	   defensive	  structure	   necessarily	   relies	   on	   force,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   absolute	   control	   of	   the	  inside,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  banishing,	  excluding	  and	  marginalising	  anything	  on	  the	  outside	  that	  could	  threaten	  its	  sovereign	  rule.	  The	  territorial	  self	  thus	  becomes	  characterised	   by	   “a	   rational	   inside	   coping	   with	   problems	   on	   the	   outside”	  (Bartelson,	  1995,	  42),	  and	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  recognise	  in	  this	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  self	   characterised	   by	   splitting	   and	   projection,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   5.	   This	  structure,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  crucially	  involves	  establishing	  the	  spurious	  rule	  of	  the	  ‘sovereign	  mind’	  over	  the	  body,	  and	  is	  thus	  a	  self	  that	  perceives	  of	  itself	  as	  ‘having’	  rather	  than	  ‘being’	  a	  body.	  	  	  	  Winstanley’s	  own	  political	  programme	  included	  “common	  ownership	  of	  the	  land,	  the	   abolition	   of	   the	   buying	   and	   selling	   of	   land,	   the	   communal	   practice	   of	  agriculture,	   and	   likewise…the	   communal	   operation	   of	   forestry,	   mining	   and	  manufactures,	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  payment	  of	  rent	  and	  of	  wage	  labour”	  (Aylmer,	  2013,	   8),	   and	   he	   and	   his	   associates,	   dubbed	   the	   ‘Diggers’	   set	   out	   in	   practical	  pursuit	  of	   this	  vision	  by	  occupying	  and	  attempting	  to	  cultivate	   land	  and	  freely	  distribute	  the	  crops.	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  these	  occupations	  at	  saint	  George’s	  Hill	   in	   Surrey	   in	   1649	   was	   evicted	   only	   the	   following	   year	   by	   enraged	  landowners,	  and	  other	  Digger	  communities	  suffered	  the	  same	  fate	  not	  long	  after	  (Bradstock	  et	  al,	  2013).	  The	  Digger	  occupations	  continue	  to	  inspire	  movements	  to	  communalise	  the	  land,	  such	  as	  the	  contemporary	  ‘The	  Land	  Is	  Ours’	  campaign,	  and	   is	   frequently	   echoed	   in	   socialist	   theories	   which	   interpret	   property	   as	  property	  in	  the	  means	  of	  production	  and	  distinguish	  it	  from	  possession,	  i.e.	  the	  rights	  to	  an	  object	  bestowed	  by	  its	  actual	  use.	  Socialism,	  in	  this	  view	  	  	  	  
"abolishes	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  and	  distribution,	  and	  with	  
it	  goes	  capitalistic	  business.	  Personal	  possession	  remains	  only	  in	  the	  things	  you	  use.	  
Thus,	  your	  watch	  is	  your	  own,	  but	  the	  watch	  factory	  belongs	  to	  the	  people.	  Land,	  
machinery,	  and	  all	  other	  public	  utilities	  will	  be	  collective	  property,	  neither	   to	  be	  
bought	  nor	  sold.	  Actual	  use	  will	  be	  considered	  the	  only	  title	  -­‐‑-­‐‑	  not	  to	  ownership	  but	  
to	  possession."	  (Berkman,	  yr,	  217)	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  Winstanley’s	  version	  of	  the	  spatial	  self,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  far	  less	  antagonistic.	  While	  he,	  too,	  recognises	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  spatiality,	  the	  ‘domain’	  that	  his	   self	   inhabits	   is	   less	   of	   a	   fortress	   and	  more	   of	   a	   garden,	   a	   spatiality	   that	   is	  “concerned	  with	  wholeness	  rather	  than	  restriction	  or	  protection”	  (Brace,	  1997,	  145).	   Winstanley	   uses	   the	   Christian	   metaphor	   of	   the	   Fall	   to	   describe	   the	  predicament	  of	  a	  self	  that	  is	   ‘cast	  out	  of	  itself’	  by	  the	  force	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘imagination’;	   and	  what	   in	  modern	   language	   one	   could	   see	   as	   the	   forces	   of	   a	  compartmentalising	  reason	  that	  divides	  up	  the	  world	  and	  introduces	  separation	  into	   the	   primal	   state	   of	   unity.	   Again,	   this	   imagery	   mirrors	   the	   concept	   of	  dissociation	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  that	  is,	  a	  splitting	  of	  the	  self,	  which	  results	  in	  inner	  fragmentation.	  In	  order	  to	  ‘return	  to	  the	  Garden	  of	  Eden’,	  to	   become	   whole	   again,	   Winstanley	   argues	   that	   ‘man’	   has	   to	   overcome	   his	  impulse	  to	  ‘covet’	  things	  outside	  of	  himself,	  and	  to	  return	  to	  his	  ‘inner	  kingdom’	  and	  a	  state	  of	  wholeness	  (Hill,	  1973/2006).	   I	   interpret	   this	  not	  so	  much	  as	  an	  admonishment	  to	  forego	  the	  temptation	  of	  coveting	  outside	  ‘stuff’102,	  but	  more	  as	  a	  metaphor	   for	   the	   tendency	  of	   the	  dissociated	  self	   to	   split	   and	  externalise	  parts	  of	  itself,	  which	  then	  have	  to	  be	  ‘brought	  back’	  into	  experience	  through	  their	  embodiment	  in	  others103.	  Winstanley’s	  account	  can	  therefore	  be	  read	  as	  a	  call	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  true	  battle	  is	  not	  between	  the	  self	  and	  its	  outside,	  but	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  ‘imagination’	  that	  builds	  a	  ‘hedge’	  or	  ‘dam’	  inside	  it	  (Brace,	  1997,	  138),	  thus	  splitting	  it	  in	  two.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  to	  Hegel,	  Winstanley	  therefore	  sees	  the	  goal	  of	  ethical	  development	   in	  an	  overcoming	  of	  this	  division,	  a	  process	  of	  inner	  sublation	  that	  will	  restore	  the	  self	  to	  wholeness	  and	  integrity.	  This,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	   crucially	   involves	  overcoming	   the	  division	  between	   ‘mind’	   and	   ‘body’,	  and	  thus	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  ‘disposed	  over’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Although	  Winstanley,	  being	  a	  Puritan,	  at	  least	  partly	  does	  mean	  ‘stuff’,	  see	  conclusion.	  103	  The	  traditional	  gender	  binary	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  this	  ‘covetousness’	  works	  in	  terms	  of	  psychodynamics.	  If	  culture	  requires	  individuals	  to	  exhibit	  particular	  traits	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  their	  body	  type,	  then	  other	  aspects	  –	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  ‘opposite’	  gender	  –	  have	  to	  be	  split	  off.	  Since	  this	  splitting	  is	  (in	  my	  view)	  dysfunctional,	  crippling	  and	  harmful,	  people	  attempt	  to	  ‘heal’	  the	  split	  by	  ‘coveting’	  the	  aspects	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  dissociate	  in	  others	  –	  the	  result	  is	  widespread	  ‘heterosexuality’	  with	  all	  of	  its	  associated	  problems.	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We	  will	  discuss	  these	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  self	  at	  more	  length	  below.	  For	  now,	  I	  want	  to	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘home’	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  –	  the	  haven,	  the	  shelter,	  the	  place	  of	  ontological	  safety	  –	  is	  the	  domain	  of	   a	   spatial	   self	   that	   has	   achieved	   sovereignty	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   ‘despotic	  dominion’	  (Brace,	  2004,	  1)	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  return	  to	  unbroken	  wholeness	  –	  in	  Winstanley’s	  terms,	  a	  return	  to	  the	  Garden	  before	  the	  Fall,	  or	  in	  Bachelard’s	  words,	  the	  cradle.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  are	  metaphors	  of	  return	  and	  restoration	  should	  not	  obscure	  that	  they	  are,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  metaphors	  for	  becoming;	  they	  imply	  a	  kind	  of	  backwards	  utopianism	  that	  seeks	  to	  approximate	  a	  future	  through	  invoking	  images	  of	  an	  idealised	  past.	  As	  Jessica	  Benjamin	  (chapter	  5)	  reminds	  us,	  the	  embodied	  self	  emerges	  from	  an	  original	  relationship	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  between	   subjects,	   the	   original,	   unbroken	   state	   of	   a	   self	   that	   is	   safe	   in	   being	  recognised	  as	  a	  whole	  person	  and	  thus	  can	  provide	  the	  same	  recognition	  for	  the	  other.	  If	  the	  metaphors	  of	  return	  therefore	  point	  to	  the	  future,	  then	  to	  say	  that	  the	  cradle	  of	  mutuality	  that	  first	  sustained	  the	  self	  is	  not	  forever	  lost,	  but	  can	  be	  re-­‐‑created	   in	   a	   ‘home’	   characterised	   by	   honouring	   the	   shared	   human	  vulnerability	  of	  its	  inhabitants;	  thus	  re-­‐‑affirming	  the	  age-­‐‑old	  connection	  between	  belonging	  and	  hope.	  In	  the	  following,	  we	  will	  look	  at	  how	  squatters	  went	  about	  creating	  a	  home	  that	  is	  such	  a	  safe	  space,	  or	  at	  least	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  one.	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  Critics	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  home	  as	  a	  safe	  space104	  have	  rightly	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  poorly	  reflects	   the	   empirical	   reality	   of	   many	   people	   for	   whom	   ‘home’	   is	   the	   exact	  opposite,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  (Saunders/Williams,	  1988).	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  above,	  the	  problem	  here	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  home	  as	  a	  ‘haven’	  does	  not	  have	  any	  basis	  in	  reality,	  but	  rather,	  that	  in	  really	  existing	  homes,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  tension	  between	  what	  its	  inhabitants	  would	  wish	  for	  it	  to	  be	  and	  what	  it	  really	  is.	  Rather	  than	  saying	  that	  a	  ‘home’	  should	  not	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  safe	  space,	  I	  would	  therefore	  argue	  that	  if	  it	  is	  not	  safe	  then	  it	  does	  not	  deserve	  the	  name	  of	  ‘home’.	  The	  controversy	  does	  however	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  Tucker	  (1994)	  notes:	  “most	  people	  spend	  their	  lives	  in	  search	  of	  home,	  at	  the	   gap	   between	   the	   natural	   home	   [conceived	   as	   the	   home	   environment	  conducive	  to	  human	  existence,	  i.e.	  dry	  land]	  and	  the	  particular	  ideal	  home	  where	  they	  would	  be	  fully	  fulfilled”	  (n.p.).	  In	  this	  definition,	  ‘home’	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  place	  as	  it	  is	  a	  process,	  the	  continuous	  approximation	  of	  an	  ideal	  and	  thus	  an	  on-­‐‑going	  project	  of	  becoming	  safer	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  Dovey	  recognises	  this	  when	  she	  contrasts	  the	  Heideggerian	  notion	  of	  ‘being-­‐‑at-­‐‑home’105	  with	  a	  process	  of	  ‘becoming-­‐‑at	  home’,	  which	  to	  her	  means	  precisely	  the	  process	  of	   appropriation	   that	  distinguishes	  mere	  geographical	   space	   from	   the	  relational	  space	  of	  ‘home’.	  However,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  squatting	  illustrates,	  this	  approximation	   does	   not	   always	   point	   to	   a	   harmonious	   movement	   of	  appropriating	   the	  material	   world	   through	   human	   agency,	   as	   Dovey’s	   concept	  implies.	  Rather,	  ‘becoming	  at	  home’	  as	  a	  squatter	  implies	  a	  struggle,	  as	  the	  project	  of	  becoming	  safer	  in	  the	  world	  requires	  a	  confrontation	  with	  the	  social	  structures	  that	   prevent	   this	   from	   happening,	   and	   is	   thus	   paradoxically	   opposed	   to	   the	  strategies	   that	   the	   ‘housed’	   population	   employs	   for	   the	   same	   purpose.	   For	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  e.g.	  Wardhaugh,	  1999;	  Jones,	  1995,	  2000;	  Goldsack,	  1999,	  Giddens,	  1984,	  1990;	  Dupuis	  and	  Thorns,	  1996,	  1998;	  Chapman/Hockey,	  1999a/b;	  Massey,	  1992,	  Passaro	  1996,	  Porteous	  1976	  105	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  eight,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  generous	  interpretation	  of	  Heidegger,	  and	  in	  the	  light	  of	  what	  he	  (as	  I	  will	  demonstrate)	  actually	  means	  by	  ‘being	  at	  home’,	  his	  concept	  should	  be	  approached	  with	  caution.	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example,	  for	  the	  general	  population,	  private	  property	  is	  one	  mechanism	  by	  which	  ‘home’	  is	  established	  as	  a	  place	  of	  safety	  (at	  least	  until	  the	  next	  housing	  market	  crash	   illustrates	   the	  precariousness	  of	   this	   approach).	  Being	  homeless,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   precisely	   means	   being	   excluded	   from	   property	   as	   a	   means	   of	  establishing	  spatial	  entitlement,	  and	  thus	  what	  is	  one	  person’s	  ticket	  to	  safety	  is	  another	   person’s	   existential	   threat.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   delivery	   of	   ‘papers’,	   by	  which	   property	   asserts	   itself,	   is	   the	   precise	   moment	   a	   squatter	   turns	   into	   a	  homeless	   person,	   a	   person	   for	  whom	   the	   relative	   safety	   of	   inside	   space	   is	   no	  longer	   guaranteed.	   ‘Papers’	   signify	   a	   bureaucratic	   assault	   that	   breaches	   the	  protective	  boundary	  of	  home,	  strips	  away	  the	  temporary	  safety	  of	  the	   interior	  space	  and	  puts	  its	  inhabitant	  on	  the	  street	  –	  not,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  by	  putting	  them	  outside	  of	  the	  building,	  but	  by	  putting	  the	  unsafe,	  dangerous	  space	  of	  ‘the	  street’106	  inside.	  For	  our	  crew	  the	  expectation	  of	  eviction	  meant	  that	  while	  our	  house	   still	   sheltered	   us	   from	   the	   elements,	   this	   physical	   shelter	   did	   not	   fully	  translate	   into	   a	   subjective	   experience	   of	   safety	   any	  more,	   since	   the	   future	   no	  longer	  held	  the	  promise	  of	  being	  sheltered.	  	  Although	  there	  was	  little	  conversation	  about	  it,	  this	  uncertainty	  had	  immediate	  effects.	  Life	  in	  our	  ex-­‐‑home	  took	  on	  a	  new	  quality	  of	  urgency,	  almost	  militancy,	  as	  if	   we	   were	   collectively	   breaching	   ourselves	   for	   the	   confrontation	   with	   the	  outdoors	  that	  lay	  ahead.	  During	  the	  day,	  we	  scouted	  the	  city	  for	  empty	  properties	  via	  the	  internet,	  at	  night	  we	  went	  out	  in	  person,	  wrapped	  in	  thick	  layers	  against	  the	  cold,	  to	  scout	  eligible	  ‘empties’	  and	  find	  possible	  points	  of	  entry.	  After	  some	  reshuffling	  of	  crewmembers,	  a	  new	  group	  of	  seven	  people	  from	  the	  St	  Pauls	  squat	  emerged,	  who	  committed	  to	  taking	  on	  a	  new	  space	  together.	  Among	  the	  seven,	  fierce	  competition	  began	  to	  ensue	  as	  members	  tried	  to	  ascertain	  that	  they	  were	  an	  asset	  to	  the	  group,	  rather	  than,	  to	  use	  Ralph’s	  favourite	  term,	  ‘a	  liability’.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  things,	  we	  were	  a	  leader-­‐‑less	  and	  non-­‐‑hierarchical	  crew,	  but	  there	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  The	  image	  of	  ‘the	  street’	  is	  often	  invoked	  as	  code	  for	  racist	  or	  classist	  descriptions	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  people	  who	  are	  assumed	  to	  hang	  out	  there	  (see	  for	  example	  the	  controversy	  around	  Anderson’s	  ‘code	  of	  the	  street’	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  point	  out	  that	  I	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  ‘street’	  as	  code	  for	  anything,	  but	  am	  talking	  about	  the	  actual	  street,	  i.e.	  publicly	  accessible	  urban	  space,	  which	  as	  I	  have	  discussed	  above,	  for	  the	  homeless	  is	  quite	  a	  dangerous	  place.	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nevertheless	  an	  unacknowledged	  hierarchy	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  and	  how	  individuals	  contributed	  to	  the	  group.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  not	  so	  much	  existential	  –	  no	  crew	  member	  would	  be	  left	  out	  cold	  just	  for	  being	  lazy	  –	  but	  could	  perhaps	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  need	  for	  recognition	  of	  a	  higher	  order,	  since	  the	  question	  of	  who	  would	  make	   the	   crucial	   contribution	   that	   resulted	   in	   a	   new	   home	   for	   us	   held	  implications	  for	  this	  person’s	  future	  status	  in	  the	  group.	  	  By	  virtue	  of	  resolving	  an	  urgent	  problem	  –	  that	  of	  shelter	  –	  the	  successful	  ‘hunter’107	  would	  prove	  beyond	  a	   doubt	   that	   his	   or	   her	   skills	   and	   experience	  were	   supremely	  matched	   to	   the	  requirements	  of	  squatter	  life,	  and	  thus	  the	  indisputable	  fact	  of	  success	  would	  give	  their	   opinion	   a	   greater	   weight	   in	   future	   decisions.	   As	   a	   result,	   several	  crewmembers	   came	   up	   with	   particular	   empties	   and	   plans	   to	   take	   them,	   and	  refused	   to	   consider	   other	   options,	   lest	   someone	   else	   took	   all	   the	   glory.	   The	  competitive	  atmosphere	  was	  contagious,	  and	  before	  long	  I	  found	  myself	  just	  as	  eager	  to	  prove	  myself	  an	  asset	  as	  the	  others.	  	  This	   situation	   of	   literal	   ‘house-­‐‑hunting’	   led	   to	   one	   of	   the	   few	   occasions	   that	  gender	  politics	  were	  overtly	  discussed	   in	  our	  crew.	  Competition	  had	  begun	  to	  crystallise	  around	  two	  of	  the	  men,	  each	  favouring	  a	  different	  ‘empty’,	  and	  their	  personal	  rather	  than	  practical	  refusal	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  course	  of	  action	  was	  starting	  to	  stall	  the	  entire	  operation.	  There	  were	  at	  this	  point	  only	  two	  women	  left	  in	  the	  squat	  –	  me	  and	  a	  22	  year	  old	  named	  Katy	  –	  and	  one	  night	  we	  decided	  that	  we	  could	   take	   care	   of	   the	   crew	   just	   as	   well	   as	   the	   men	   could	   or	   better.	   In	   a	  meticulously	  planned	  action	  involving	  a	  truck,	  several	  yards	  of	  carpet	  roll	  and	  a	  temporarily	  distracted	  CCTV	  camera,	  we	  took	  our	  own	  building,	  sliding	  from	  the	  back	  of	  the	  vehicle	  through	  a	  1ft	  gap	  in	  the	  broken	  glass	  of	  the	  front	  door,	  using	  the	  carpet	  rolls	  as	  padding.	  Our	  pride	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  the	  men	  could	  have	  accomplished	   this	   feat	   (due	   to	   their	   sheer	   size)	   was	   however	   short-­‐‑lived	   –	  unbeknownst	  to	  us,	  and	  to	  each	  other,	  two	  other	  breaking	  crews	  had	  set	  out	  the	  same	  night,	  and	  when	  the	  sun	  rose	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  our	  crew	  was	  holed	  up	  in	  three	   different	   empties,	   each	   group	   refusing	   to	   give	   up	   the	   space	   they	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  I	  am	  not	  being	  flippant	  in	  invoking	  a	  ‘hunter’	  metaphor,	  since	  references	  to	  ‘tribes’	  and	  ‘hunter-­‐‑gatherers’	  were	  on	  occasion	  invoked	  by	  squatters	  themselves,	  albeit	  also	  in	  a	  not-­‐‑quite-­‐‑serious	  fashion.	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conquered	  to	  join	  the	  others.	  All	  three	  of	  these	  occupations	  failed	  eventually	  (our	  ‘girl’s	   squat’	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   un-­‐‑heatable),	   but	   bragging	   about	   who	   had	  
technically	  gotten	  us	  a	  squat	  that	  night	  continued	  for	  months	  after.	  	  The	  crown	  eventually	  fell	  to	  Drew.	  He	  had	  found	  an	  empty	  property	  in	  the	  north	  of	  the	  city,	  a	  former	  nursery	  now	  scheduled	  for	  demolition,	  easily	  accessed	  via	  a	  low	  roof	  and	  an	  open	  door	  that	  led	  from	  the	  inside	  yard	  into	  the	  building.	  With	  only	   two	   weeks	   to	   go	   until	   the	   court	   date	   –	   and	   thus	   potentially	   immediate	  eviction	   –	   any	   alternative	   buildings	  were	   eventually	   ruled	   out	   as	  much	  more	  difficult	   to	   gain	   access	   to.	  The	  nursery	  was	   taken	  one	  night	   in	   time-­‐‑honoured	  fashion:	  get	  in,	  secure	  all	  entrances	  with	  deadbolts	  from	  the	  inside,	  stick	  a	  section	  6	  on	  the	  door	  and,	  as	  they	  say,	  ‘Bob’s	  yer	  uncle’.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  phone	  call	  came	  to	  inform	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  crew	  the	  house	  was	  secure,	  we	  shouldered	  our	  essential	  belongings	  and	  joined	  the	  breaking	  team.	  	  	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  days,	  the	  transformation	  of	  our	  squat	  into	  a	  home	  began	  to	  take	  shape.	   	   The	   first	   step	   consisted	   in	   ensuring	   that	   there	   were	   no	   immediate	  reprisals	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  illegal	  eviction	  attempt.	  For	  the	  first	  48	  or	   so	  hours,	   this	  meant	   that	   instead	  of	   just	   one	  person	   ‘squat-­‐‑sitting’,	   at	   least	  three	  or	  four	  were	  present	  at	  all	  times	  to	  deal	  with	  any	  potential	  attacks.	  Once	  it	  had	  become	  sufficiently	  clear	  that	  an	  attack	  was	  unlikely,	  and	  thus	  a	  level	  of	  basic	  security	  was	  established,	  we	  gradually	  began	  to	  move	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  stuff	  (we	  collectively	  owned,	  among	  other	  things,	  seven	  double	  mattresses,	  a	  small	  oven	  with	   two	   hobs,	   a	   washing	   machine	   and	   an	   assortment	   of	   power	   tools)	   and	  claimed	  our	  individual	  spaces.	  The	  latter	  was	  done	  by	  putting	  one’s	  bag	  down	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  room	  one	  wanted	  to	  occupy,	  and	  subsequently	  making	  the	  case	  for	  one’s	  entitlement	   to	   this	   space	   in	  more	  or	   less	   lengthy	  debates	  with	  other	  squatmates.	   The	  question	   of	  who	  had	   contributed	  what	   to	   the	   opening	   of	   the	  space	  here	  translated	  directly	  into	  claims	  to	  the	  nicest	  rooms	  in	  the	  house.	  	  The	  nursery	  was	  a	  strange	  place	  for	  adults	  to	  inhabit.	  The	  building	  was	  made	  to	  accommodate	  four	  year	  olds,	  and	  moving	  through	  it	  made	  one	  feel	  like	  a	  giant	  in	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a	   dwarf’s	   house.	   The	   ceilings	   were	   low,	   the	   chairs	   and	   tables	   miniature,	   the	  cheerful	  animal	  wallpaper	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  damp	  and	  bitter	  cold	  air	  that	  hung	  in	  the	  rooms.	  This	  was	  the	  winter	  2011/12,	  and,	   like	  every	  winter	  I	  have	  ever	   lived	  through	   in	  the	  UK,	   it	  was	  heralded	  by	  the	  media	  as	   the	   ‘worst	  winter	  in	  living	  memory’.	  In	  this	  particular	  case	  the	  media	  were	  not	  far	  off	  the	  mark	  –	  temperatures	  had	  dropped	  to	  -­‐‑15	  C,	  cold	  even	  by	  Austrian	  standards,	  and	  a	   thin,	   persistent	   layer	   of	   snow	  had	   covered	   the	   city	   for	  weeks.	  Our	   previous	  squat	  had	  benefitted	  from	  central	  heating,	  which	  the	  former	  occupants	  had	  not	  bothered	  to	  turn	  off,	  but	   in	  the	  nursery	  we	  had	  to	  revert	  to	  portable	  electrical	  space	  heaters	  and	  physical	  proximity	  to	  keep	  warm.	  	  	  The	  cold	  drew	  the	  psychological	  demarcation	  lines	  between	  inside	  and	  outside	  more	  decisively	  than	  a	  legal	  warning	  on	  the	  door	  could.	  Heat	  was	  precious,	  and	  our	  bodies	  reacted	  by	  instinctively	  limiting	  the	  expenditure	  of	  precious	  calories	  on	  ventures	  outside	  of	  the	  house.	  Our	  nutrition	  was	  dubious	  at	  best,	  as	  we	  lived	  mainly	  on	  food	   ‘skipped’	  from	  the	  bins	  of	   local	  supermarkets.	  Skipping	  had	  its	  limits,	  as	  much	  of	  the	  food	  that	  was	  thrown	  out	  was	  of	  the	  ‘gack’	  variety	  –	  sugar	  and	  cheap	  carbohydrates	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  chocolate	  bars	  and	  biscuits.	  Vegetables	  and	   fruit	   were	   rare,	   as	  was	   the	   cooking	   of	   actual	  meals	   in	   the	   small	   nursery	  kitchen.	  Some	  of	  us,	  me	  included,	  had	  money	  to	  buy	  food,	  but	  the	  implicit	  logic	  of	  the	   space	   required	   something	   akin	   to	   a	   ‘solidarity	   of	   the	   smallest	   common	  denominator’,	   in	  other	  words,	  as	   long	  as	  some	  of	  us	  had	  no	  money,	  the	  others	  were	  careful	  not	  to	  flaunt	  theirs	  too	  openly.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  items	  of	  food	  were	  considered	  indispensable,	  and	  whoever	  had	  money	  would	  buy	  them	  (coffee	   was	   top	   of	   the	   list,	   followed	   by	   milk	   for	   the	   coffee),	   on	   the	   whole,	   a	  somewhat	  self-­‐‑defeating	  logic	  of	  ‘we’	  had	  begun	  to	  override	  a	  logic	  of	  individual	  self-­‐‑preservation.	  In	  this,	  our	  crew	  was	  different	  from	  others	  I	  have	  known,	  since	  some	   squats	  were	  blessed	  with	  members	  who	   could	  make	   fantastic	   collective	  meals	   out	   of	   the	  most	   humble	   of	   ingredients.	   Our	   crew,	   however,	   seemed	   to	  contain	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  people	  who,	  for	  one	  reason	  or	  another,	  had	  trouble	  taking	  care	  of	  their	  basic	  physical	  needs.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  we	  all	  ate	  too	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little	  of	   the	  wrong	  kind,	  and	  to	  run	  around	  in	  the	  cold	  weather	  began	  to	  seem	  increasingly	  frivolous.	  	  	  Instead,	  we	  began	   to	   ‘make	  ourselves	  at	  home’	   in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  After	   making	   the	   space	   safe	   in	   terms	   of	   physical	   survival	   –	   which	   is	   not	   a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  homeless	  in	  winter	  –	  our	  next	  step	  consisted	  in	  symbolically	  appropriating	  it	  by	  means	  of	  decorating.	  As	  Bachelard	  observes,	  “an	  entire	  past	  comes	  to	  dwell	  in	  a	  new	  house.	  The	  old	  saying	  ‘we	  bring	  our	  lares108	  with	  us’	  has	  many	  variations”	  (1958/1994,	  5).	  Most	  squatters	  then	  also	  had	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  personal	  objects	  that	  represented	  their	  personal	  space,	  and	  in	  every	  new	  squat	  these	  were	  carefully	  distributed	  and	  arranged	  to	  produce	  the	  coherence	  that	  this	  person	  recognised	  as	  ‘their	  room’.	  The	  objects	  could	  be	  pictures	  or	  posters,	  small	  pieces	  of	  furniture	  or	  musical	  instruments,	  or	  objects	  the	  person	  associated	  with	  their	   role	   as	   a	   squatter,	   i.e.	   tools,	   climbing	   gear	   and	   other	   signifiers	   of	  ‘outdoorsiness’.	   Their	   particular	   arrangement	   varied	   from	  move	   to	  move,	   but	  their	  collective	  presence	  served	  to	  identify	  personal	  space	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  its	  inhabitant.	  It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  ‘home’	  is	  	  	  
“a	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  environment	  that	  may	  be	  transposed	  from	  place	  to	  place,	  
and	   in	   this	   way	   the	   meanings	   of	   home	   may	   be	   re-­‐‑evoked	   if	   the	   patterns	   are	  
recreated.	  For	   instance	   the	   !Kung	  bushmen	  of	   the	  Kalahari	  Desert	   create	  a	  new	  
home	   every	   night	  with	   just	   a	   fire	   to	  mark	   the	   center	   and	  a	   small	  windbreak	   or	  
symbolic	  entry.	  These	  are	  enough	  to	  evoke	  a	  complex	  schema	  of	  spatial	  meanings	  
that	  orients	  everyone	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  fire.”	  (Marshall,	  1973,	  cited	  in	  Dovey,	  1985,	  5).	  	  
Similarly,	   a	   squatter’s	   ‘home’	   could	  be	   easily	   transposed	   from	  one	  building	   to	  another,	  by	  projecting	   the	  psychic	  space	  of	   ‘home’	  onto	  different	  architectural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Latin:	  Lar,	  plural	  M,	  	  in	  Roman	  religion,	  any	  of	  numerous	  tutelary	  deities.	  They	  were	  originally	  gods	  of	  the	  cultivated	  fields,	  worshipped	  by	  each	  household	  at	  the	  crossroads	  where	  its	  allotment	  joined	  those	  of	  others.	  Later	  the	  Lares	  were	  worshipped	  in	  the	  houses	  in	  association	  with	  the	  Penates,	  the	  gods	  of	  the	  storeroom	  (penus)	  and	  thus	  of	  the	  family’s	  prosperity;	  the	  household	  Lar	  (Familiaris)	  was	  conceived	  as	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  family	  and	  of	  the	  family	  cult.	  (Encyclopaedia	  Britannica)	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structures.	   The	   arrangement	   of	   objects	   thus	   helped	   to	   produce	   a	   sense	   of	  continuity	  of	  personhood,	  by	  giving	  the	  same	  symbolic	  meaning	  to	  a	  (often	  quick)	  succession	  of	  different	  architectures109.	  To	  make	  oneself	  at	  home	  in	  such	  a	  way	  shares	   a	   lot	   of	   features	  with	  what	   Clark	   and	   Chalmers	   (1998)	   refer	   to	   as	   the	  “active	  externalism”	  of	  the	  mind:	  	  
“The	  human	  organism	  is	  linked	  with	  an	  external	  entity	  in	  a	  two-­‐‑way	  interaction,	  
creating	  a	  coupled	  system	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  cognitive	  system	  in	  its	  own	  right…If	  
we	  remove	  the	  external	  component	  the	  system's	  behavioral	  competence	  will	  drop,	  
just	  as	  it	  would	  if	  we	  removed	  part	  of	  its	  brain….this	  sort	  of	  coupled	  process	  counts	  
equally	  well	  as	  a	  cognitive	  process,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  wholly	  in	  the	  head”	  (Clark	  and	  Chalmers,	  1998,	  3)	  
Since	  the	  production	  of	  a	  self-­‐‑model	  is	  a	  cognitive	  process,	  and	  since	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  safe	  personal	  space	  to	  support	  and	  stabilise	  itself,	  one	  could	  say	  that	   such	   a	   space	   does	   for	   the	   embodied	   self	   what	   according	   to	   Clark	   and	  Chalmers	  external	  cognitive	  processing	  does	  for	  the	  ‘mind’	  –	  it	  extends	  it	  past	  its	  immediate	  boundaries	  and	  produces	  a	  coupled	  system	  in	  which	  the	  self	  and	  its	  ‘domain’	  become	  part	  of	  the	  same	  functional	  unit.	  The	  authors	  call	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  mind	  can	  join	  with	  external	  structures	  to	  form	  one	  and	  the	  same	  cognitive	  system	  the	  “extended	  mind”	  hypothesis	  (ibid).	  But	  if	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  line	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  ‘mind’	  and	  ‘body’,	  then	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  asked	  if	  there	  should	  not	  be	  an	  analogous	   ‘extended	  body	  hypothesis’,	   in	  which	   the	  material	  structures	  that	  immediately	  support	  and	  thus	  form	  a	  ‘survival	  system’	  with	  the	  organic	  body	  are	  counted	  as	  part	  of	  its	  functional	  system	  as	  well.	  A	  ‘home’	  in	  the	  sense	   I	   have	   been	   discussing	   here	   would	   be	   an	   example	   of	   how	   an	   external	  structure	   interacts	   with	   the	   ‘spatial	   self’	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   symbolic	   re-­‐‑creation	   of	   a	   spatial	   arrangement	   simultaneously	   cognitively	   re-­‐‑produces	   the	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  Martin,	  a	  Gypsy	  activist	  I	  spoke	  to	  (see	  chapter	  12)	  pointed	  out	  to	  me	  that	  the	  same	  logic	  underlies	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  Gypsy	  sites	  –	  when	  people	  pull	  up	  at	  a	  new	  site,	  they	  arrange	  the	  vehicles	  in	  a	  specific	  pattern	  (tow	  end	  of	  the	  caravans	  facing	  inwards),	  creating	  a	  symbolic	  boundary	  between	  ‘inside	  space’	  of	  the	  Travellers	  and	  the	  ‘outside	  space’	  of	  the	  gorja	  (non-­‐‑Traveller).	  As	  Martin	  put	  it,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  things	  people	  do	  on	  a	  new	  site	  is	  ‘put	  the	  flowerpots	  out’,	  i.e.	  arrange	  material	  objects	  in	  a	  way	  that	  structures	  the	  space	  and	  represents	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  dweller	  (See	  also	  Olwig,	  1999)	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identity	   of	   its	   inhabitant:	   “we	   build	   the	   intimate	   shell	   of	   our	   lives	   by	   the	  organization	  and	  furnishing	  of	  the	  space	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  How	  we	  function	  as	  persons	  is	  linked	  to	  how	  we	  make	  ourselves	  at	  home”	  (Ginsberg,	  1999,	  31;	  see	  also	  Ingold,	  1995;	  Jackson	  et	  al	  1995).	  Consequently,	  take	  away	  the	  ‘home’	  and	  you	  will	  compromise	  the	  brain’s	  ability	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  functioning,	  stable	  self	  model.	  While	  I	  would	  not	  want	  to	  push	  the	  analogy	  too	  far,	  there	  is	  therefore	  a	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  the	  symbolic	  structure	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  –	  mobile	  or	  static	  –	  has	  an	  indispensable	  function	  for	  embodied	  cognition	  and	  thus	  serves	  as	  something	  of	  an	  ‘extended	  self’.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  squat	  needed	  to	  be	  made	  secure	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  outside	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  fortifying	  it	  against	  possible	  intrusion.	  This	  involved,	  at	  the	  minimum,	  making	  sure	  that	  only	  one	  entrance	  was	  accessible,	  and	  thus	  access	  to	  the	  house	  could	  be	  strictly	  controlled.	  In	  the	  nursery	  this	  was	  not	  difficult,	  given	  that	  the	  building	   had	   been	   designed	   to	   keep	   four-­‐‑year-­‐‑olds	   from	   escaping.	   In	   other	  contexts,	  there	  were	  a	  range	  of	  different	  fortifications	  squats	  used,	  from	  sticking	  newspapers	   over	   ground	   floor	   windows	   to	   avoid	   being	   recognised	   from	   the	  outside,	  to	  elaborately	  booby-­‐‑trapped	  staircases	  designed	  for	  days-­‐‑long	  eviction	  sieges.	  The	   level	  of	  effort	   that	  went	   into	  such	  contraptions	   increased	  with	   the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  police	  raid	  or	  eviction	  attempt,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  squatters	  would	  occasionally	  barricade	  a	  building	   they	  had	  decided	   to	   abandon,	   only	   to	  watch	  with	  great	  hilarity	  from	  the	  outside	  as	  police	  or	  security	  forces	  worked	  for	  hours	  to	  get	  inside.	  Normally,	  however,	  fortifications	  were	  simply	  driven	  by	  necessity	  –	  the	  risk	  of	  illegal	  eviction,	  police	  raids,	  racist	  attacks	  or	  theft	  meant	  that	  a	  space	  had	  to	  some	  extent	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  possible	  intruder,	  and	  all	  opportunities	   for	   trespass	   had	   to	   be	   eliminated.	   Squatters,	   of	   course,	   knew	   a	  thing	   or	   two	   about	   trespass,	   and	   so	   it	   was	   not	   surprising	   that	   in	   some	   cases	  nothing	  short	  of	  an	  outright	  SWAT	  attack	  on	  part	  of	  the	  police	  could	  breach	  the	  perimeter.	  	  	  What	  we	   can	   see	   in	   these	   examples	   are	   therefore	   two	   different	   strategies	   by	  which	  the	  spatial	  self	  comes	  to	  feel	  ‘at	  home’.	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  self	  comes	  to	  shape	  its	   immediate	  surroundings	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  serve	  as	  a	   ‘safe	  space’	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that	  sustains	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  continuous,	  unbroken	  identity.	  The	  production	  of	   this	   space	   crucially	   relies	   on	   the	   willingness	   of	   others	   to	   recognise	   its	  legitimacy,	   for	   example	   by	   not	   intruding	   into	   a	   person’s	   room	   without	  permission.	  Such	  recognition,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  does	  not	  require	  defences,	  at	  least	  not	  as	  long	  as	  others	  are	  willing	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  respect	  the	  integrity	  of	  one’s	  personal	  space	  as	  part	  of	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  self.	   In	  chapter	   two,	   I	  have	  recounted	  how	  I	  was	  awarded	  such	  recognition	  of	  my	  habitation	  of	  the	  corner	  in	  Joe’s	  living	  room	  –	  no	  demarcation	  line	  required.	  Implied	  in	  this	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  shared	   vulnerability	   we	   have	   encountered	   before,	   as	   respecting	   somebody’s	  personal	  space	  means	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  space	  forms	  a	  protective	  ‘shell’	  in	  which	  the	  self	  can	  reproduce	  itself	  through	  a	  sense	  of	  safety	  and	  containment,	  and	  to	  not	  wilfully	  disturb	  this	  process.	  Recognition	  here	  means	  to	  know	  that	  in	  its	  own	  space	  “physically,	  the	  creature	  endowed	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  refuge,	  huddles	  up	   to	   itself,	   takes	   to	   cover,	   hides	   away,	   lies	   snug,	   concealed”	   (Bachelard,	  1958/1994,	  91),	  and	  in	  precisely	  this	  way,	  can	  emerge	  anew	  to	  re-­‐‑connect	  with	  others.	  	  The	   second	  example	  –	   that	  of	  building	   fortifications	  –	   shares	   some	  superficial	  features	  with	  the	  first.	  Here,	  too,	  the	  immediate	  environment	  is	  shaped	  in	  such	  a	  way	   that	   the	   ‘creatures’	   inside	   become	   safer.	   However,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   social	  relations	  implied	  in	  this	  arrangement,	  recognition	  is	  no	  longer	  assumed,	  on	  the	  contrary	  –	  barricading	  and	  booby-­‐‑trapping	  are	  activities	  that	  make	  sense	  only	  when	   there	   is	   a	   fair	   chance	   that	   others	  will	  not	   respect	   one’s	   spatial	   domain,	  which	   for	   squatters,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   is	   a	   very	   realistic	   expectation.	   I	   will	  therefore	   here	   draw	  a	   distinction,	   as	   announced	   above,	   between	   safety	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  the	  containment	  of	  the	  self	  in	  its	  domain,	  and	  security	  –	  the	  desired	  state	  of	   a	   self	   that	   already	   sees	   itself	   under	   attack.	   This	   latter	   self	   therefore	  corresponds	  to	  what	  with	  Brace	  (1997)	  above	  we	  have	  called	  the	  “territorial	  self”	  –	  a	  self	  who	  is	  “preoccupied	  with	  breakdown,	  with	  invasion	  and	  with	  identifying	  the	   risk	   the	   other	   poses”	   (142)	   and	   thus	   barricades	   itself	   into	   a	   space	   that	  resembles	  a	  veritable	  fortress.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  have	  called	  the	  ‘home’	  of	  the	  spatial	  self	  a	  ‘safe	  space’,	  we	  can	  therefore	  call	  the	  ‘home’	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	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a	  ‘secure	  space’	  –	  and	  have	  thus	  discovered	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  why	  the	  literature	  appears	  to	  consistently	  refer	  to	  two	  different	  versions	  of	  ‘home’.	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  therefore	  use	  the	  term	  ‘safe	  space’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  space	  created	  by	  relations	  of	  recognition,	  and	  ‘secure	  space’	  to	  identify	  a	  space	  characterised	  by	  misrecognition	  and	  objectification.	  Drawing	  on	   further	  examples,	   we	   will	   see	   how	   these	   two	   ethical	   patterns,	   and	   the	   spatial	  configurations,	   they	  produce	  recur	   in	   the	   lives	  of	  homeless	  people	   in	  different	  contexts.	   Before	   moving	   on	   to	   this	   discussion,	   however,	   one	   last	   remark:	   in	  contrasting	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition,	   the	  spatial	  and	   the	   territorial	   self,	  and	  ‘safe	  space’	  vs.	  ‘secure	  space’,	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  draw	  a	  simple	  ‘good	  vs.	  evil’	  dichotomy.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  appropriate	  to	  critique	  e.g.	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  in	  the	  abstract,	  as	  Brace	  does	  and	  I	  will	  do	  as	  well	  in	  chapter	  8,	  the	  example	  of	  squatter’s	  barricading	  here	  shows	   that	   in	  practice,	   there	   is	  often	  a	  very	  good	  reason	  for	  a	  self	  to	  become	  territorial.	  Defending	  one’s	  space	  does	  not	  necessarily	  speak	  of	  baseless	  paranoia	  or	  a	  desire	  to	  dominate	  and	  exclude	  others	  for	  the	  sheer	  sake	  of	  it.	  Sometimes	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  squatters	  –	  selves	  really	  do	  find	   themselves	   under	   attack,	   and	   if	   they	   react	   by	   building	   barricades,	   the	  question	  needs	  to	  be	  asked	  what	  other	  option	  they	  have.	  While	  I	  therefore	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  territorial	  self,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  flat-­‐‑out	  condemn	  it.	  Rather,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  what	  produces	  a	  territorial	  self,	  and	  what,	  if	  anything,	  could	  persuade	  it	  to	  trade	  security	  for	  safety.	  That	  said,	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  look	  at	  the	  connection	  between	  relational	  ethics	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  space	  in	  more	  detail.	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Chapter	  Seven:	  Codes	  Of	  Honour	  And	  Protection	  
	  
	  
The	  ache	  for	  home	  lives	  in	  all	  of	  us.	  The	  
safe	  place	  where	  we	  can	  go	  as	  we	  are	  
and	  not	  be	  questioned	  Maya	  Angelou	  	  	  Alongside	   our	   basic	   opposition	   between	   patterns	   of	   recognition	   and	  misrecognition,	   we	   have	   now	   established	   two	   analogous	   oppositions,	   namely	  between	   the	   spatial	   self	   and	   the	   territorial	   self,	   and	   between	   safe	   space	   and	  secure	  space.	  These	  three	  dyads	  will	  structure	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  discussion,	  as	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  they	  come	  to	  play	  out	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  contexts.	  This	  also	  involves	  the	  previously	  established	  claim	  that	  these	  patterns	  and	  their	  correlates	  in	  self	  and	  space	  can	  be	  found	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  scale	  –	  from	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  cultural	  and	  from	  the	  home	  to	  the	  nation	  state.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  present	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  territorial	  self	  and	  the	  spatial	  self	  differ	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  spaces	  they	  create,	  this	  time	  not	  so	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  arrangement	  of	  physical	   structures,	   but	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   social	   relations	   that	   form	   the	   ‘fourth	  dimension’	   of	   socially	   constructed	   space.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   while	   theoretical	  binaries	  are	  easily	  established	  in	  the	  abstract,	  once	  they	  come	  to	  bear	  on	  real	  life,	  things	  can	  get	  considerably	  messier.	  The	  spatial	  and	  social	  configurations	  we	  will	  encounter	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  only	  to	  a	  very	  small	  extent	  pure	  examples	  of	  their	  kind	  –	  most	  of	  them	  show	  at	  least	  a	  degree	  of	  hybridity	  and	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  pattern	  they	  represent.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss,	  these	  hybrid	  configurations	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  represent	  attempts	  to	  establish	  an	  ethics	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  within	  and	  against	  a	  social	  context	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  opposite.	  While	  we	  will	  therefore	  not	  find	  a	  space	  that	  is	  entirely	  untouched	  by	  territoriality	  and	  misrecognition,	  we	  will	  encounter	  examples	   in	  which	  this	  form	   of	   spatial	   ethics	  was	   at	   least	   seriously	   contested,	   and	   thus	   consider	   the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  territoriality	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  	  Sharing	  a	  space	  with	  others	  inevitably	  involves	  the	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  creation	  of,	  and	  adherence	  to,	  a	  certain	  mutually	  accepted	  normative	  framework.	  For	  our	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crew	   this	   meant	   that	   while	   life	   in	   the	   previous	   squat	   had	   been	   relatively	  harmonious,	  in	  a	  new	  building	  the	  rules	  had	  to	  be	  re-­‐‑negotiated.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	   new	   squat	  meant	   a	   ‘clean	   slate’	   in	   terms	   of	   seniority	   for	   all	   who	  moved	   in	  simultaneously.	  In	  our	  previous	  house,	  people	  had	  moved	  in	  one	  after	  another,	  with	  Drew	  being	   the	   longest-­‐‑standing	   inhabitant	   and	  me	   the	   last	   arrival.	  This	  temporal	   difference	   translated	   into	   a	   difference	   in	   degree	   of	   authority	   –	   the	  person	  who	  lived	  there	  longest	  was	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  investment	  in	  the	  space,	  and	  thus	  their	  voice	  was	  given	  more	  weight	  when	  decisions	  had	  to	  be	  made.	  At	  least	  in	  our	  crew,	  this	  construction	  of	  ‘authority’	  was	  bound	  up	  not	  so	  much	  with	  a	  belief	  in	  leaders,	  but	  rather,	  with	  a	  peculiar	  understanding	  of	  being	  considerate	  towards	  the	  connection	  of	  personal	  identity	  and	  place	  –	  the	  person	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  house	  longest	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  most	  strongly	  entangled	  with	  the	  space,	  it	  was	  his	  or	  her	  ‘home’,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  extension	  of	  his	  personhood,	  more	  than	  that	  of	  whoever	  came	  later.	  Implicit	  in	  this	  understanding	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  whoever	  was	  thus	  most	  invested	  in	  the	  space	  was	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  its	  loss,	  and	  therefore,	  should	  have	  all	  the	  more	  say	  in	  how	  it	  was	  run	  and/or	  kept.	  Once	  we	  had	  moved	  into	  the	  nursery,	  however,	  the	  differences	  that	  had	  structured	  the	  group	  along	  these	  lines	  were	  wiped	  out	  –	  we	  were	  now	  all	  ‘equal’	  regarding	  the	  duration	  of	  our	  connection	  with	  the	  place,	  and	  each	  had	  as	  much	  to	  lose	  as	  any.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  had	  decided	  that	  we	  wanted	  to	  be	  an	  explicitly	  ‘political’	  squat.	  There	  were	   two	  ways	   in	  which	   squatters	   considered	   their	   squats	   to	  be	  ‘political’	  –	  in	  one	  sense,	  the	  act	  of	  squatting	  in	  itself	  was	  considered	  a	  political	  act,	   and	   thus	   a	   squat	   was	   a	   ‘political’	   space	   in	   that	   it	   was	   simply	   contested	  territory.	   In	   the	  other	   sense	   (the	  one	  our	   crew	  had	   in	  mind),	   squats	   could	  be	  ‘political’110	  in	  that	  their	  inhabitants	  adhered	  to	  specific	  political	  principles,	  most	  often	   of	   the	   anarchist	   (and	   as	   such	   by	   implication	   at	   least	   vaguely	   feminist)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘political’	  here	  therefore	  in	  a	  different	  sense	  than	  Prujit	  (2013,	  see	  chapter	  4),	  who	  refers	  as	  ‘political’	  to	  squats	  whose	  inhabitants	  have	  the	  ‘ulterior	  motive’	  of	  opposing	  the	  state.	  While	  this	  motive	  was	  certainly	  present	  for	  some	  squatters,	  it	  was	  not,	  in	  their	  own	  understanding,	  what	  made	  them	  ‘political’.	  Rather,	  ‘being	  political’	  consisted	  in	  first	  and	  foremost	  adopting	  what	  one	  considered	  an	  appropriate	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  other	  people,	  followed	  by	  the	  realisation	  that	  the	  state	  was	  one	  of	  the	  social	  structures	  that	  prevented	  one	  from	  consistently	  doing	  so.	  Fighting	  the	  state	  therefore	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  creating	  'safe	  spaces',	  not	  its	  purpose.	  
	   186	  
persuasion.	  Squats	  of	   the	   latter	   type	  were	   those	   that	  explicitly	   referred	   to	   the	  concept	  of	  Safe	  Space	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  conduct,	  and	  often	  operated	  a	  type	  of	  written	  policy	  setting	  out	   that	  discrimination	  of	  any	  kind	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	   race,	  sexuality,	   age,	   disability	   and	   a	   number	   of	   other	   identity	   categories	   was	  prohibited.	  These	  sets	  of	  rules	  were	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Safe	  Space	  policy’	  (or,	  acknowledging	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  totally	  safe	  space,	  ‘Safe(r)	  Space	  policy’)	  and	  could	  often	  be	  found	  printed	  out	  and	  displayed	  publicly	  within	  a	  squat.	  But	  also	  where	  such	  systems	  of	  rules	  were	  not	  explicitly	  displayed,	  ‘political’	  squats	  usually	   involved	   an	   expectation	   that	   anyone	   who	   used	   the	   space	   adhere,	   at	  minimum,	   to	   the	   proscription	   of	   ‘sexism’,	   ‘racism’	   and	   other	   such	   forms	   of	  misrecognition.	  	  The	   precise	   phrasing	   of	   Safe	   Space	   policies	   varied.	   BHAM,	  who	  we	   have	  met	  previously,	   simply	   state	   “we	   operate	   a	   safe	   space	   policy	   at	   our	  meetings,	   this	  means	  we	  do	  not	  allow	  racist,	  sexist,	  homophobic	  or	  any	  type	  of	  discriminatory	  behaviour”	  (BHAM	  flyer).	  In	  this	  negative	  formulation,	  Safe	  Space	  refers	  to	  a	  set	  of	   behaviours	   that	   are	  proscribed	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   they	   are	   seen	   as	   common	  forms	   of	   structural	   oppression	   against	   certain	   groups.	   Other	   spaces	   choose	   a	  positive	   formulation:	   Kebele	   Social	   Centre	   in	   Easton	   sees	   its	   purpose	   among	  other	  things	  in	  “providing	  a	  space	  that	  is	  equally	  welcoming	  to	  everyone	  (except	  cops,	   fascists	  etc.)	   irrespective	  of	   age,	   race,	   gender,	  background,	   sexuality	  and	  (dis)ability”	  (Kebele	  website).	  Whether	  expressly	   inviting	  people	  regardless	  of	  their	   specific	   positionality,	   or	   by	   proscribing	   discrimination	   against	   them,	   the	  assumption	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	   safety	   of	   a	   diverse	   range	  of	   people,	  certain	  other	  groups	  must	  be	  expressly	  excluded.	   ‘Cops,	   fascists	  etc.’	   therefore	  here	  becomes	  shorthand	  for	  the	  identified	  aggressor	  that	  the	  users	  of	  the	  ‘Safe	  Space’	   have	   to	   be	   kept	   safe	   from	   –	   again	   emphasising	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	  shared	  vulnerability	  of	  these	  groups,	  this	  time	  to	  violent	  domination	  such	  as	  the	  ‘cops	  and	  fascists’	  are	  (not	  without	  reason)	  seen	  to	  embody.	  	  	  To	  a	  certain	  degree,	  ‘Safe(r)	  Space’	  policies	  could	  appear	  strangely	  selective,	  as	  they	   routinely	   listed	   a	   (sometimes	   impressively	   high)	   number	   of	   proscribed	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forms	  of	  discrimination,	  when	  they	  arguably	  could	  have	  simply	  proscribed	  any	  form	  of	  domination	  whatsoever.	  To	  an	  extent,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  areas	  of	  presumed	  discrimination	  were	  not	  as	  clear-­‐‑cut	  as	  others.	  Occupy	  Bristol,	  for	  example	  includes	  in	  its	  ‘Safe	  Space’	  policy	  “race,	  gender,	  sexuality,	  age,	  ability,	  religion”,	  while	  the	  ‘religion’	  aspect	  is	  notably	  absent	  in	  both	  BHAM	  and	  Kebele’s	  versions.	  This	  may	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  within	  anarchist	  politics,	  religion	  is	  often	  regarded	  with	  suspicion,	  as	   it	   is	  seen	  as	  one	  form	  of	  social	  domination	  among	  many	  (exemplified	  in	  the	  slogan	  ‘No	  Gods,	  No	  Masters’).	  The	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	   some	   people	   experience	   discrimination	  because	   of	   their	   religious	   beliefs	  makes	  this	  a	  complex	  and	  often	  contentious	  issue.	  	  	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  the	  individual	  listing	  of	  different	  oppressed	  groups	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   ethical	   and	   political	   gesture,	   a	   statement	   that	   these	  social	   struggles	   were	   recognised	   and	   supported	   each	   in	   their	   specificity	   and	  particularity.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  logic	  of	  addressing	  them	  under	  the	  same	   banner	   pointed	   to	   an	   implicit	   recognition	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   all	   held	  something	  in	  common.	  The	  Bristol	  Anarchist	  Federation,	  for	  example,	  states	  in	  an	  article	  about	  ‘Safe(r)	  Space’	  policies:	  “Looking	  at	  the	  world	  today	  we	  can	  see	  that	  it	  is	  full	  of	  prejudice.	  Gender,	  sexuality,	  age,	  physical	  ability,	  social	  class,	  skin	  colour	  and	  being	  part	  of	  a	  specific	  ethnic	  group	  are	  all	  used	  as	  excuses	  for	  society	  undertaking	  and	  accepting	  a	  catalogue	  of	  abuses	  against	  people”111.	  Inherent	  in	  this	  view	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  oppression	  that	  looks	  beyond	  particular	  identity,	  in	  order	  to	  critique	  the	  binary	  logic	  of	  domination	  and	  submission,	  subject	  and	  object,	  that	  governs	  all	  of	  them	  –	  what	  the	  anarchists	  are	  here	  calling	  out	  is	  not	  a	  specific	   form	  of	  domination,	  but	   the	   fact	  of	  domination	  as	  such.	  The	  anarchist	  commitment	   to	   creating	   spaces	   free	   from	   these	   forms	  of	   abuse	  was	   therefore	  quite	   explicitly	   framed	   as	   a	   process	   of	   simultaneously	   acknowledging	   and	  rejecting	  relations	  of	  misrecognition,	  and	  their	  replacement	  with	  their	  opposite.	  	  	  In	  practice,	  Safe	  Space	  policies	  were	  most	  often	  invoked	  in	  the	  context	  of	  gender	  relations,	  more	  precisely,	   in	   instances	  of	   gender	  discrimination	  and/or	   sexual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Author	  anonymous,	  http://floaker.net/2013/03/31/organised-­‐‑safer-­‐‑space-­‐‑2/,	  17.12.2013	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violence.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  women	  were	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  ‘subjugated’	  groups	  within	  the	  squatting	  scene,	  while	  other	  groups	  (such	  as	  people	   of	   colour)	   were	   relatively	   underrepresented.	   For	   this	   reason,	   as	   the	  anonymous	  Anarchist	  Federation	  writer	  puts	  it,	  “while	  [discriminatory]	  cultural	  norms	  can	  be	  seen	  wherever	  oppression	  takes	  place,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pervasive	  and	  widespread	  of	  these	  affecting	  all	  our	  radical	  spaces	  today	  are	   carried	   over	   from	   our	   dominant	   culture’s	   acceptance	   of	   rape	   and	   sexual	  violence”.	  Safe	  Spaces	  were	  therefore	  seen	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  observation	  that	  most	  spaces	  within	  the	  ‘dominant	  culture’	  were	  not	  safe	  for	  women,	  and,	  in	  smaller	   numbers,	   for	   those	   men	   who	   also	   became	   victims	   of	   sexual	   assault.	  Preventing	   sexual	   violence	   –	   and	   where	   it	   could	   not	   be	   prevented,	   at	   least	  retrospectively	   keeping	   the	   victim	   safe	   from	   repeatedly	   having	   to	   face	   the	  perpetrator	   –	   thus	   was	   the	   most	   frequent	   reason	   ‘Safe	   Space’	   policies	   were	  applied	  in	  practice.	  This	  meant	  that	  a	  collective	  effort	  had	  to	  be	  undertaken	  to	  exclude	  the	  alleged	  perpetrator	  from	  communal	  spaces,	  particularly	  those	  that	  were	   frequented	  by	   the	  victim,	   and	   thus	   also	   to	   socially	  ostracise	  him.	   In	  one	  instant,	   the	   following	   statement	   was	   publicly	   issued	   by	   a	   number	   of	   radical	  groups	  following	  an	  alleged	  sexual	  assault:	  	  
“Following	  notification	   from	   [a	   social	   centre]	   that	   X.	   has	   been	   banned	   from	   the	  
centre	  and	  its	  activities	  due	  to	  allegations	  of	  a	  serious	  sexual	  assault,	  an	  emergency	  
meeting	  of	  individuals	  and	  radical	  groups	  in	  Bristol	  was	  held.	  
	  
As	  individuals	  and	  networks	  opposed	  to	  domination	  and	  oppression,	  including	  but	  
not	  exclusive	  to	  misogyny,	  sexual	  violence,	  bullying	  and	  intimidation,	  it	  was	  agreed	  
that	  X.	  would	  be	  excluded	  from	  involvement	  with	  the	  projects,	  organisations	  and	  
groups	  named	  below.	  These	   groups	  will	   also,	  where	   they	  are	   able,	   take	   steps	   to	  
exclude	  him	  from	  public	  events	  and	  actions	  in	  which	  they	  take	  part.”	  	  This	   perpetrator	   was	   subsequently	   successfully	   removed	   from	   physical	   and	  social	  spaces	  and	  aggressively	  confronted	  when	  he	  did	  show	  his	  face	  in	  public.	  There	   was	   some	   criticism	   raised	   against	   this	   mode	   of	   action,	   mainly	   that	   in	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creating	  a	  Safe	  Space	  for	  the	  victim	  within	  the	  ‘scene’,	  the	  perpetrator	  would	  be	  driven	   to	   go	   elsewhere	   to	   possibly	   find	   new	   victims.	   Involving	   the	   police	   (a	  decision	  that	  was	  generally	  left	  up	  to	  the	  survivor)	  did	  not	  appear	  too	  promising	  an	   option,	   given	   the	   abysmal	   conviction	   rate	   for	   sexual	   violence	   and	   the	  considerable	   emotional	   cost	   for	   the	   victim,	   even	   if	   a	   conviction	   is	   obtained.	  Additionally,	   there	   was	   a	   strong	   social	   taboo	   against	   involving	   the	   police	   in	  anything,	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   usually	   did	   the	   opposite	   of	   protecting	  anarchists	   from	  harm	  (this	  assumption	  was	   in	  no	  way	  unfounded,	  see	  chapter	  11).	  The	  problem	  of	  ejecting	  a	  predator	  from	  one	  space	  and	  thereby	  inevitably	  inflicting	  him	  on	   somebody	   else	   thus	  pointed	   to	   the	  difficulty	   of	   creating	   safe	  space	  within	  a	  cultural	  setting	  in	  which	  such	  spaces	  were	  not	  generally	  the	  norm.	  	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Safe	  Space	  policies	  were	  therefore	  based	  on	  a	  similar	  principle	  as	  the	  politics	  of	  mutual	  support	  against	  eviction	  described	  in	  chapter	  two	  –	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  shared	  vulnerability	  and	  the	  readiness	  to	  protect	  one	  another	  from	  aggression.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  also	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  an	  abstract	  principle	  and	  real	  life:	  in	  real	  life,	  very	  few	  things	  ever	  occur	  in	  the	  pure	  and	  unadulterated	  form	  the	  abstract	  model	  would	  suggest.	  This	   is	  apparent	   in	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  they	  implied	  a	  conscious	  politics	  of	  recognition,	  Safe	  Spaces	  also	   to	   an	   extent	   relied	   on	   territoriality,	   namely	   in	   the	   aspect	   that	   involved	  excluding	  all	  kinds	  of	  aggressors,	  if	  necessary	  by	  means	  of	  force.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  fear	  that	  leads	  the	  territorial	  self	  to	  barricade	  itself	  in	  a	  fortress	  need	  not	  be	  baseless,	   since	  sometimes	  –	  such	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	   sexual	  assaults	  or	  eviction	  attempts	  –	  there	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  others	  are	  in	  fact	  out	  to	  get	  one.	  Actually	  existing	  Safe	  Spaces	  were	  therefore	  most	  often	  hybrid	  configurations,	   in	   which	   an	   ethics	   of	   mutually	   affirming	   one	   another’s	  subjecthood	  met	  with	  the	  necessity	  to	  create	  a	  secure	  space	  in	  which	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	   to	   lay	   the	  blame	   for	   this	   lack	  of	  pure	   form	  at	   the	  door	  of	   the	  anarchists	  –	  they	  were,	  after	  all,	  attempting	  to	  create	  new	  forms	  of	  social	  relating	  amidst	  an	  environment	  that	  empathically	  did	  not	  want	  to	  acknowledge	  them.	  The	  problem	  of	  shifting	  the	  responsibility	  of	  dealing	  with	  sexual	  predators	  elsewhere	  is	  a	  case	   in	  point	  –	   trying	  to	  create	  safe	  space	   in	  an	   isolated	  bubble	   inevitably	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leads	  to	  friction	  at	  the	  boundaries,	  where	  the	  ethical	  impetus	  of	  the	  inside	  collides	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  outside.	  This	  problem	  is	  not	  exclusive	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  space	  –	  many	  forms	  of	  political	  action	  contend	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  in	  a	  contradictory	   relationship	   with	   precisely	   the	   structures	   they	   are	   trying	   to	  overcome.	  Critics	  of	  the	  money	  economy	  find	  that	  they	  have	  to	  earn	  a	  minimum	  amount	   of	   cash	   to	   participate	   in	   social	   relations,	   feminists	   find	   that	   the	   very	  women	  they	  want	  to	  reach	  hold	  unacceptably	  un-­‐‑feminist	  views;	  and	  advocates	  of	  abolishing	  the	  prison	  system	  on	  occasion	  find	  out	  that	  the	  ‘political’	  prisoners	  they	   have	   been	   sending	   letters	   of	   solidarity	   to	   are	   actually	   psychopathic	  murderers	  who	  kept	  somebody’s	  head	  in	  a	  fridge	  (this	  actually	  happened).	  But	  while	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  point	  at	  these	  contradictions	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  political	  goal	  is	  set	  too	  high,	  hybridity	  of	  practice	  is	  almost	  unavoidable	  in	  processes	  of	  social	  transformation,	  when	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	  collide	  in	  really	  existing	  spaces.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  this	  as	  evidence	  that	  a	   ‘pure’	  ethics	  of	  recognition	  is	   impossible	  to	  realise,	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  emphasise	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  was	  realised,	  despite	  the	   traditional	   reluctance	  of	   structure	   to	   yield	   to	   the	  political	   demands	  of	   the	  individual.	  	  	  That	   said,	   hybridity	   is	   rarely	   a	   smooth	   process	   of	   coexistence,	   but	   rather,	  illustrates	   the	   contradictions	   of	   praxis	   to	   a	   sometimes	   painful	   degree.	   For	  example,	  in	  as	  far	  as	  Safe	  Space	  policies	  were	  formulated,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  time	  practically	   applied	   to,	   gender	   relations,	   they	   had	   to	   contend	   with	   a	   certain	  ambiguous	  relationship	  with	  traditional	  masculinity.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  state	  of	  material	  threat	  that	  squatters	  found	  themselves	  in,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  living	  arrangements	  and	  of	  their	  wider	  political	  activities,	  meant	  that	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  reactive	  macho	  behaviour	  was	  common	  within	  the	  scene,	  and	  by	  far	  not	  limited	  to	  male-­‐‑identified	  persons.	  The	   image	  of	   the	   tough,	   tool-­‐‑carrying,	  wall-­‐‑scaling,	  police-­‐‑fighting	  ‘man-­‐‑archist’	  was	  simultaneously	  an	  ideal	  and	  a	  source	  of	  ridicule,	  and	  while	  women	  (myself	  included)	  criticised	  this	  type	  of	  behaviour,	  they	  were	  at	   the	   same	   time	  no	   less	   apt	   at	   exhibiting	   it.	  Where	  women	  definitely	  did	  not	  compete	  with	  men	  was	   in	  terms	  of	  physical	  aggression	  –	  although	  many	  were	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  fighting,	  they	  were	  notably	  less	  inclined	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  may	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have	  to	  do	  with	  gendered	  socialisation,	  which	  poses	  strong	  prohibitions	  against	  physical	   fighting	   in	   girls,	   and	   at	   least	   some	   squatter	   women	   saw	   in	   this	   a	  deliberate	   strategy	   by	   the	   patriarchy	   to	   keep	   women	   unable	   to	   defend	  themselves.	  One	  woman	  I	  squatted	  with	  for	  a	  while	  told	  me	  that	  as	  an	  adolescent,	  she	  had	  to	  literally	  train	  herself	  to	  be	  able	  to	  respond	  aggressively	  to	  a	  threat:	  “this	  guy	  said	  he’d	  teach	  me	  to	  throw	  a	  punch	  and	  I	  said	  yes,	  so	  I	  punched	  him.	  It	  took	  me	  a	  few	  tries	  before	  I	  could	  even	  do	  it.	  It	  was	  like	  there	  was	  this	  invisible	  rubber	   band	   holding	   my	   hand	   back”.	   Consequently,	   self-­‐‑defence	   trainings	  especially	  for	  women	  were	  common	  features	  of	  many	  social	  centres.	  	  	  Where	  masculine	   swagger	   got	   out	   of	   hand,	   it	   could	   occasionally	   tip	   over	   into	  serious	  trouble.	  There	  was	  a	  tiny	  but	  prominent	  minority	  of	  men	  present	  whose	  behaviour	   was	   characterised	   by	   a	   convergence	   of	   a	   general	   propensity	   for	  violence,	   and	   dominating	   and	   objectifying	   behaviour	   toward	  women.	  Most	   of	  them	   had	   first-­‐‑hand	   experience	   of	   institutions	   where	   this	   form	   of	   aggressive	  masculinity	  was	  fostered,	  such	  as	  the	  military	  or	  the	  prison	  system	  –	  perhaps	  the	  working	   class	   equivalent	   of	   boarding	   schools	   as	   ‘human	   factories’	   for	   the	  production	  of	   territorial	   selves	  –	  and	   like	  with	  boarding	  schools,	   the	  resulting	  habitus	  may	  well	  have	  been	  acquired	  as	  a	  survival	  strategy.	  One	  such	  man	  was	  once	  described	  to	  me	  as	  “the	  human	  equivalent	  of	  a	  hand	  grenade:	  very	  useful	  to	  have	  around	  in	  some	  cases,	  but	  dangerous	  when	  you	  get	  too	  close”.	  Implied	  in	  this	  statement	   is	   the	   idea	   that	  while	   these	  men	  were	  certainly	  valuable	  assets	  when	   it	   came	   to	   defending	   the	   boundaries	   of	   spaces	   from	   attack,	   they	  simultaneously	  made	  these	  spaces	  considerably	  less	  safe	  on	  the	  inside.	  Gavin,	  for	  example,	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  avoid	  a	  guy	  who	  had	  once	  beat	  him	  up	  in	  a	  rage,	  and	  was	  ostensibly	  relieved	  when	  this	  man	  eventually	  went	  to	  prison.	  On	  another	  occasion,	   he	   explicitly	   warned	  me	   against	   spending	   a	   night	   in	   a	   squat	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  man	  who	  had	  committed	  a	  string	  of	  sexual	  assaults.	  In	  some	  squats,	  men	  like	  this	  established	  veritable	  reigns	  of	  terror,	  by	  aggressively	  dominating	  other	  men	  and	  women	  alike.	  	  





	  While	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   squatted	   spaces	   were	   therefore	   characterised	   by	   a	  contradictory	   relationship	   between	   an	   ethics	   of	   recognition	   and	   an	   ethics	   of	  territoriality,	   they	  also	   showed	   that	   in	   real	   life,	   not	   all	   territoriality	   is	   created	  alike.	   In	   the	   most	   general	   terms,	   territoriality	   means	   “the	   attempt	   by	   an	  individual	   or	   group	   to	   affect,	   influence,	   or	   control	   people,	   phenomena	   and	  relationships,	  by	  delimiting	  and	  asserting	  control	  over	  a	  geographic	  area…this	  delimitation	   becomes	   a	   territory	   only	  when	   its	   boundaries	   are	   used	   to	   affect	  behaviour	   by	   controlling	   access”	   (Sack,	   1986,	   19).	   As	   Sack	   elaborates,	   this	  definition	   can	   involve	   a	   number	   of	   different	   scenarios.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  territoriality	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  state,	  but	  “occurs	  in	  degrees”	  (ibid),	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  securisation,	  a	  space	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  territorial.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   since	   territories	   are	   not	   naturally	   occurring	   phenomena	   but	  social	  ones,	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  territorial	  actors	  must	  be	  taken	  in	  to	  account.	  As	  Sack	  argues,	  there	  can	  be	  reasons	  for	  territorial	  behaviour	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  benefit	  those	  controlled,	  for	  example	  when	  a	  parent	  limits	  the	  access	  of	  a	  child	  to	  a	   particular	   area	   to	   keep	   the	   child	   safe.	   He	   therefore	   distinguishes	   between	  “benign”	  and	  “malevolent”	  (31)	  territoriality,	  depending	  on	  who	  benefits	  from	  its	  exercise	  –	  those	  in	  control	  or	  those	  being	  controlled.	  Additionally,	  there	  can	  be	  more	  than	  one	  party	  involved,	  and	  while	  territorial	  behaviour	  may	  be	  designed	  to	  benefit	  one	  side,	   it	  may	  simultaneously	  disadvantage	  another.	  Territoriality	  therefore	   must	   also	   be	   assessed	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   concrete	   power	   relations	  between	  the	  territorial	  actors.	  	  	  This	  caveat	  is	  important	  since	  paradoxically	  –	  given	  that	  their	  problem	  is	  the	  lack	  of	   an	  area	   they	   could	   control	  –	  homeless	  people	  are	  often	   found	   to	  behave	   in	  strongly	  territorial	  ways.	  Luhrmann	  (2008)	  discusses	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  protective	  measures	  that	  full	  citizenship	  (that	  is,	  full	  access	  to	  legal	  protection)	  awards,	   the	   homeless	   often	   adopt	   a	   certain	   aggressive	   style	   of	   interaction	   in	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order	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  assault.	  Luhrmann	  compares	  this	  to	  “the	  ‘code	  of	   honour’	   commonly	   found	   among	   nomadic	   peoples,	   pastoralists	   and	  ranchers…(who),	  because	  they	  are	  isolated…have	  few	  others	  to	  help	  to	  defend	  them.	   In	   such	   poorly	   policed	   settings,	   physical	   survival	  may	   depend	   upon	   an	  ability	  to	  defend	  one’s	  turf	  so	  aggressively…that	  the	  trouble	  slinks	  away”	  (3).	  For	  Luhrmann’s	  female	  respondents,	  who	  apparently	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  anything	  akin	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  squatting	  scene,	  there	  is	  indeed	  good	  reason	  to	  do	  so,	  since	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  homeless	  women	  face	  an	  extremely	  high	  risk	  of	   being	   violently	   (sexually)	   assaulted.	   She	   therefore	   contends	   that	   homeless	  people	   employ	   a	   general	   mode	   of	   behaviour	   comparable	   to	   what	   Anderson	  (1999,	  2002)	  has	  called	  the	  “code	  of	  the	  street”112,	  i.e.	  a	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  that	  is	   designed	   to	   aggressively	   intimidate	   anyone	   who	   could	   potentially	   pose	   a	  threat.	  What	   for	   Luhrmann	   links	   such	   disparate	   groups	   as	   homeless	   women,	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  black	  ghetto	  and	  ‘nomadic	  peoples’	  is	  therefore	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  territoriality,	  in	  which	  the	  boundaries	  of	  personal	  space	  are	  demarcated	  and	  defended	  through	  aggressive	  posturing	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  violence.	  	  	  The	  ‘code	  of	  the	  street’,	  in	  the	  sense	  Luhrmann	  uses	  it,	  is	  therefore	  an	  example	  of	  the	   ‘territorial	   self’	   in	   action.	   ‘The	   street’	   here	   becomes	   shorthand	   for	   the	  Hobbesian	  “existential	  nightmare”	  (Prokhovnik,	  1996,	  1718)	   that	  puts	   the	  self	  into	  a	  position	  of	  such	  precarity	  that	  it	  “cannot	  distinguish	  between	  the	  wicked	  and	  the	  righteous”	  (Brace,	  1997,	  140)	  since	  every	  mistake	  might	  come	  at	  a	  cost	  to	  life	  and	  limb.	  It	  must	  therefore	  assume	  that	  all	  others	  are	  possessed	  of	  a	  “will	  to	  hurt”	  (142)	  and	  in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐‑empt	  attack,	  must	  prominently	  exhibit	  such	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Anderson’s	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘code	  of	  the	  street’	  has	  been	  widely	  criticised,	  notably	  by	  Loïc	  Wacquant,	  since	  it	  at	  least	  in	  part	  appears	  to	  attribute	  the	  emergence	  of	  violent	  interactions	  among	  poor,	  black	  residents	  of	  a	  US	  ‘ghetto’	  to	  essentially	  a	  moral	  failure	  on	  their	  part	  	  (see	  Wacquant,	  2002,	  1486).	  Anderson	  replies	  that	  the	  ‘moral	  failure’	  is	  not	  of	  his	  own	  judgment,	  but	  of	  that	  of	  his	  respondents,	  and	  the	  ‘code’	  therefore	  is	  a	  relevant	  category	  of	  their	  own	  understanding	  (Anderson,	  2002a).	  Both	  authors	  make	  serious	  and	  compelling	  arguments,	  although	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  entire	  debate	  (which	  I	  will	  not	  repeat	  here),	  I	  tend	  toward	  the	  opinion	  that	  Anderson’s	  approach	  is	  ultimately	  less	  problematic	  than	  that	  of	  Wacquant,	  who	  here	  speaks	  as	  a	  white	  man	  telling	  a	  black	  man	  he	  is	  ‘doing	  race	  wrong’	  by	  using	  ‘native’	  categories.	  However,	  the	  issue	  remains	  that	  the	  study	  of	  marginalisation	  must	  aim	  for	  systemic	  interpretations	  rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  explain	  poverty	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  phenomenology,	  such	  as	  in	  approaches	  which	  assume	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  poverty’	  or,	  indeed,	  of	  homelessness	  (see	  chapter	  4)	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will	  itself.	  The	  connection	  of	  this	  paranoid	  stance	  to	  a	  putative	  ‘code	  of	  honour’	  is	  prominent	  in	  Hobbes,	  since	  the	  self	  “has	  to	  legitimate	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  others	  through	  notions	  of	  honour	  and	  glory	  which	   consist	   in	   comparison”	   (141)	   and	  thus	  it	  “will	  challenge	  others	  to	  acknowledge	  his	  superiority	  and	  require	  them	  to	  honour	  and	  respect	  him”	  (142)113.	  This	  version	  of	   ‘respect’	   is	   therefore	  a	  very	  different	  one	  from	  Honneth’s	  gentle	  awareness	  of	  another’s	  integrity	  –	  it	  consists	  in	  submission	  to	  the	  superior	  ability	  of	  another	  to	  cause	  harm,	  and	  thus	  speaks	  of	  intimidation	  rather	  than	  recognition.	  	  	  While	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   Luhrmann’s	   ‘pastoralist’	   indeed	   lives	   in	   a	  Hobbesian	   state	   of	   nature,	   or	   is	   merely	   seen	   to	   do	   so	   through	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	  Western	   anthropologist,	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that	   the	   homeless	   on	   the	   streets	   of	  Western	  cities	  have	  to	  actually	  contend	  with	  a	  permanent	  threat	  to	  their	  spatial	  selves.	  As	  I	  have	  argued,	  this	  threat	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  metaphor	  –	  in	  as	  far	  as	  bodies,	  and	  thus	  selves,	  are	  spatial,	   they	  do	  involve	  a	  risk	  of	  territorial	  attack	  through	  colonisation	   and	   invasion.	   This	   is	   nowhere	   more	   obvious	   than	   in	   the	   risk	   of	  sexual	  violation	  that	  homeless	  women	  face,	  when	  the	  space	  of	   their	  embodied	  self	  is	  violently	  intruded	  upon.	  While	  I	  would	  therefore	  agree,	  in	  principle,	  that	  the	   metaphor	   of	   the	   boundary	   as	   a	   fixed,	   defensible	   demarcation	   line	   of	   the	  territorial	  self	  must	  be	  critically	  questioned	  (Nedelsky,	  1990),	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  ill	  advised	  to	  demand	  this	  kind	  of	  disarmament	  from	  a	  self	  that	  is	  under	  actual	  threat	   of	   being	   colonised114.	   As	   Brace	   argues,	   a	   critique	   of	   territoriality	  must	  always	  also	  involve	  an	  account	  of	  really	  existing	  power	  relations	  (152),	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  homeless	  people	  and	  especially	  homeless	  women,	  ‘aggressively	  defending	  their	  turf’	  might	  be	  their	  only	  survival	  option.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   not	   all	   territorial	   posturing	   occurs	   in	   self-­‐‑defence.	   If,	   for	  example,	  one	  went	  out	  in	  Bristol	  city	  centre	  on	  a	  Friday	  or	  Saturday	  night,	  one	  could	  observe	  a	  ritual	  which,	   I	  am	  sure,	  can	  be	   found	   in	  similar	   form	  in	  many	  other	   places:	   mostly	   young	   men,	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   copious	   amounts	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  For	  a	  more	  in-­‐‑depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘honour’	  in	  this	  context	  see	  chapter	  12	  114	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  collective	  entities,	  such	  as	  colonized	  peoples.	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alcohol,	  were	  wandering	  around	  looking	  for	  a	  physical	  confrontation.	  One	  very	  efficient	  strategy	  of	  finding	  it	  consisted	  in	  picking	  a	  potential	  opponent,	  walking	  into	  his	  path,	  and	  then	  to	  just	  keep	  walking	  as	  if	  his	  body	  was	  not	  there,	  so	  that	  one	  bumped	   into	  him.	  The	  gesture	  was	  universally	  understood	  as	  a	  challenge,	  and	  if	  the	  other	  took	  it	  up,	  the	  combatants	  would	  keep	  pounding	  at	  each	  other	  until	  the	  police	  arrived.	  What	  was	  interesting	  about	  this	  kind	  of	  challenge	  was	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  efficient	  way	  to	  win	  a	  fight	  –	  if	  the	  point	  had	  been	  to	  just	  defeat	  an	  opponent,	  it	  would	  have	  made	  more	  sense	  to	  quickly	  run	  up	  and	  punch	  him	  in	  the	  face	  before	  he	  got	  a	  chance	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  ritual	  of	  ‘walking	  into’	  the	  opponent	  therefore	  had	  the	  function	  of	  communicating	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  insult	  –	  ‘I	  am	  going	  to	  move	  through	  space	  as	  if	  your	  body	  wasn’t	  there	  (and	  what	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do	  about	   it?)’.	   It	  worked	  as	  an	   insult	  not	  only	  because	   it	  was	  painful,	   but	   because	   it	   clearly	   communicated	   that	   as	   far	   as	   the	   attacker	   was	  concerned,	  the	  other	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  spatial	  sense,	  his	  body	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  obstacle	  one	  had	  to	  move	  around,	  there	  was	  only	  ‘air’	  where	  he	  existed.	  This	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘honour’	  then	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  attacked	  was	  forced	  to	  assert	  his	  spatial	  existence	  by	  means	  of	  his	  fists.	  	  	  What	  these	  examples	  show	  is	  that	  territoriality	  –	  while	  universally	  problematic	  –	  must	  be	  read	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  dominance	  and	  subjugation	  that	  characterise	  the	  social	  relations	  between	  the	  involved	  parties.	  What	  makes	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  quite	  complex	  is	  that	  often,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  ascertain	  who	  in	  a	  given	  territorial	  conflict	  is	  the	  attacker	  and	  who	  the	  victim.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Hobbes’	  territorial	  notion	  of	  the	  self,	  territoriality	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  always	  the	  product	  of	  fear,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  fear	  is	  justified	  can	  be	  a	  difficult	  question.	  I	  want	  to	  approach	  this	  issue	  through	  the	  distinction,	  made	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  between	  ‘territory’	  and	  ‘domain’.	  While	  a	  ‘territory’,	  as	  we	  have	  said,	  is	  the	  fortress	  of	  the	  paranoid	  Hobbesian	  self,	  a	  ‘domain’	  is	  simply	  the	  space	  that	  a	  self	  inhabits	  as	  a	  consequence	   if	   its	   necessary	   spatiality.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   territorial	  reactions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  really	  existing	  power	  relations,	  it	  is	  therefore	  worth	  asking	  whether	  the	  space	  that	  is	  being	  defended	  was,	  before	  it	  was	  challenged,	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one	  or	  the	  other.	  While	  territorial	  defence	  looks	  quite	  similar	  in	  either	  case,	  the	  
reason	  for	  this	  defensive	  reaction	  is	  quite	  different.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  let	  us	  look	  at	  the	  territorial	  element	  of	  gender-­‐‑based	  violence	  in	  the	  home.	  The	  behaviour	  of	  men	  who	  abuse	  women	  and	  children	  in	  the	  home	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  Hobbesian	  self	  –	  an	  abuser	  typically	  draws	  firm	  boundaries	  around	  ‘his’	  territory	  by	  controlling	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  come	  and	  go,	  and	  simultaneously	  establishes	  ‘despotic	  dominion’	  on	  the	  inside,	  where	  no	  move	  of	  the	  interned	  escapes	  his	  attention.	  This	  kind	  of	  behaviour	  has	  then	  also	  been	  framed	  as	  an	  attempt	  on	  part	  of	  the	  abuser	  to	  make	  himself	  feel	  subjectively	  safer,	  by	  turning	  the	   ‘home’	   into	  a	   fortress	  and	  including	  women	  and	  children	  in	  his	  territorial	   claim	   (e.g.	   Davis	   et	   al,	   2000;	   Dutton,	   2006).	   Abusers	   of	   this	   sort	  therefore	  act	  not	  so	  much	  out	  of	  a	  sadistic	  pleasure	  in	  hurting	  (although	  this	  is	  not	  ruled	  out	  either),	  but	  because	  they	  see	  the	  other	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  home	  as	  extensions	  of	  their	  own	  territorial	  self,	  who	  must	  be	  subjugated	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  inside	  ‘rational’	  and	  keep	  any	  threatening	  influence	  out.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  such	  a	  home	  then	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  safe	  space	  and	  becomes	  a	  secure	  space,	  i.e.	  a	  space	  that	  reflects	  the	  illusion	  of	  safety	  for	  a	  territorial	  self,	  bought	  at	  the	  expense	  of	   the	  safety	  of	  others.	  The	  abuser’s	   territorial	   sovereignty	   in	   the	  home	  is	  thus	  directly	  opposed	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  abused	  over	  their	  own	  bodies,	   in	   that	   the	   integrity	  of	   their	   spatial	   selves	   is	  disrupted	  and	  sometimes	  permanently	  destroyed.	  	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  that	  this	  pattern	  of	  territoriality	  is	  so	  common,	  especially	  in	  heterosexual	  relationships,	  is	  that	  women’s	  bodies	  are	  traditionally	  not	  seen	  as	  ‘sovereign	   domains’	   in	   their	   own	   right.	   Because	   women	   under	   Western	  patriarchy	   have	   only	   recently	   been	   tentatively	   recognised	   as	   subjects,	   i.e.	   the	  types	  of	  entities	  who	  can	  inhabit	  a	  domain,	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  should	  have	  their	  own	  spaces	  is	  relatively	  new.	  Virginia	  Woolf	  famously	  called	  for	  ‘a	  room	  of	  one’s	  own’	  as	  a	   fundamental	  demand	  of	   the	   feminist	  movement,	  pointing	  to	  the	   fact	  that	   women	   have	   almost	   universally	   been	   regarded	   objects	   in	   a	  man’s	   space	  rather	   than	   people	   who	   can	   be	   sovereign	   within	   their	   own.	   This	   also	   and	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especially	  goes	  for	  the	  space	  of	  women’s	  bodies,	  which	  have	  traditionally	  been	  regarded	  as	  quite	  literally	  ‘uninhabited’	  and	  full	  of	  ‘holes’	  rather	  than	  organs,	  and	  thus	  fit	  to	  be	  penetrated	  and	  colonised.	  Maurice	  Bloch’s	  cavalier	  assertion	  that	  ‘we’	   go	   “in	   and	  out	   of	   each	  other’s	   bodies”	   all	   the	   time	   “like	   in	  birth	   and	   sex”	  (Bloch,	  2013),	  for	  example	  fails	  to	  mention	  that	  it	  is	  women’s	  bodies	  that	  are	  here	  frequented	  as	  if	  they	  were	  hotels115.	  Since	  the	  resident	  woman	  cannot	  be	  evicted	  without	   the	  body	  dying,	  she	   is	  merely	  pushed	  aside	  to	  accommodate	  whoever	  wants	  to	  move	  in	  –	  be	  that	  a	  fetus,	  whose	  right	  to	  occupancy	  is	  seen	  as	  above	  hers,	  or	   the	   penetrations	   of	   a	  male	   body	   part	   or	   a	  male	  mind.	   This	   assumption	   of	  ‘uninhabitedness’	  is	  not	  unlike	  those	  that	  have	  been	  made	  about	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  earth,	  which	  white	  colonists	  could	  ‘discover’	  and	  subsequently	  invade,	  and	  the	   same	   is	   also	   implied	   in	   the	  male	   ritual	   of	   ‘walking	   into’	   the	   space	   that	   a	  potential	   opponent’s	   body	   occupies,	   namely	   that	   there	   is	   really	   nobody	   there	  whose	   spatial	   existence	   would	   have	   to	   be	   recognised.	   Unlike	   squatters,	   who	  generally	  made	  sure	  that	  the	  spaces	  they	  moved	  into	  were	  actually	  empty,	  the	  white	  male	  western	  subject	   is	   therefore	  groomed	  to	  habitually	   ignore	  that	  the	  space	  he	  wishes	  to	  occupy	  is	  already	  somebody’s	  home,	  and	  women	  and	  other	  colonised	  people	  often	  have	  little	  other	  choice	  than	  to	  aggressively	  defend	  their	  ‘turf’	  or	  be	  overrun.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  while	  both	  the	  male	  defence	  of	  the	  ‘fortress’	  home	  and	  a	  woman’s	  defence	  of	  her	  body	  within	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  territorial,	  what	  is	  being	  defended	  is	  quite	  different.	  While	  women’s	   (and	  colonised	  people’s)	   territoriality	   stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  spatial	  selves	  are	  actually	  under	  attack,	  the	  territoriality	  of	  the	  white	  male	  subject	  aims	  not	  so	  much	  at	  the	  defence	  of	  his	  space	  (although	  that	   is	   part	   of	   it)	   but	   at	   the	  defence	   of	   his	   status	   as	   territorial	   dominant.	   This	  difference	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  unlike	  women	  and	  people	  of	  colour,	  the	  white	  male	  subject	  is	  precisely	  defined	  by	  his	  ability	  to	  rule	  over	  territory.	  A	  challenge	  to	  his	  territorial	  claim	  therefore	  is	  not	  only	  a	  threat	  to	  his	  embodied	  spatial	  self,	  but	   to	   his	   very	   status	   as	   a	  masculine,	   and	   hence	   dominant,	   subject.	   As	   Brace	  argues,	  male	  anxiety	  about	  boundary	  loss	  and	  invasion	  (1997,	  144),	  such	  as	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  And	  possibly	  gay	  men’s,	  but	  that’s	  exactly	  what	  supposedly	  makes	  them	  ‘feminised’	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example	  implied	  in	  homophobic	  fears	  of	  potential	  penetration,	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  masculinity	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  territorial	  control	  over	  the	  body	  and	  over	  the	  space	  the	  body	  occupies.	  Thus	  the	  reason	  a	  homosexual	  male	  is	  seen	  as	  ‘feminised’	  and	  thus	  demeaned	  stems	  from	  the	  suspicion	  that	  the	  boundaries	  of	  his	   body	   might	   be	   permeable,	   and	   thus	   closer	   to	   the	   ‘uninhabited’	   and	   thus	  invadable	  space	  of	  a	  female	  body.	  A	  homosexual,	  in	  short,	  is	  suspected	  of	  not	  fully	  ‘being	  there’	  as	  a	  territorial	  self,	  and	  thus	  a	  man.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  view	  of	  the	   female	  body	  as	  penetrable,	  and	  thus	  not	   inhabited	  by	  a	   territorial	  self	  one	  would	  have	  to	  take	  seriously,	  is	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  femininity.	  Equally,	  the	  insult	  implied	  in	  the	  ritual	  of	  bumping	  into	  a	  potential	  opponent’s	  body	  is	  meant	  to	  question	  the	  victim’s	  masculinity,	  by	  insinuating	  that	  he	  cannot	  adequately	  control	  his	  boundaries	  and	  is	  therefore	  inferior	  to	  the	  more	  dominant	  and	  hence	  more	  masculine	  attacker.	  Territoriality	  must	  therefore	  also	  be	  seen	  under	   the	   aspect	   of	   what	   is	   being	   defended	   –	   a	   spatial	   self’s	   undisturbed	  occupation	  of	  her	  domain,	   or	   a	   territorial	   self’s	  dominant	  position	   in	   a	  power	  relation.	   While	   both	   can	   look	   similar	   to	   the	   observer,	   they	   come	   from	   very	  different	   backgrounds	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   respective	  positioning	   in	   a	   relation	  of	  dominance	  and	  subjugation,	  and	  the	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  the	  ‘territorial’	  reactions	  of	  homeless	  people	  and	  squatters.	  	  	  In	  practice,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  hybrid	  nature	  of	  actually	  existing	  Safe	  Spaces	  also	  involved	   a	   ‘real-­‐‑time	   analysis’	   of	   power	   relations.	   As	   the	   following	   example	  illustrates,	  this	  on	  occasion	  demanded	  a	  quick	  succession	  of	  contradictory	  moves,	  the	  logical	  consistency	  of	  which	  nevertheless	  points	  to	  the	  underlying	  principle	  of	  recognising	  and	  protecting	  vulnerability.	  The	  situation	  in	  question	  arose	  when	  the	   nursery’s	   newly	   adopted	   Safe	   Space	   policy	   was	   put	   to	   the	   test.	   T,	   the	  (presumed	   undocumented)	  migrant	  who	   had	   shared	   our	   previous	   squat,	   had	  turned	  up	  at	  the	  door	  of	  the	  nursery	  one	  day,	  after	  having	  lived	  for	  some	  time	  with	  friends.	  He	  had	  nowhere	  to	  go	  and	  since	  the	  nursery	  was	  spacious	  enough,	  he	  was	  invited	  to	  move	  in.	  As	  it	  emerged,	  he	  had	  unfortunately	  since	  developed	  a	  cocaine	   habit,	   and	   the	   drug	   caused	   him	   (or	   gave	   him	   license	   to)	   behave	  aggressively	  and	  disrespectfully	  to	  those	  around	  him.	  To	  the	  particular	  chagrin	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of	  the	  female	  squatters,	  he	  seemed	  to	  have	  decided	  that	  it	  was	  women’s	  role	  to	  keep	  the	  house	  clean,	  cook	  and	  wash,	  and	  generally	  wait	  on	  his	  whim,	  which	  he	  noisily	   and	   aggressively	   demanded.	   He	   made	   unwelcome	   sexual	   jokes	   and	  insulted	   female	   housemates	   with	   obnoxious	   misogynistic	   language.	   The	  squatmates	  –	  at	  this	  point,	  the	  nursery	  was	  crammed	  after	  a	  wave	  of	  evictions,	  and	  besides	  ours	  was	  also	  home	  to	  another	  crew	  with	  several	  women	  members	  -­‐‑	  grew	  increasingly	  impatient	  with	  T’s	  behaviour,	  and	  he	  was	  confronted	  several	  times	  to	  no	  avail.	  Finally,	  one	  woman	  came	  forward	  to	  say	  that	  T	  had	  sexually	  assaulted	  her.	  She	  expressed	  that	  she	  did	  not	  feel	  safe	  or	  comfortable	  around	  him,	  and	  demanded	  that	  either	  he	  should	  leave	  the	  house	  or	  she	  would.	  	  	  T	  was	  summoned	  to	  a	  house	  meeting,	  confronted	  with	  his	  behaviour,	  and,	  since	  no	   insight	   was	   forthcoming,	   asked	   to	   move	   out.	   His	   reaction	   consisted	   in	   an	  explosion	   of	   temper	   at	   this,	   in	   his	   view,	   unjust	   and	   despotic	   decision,	   and	   he	  stomped	  back	  to	  his	  room	  in	  a	  flurry	  of	  anger.	  As	  the	  afternoon	  progressed,	  he	  drank	   himself	   into	   a	   rage	   and	   periodically	   stepped	   outside	   his	   door	   to	   shout	  abuse	   at	   everyone	   present.	   Meanwhile,	   a	   callout	   had	   happened	   to	   summon	  auxiliary	  troops,	  should	  the	  internal	  ‘eviction’	  escalate.	  	  	  When	   the	  night	   fell,	   T	   had	   taken	   to	   angrily	   pacing	  up	   and	  down	   the	   corridor,	  brandishing	  an	  axe	  and	  threatening	  to	  kill	  anyone	  who	  dared	  come	  near	  him.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  building,	  a	  small	  mob	  of	  squatters,	  armed	  with	  assorted	  blunt	  objects,	  huddled	  in	  a	  corner	  trying	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  do.	  Periodically,	  one	  of	  the	  group	  would	  venture	  across	  the	  yard	  to	  try	  and	  talk	  sense	  into	  T,	  only	  to	  come	  back	  unharmed	  but	  without	  result.	  	  	  	  The	  standoff	  lasted	  until	  finally	  Joe,	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  escalating	  aggression	  than	   others,	   lost	   his	   nerve	   and	   phoned	   the	   police.	   As	   he	   announced	   their	  imminent	   arrival,	   a	   shower	   of	   abuse	   rained	   upon	   him	   from	   both	   sides	   of	   the	  battlefield.	  	  	  “You	  fucking	  idiot”	  someone	  shouted,	  “T	  is	  illegal”.	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  In	  an	  instant,	  the	  weapons	  vanished	  on	  both	  sides,	  and	  when	  the	  police	  rang	  the	  doorbell	  a	   few	  minutes	   later,	   they	  were	  bid	  a	  warm	  and	  relaxed	  welcome	  and	  were	   repeatedly	  assured	   that	  absolutely	  nothing	  untoward	  was	  going	  on.	  The	  police,	   having	   no	   heightened	   interest	   in	   squatter’s	   internal	   problems 116 ,	  grumbled	  something	  about	  wasting	  their	  time	  and	  were	  speedily	  sawn	  off	  to	  their	  vehicle.	  	  	  During	   the	  discussion	  with	   the	  police,	   someone	  had	   thankfully	   located	  T’s	  axe	  and	  hidden	  it	  out	  of	  sight.	  Thus	  disarmed,	  T	  realised	  his	  battle	  was	  lost	  and	  began	  to	   pack	   his	   things,	   presumably	   both	   placated	   and	   intimidated	   by	   his	   narrow	  escape	  from	  the	  law.	  Several	  others	  eventually	  helped	  him	  carry	  his	  belongings	  to	  a	  friend’s	  house	  and	  made	  sure	  he	  had	  a	  place	  to	  stay.	  	  So	  what	  happened	  here?	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  in	  T’s	  behaviour	  the	  stance	  of	  the	  prototypical	   Hobbesian	   self,	   trying	   to	   exercise	   despotic	   dominion	   over	   the	  women	  he	  considered	  part	  of	  ‘his’	  territory,	  and	  following	  up	  with	  the	  requisite	  aggression	  when	  his	  claim	  was	  challenged.	  He	  had	  a	  conservative	  understanding	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  man	  around	  the	  house,	  which	  translated	  into	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  ‘objects’,	   i.e.	   women,	   within	   the	   space	   should	   obey	   his	   will.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  women	  had	  the	  temerity	  to	  assert	  their	  own	  spatial	  existence	  –	  for	  example	  by	  insisting	  that	  their	  bodies	  were	  their	  own	  and	  that	  he	  had	  no	  right	  to	  transgress	  their	  boundaries	  –	  thus	  limited	  the	  control	  over	  the	  movement	  of	  ‘things’	  in	  what	  he	  considered,	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  gender,	  his	  space.	  For	  the	  women,	  this	  resulted	  in	  the	  home	  they	  lived	  in	  ceasing	  to	  be	  a	  safe	  space,	  as	  their	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  domain	  –	  both	  of	  the	  house	  and	  of	  their	  bodies	  –	  was	  no	  longer	  guaranteed.	  Under	   different	   circumstances,	   they	   may	   have	   had	   little	   defence	   against	   this	  situation,	  since	  homeless	  women	  are	  often	  forced	  to	  accept	  unwelcome	  sexual	  advances	  to	  put	  a	  roof	  over	  their	  heads	  or	  keep	  it	  there	  (e.g.	  Greene	  et	  al,	  1999).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Police	  most	  often	  regarded	  squatting	  as	  such	  a	  ‚private	  matter’	  as	  it	  was	  codified	  in	  civil,	  rather	  than	  criminal	  law	  and	  therefore	  outside	  their	  responsibility.	  Unless	  they	  had	  a	  specific	  interest	  in	  a	  squat	  because	  of	  its	  political	  activities	  or	  because	  they	  had	  a	  reason	  to	  suspect	  crime,	  they	  often	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  get	  involved.	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Since	  these	  women	  however	  had	  access	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  squatting	  scene,	  and	   thus	   the	   ethical	   impetus	   to	   create	   Safe	   Spaces,	   they	  used	   this	   leverage	   to	  mobilise	  the	  help	  of	  others.	  The	  rest	  of	   the	  house	   identified	  the	  women	  as	  the	  ones	   who,	   in	   this	   situation,	   were	   vulnerable	   to	   violence	   and	   thus	   in	   need	   of	  protection.	   The	   following	   reaction,	   namely	   to	   remove	   T	   from	   the	   space,	   was	  therefore	   doubtlessly	   territorial,	   but	   it	   was	   also	   based	   on	   a	   analysis	   of	   the	  concrete	  power	  relations	  at	  play	  –	  the	  setting	  of	  boundaries	  was	  not	  primarily	  geared	   toward	   excluding	   T,	   but	   was	   supposed	   to	   benefit	   the	   people	   he	   was	  threatening.	  	  	  	  T	   (rightfully)	   saw	  his	  masculine	   ‘honour’	   questioned	   and	   reacted	   in	   the	   time-­‐‑honoured	  manner	  of	  the	  territorial	  subject,	  by	  posturing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  threatened	  violence,	   but	   not	   actually	   attacking	   anyone.	   His	   axe-­‐‑wielding	   display	  was	   not	  really	  geared	  toward	  hurting,	  but	  at	  evoking	  the	  impression	  that	  he	  had	  the	  will	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  house	  reacted	  with	  another	  call	  for	  help,	  and	  again,	  more	  people	   arrived	   to	   support	   those	   they	   identified	   as	   the	  more	   vulnerable	  party,	  namely	  those	  who	  took	  the	  side	  of	  the	  women.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  even	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  anarchist’s	  own	  stated	  political	  analysis,	  this	  implied	  something	  of	   a	   trade-­‐‑off,	   since	   T	  was	   not	   only	   a	  masculine	   subject,	   but	   also	   a	   person	   of	  colour.	  There	  were	  therefore	  two	  intersecting	  axes	  of	  domination	  involved,	  and	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  appropriate	  to	  critically	  ask	  whether	  racism	  played	  into	  this	  course	  of	  action.	  What	  happened	  next,	  however,	  shows	  the	  weakness	  of	  such	  an	  identity-­‐‑based	   analysis.	  Up	  until	   this	   point,	   all	   of	   this	   could	  have	   simply	   been	  down	   to	   the	   application	   of	   a	   certain	   normative	   rule	   –	   “if	   there	   is	   a	   conflict	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  take	  the	  side	  of	  the	  woman	  no	  matter	  what”	  –	  and	  does	  not	  yet	  show	  us	  any	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ethics	  of	  recognition	  at	  play.	  Note,	  however,	  what	  happened	  when	  the	  police	  arrived:	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  police,	  T	  as	  an	  undocumented	  migrant	  was	  recognised	  as	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  party.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  balance	  of	  solidarity	  shifted,	  and	  suddenly,	  the	  same	  people	  who	  just	  a	  moment	  ago	  tried	  to	  get	  T	  out	  of	  the	  house	  now	  protected	  him	  from	  the	  new	  aggressor.	  Again,	  there	  was	  a	  territorial	  element	  involved:	  the	  police	  were	  acting	  as	  representatives	  of	  a	  state	  which	  attempted	  to	  secure	  its	  territory	  against	  the	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likes	   of	   T.	   While	   he	   had	   just	   been	   in	   the	   role	   of	   the	   territorial	   dominant,	   T	  therefore	  now	  found	  himself	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  subjugated	  party,	  a	  role	  that	  could	  be	  called	  that	  of	  the	   ‘territorial	  other’.	  As	  such,	  he	  was	  now	  the	  one	  in	  need	  of	  protection,	  until	  the	  ‘territorial	  dominant’,	  i.e.	  the	  state,	  had	  withdrawn.	  As	  soon	  as	   the	   police	   had	   left,	   the	   balance	   shifted	   again,	   back	   to	   solidarity	   with	   the	  women,	  and	  T	  was	  finally	  successfully	  removed.	  	  	  What	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	   situation	   show,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   this	   practical	  application	   of	   ethical	   principles	   rested	   not	   so	   much	   on	   identification	   with	  particular	   political	   identities,	   but	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   who,	   in	   a	   concrete,	  situational	   power	   relation,	   was	   the	   more	   vulnerable	   party.	   Without	   any	  conscious	  deliberation,	  the	  anarchists	  sided	  first	  with	  the	  women	  against	  T,	  then	  seamlessly	   moved	   to	   siding	   with	   T	   against	   the	   police,	   and	   finally	   equally	  seamlessly	  moved	  back	  to	  siding	  with	  the	  women	  –	  all	  depending	  on	  who	  at	  a	  concrete	  point	  in	  time	  was	  most	  urgently	  in	  need	  of	  protection.	  The	  point	  was	  therefore	   not	   to	   privilege	   ‘gender’	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   ‘race’,	   but	   to	   practically	  assess	   who	   was	   under	   threat	   right	   now	   and	   take	   that	   person’s	   side.	   While	  knowledge	  of	  actually	  existing	  political	  power	  relations	  was	  important	  to	  analyse	  the	   situation	   and	   identify	   who	   that	   was,	   the	   underlying	   logic	   was	   more	  encompassing	  than	  just	  “side	  with	  women”	  or	  “side	  with	  migrants”	  –	  it	  was	  an	  ethics	   that	   out	   of	   a	   rejection	   of	   domination	   as	   such	   implied	   solidarity	   with	  whoever	  was	  being	  dominated.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  shifting	  of	  solidarities,	  geared	  towards	  tipping	  the	  scales	  of	  power	  toward	  equilibrium.	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Figure	  7:	  Basic	  anarchist	  ethics	   	  
	   	  Figure	  8:	  Advanced	  anarchist	  ethics	  	  The	  above	  diagrams	  illustrate	  schematically	  how	  this	  very	  simple	  and	  effective	  principle	  worked	  in	  order	  to	  stabilise	  the	  balance	  of	  power.	  What	  they	  cannot	  convey	  is	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  this	  practice	  –	  it	  precisely	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  fix	  solidarity	   in	   one	   particular	   configuration,	   but	   rather,	   flexibly	   adapted	   to	   the	  situational	  play	  of	  power	  dynamics,	  a	  form	  of	  recognition-­‐‑in-­‐‑motion.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	   this	   was	   not	   a	   question	   of	   either	   applying	   an	   ethics	   of	   recognition	   or	   a	  territorial	  ethics,	  but	  involved	  a	  movement	  between	  one	  and	  the	  other	  –	  from	  the	  recognition	  of	  vulnerability	  came	  the	  need	  to	  adopt	  a	  territorial	  stance,	  but	  this	  territory	   equally	   shifted	   when	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   changed,	   sometimes	  including	   T,	   sometimes	   excluding	   him.	   This	   form	   of	   ethical	   practice	   therefore	  resembled	  a	  complex	  dance,	  in	  which	  a	  pattern	  of	  recognition	  was	  mapped	  onto	  a	  quick	  succession	  of	  manifest	  power	  relations.	  	  	  What	  we	  can	  take	  from	  this,	   for	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  discussion,	   is	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  ethical	  patterns	  are	  inscribed	  into	  the	  matrix	  of	  power	  relations	  that	  is	  commonly	  referred	   to	   as	   ‘intersectionality’,	   also	   and	   especially	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  construction	  of	  space.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  explore	  this	  idea	  at	  some	  more	  length,	  by	  contrasting	  the	  already	  familiar	  ‘struggle	  for	  recognition’	  with	  another	  kind	   of	   struggle	   prominent	   in	   philosophy	   –	   that	   of	   the	   ‘struggle	   for	   being’	   as	  discussed	  in	  phenomenology	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Heidegger.	  As	  I	  will	  aim	  to	  show,	  while	  the	  Hobbesian	  notion	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  can	  inform	  us	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  such	  a	  self	  in	  a	  presumed	  antagonistic	  ‘state	  of	  nature’,	  Heidegger’s	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work	  and	  life	  are	  prime	  examples	  of	  what	  happens	  when	  such	  a	  self	  is	  taken	  not,	  as	  in	  Hobbes,	  as	  a	  necessary	  evil,	  but	  as	  an	  ideal	  model	  for	  human	  behaviour.	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Chapter	  Eight:	  A	  Tale	  Of	  Two	  Struggles	  	  	  
I’ve	  read	  Hamlet,	  I	  know	  men	  suffer.	  	  Andrea	  Dworkin	  	  	  In	  the	  last	  chapter	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  territoriality	  –	  the	  spatial	  expression	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	  –	  can	  be	  a	  double-­‐‑edged	  sword.	  Like	  any	  weapon,	  it	  can	  be	   used	   for	   attack	   or	   for	   self-­‐‑defense,	   and	   whether	   it	   does	   one	   or	   the	   other	  depends	  on	   the	  concrete	  power	  relations	   in	  question.	  Thus,	  paradoxically,	   the	  creation	  of	  safe	  space,	  that	  is	  a	  space	  comprised	  of	  the	  domains	  of	  equal	  subjects,	  sometimes	  comes	  to	  rely	  on	  territorial	  practices	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  its	  continued	  existence.	  If	  we	  return	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  recognition	  as	  originally	  formulated	  in	  Hegel,	  this	  very	  same	  principle	  informs	  the	  position	  of	  the	  slave	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Master	  –	  since	  he	  is	  denied	  recognition	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  subject,	  the	  slave	  has	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  struggle	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  the	  Master	  that	  he	  is	  indeed	  an	  equal,	  thus	  acting	  with	  a	  similar	  degree	  of	  aggression,	  but	  a	  very	  different	  motivation.	  But	  if	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  recognition’	  can	  be	  read	  as	  the	  attempt	  of	  a	  spatial	  self	  to	  have	  the	   integrity	  of	   its	  domain	  respected,	   then	  what	  would	  be	  the	  equivalent	  stance	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  territorial	  self?	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  suggest	  approaching	   this	   question	   through	   a	   reading	   of	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   struggle;	  namely	   the	   ‘struggle	   for	   Being’	   as	   it	   has	   been	   discussed	   in	   the	   existentialist	  tradition,	  and	  particularly	  in	  Heidegger.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  will	  give	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  and	  when	  territoriality	  becomes	  what	  Sack	  (1986)	  calls	  “malevolent”,	  that	  is,	  how	  territorial	  dominance	  translates	  into	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  space	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  harm	  those	  affected	  by	  territorial	  control.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  will	  give	  us	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  our	  ethical	  patterns	  –	  the	  pattern	  of	  misrecognition	  in	  this	  case	  –	  can	  come	  to	  manifest	  on	  the	  macro-­‐‑level	  of	  culture,	  and	  thus	  replicate	  some	  of	  the	  features	  we	  have	  identified	  on	  the	  individual	  and	  interpersonal	  levels	  on	  a	  larger	  scale.	  	  	  In	  addressing	  this	  aspect	  through	  Heidegger,	  I	  am	  arguably	  deviating	  somewhat	  from	   my	   cultural	   focus,	   drawing	   on	   the	   political	   life	   and	   work	   of	   a	   German	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philosopher	  rather	  than	  a	  British	  proponent	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  argument.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  this:	  first	  and	  foremost	  that	  if	  one	  is	  going	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  cultural	  critique,	  it	  is	  only	  polite	  to	  start	  with	  one’s	  own	  culture	  before	  pointing	  a	  finger	  at	  somebody	  else’s.	  However,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	   many	   of	   the	   features	   of	   Heidegger’s	   uniquely	   territorial	   account	   of	  spatiality	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  British	  culture,	  and	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  the	  British	  tradition	  has	  many	  fine	  examples	  of	  philosophies	  of	  territoriality,	  such	  as	  Hobbes	  from	  whom	  we	  have	  borrowed	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘territorial	  self’.	  While	  I	  will	  return	  to	  Hobbes,	  I	  am	  choosing	  Heidegger	  here	  because	  his	  philosophy	  is	  in	  a	   lot	  of	  ways	  a	  purer	  example	  of	   ‘malevolent	   territoriality’.	  Hobbes,	   for	  all	  his	  pessimistic	   outlook,	   does	   not	   advocate	   the	   war	   of	   all	   against	   all	   –	   he	  merely	  diagnoses	  it;	  and	  suggests	  that	  territoriality,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  or	  the	  state,	  should	  remedy	  this	  state	  of	  ubiquitous	  antagonism.	  Heidegger,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	  so	  much	  see	  territoriality	  as	  a	  necessary	  evil	  as	  he	  glories	  in	  it,	  resulting	  in	  a	  convergence	  of	  his	  thought	  and	  his	  politics	  that	  led	  him	  directly	  to	  an	  identification	  with	  the	  territorial	  project	  of	  the	  Nazi	  state.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  this	  convergence	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  mistake	  or	  a	  temporary	  aberration	  in	  the	  life	  of	  an	  otherwise	  fine	  philosopher,	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  thinking	  that	  has	  made	  the	  ideology	  of	  territorial	  dominance	  its	  pivotal	  point.	  The	  key	  to	  this	  ideology	  lies	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  ethical	  relations	  implied	  in	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  we	  have	  to	  start	  with	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  the	  self.	  Heidegger	  prominently	  critiqued	  the	  Cartesian	  subject,	  i.e.	  the	  ‘self-­‐‑objectifying’	  rational	  mind,	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  truth.	  This	  should	   remind	   us	   somewhat	   of	   the	   kinds	   of	   criticism	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   5,	  where	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘despotic	  dominion’	  of	  the	  mind	  over	  the	  rest	  results	  in	  an	  alienated	  account	  of	  embodiment,	  emotion	  and	  morality.	  Heidegger	  tries	  to	  resolve	   this	   issue	   by	   postulating	   ‘Being’	   (rather	   than	   the	   ‘subjectivity’	   of	  Enlightenment	   philosophy)	   as	   the	   central	   category	   of	   his	   account	   of	   human	  existence,	  and	  argues	  that	  while	  reasoning	  can	  only	  alienate	  Being	  from	  itself,	  it	  can	   ‘come	  to	  itself’	   in	  a	  kind	  of	  primordial	  revelation	  or	  immediate	  experience	  that	  has	  decidedly	  religious	  undertones	  (Faye,	  2009).	  Philosophy	  then	  for	  him	  is	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also	  not	  so	  much	  a	  process	  of	   thought	  or	   ‘knowledge	  production’,	  but	  a	  quasi-­‐‑religious	  practice	  of	  openness	  to	  the	  revelation	  of	  Being	  to	  itself.	  This	  process	  is	  not	  a	  peaceful	  one,	  since	  Being	  has	  to	  constantly	  assert	  itself	  against	  all	  kinds	  of	  imposition,	  not	  least	  that	  of	  thinking,	  and	  therefore,	  “ontology	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  warfare	  occurring	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  existence,	  for	  it	  is	  only	  in	  and	  through	  such	  existence	   that	   Being	   can	  manifest	   itself”	   (McBride,	   1997,	   165).	   This	   ‘warfare’	  encompasses	  the	  person	  in	  his/her	  entirety,	  since	  “the	  struggle	  for	  Being	  drives	  itself	   onto	   the	   field	   of	   thinking,	   of	   asserting,	   of	   the	   soul,	   of	   subjectivity”	  (Heidegger,	  cited	  ibid.),	  and	  war	  thus	  becomes	  the	  driving	  principle	  of	  existence.	  	  	  To	   appreciate	   what	   this	   means	   in	   practice,	   it	   is	   worth	   looking	   at	   how	  anthropologists	  have	  used	  this	  notion	  to	  describe	   the	   lives	  of	  actually	  existing	  people.	  The	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’,	  received	  through	  Heidegger’s	  student	  Jean	  Paul	  Sartre,	   informs	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	  work	   of	  Michael	   Jackson	   (2005).	   Jackson’s	  ethnographic	  accounts	  of	  precarious	   lives	  of	  migrants	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	   is	  informed	   by	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   “perennial	   struggle	   for	   existence”	   as	   “a	  dynamic	   relationship	   between	   circumstances	   over	   which	   we	   have	   little	  control…and	  our	  capacity	  to	  live	  those	  circumstances	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways”	  (p	  xi,	  emphasis	   orig.).	   ‘Being’	   therefore	   here	   struggles	   against	   constraints	   on	   itself	  posed	  by	  the	  exterior	  world	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  “not	  reducible	  to	  history	  but	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  human	  condition”,	  manifested	  in	  a	  hiatus	  between	  “the	  objects	  on	   which	   we	   fasten	   in	   our	   ongoing	   search	   for	   satisfaction…and	   the	  undifferentiated	   yearnings	   that	   are	   the	   precondition	   of	   existence	   itself”	   (ibid,	  165).	  Jackson	  protests	  against	  a	  ‘clichéd’	  understanding	  of	  existentialism	  which	  is	   concerned	   only	   with	   the	   individual	   and	   its	   ‘cast-­‐‑ness’	   into	   the	   world,	   and	  instead	  takes	  explicit	  recourse	  to	  object	  relations,	  and	  specifically	  Winnicott,	  to	  argue	  that	  anthropology	  should	  theorise	  the	  “dynamic	  relationship	  between	  the	  human	   capacity	   for	   life,	   and	   the	   potentialities	   of	   any	   social	   environment	   for	  providing	  the	  wherewithal	  of	  life”	  (ibid,	  xii).	  	  	  After	  what	  we	  have	  heard	  about	  object	  relations	  in	  chapter	  5,	  this	  should	  give	  us	  pause.	   As	   I	   have	   argued,	   the	  whole	   point	   of	   the	   ‘intersubjective’	   approach	   to	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psychoanalysis	  is	  precisely	  not	  to	  see	  a	  person’s	  social	  environment	  as	  a	  resource	  ‘providing	  the	  wherewithal’	  of	  anything,	  but	  as	  comprised	  of	  other	  people	  with	  whom	  the	   individual	  stands	   in	  relations	  of	  mutuality	  and	  interdependence.	  To	  see	   them	  as	   ‘potentialities’	   to	  sustain	  one’s	  own	  existence	   is	  paradoxically	   the	  hallmark	   of	   precisely	   the	   instrumental	   reason	   existentialism	   supposedly	  critiques,	  and	  leads	  directly	  to	  objectification	  and	  domination.	  It	  is	  this	  precise	  assumption	   about	   the	   ontological	   state	   of	   the	   self	   that	   Jessica	   Benjamin	  (1988/2013)	  criticises	  in	  Freud,	  who	  sees	  “the	  ego’s	  initial	  reaction	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  (as)	  hostile,	  rejecting	  its	  impingement”	  (p15)	  and	  has	  other	  people	  (like	  the	  ‘mother’)	  appear	  only	  as	  objects	  to	  satisfy	  the	  ego’s	  needs.	  Existence	  is	  here	  presented	  as	  in	  principle	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  war	  of	  the	  self	  against	  practically	  everything	   else	   (reminiscent	   of	   Sartre’s	   ‘hell	   is	   other	   people’),	   and	  intersubjectivity	   only	   comes	   into	   play	   in	   so	   far	   as	   others	   are	   ‘objects’	   or	  ‘circumstances’	  which	   can	   facilitate	   or	   impede	   one’s	   own	   chances	   of	   survival.	  Consequently,	   Jackson’s	   solitary	   ‘struggle	   for	   Being’	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   a	   fairly	  unpleasant	  affair,	  and	  he	  delivers	  many	  a	  chilling	  portrayal	  of	  human	  suffering	  while	  pondering	  what	  a	  shame	  it	  is	  that	  this	  should	  be	  the	  human	  condition.	  His	  account	  can	  therefore	  give	  us	  a	  good	  idea	  of	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  recognition’	  and	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  –	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  former	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  relation	  of	  mutuality,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  a	  conflictual	  one.	  The	  latter,	  however,	  does	  not	  make	  recourse	  to	  the	  other	  at	  all,	  save	  for	  its	  function	  as	  a	  life	  support	  system	  for	  the	  self,	  and	  thus	  rests	  on	  a	  model	  of	  the	  self	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  objectifying	  and	  instrumentalising	  ‘white	  masculine	  subject’	  we	  have	  already	  met	  in	  a	  number	  of	  contexts.	  As	  was	  said,	  this	  subject	  is	  inherently	  territorial,	  and	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  following,	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  space	  and	  place	  therefore	  reflect	  the	  preoccupations	  of	  a	  territorial	  self.	  	  	  In	  our	  previous	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  this	  self	  comes	  to	  stake	  its	  territorial	  claim	  by	  constructing	  a	  space	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  relies	  on	  policing	  of	  boundaries	  and	  thus	  seeks	   to	  “banish,	  exclude	  and	  marginalise”	  (Brace,	  1997,	  141),	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  subjects	  those	  dwelling	  within	  this	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territory	   to	   despotic,	   ‘rational’	   control.	   This	   has	   led	   a	   number	   of	  writers117	  to	  argue	  that	  a	   ‘home’	  that	   is	  characterised	  by	  territoriality	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  safe	  space	  at	  all	  for	  those	  who	  live	  in	  it,	  especially	  women	  and	  children.	  They	  are	  joined	  by	   feminists	  and	  postcolonial	   theorists118,	  who	  explicitly	  emphasise	  the	  ‘home’	  as	  a	  site	  of	  political	  domination,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  relations,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  producing	  a	  space	  free	  from	  a	  racialised	  other119.	  All	  these	  critiques	  aim,	  in	  different	  ways,	  at	  describing	  the	  dual	  strategies	  of	   internment	  and	  exclusion	  that	  characterise	  the	  territorial	  home,	  and	  turn	  it	  into	  what	  we	  have	  begun	  to	  call	  a	  ‘secure	  space’.	  Feminist	  critiques	  tend	  to	  focus	  more	  strongly	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  internment:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  subjugation	  of	  women	  as	  free	  domestic	  labour,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  outright	  domination	  of	  some	  women	  and	  children	  through	  ‘domestic	  violence’	  and	  imprisonment.	  The	  latter	  issue	  is	  also	  intimately	  tied	  up	  with	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   ‘home’	   as	   private,	  which	   can	   shield	   the	   physical,	  sexual	   and	   emotional	   abuse	   in	   it	   from	   detection	   (Young,	   1997/2001).	  	  Postcolonial	  critiques,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  emphasise	  the	  aspect	  of	  exclusion,	  here	  it	  is	  a	  subjugated	  and	  objectified	  other	  who	  has	  to	  be	  kept	  out	  (although,	  should	  he	  breach	  the	  perimeter,	  this	  other	  as	  well	  faces	  internment).	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	   therefore	   approach	   the	   logic	   of	   territoriality	   implied	   in	   the	   ‘struggle	   for	  Being’	  through	  Heidegger’s	  concept	  of	   ‘home’,	  and	  argue	  that	   it	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  involve	  both	  an	  account	  of	  gender	  and	  an	  account	  of	  ‘race’	  that	  makes	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  spatiality	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  ‘secure	  space’.	  	  Heidegger’s	  idea	  of	  ‘home’	  rests	  on	  his	  conceptions	  of	  ‘building’	  and	  ‘dwelling’.	  Dwelling	  is	  the	  specific	  way	  in	  which	  humans	  are	  ‘in	  the	  world’,	  and	  the	  specific	  mode	  of	  dwelling	  thus	  determines	  identity	  and	  belonging.	  It	  relates	  to	  building	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  shaping	  and	  making	  of	  the	  world	  itself	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  “world	  founding”	  (Young,	  1997/2001,	  256)	  and	  thus,	  a	  form	  of	  dwelling.	  Furthermore,	  “building	  as	  dwelling	  unfolds	  into	  the	  building	  that	  cultivates	  growing	  things	  and	  the	   building	   that	   erects	   buildings”	   (Heidegger,	   1971,	   146).	   Although	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  See	  chapter	  6	  118	  Such	  as	  De	  Beauvoir	  (1952);	  Said	  (1993);	  Young	  (1997);	  Dworkin	  (2000);	  Mohanty/Martin	  (2003);	  O’Mahony	  (2006);	  Weir	  (2008)	  119	  In	  contrast,	  bell	  hooks	  (1990)	  argues	  that	  a	  home	  can	  become	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  also	  for	  those	  oppressed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘race’,	  since	  the	  safekeeping	  from	  the	  racialised	  Other	  works	  both	  ways	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conception	   is	   initially	   framed	  as	  a	  dual	  one	  –	  cultivating	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  erecting	  on	  the	  other	  –	  Heidegger	  then	  abandons	  the	  aspect	  of	  cultivation	  to	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  construction.	  “Building	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  preserving	  and	  nurturing	  is	  not	  making	  anything”	  (147)	  he	  states,	  thus	  privileging	  the	  activity	  of	  making	  to	  that	   of	   nurturing	   and	   protecting.	   Feminist	   commentators	   such	   as	   Iris	   Young	  (1997,	   2001)	   have	   pointed	   out	   the	   relatively	   obvious	   gender	   bias	   in	   this	  conception:	  	  	  “Through	  building,	  man	  establishes	  a	  world	  and	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world,	  according	  
to	   Heidegger,	   establishes	   himself	   as	   somebody,	   with	   an	   identity	   and	   history…If	  
building	   in	   this	  way	   is	   basic	   to	   the	   emergence	  of	   subjectivity,	   to	   dwelling	   in	   the	  
world	  with	  identity	  and	  history,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  only	  men	  are	  subjects120.	  
On	  the	  whole,	  women	  do	  not	  build”	  (2001,	  255)	  	  	  The	   problem,	   as	   Young	   recognises,	   does	   not	   so	   much	   lie	   in	   the	   unequal	  distribution	  of	  opportunities	  to	  construct,	  but	   in	  the	  hierarchical	  evaluation	  of	  the	   activity	   of	   constructing	   versus	   that	   of	   preserving 121 .	   Drawing	   on	   Luce	  Irigaray,	  she	  then	  proceeds	  to	  name	  the	  gender	  bias	  involved	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  building,	  which	   sees	  man	   constructing	  himself	   a	  place	   in	   a	  natural	  world	   that	  precedes	  him.	  This	  nature,	   for	  Irigaray,	   is	  symbolic	  of	  the	  mother,	   from	  whose	  womb	  man	  was	  ‘ejected’	  and	  where	  he,	  in	  her	  view,	  attempts	  to	  return	  in	  every	  act	   of	   heterosexual	   intercourse.	   The	   building	   activities	   of	   man	   thus	   come	   to	  appear	  as	  a	  nostalgic	  attempt	  to	  replace	  the	  dwelling	  of	  the	  womb,	  with	  woman	  as	  both	  building	  material	  and	  the	  mirror	  of	  his	  emerging	  subjectivity.	  In	  Irigaray’s	  formulation,	  woman	  therefore	  is	  a	  form	  of	  dwelling	  for	  man,	  which	  he	  comes	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  This	  formulation	  is	  technically	  not	  entirely	  correct	  since,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail,	  for	  Heidegger	  actually	  no	  one	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  ‘subject’	  in	  the	  usual	  sense	  since	  ‘subjectivity’	  is	  precisely	  what	  his	  concept	  of	  Being	  is	  formulated	  against.	  	  121	  Young	  therefore	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  preserving	  to	  that	  of	  building,	  without,	  however,	  asking	  why	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  building	  for	  Heidegger	  should	  lead	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  subjectivity	  while	  preserving	  should	  not.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  becomes	  understandable	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  situation	  Young	  describes	  in	  reverse	  –	  building	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  produce	  subjectivity,	  but	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  setting	  where	  only	  men	  are	  subjects,	  everything	  men	  do	  must	  appear	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  subjectivity.	  Conversely,	  if	  women	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  objects,	  then	  whatever	  they	  do	  (building,	  preserving,	  nurturing	  or	  anything	  else)	  must	  appear	  as	  but	  the	  raw	  material	  of	  men’s	  all	  the	  more	  essential	  contributions	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shape	   to	   his	   requirements.	   Young,	   paraphrasing	   Irigaray,	   then	   sums	   up:	  “Everyone	  is	  born	  in	  loss.	  Ejected	  from	  the	  dark	  comfort	  of	  the	  mother’s	  body,	  we	  are	   thrown	   into	   a	  world	  without	  walls,	  with	  no	   foundation	   to	   our	   fragile	   and	  open-­‐‑ended	  existence”.	  	  	  	  Since	  this	  ‘ejection’	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  Heidegger’s	  ‘struggle’,	  let	  us	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  this	  idea.	  As	  Bachelard	  sums	  up	  in	  his	  ironic	  metaphor	  “before	  he	  is	  ‘cast	  into	  the	  world’,	  as	  claimed	  by	  certain	  hasty	  metaphysics,	  man	  is	  laid	  in	  the	  cradle	  of	  the	   house”	   (1958/1994,	   7),	   and	   as	   object	   relations	   theorists	   elaborate,	   this	  scenario	  of	  ‘ejection’	  into	  a	  cold	  and	  hostile	  world	  is	  the	  case	  only	  under	  the	  most	  unfortunate	   of	   circumstances,	   and,	   as	   psychoanalysts	   such	   as	   John	   Bowlby	  (1951)	  have	  demonstrated,	   in	  real	   life	  results	   in	  severe	  emotional	  disturbance	  and	  possibly	  death.	  Normal	  human	  development,	  rather	  than	  ‘thrownness’	  and	  abandonment	  to	  the	  elements,	  consists	  in	  a	  prolonged	  phase	  of	  inhabiting	  what	  Bachelard	   calls	   a	   ‘cradle’,	  Winnicott	   frames	  as	   a	   ‘holding	   space’	   and	  Benjamin	  speaks	  of	  as	  the	  original	  relation	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  between	  the	  child	  and	  its	  ‘mother’.	  Although	  the	  child	  is	  no	  longer	  inside	  the	  womb,	  it	  is	  therefore	  safely	  contained	  and	  in	  an	  intimate,	  mutually	  constituting	  relationship	  with	  an	  other,	  until	   it	   gradually	   develops	   enough	   independence	   to	   venture	   out	   of	   this	   safe	  primal	  space	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  world.	  	  	  Why	   then	   the	  emphasis	  on	   ‘thrownness’,	   a	  Heideggerian	   conception	   that	  here	  curiously	  escapes	  feminist	  critique?	  The	  answer	  may	  lie	  not	  so	  much	  in	  ontology,	  but	   rather	   in	   precisely	   the	  masculine	   bias	   that	   Young	   and	   Irigaray	   set	   out	   to	  critique.	  	  As	  Jessica	  Benjamin	  argues,	  although	  the	  primal	  relationship	  involves	  mutual	  recognition	  between	  two	  subjects,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  the	  mother,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  she	  is	  a	  woman	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  society,	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  is	  externally	  defined	  as	  an	  object.	  This	  situation	  comes	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  socially	  enforced	  ‘gender	  specific	  development’	  of	  the	  child,	  who,	  at	  the	  point	  that	  Freud	  called	  the	  oedipal	  conflict	  is	  forced	  to	  accept	  either	  that	  she	  is	  a	  girl	  (and	  thus	  like	  the	  mother)	  or	  that	  he	  is	  a	  boy	  (and	  thus	  different	  from	  the	  mother).	  In	  case	  of	  the	  boy-­‐‑child,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  mother,	  the	  first	  other	  he	  was	  in	  mutual	  recognition	  with,	  has	  to	  
	   212	  
be	  repudiated,	  separated	  from,	  and	  denigrated,	  so	  the	  boy	  can	  come	  to	  identify	  with	   the	   father	   (another	   man/subject)	   instead.	   This	   crucially	   involves	   the	  repression,	   or	   ‘splitting-­‐‑off’	   of	   those	   parts	   of	   the	   boy’s	   psyche	   which	   are	  associated	  with	  the	  feminine,	  such	  as	  emotion,	  nurturing	  or	  vulnerability,	  traits	  that	   he	   then	  projects	   outside	   of	   himself	   onto	   other	   (female)	   bodies,	  which	  he	  simultaneously	   tries	   to	   control	   and	   violently	   rejects:	   “the	   vulnerability	   of	  masculinity	   that	   is	   forged	   in	   the	   crucible	   of	   femininity,	   the	   ‘great	   task’	   of	  separation	   so	   seldom	   completed,	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   later	  objectification	  of	  women”	  (Benjamin,	  1988/2013,	  76).	  	  	  We	   have	   already	   encountered	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘splitting’	   in	   chapter	   5,	   when	  discussing	  the	  embodiment	  of	  ethical	  patterns	  in	  terms	  of	  object	  relations.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  with	  Duffell	  (2000,	  2014),	  the	  production	  of	  masculine	  subjectivities	  in	   the	   boarding	   school	   system	   relies	   on	   a	   mechanism	   of	   splitting	   off	   and	  projecting	  parts	  of	  the	  self	  –	  primarily	  vulnerability,	  weakness	  and	  dependency	  –	  and	  projecting	   them	  onto	  somebody	  else.	  The	   trajectory	  of	   such	  a	   ‘boarding	  school	  survivor’	  is	  therefore	  a	  real-­‐‑life	  example	  of	  the	  above	  dynamic	  –	  separated	  from	  the	  feminine	  in	  both	  the	  concrete	  and	  the	  abstract,	  the	  young	  boy	  here	  is	  thrown	   into	   an	   all-­‐‑male	   environment	   characterised	   by	   an	   ideal	   of	   strength,	  superiority	  and	  violence.	  If	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  come	  under	  suspicion	  of	  not	  being	  a	  ‘real	  man’,	  the	  boy	  therefore	  has	  to	  learn	  to	  ‘outsource’	  the	  undesirable	  parts	  of	  himself	   and	   project	   them	   onto	   other	   people,	   thus	   constructing	   ‘femininity’	   in	  conflictual	  opposition	  to	  himself.	  Such	  a	  boy	  is	  then	  literally	  ‘cast	  out’	  and	  ‘thrown	  into	  the	  world’,	  and	  while	  he	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  return	  to	  the	  ‘womb’	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  he	  might	  long	  to	  go	  back	  home	  –	  a	  longing,	  however,	  that	  is	  proscribed	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  an	  environment	  that	  wants	  to	  turn	  him	  into	  an	  embodiment	  of	  territorial	  masculinity.	  	  	  The	   example	   of	   boarding	   schools	   thus	   illustrates	   that	   it	   is	   not	   an	   ahistorical	  ‘human	  condition’	  that	  winds	  man	  up	  in	  a	  state	  of	  ‘thrownness’,	  but	  rather,	  this	  state	  is	  a	  result	  of	  social	  relations	  which	  force	  him	  to	  abandon	  his	  ‘cradle’	  and	  to	  identify	   with	   the	   competitive	   and	   aggressive	  world	   of	  masculine	   subjects.	   As	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Stoltenberg	  (2000,	  2005)	  argues,	  this	  world	  is	  hostile	  in	  so	  far	  as	  men	  can	  never	  be	  entirely	  sure	  whether	   the	  separation	   from	  the	  devalued	   feminine	  has	  been	  fully	   accomplished.	   Certainty	   about	   this	   question	   (i.e.	   about	   the	   fact	   one	   is	   a	  subject	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  once	  was	  intimately	  connected	  to	  a	  mere	  object)	  can	  only	  come	  from	  another	  subject,	   i.e.	  a	  man,	  and	  so	  men	  are	  fundamentally	  preoccupied	   with	   asserting	   to	   each	   other	   and	   themselves	   the	   fact	   of	   their	  subjectivity.	   As	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   this	   also	   and	   particularly	  involves	  territoriality	  as	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  masculine	  self,	  and	  thus	  men	  challenge	  each	  other’s	  status	  through	  all	  kinds	  of	   territorial	  displays.	  Stoltenberg	  argues	  that	  this	  permanent	  state	  of	  warfare	  is	  only	  interspersed	  with	  tentative	  truces	  struck	  ‘over	  the	  body’	  of	  another.	  This	  means	  that	  such	  men	  can	  only	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  somebody	  who	  both	  can	  agree	  is	  less	  of	  a	  man	  than	  them	  –	  a	  woman,	   for	   instance,	  but	  also	  a	  gay	  man,	  a	   transgender	  person,	  or	  a	  ‘feminised’	  racial	  other122.	  This	  third	  party	  then	  becomes	  the	  ‘raw	  material’	  that	  allows	  men	  to	  put	  their	  competition	  aside	  and	  join	  forces	  in	  the	  denigration	  of	  the	   ‘less	  masculine	  one’123.	  The	   feminine	   thus	  becomes	  a	  proxy	   that	  mediates	  men’s	  mutual	  experience	  of	  subjecthood,	  since	  direct	  recognition	  of	  one	  another	  is	  precluded	  through	  the	  taboo	  on	  vulnerability.	  	  	  	  In	  this	  relation	  then	  also	  lies	  a	  first	  clue	  as	  to	  the	  perspective	  taken	  by	  Heidegger	  in	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’.	  I	  am	  not	  implying,	  of	  course,	  that	  humans	  do	  not	  often	  have	  to	  struggle	  for	  their	  mere	  existence,	  physically	  or	  psychically,	  and	  that	  such	  struggles	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   conception	   of	   this	  struggle	  as	  the	  human	  condition	  per	  se,	  however,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  Being	  who	  finds	  himself	  ‘cast’	  into	  a	  hostile	  and	  cold	  world	  full	  of	  existential	  threat	  is	  most	   likely	   male.	   Moreover,	   masculinity	   here	   is	   already	   a	   ‘fallout	   product’	   –	  namely	   of	   the	   prior	   breakdown	   of	   the	   original	   condition	   of	   mutuality.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  As	  Stoltenberg	  argues,	  predominantly	  male	  institutions	  like	  the	  military	  or	  the	  police	  therefore	  also	  have	  the	  function	  of	  providing	  a	  strict	  hierarchy,	  which	  to	  some	  degree	  serves	  to	  channel	  masculine	  competition	  through	  removing	  the	  constant	  need	  to	  negotiate	  rank	  (2015,	  personal	  correspondence)	  –	  an	  assessment	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  equally	  true	  for	  boarding	  schools.	  123	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  initial	  altercation	  in	  Lordship	  and	  Bondage	  could	  also	  be	  read	  as	  the	  meeting	  of	  two	  masculine	  subjects	  who,	  for	  the	  sheer	  life	  of	  them,	  have	  to	  prove	  to	  each	  other	  that	  they	  are	  men.	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masculine	  subject	  is	  thus	  essentially	  left	  alone	  in	  a	  world	  where	  everything	  and	  everyone	  else	  appears	  either	  as	  an	  object	  of	  his	  needs	  and	  wants,	  or	  a	  potential	  adversary	  who	  could	  challenge	  his	  dominance.	   In	  psychoanalysis,	   this	   state	  of	  affairs	   is	   also	   referred	   to	   under	   such	   labels	   as	   ‘pathological	   narcissism’	   (e.g.	  Kernberg,	  1975,	  1976,	  1984;	  Fromm,	  1964;	  Kohut,	  1971),	  or	   in	  more	  extreme	  forms,	   ‘sociopathy’	   or	   ‘psychopathy’	   (Hare,	   1999;	   Babiak/Hare,	   2006).	   It	  describes	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  self	  which	  is	  capable	  only	  of	  instrumental	  relations	  with	  others,	  who	  are	  not	  recognised	  as	  independent	  but	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  merely	  as	   functional	   extensions	   of	   the	   self.	   There	   is	   on-­‐‑going	   debate	   among	  psychoanalysts	   as	   to	   whether	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   narcissism	   is	   a	   ‘healthy’	  component	   of	   the	   psyche	   or	  whether	   it	   is	   always	   ‘pathological’124,	   agreement	  exists	  however	  that	  in	  its	  more	  extreme	  manifestations125,	  narcissism	  inevitably	  amounts	   to	  a	   certain	  emotional	   solipsism,	  a	   condition	  of	  existential	   loneliness	  that	  results	  from	  an	  experience	  of	  others	  as	  mere	  objects,	  incapable	  of	  awarding	  intersubjective	  recognition,	  or	  as	  threats	  to	  the	  fragile	  and	  fragmented	  self.	  Beers	  (1992)	  sees	  narcissism	  as	  a	  specifically	  masculine	  phenomenon	  –	  i.e.	  a	  structure	  inherent	   in	   masculinity	   as	   such	   –	   and	   argues	   that	   at	   its	   core	   is	   a	   fear	   of	  disintegration	  and	  death,	  a	  fear	  that	  must	  be	  externalised	  in	  order	  to	  control	  it.	  He	  therefore	  draws	  a	  connection	  between	  male	  narcissism	  and	  sacrifice,	  arguing	  that	  religious	  rituals	  also	  and	  especially	  function	  to	  maintain	  the	  coherence	  of	  an	  unstable	  self	  by	  ritually	  destroying	  contradicting	  and	  unacceptable	  parts	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  I	  use	  quotes	  when	  using	  the	  terms	  ‘healthy’	  and	  ‘pathological’	  in	  relation	  to	  socio-­‐‑psychological	  conditions,	  in	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	  constitute	  mental	  health	  or	  illness	  is	  both	  a	  medical	  and	  a	  social	  and	  political	  matter	  (see	  e.g.	  Foucault,	  1973),	  and	  such	  categories	  are	  therefore	  never	  unproblematic.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  mental	  and	  behavioural	  states	  are	  certainly	  more	  conductive	  to	  individual	  and	  collective	  flourishing	  than	  others,	  and	  thus	  attempts	  at	  framing	  as	  pathological	  that	  which	  causes	  suffering	  cannot	  entirely	  be	  attributed	  to	  political	  domination.	  In	  any	  case,	  since	  I	  do	  not	  have	  any	  medical	  qualification,	  my	  use	  of	  medical	  categories	  and	  diagnoses	  is	  strictly	  conceptual	  and	  does	  not	  make	  any	  claims	  to	  medical	  expertise.	  	  125	  Framed	  in	  the	  DSM	  V	  and	  the	  ICD	  10	  (the	  US	  and	  European	  diagnostic	  manuals	  for	  mental	  disorders)	  as	  ‘Narcissistic	  Personality	  Disorder’.	  The	  problematic	  nature	  of	  diagnostic	  criteria	  is	  exemplified	  e.g.	  in	  the	  newer	  DSM	  V	  version	  of	  ‘sociopathy’,	  namely	  ‘Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder’	  (ASPD).	  It	  is	  in	  part	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  compliance	  with	  governmentality	  (e.g.	  breaking	  the	  law),	  rather	  than	  suffering	  caused	  to	  self	  and/or	  others,	  thus	  mixing	  medical,	  social	  and	  legal	  categories.	  Unlike	  psychiatric	  (i.e.	  medical)	  categories,	  the	  psychoanalytic	  description	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  ‘sociopath’	  or	  ‘malignant	  narcissist’	  (Fromm	  1964)	  does,	  however,	  come	  very	  close	  to	  the	  subjectivity	  I	  am	  discussing	  here.	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form	  of	  others126.	  Since	  a	  narcissist	  believes	  that	  others	  are	  extensions	  of	  him,	  he	  experiences	  their	  individuality	  and	  independence	  as	  threatening,	  and	  will	  go	  to	  great,	   and	   sometimes	   violent,	   lengths	   to	   bring	   them	   (back)	   under	   his	   control.	  Once	   this	   is	   achieved,	   however,	   he	   finds	   himself	   alone	   again,	   surrounded	   by	  ‘things’ 127 	  but	   devoid	   of	   real	   human	   contact.	   For	   him,	   the	   world	   therefore	  essentially	  consists	  of	  human	  property	  and	  enemies,	  and	  he	  is	  thus	  the	  ‘psych-­‐‑profession’s’	  version	  of	  the	  territorial	  self.	  	  	  Narcissism	  or	  sociopathy	  can	  therefore	  here	  serve	  as	  metaphors	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  white,	  masculine	  ruling	  class	  subjectivity	  that	  employs	  territoriality	  in	  order	  to	   cement	   its	   dominant	   position	   vis	   a	   vis	   an	   objectified	   other.	   The	   violence	  inherent	   in	   this	   way	   of	   relating	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   despite	   its	   rigid	  boundaries,	  this	  subject	  does	  not	  recognise	  limitations	  to	  the	  territorial	  claim	  of	  its	  ego,	  such	  as	  the	  spaces	  inhabited	  by	  other	  selves.	  “The	  Hobbesian	  self	  is	  thus	  a	   colonial	   self”	   (Brace,	   1997,	   144)	  whose	   territorial	   claim	  must	   constantly	   be	  expanded.	  	  In	  so	  far	  as	  this	  self	  is	  constructed	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  feminine	  and	  to	  the	  ‘inferior’	  person	  of	  colour,	  it	  is	  precisely	  defined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  to	  recognise	  no	  one	  as	  its	  equal,	  and	  thus	  is	  cognitively	  and	  emotionally	  incapable	  of	  recognising	  others	  as	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  would	  put	  limits	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  his	   claim	   to	   territorial	   control.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   other’s	   assertion	   of	  independent	  subjectivity,	  or	  personhood,	  fundamentally	  questions	  this	  subject’s	  identity,	  since	  if	  his	  subjectivity	  is	  defined	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  superiority	  over	  others,	  then	  if	  these	  others	  are	  no	  longer	  inferior,	  he	  must,	  in	  a	  sense,	  cease	  to	  exist.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  comes	  to	  fear	  the	  humanity	  of	  others,	  and,	  because	  it	  illustrates	  to	  him	  his	  dependence	  on	  these	  others	  to	  act	  as	  proxies	  for	  his	  split	  self,	  his	  own.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Compare	  Douglas	  (1966)	  theory	  of	  sacrifice	  as	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  economy	  of	  the	  self,	  in	  which	  fears	  of	  impurity	  and	  contamination	  are	  warded	  off	  by	  trying	  to	  re-­‐‑structure	  and	  ‘cleanse’	  the	  self	  through	  sacrifice.	  	  127	  The	  ‘things’	  to	  the	  narcissist	  are	  essentially	  mirrors,	  reflecting	  back	  to	  him	  an	  image	  of	  himself	  via	  a	  process	  of	  projection	  and	  projective	  identification.	  Others	  therefore	  really	  do	  become	  functions	  of	  the	  narcissist’s	  ego,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  come	  to	  embody	  –	  via	  projective	  identification	  –	  a	  part	  of	  himself.	  Depending	  on	  whether	  the	  other	  reflects	  the	  narcissist’s	  idealised	  ego	  or	  his	  (rejected	  and	  feared)	  actual	  vulnerability,	  the	  narcissist	  either	  idealises	  the	  other	  or	  devalues	  them,	  often	  in	  rapid	  succession.	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In	  this	  sense,	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  white	  masculine	  subject	   to	  deal	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	   its	  own	  unfortunate	  constitution.	  Heidegger,	  of	  course,	  takes	  this	  specific	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  relations	   it	   has	   with	   others	   as	   an	   immediate,	   natural	   and	   necessary,	   trans-­‐‑cultural	   and	   trans-­‐‑historical	   human	   condition,	   reminiscent	   of	  what	   Bachelard	  calls	  the	  “all-­‐‑of-­‐‑a-­‐‑piece	  school	  of	  phenomenologists	  who	  take	  the	  World	  as	  their	  next	  door	  neighbor”	  (1958/1994,	  143).	  Consequently,	  when	  Heidegger	  speaks	  of	  ‘being-­‐‑with’	  another,	  he	  implies	  a	  particular	  relation	  to	  the	  other,	  not	  as	  a	  specific,	  individual	  other,	  but	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  self.	  As	  Levinas	  puts	  it,	  “Heideggerian	  ontology...subordinates	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  Other	  to	  the	  relationship	  with	  Being	  in	  general”	  (Levinas,	  cited	  in	  Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  4).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	   construction	   becomes	   clearer	   when	   we	   take	   a	   look	   at	   how	   Heidegger’s	  concept	  of	  Being	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  ‘home’	  develops	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  work,	  and	  what	   it	   actually	   refers	   to.	   In	  his	  earlier	  work,	   specifically	  Being	  and	  Time,	  Heidegger	   contemplates	   man’s	   existential	   state	   of	   ‘homelessness’	   in	   terms	   of	  ‘thrownness’,	  ‘abandonment’,	  ‘anxiety’	  and	  ‘expulsion	  from	  the	  homeland’,	  which	  for	  him	  at	  this	  point	  are	  necessary	  preconditions	  for	  ‘authenticity’.	  Authenticity	  here	  means	  that	  the	  attempts	  of	  Being	  to	  make	  itself	  at	  home	  –	  to	  ‘dwell’	  –	  are	  doomed	  to	  failure,	  since	  they	  must	  result	  in	  a	  state	  of	  inauthenticity	  in	  which	  the	  self	   denies	   the	   radical	   ontological	   insecurity	   of	   its	   existence.	   As	   Julian	   Young	  comments,	  “thus,	  not	  dwelling	  but	  rather	  heroic	  alienation,	  the	  courage	  to	  carry	  on	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   nihilating	   pressure	   of	   the	   nothing,	   is	   the	   fundamental	  character	   of	   Being	   and	   Time’s	   (as	   Nietzsche	  would	   say)	   ‘higher	   type’”	   (2000,	  190).	  Having	  abandoned	  all	  hope	  to	  return	  to	  the	  ‘cradle’,	  the	  subject	  thus	  decides	  to	  turn	  a	  necessity	  into	  a	  challenge	  and	  realise	  his	  ‘authentic’	  manhood	  through	  existential	   nomadism.	   But	   from	   this	   relatively	   commonplace	   position,	  Heidegger’s	  project	  then	  takes	  a	  turn	  toward	  something	  considerably	  darker.	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The	  Struggle	  For	  Lebensraum	  	  	  As	   Young	   goes	   on	   to	   discuss,	   Heidegger’s	   conception	   of	   ‘home’	   undergoes	   a	  radical	  transformation	  in	  his	  later	  work128,	  where	  the	  state	  of	  “heroic	  nihilism”	  (ibid)	  associated	  with	  homeless-­‐‑but-­‐‑authentic	  Being	  turns	  into	  a	  philosophy	  of	  homecoming.	  	  	  Becoming	  a	  ‘dweller’,	  man	  now	  begins	  to	  build	  himself	  a	  place	  in	  the	  world	  with,	  as	  Irigaray	  argues	  above,	  woman	  as	  raw	  material.	  Having	  stared	  into	   the	   abyss	   of	   disconnectedness	   (for	   Heidegger,	   synonymous	   with	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  subject,	  which	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  historical	  aberration129,	  Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  3),	  ‘man’	  is	  now	  content	  to	  create	  for	  himself	  a	  space	  of	  ontological	   safety	   (Young,	   2000,	   190).	   Young	   uses	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘ontological	  safety’	  here	   in	  a	  similar	  sense	  as	  I	  have	  done	  in	  chapter	  six,	   that	   is,	  he	  defines	  ‘home’	  a	  place	  of	  protection	  from	  a	  hostile	  outside	  world.	  However,	  upon	  closer	  inspection	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  what	  Heidegger	  is	  referring	  to	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  place	  characterised	  by	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  shared	  vulnerability,	  but	  rather,	  the	  security	  implied	  in	  the	  fortress	  of	  the	  territorial	  self.	  As	  Eubanks/Gauthier	  point	  out,	  “Heidegger‘s	  essential	  philosophical	  project	   is	  to	  effect	  a	  return	  to	  a	  state	  of	  human	  consciousness	  that	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  irruption	  of	  subjectivity”	  (2011,	  3,	   emphasis	  mine),	   i.e.	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  wish	   to	   return	   to	   a	   state	  of	  recognition	  of	  mutuality-­‐‑in-­‐‑difference,	  but	  rather	  envisions	  a	  kind	  of	  unmediated	  merger	  of	  self	  and	  other	  in	  a	  fantasized	  primordial	  soup	  (the	  ‘fourfold’),	  where	  Being	  is	  unimpinged	  upon	  by	  the	  assertion	  of	  another’s	  ‘I’,	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  other’s	  individuality	  and	  difference.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  above,	  difference	  is	  threatening	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  A	  transition	  that	  is	  historically	  situated	  at	  the	  watershed	  between	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  129	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  Heidegger’s	  project	  is	  not	  at	  all	  a	  critique	  of	  ‘Western	  subjectivity’	  such	  as	  anthropologists	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  when	  trying	  to	  avoid	  ethnocentrism	  (see	  also	  discussion	  below).	  The	  ‘Western’	  thought	  he	  critiques	  encompasses	  essentially	  all	  thought	  other	  than	  German	  thought	  (or,	  as	  Heidegger	  would	  possibly	  prefer,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authentic	  German	  doesn’t	  think).	  His	  criticism	  of	  biologism,	  for	  example,	  indicts	  Darwin	  and	  the	  ‘English’	  school	  of	  thought,	  but	  has	  no	  problem	  embracing	  ‘scientific’	  biological	  explanations	  of	  genealogy	  coming	  from	  Nazi	  Rassenkunde	  (Faye,	  2006,	  10).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  rejecting	  the	  ‘Western’	  Cartesian	  subject,	  Heidegger	  replaces	  it	  with	  the	  collective	  subject	  of	  the	  German	  Volk	  (see	  Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  6),	  and	  thus	  arguably	  creates	  one	  of	  the	  most	  ethnocentric	  philosophies	  possible.	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the	  territorial	  self,	  and	  thus	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  overcome	  it	  by	  demanding	  that	  self	  and	  other	  merge	  in	  a	  half-­‐‑biological,	  half-­‐‑spiritual	  collectivity.	  This	  ecstatic	  merger	  is	  finally	  at	  the	  root	  of	  Heidegger’s	  ‘Being’,	  and	  it	  points	  to	  the	  intimate	  connection	  between	  his	  philosophy	  and	  his	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  of	  course	  largely	  undisputed	  at	  this	  point	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  an	  enthusiastic	  Nazi.	  Nevertheless,	  some	  of	  his	  adherents	  have	  tried	  to	  portray	  his	  involvement	  in	  German	  fascism	  as	  merely	  the	  temporary	  mistake	  of	  a	  confused	  ivory-­‐‑tower	  dweller,	  who	  either	  did	  not	  quite	  understand	  what	  he	  was	  doing,	  was	  trying	  to	  save	  his	   hide,	   or,	   in	   some	   renditions,	  was	   actually	   a	   fascist	   but	   somehow	   still	  managed	   to	   make	   a	   useful	   and	   valuable	   contribution	   to	   philosophy	   (see	   e.g.	  Wolin,	  2004,	  36).	  However,	  as	  Emmanuel	  Faye	  concludes	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  not	  only	  Heidegger’s	  published	  writings,	  but	  also	  unpublished	  speeches,	  lectures	  and	  personal	  correspondence,	  this	  point	  of	  view	  severely	  underestimates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Heidegger’s	  Nazism	  shaped	  not	  only	  his	  personal	  politics,	  but	  also	  and	  especially	  his	  philosophical	  system.	  Despite	  his	  feigned	  ignorance130	  after	  1945,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  following	  discussion,	  I	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  say	  that	  as	  a	  person	  who	  was	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Austria,	  my	  perspective	  here	  is	  certainly	  more	  critical	  than	  that	  of	  scholars	  from	  different	  cultural	  contexts.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  since	  German	  is	  my	  native	  language,	  I	  am	  sensitive	  to	  the	  specific	  cultural	  context	  of	  Heidegger’s	  language	  and	  imagery.	  The	  Nazis	  fundamentally	  changed	  the	  German	  language	  forever,	  by	  entwining	  specific	  words	  and	  expressions	  so	  closely	  with	  their	  ideology	  that	  they	  became	  almost	  unusable	  after	  ‘45.	  The	  word	  ‘Heimattreue’	  (loyalty	  to	  one’s	  home	  country)	  is	  an	  example,	  as	  is	  the	  word	  ‘Volk’	  or	  ‘Heldentum’	  (heroism).	  These	  words,	  while	  not	  forbidden,	  have	  become	  so	  strongly	  associated	  with	  their	  use	  in	  Nazi	  ideology	  that	  they	  now	  serve	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  code	  by	  which	  those	  on	  the	  radical	  right	  assert	  their	  political	  beliefs	  in	  public,	  despite	  the	  Verbotsgesetz	  (the	  law	  criminalising	  Nazi	  imagery	  or	  ideology,	  such	  as	  Holocaust-­‐‑denial).	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  certain	  ideological	  figures,	  such	  as	  the	  belief	  in	  strong	  leaders	  or	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘blood	  and	  soil’.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  Heidegger	  not	  only	  uses	  this	  kind	  of	  language,	  but	  his	  project	  is	  substantially	  implicated	  in	  the	  re-­‐‑coding	  of	  these	  harmless	  words	  as	  ideological	  weapons	  of	  genocide.	  Second,	  I	  am	  to	  a	  degree	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  product	  of	  a	  post-­‐‑war	  radical	  left	  discourse	  in	  Austria	  and	  Germany,	  which	  centrally	  turned	  on	  confronting	  the	  Nazi	  past	  and	  the	  former	  perpetrators.	  Young	  people	  of	  the	  generations	  after	  ’45	  explicitly	  and	  overtly	  challenged	  the	  denial	  and	  silence	  of	  their	  parent’s	  generation	  and	  demanded	  to	  know	  exactly	  what	  their	  parents	  and	  grandparents	  had	  been	  up	  to	  under	  Hitler.	  Through	  these	  political	  currents,	  it	  came	  to	  light	  that	  many	  of	  the	  perpetrators	  were	  still	  holding	  on	  to	  their	  power	  and	  positions,	  publicly	  denying	  that	  they	  had	  ‘known	  of	  anything’	  or	  ‘taken	  part	  in	  anything’	  (there	  were,	  after	  all,	  repercussions	  down	  to	  incarceration	  and	  execution	  to	  be	  expected	  for	  former	  active	  Nazis).	  It	  is	  a	  popular	  trope	  on	  the	  German	  and	  Austrian	  left	  that	  after	  the	  war,	  ‘no	  one	  had	  known	  of	  anything’	  –	  Austria	  in	  particular	  insisted	  on	  its	  collective	  status	  as	  Hitler’s	  first	  victim	  well	  into	  the	  90s.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  while	  I	  can	  understand	  why	  Heidegger	  would	  hold	  some	  appeal	  for	  scholars	  not	  culturally	  sensitised	  to	  these	  issues,	  I	  am	  still	  quite	  puzzled	  why	  anyone	  would	  take	  his	  whining	  that	  ‘it	  was	  all	  a	  big	  mistake’	  at	  face	  value	  –	  that	  is,	  after	  all,	  what	  hundreds	  of	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Heidegger	  “put	  body	  and	  soul	  to	  the	  service	  of	  spreading	  Nazism”	  (Faye,	  2006,	  55).	   He	   complained,	   for	   example,	   about	   the	   Verjudung	   (‘Jewification’)	   of	   the	  university,	  affirmed	  that	  ‘racial	  selection	  is	  metaphysically	  necessary’,	  that	  ‘racial	  thought	  springs	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  Being	  as	  subjectivity’,	  and	  worried	  about	  the	   ‘not-­‐‑yet-­‐‑purified	   German	   essence’	   (60),	   the	   health	   of	   which	   should	   be	  ensured	  through	  eugenic	  euthanasia	  (Wolin,	  2004,	  91).	  But	  Heidegger	  was	  not	  content	  with	  merely	  passively	  embracing	  Nazi	  ideology	  –	  as	  Faye	  discusses,	  his	  entire	   philosophical	   system	   was	   deliberately	   constructed	   to	   introduce	   the	  foundations	  of	  this	  ideology	  into	  philosophy	  via	  his	  writing	  and	  teaching:	  	  	  “(He)	  taught	  his	  philosophy	  students	  the	  very	  doctrine	  of	  Hitlerism,	  with	  its	  racist	  
concepts	   and	   volkisch	   supremacy	   of	   the	   ‘German	   essence‘,	   its	   praise	   of	   the	  Weltanschauung	  (or	  world	  vision)	  of	  the	  Fuehrer,	  and	  its	  reference	  to	  the	   ‘blood	  
voice‘	  and	  the	  blood	  heredity	  (das	  Gebluet).	  Heidegger's	  Nazism	  is	  thus	  not	  limited	  
to	  a	  few	  speeches	  of	  the	  moment.	  It	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  teachings	  from	  
1933	  to	  1944“	  (2006,	  55).	  	  	  At	  its	  “blackest,	  innermost	  core”	  (2009,	  xi131),	  Heidegger’s	  system	  was	  therefore	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  pedagogical	  device	  to	  infuse	  the	  minds	  of	  young	  people	  with	  fascism132,	  and	  simultaneously,	  to	  conceptually	  destroy	  ‘Western’	  rationality	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  critical	  thought	  and	  dissent.	  Thus	  some	  of	  his	  most	  central	  concepts,	  read	   in	   the	   light	   of	   only	   recently	   published	  writings,	   are	   from	   their	   inception	  designed	  a	  vehicles	  for	  Nazi	  Weltanschauung.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  political	  as	  a	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  his	  lectures	  between	  1933/35,	  links	  this	  abstract	  category	  with	  the	  concrete	  political	  content	  of	  his	  thought.	  In	  Heidegger’s	  own	  words:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  thousands	  of	  former	  fascists	  said	  (and	  what	  else	  would	  they	  say),	  while	  the	  victims	  were	  mourning	  their	  dead.	  131	  Citations/page	  numbers	  of	  Faye,	  2009,	  correspond	  to	  the	  German	  edition,	  see	  bibliography	  132	  A	  project	  that	  worked,	  among	  others,	  on	  the	  young	  Herbert	  Marcuse,	  who	  has	  since	  taken	  every	  opportunity	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  his	  youthful	  folly	  (see	  e.g.	  postscript	  to	  the	  2005	  edition	  of	  Heideggerian	  Marxism:	  ‘My	  disillusionment	  with	  Heidegger’)	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“It	   is	  only	  where	   the	  unconditional	  subjectivity	  of	   the	  will	   to	  power	  becomes	  the	  
truth	   of	   being	   in	   its	   totality	   that	   the	   principle	   behind	   the	   institution	   of	   racial	  
selection,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  not	  merely	  a	  simple	  formulation	  of	  race	  deriving	  from	  itself,	  
but	  the	  thought	  of	  race	  as	  knowing	  itself,	  is	  possible,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  metaphysically	  
necessary“	  (cited	  in	  Faye,	  2006,	  62).	  	  	  So:	   the	   ‘unconditional	   subjectivity’	   (i.e.	   the	  egocentrism)	  of	   the	   ‘will	   to	  power’	  here	  becomes	  ‘the	  truth	  of	  being	  in	  its	  totality’.	  As	  a	  result,	  ‘Being’	  is	  now	  infused	  with	   a	   total	   will	   to	   power,	   so	   that	   that	   ‘race’	   can	   come	   to	   know	   itself	   as	   a	  ‘metaphysical	   necessity’.	   But	  what	   is	   this	   ‘Being’?	   Crucially,	   for	  Heidegger,	   for	  whom	   the	   philosophical	   and	   the	   political	   fell	   into	   one,	   the	   relation	   between	  ‘Being’	  and	  ‘entity’	  (Sein	  and	  Seiendem)	  “really	  aim(s)	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Hitler-­‐‑State	  and	  the	  Volk”	  (ibid.).	  Therefore,	  “Heideggerian	  identification	  of	  Being	   with	   the	   voelkisch	   State,	   with	   the	   Fuehrer	   State,	   is	   total”	   (ibid.).	   The	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being‘	  is	  therefore	  nothing	  else	  than	  the	  struggle	  for	  existence	  of	  “the	  only	  people	  who	  still	  have	  a	  destiny“	  (ibid).	  i.e.	  the	  Germans,	  and	  the	  ‘revelation	  of	  Being	  to	  itself‘	  is	  the	  emerging	  self-­‐‑consciousness	  of	  the	  Aryan	  race.	  This	  self-­‐‑consciousness	  is	  opposed	  to	  individuality	  or	  difference,	  as	  Heidegger’s	  diatribes	  against	   “all	   forms	   of	   a	   philosophy	   of	   individual	   existence“	   (Faye,	   2009,	   10)	  demonstrate	  –	  individual	  existence	  of	  ‘beings’	  for	  him	  therefore	  becomes	  merged	  in	  the	  ‘authentic‘,	  immediate	  Being	  of	  the	  racial	  community,	  driven	  by	  “a	  will	  to	  destroy	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  ‘I‘,	  to	  make	  space	  for	  the	  ‘most	  radical	  individuation‘	  that	   does	   not	   by	   any	   means	   happen	   in	   the	   individual,	   but	   in	   the	   organically	  inseparable	  Volksgemeinschaft“	   (ibid).	   ‘Being’,	   in	   short,	   is	  here	   code	   for	   ‘white	  supremacy’.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  Heidegger’s	  notions	  of	  ‘home’	  and	  ‘homelessness’,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  ‘being’	  and	  ‘dwelling’,	  it	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  quasi-­‐‑spiritual	  merger	  of	  self	  and	  other	  in	  ‘Being’	  actually	  describes	  the	  mob	  mentality	  of	   a	   Reichskristallnacht:	   “he	   equates,	   in	   effect,	   the	   ontological	   relationship	  between	  Being	  and	  beings	  with	  the	  political	  relationship	  between	  the	  State	  and	  the	  people…It	  is	  a	  question,	  he	  says,	  of	  introducing	  the	  eros	  of	  the	  Fuehrer	  State	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into	   the	   souls	   of	   the	   people“	   (Faye,	   2006,	   59).	   Indicting	   agonistic	   ‘Western’	  politics	   for	   its	   involvement	   in	  modern	  subjectivity	  which	  he	  blames	   for	  man’s	  existential	   ‘homelessness’,	   Heidegger	   thus	   seeks	   shelter	   in	   an	   organic	  ‘community’	   based	   on	   the	   immediacy	   of	   the	   monolithic	   Volk 133 ,	   collectively	  rooted	  in	  ‘blood	  and	  soil‘.	  The	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being‘	  consequently	  comes	  to	  appear	  as	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  white	  German	  ‘race’	  under	  Hitler134	  to	  realise	  its	  destiny	  in	  collective	  battle	  (Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  12);	  and	   ‘total	  war’	   is	  consequently	  ‘necessitated’	   by	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   German	   nation	   is	   threatened	   with	  extinction	  and	  must	  fulfil	  its	  Geschick	  by	  asserting	  its	  absolute	  ‘will	  to	  survival‘,	  or	  perish.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  recognise	  in	  this	  a	  particularly	  brutal	  variant	  of	  the	  Hobbesian	  self,	  who	  permanently	  sees	  himself	  under	  attack	  and	  thus	  translates	  his	  ‘will	  to	  survival’	  into	  a	  demonstrable	  ‘will	  to	  hurt’.	  	  	  The	  relation	  between	  Volk	  and	  Boden	  then	  also	  constitutes	  the	  Nazi	  version	  of	  the	  territorial	  self’s	  impetus	  to	  exclude	  and	  marginalise,	  also	  and	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  race.	  Since	  the	  Germans	  are	  organically	  ‘of	  the	  land’,	  anyone	  who	  lacks	  such	  rootedness	  must	  be	  not	  ‘of	  the	  people’	  and	  therefore,	  alien	  to	  the	  Volkskoerper,	  i.e.	   the	   organic	   body	   of	   the	   people	   as	   a	   whole.	   Nazi	   anti-­‐‑Semitic	   imagery	   for	  example	  constructs	  ‘the	  World-­‐‑Jewry’	  as	  essentially	  ‘un-­‐‑rooted’,	  and	  Heidegger	  often	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘Weltlosigkeit’	  (worldlessness)	  of	  the	  Jews.	  	  
“Jews	  for	  him	  are	  not	  just	  homeless	  but	  also	  ‘worldless’.	  In	  this	  regard,	  they	  appear	  
to	  figure	  even	  below	  animals,	  of	  which	  Heidegger	  said…they	  are	  ‘world-­‐‑poor’.	  The	  
Jews	  therefore	  not	  only	  have	  no	  place	  in	  the	  world,	  they	  also	  never	  had	  one.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  German	  word	  ‘Volk’	  is	  not	  just	  a	  neutral	  term	  describing	  members	  of	  a	  coherent	  cultural	  group,	  as	  anthropology	  sometimes	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘a	  people’.	  It	  is	  somewhere	  between	  an	  ‘apolitical-­‐‑political’	  concept	  (Schicksalsgemeinschaft,	  i.e.	  ’community	  of	  destiny’),	  and	  ‘kinship’	  in	  terms	  of	  biological,	  genetic,	  racial	  relatedness.	  The	  term	  therefore	  has	  much	  more	  of	  an	  ideological	  slant	  than	  the	  English	  equivalent.	  Similarly	  the	  Volksgenosse	  (comrade-­‐‑in-­‐‑Volk)	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  member	  of	  the	  same	  culture,	  but	  essentially	  a	  ‘racial	  kinsman’.	  	  134	  In	  terms	  of	  Hitler’s	  obsession	  with	  Lebensraum	  (living	  space)	  for	  the	  Aryan	  race,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  he	  himself	  was	  once	  a	  spatial	  other,	  a	  homeless	  watercolour	  artist	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Vienna.	  While	  this	  cannot	  work	  as	  a	  moral	  excuse,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  rather	  spectacular	  example	  of	  Duffells	  claim	  that	  a	  territorial	  self	  operates	  by	  splitting	  and	  projection.	  Hitler’s	  war	  of	  expansion	  was	  quite	  literally	  founded	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  somebody	  had	  ‘taken	  the	  German’s	  home	  away’,	  and	  he	  later	  turned	  his	  hatred	  specifically	  against	  those	  he	  saw	  as	  having	  no	  right	  to	  occupy	  space.	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Heideggerian	   existential	   of	   being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world	   therefore	   has	   a	   prominent,	  
discriminatory	  function.	  Who,	  like	  the	  Jews,	  has	  no	  world	  cannot	  be	  in	  the	  world“	  (Faye,	  2013)135	  	  
	  In	   this	   conception	   of	   being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world	   as	   ‘being	   of	   the	   soil’,	   therefore,	   lies	  ultimately	  the	  seed	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  ‘spatial	  other’	  who	  is	  seen	  to	  have	  no	  right	  to	  occupy	  any	  space	  whatsoever	  and	  therefore	  has	  no	  right	  to	  exist.	  This	  convergence	  of	  race	  and	  space	  not	  only	  informs	  Nazi	  anti-­‐‑Semitism,	  but	  also	  Nazi	  racism	  against	  Gypsies,	  whose	  real	  or	  imagined	  mobility	  was	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  their	  racial	  inferiority,	  resulting	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  between	  250.000	  and	  500.000	  people 136 .	   If	   Julian	   Young	   (2001)	   therefore	   argues	   that	   the	   transition	   “from	  homelessness	  to	  dwelling”	  in	  Heidegger	  involves	  a	  “transition	  from	  ontological	  insecurity	  to	  ontological	  security”	  (192),	  then	  this	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  how	  the	  security	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  is	  bought	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  others.	  It	  reflects	  a	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  in	  which	  a	  territorial	  dominant	  asserts	  itself	  against	  an	   other	  who	   is	   excluded	   from	   the	   racially	   defined	   space	   of	   ‘Being’;	   and	   thus	  either	  exiled,	  interned	  in	  ghettoes	  and	  camps,	  or	  massacred.	  	  The	  Nazi	  territorial	  self	  also	  follows	  the	  Hobbesian	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  internal	  ‘rational	  ordering’	  of	  its	  territory.	  Heidegger	  here	  shows	  some	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  the	  Greek	  polis,	  and	  his	  preoccupation	  with	  ‘heroes’	  as	  outstanding	  leaders	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  an	  “elitism	  (that)	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  his	  attempt	  to	  recover	  the	  sense	  of	  rank	  that	  characterized	  both	  Greek	  politics	  and	  philosophy”	  (Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  13).	  This	  politics	  of	  dominance	  to	  him	  is	  place-­‐‑bound	  and	  thus	  opposed	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  cosmopolitanism,	  and	  rests	  on	  the	   idea	   that	   the	  Volk	   has	   a	   natural	   hierarchy,	   at	   the	   top	   of	   which	   stand	   the	  ‘heroes’	   who,	   like	   Hitler,	   are	   born	   to	   lead	   the	   people	   onwards	   toward	   their	  territorial	   destiny.	   As	   Eubanks/Gauthier	   argue,	   therefore	   “Heidegger‘s	  homecoming	   project	   looks	   to	   effect	   a	   return	   to	   a	  world	   of	   agonistic	   struggle,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Interview	  in	  Die	  Zeit,	  27.12.2013,	  translation	  from	  German	  mine	  136	  There	  is	  no	  more	  exact	  estimate	  as	  to	  how	  many	  Roma	  and	  Sinti	  fell	  victim	  to	  the	  Nazis.	  To	  an	  extent,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  written	  records	  and	  census	  data	  about	  Gypsies,	  but	  the	  huge	  scope	  of	  the	  estimate	  –	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  million,	  on	  or	  off	  –	  also	  points	  to	  just	  how	  disposable	  Gypsy	  lives	  were	  seen	  to	  be.	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heroic	   creators,	   and	   rootedness	   in	   the	   soil	   (Bodenständigkeit)	   and	   a	   people	  (Volk)”	  (15).	  If	  the	  world-­‐‑weary	  wanderer	  of	  Heidegger’s	  early	  work	  now	  returns	  home,	  then	  this	  means	  essentially	  Heim	  ins	  Reich’137,	  to	  fulfil	  his	  destiny	  as	  part	  of	  the	  collective	  territorial	  dominant	  symbolically	  embodied	  by	  the	  Fuehrer.	  This	  is	  why,	  as	  Levinas	  comments,	  Heideggerian	  ontology	  “remains	  under	  obedience	  to	   the	   anonymous	   and	   leads	   inevitably	   to	   another	   power,	   to	   imperialist	  domination,	  to	  tyranny”	  (cited	  in	  Eubanks/Gauthier,	  2011,	  4)	  –	  the	  subordination	  of	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  to	  the	  relation	  of	  self	  to	  Being	  (that	  is,	  to	  the	  Aryan	  race)	   means	   that	   Heidegger	   abandons,	   quite	   deliberately,	   any	   possibility	   of	  individual	  ethical	   judgment	  and	  constructs	  as	   the	  only	  possible	  ethical	  subject	  the	  Volk.	   In	   this	   sense,	   ‘Being’	   also	   comes	   to	  be	   a	   chiffre	   for	   the	   abdication	  of	  ethical	  accountability	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  race,	  and	  thus	  led	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  morality	  that	  Rudolf	  Höss,	  after	  his	  capture,	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  words:	  “I	  want	  to	  emphasize	  that	  I	  personally	  never	  hated	  the	  Jews.	  I	  considered	  them	  to	  be	  the	  enemy	  of	  our	  nation“	  (cited	  in	  Paskuly,	  1992).	  	  In	  so	  far	  as	  the	  Fuehrer	  is	  the	  personification	  of	  ‘Being’	  that	  envelopes	  the	  individual	  German	  ‘beings’,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  actual	  ethical	  subject	  of	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  ultimately	  looks	  a	  lot	  like	  Adolf	  Hitler,	  or	  as	  Heidegger	  himself	  put	  it	  in	  1933:	  	  “The	  Führer	  alone	  is	  the	  present	  and	  future	  German	  reality	  and	  its	  law…	  Heil	  Hitler!“	  (cited	  in	  Wolin,	  1993).	  	  	  The	   reason	   I	   dwell	   on	   Heidegger’s	   fascism	   at	   such	   length	   is	   not	   merely	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   Germans	   can	   produce	   territorial	   selves	   as	   well	   as	   the	  English,	  if	  not	  better.	  In	  addition	  to	  his	  continuing	  attraction	  to	  scholars	  working	  on	  notions	  of	  ‘home’,	  of	  ‘dwelling’	  or	  of	  existential	  struggle	  (and,	  irritatingly,	  even	  to	   cognitive	   scientists,	   e.g.	   McGilchrist,	   2009),	   Heidegger	   is	   also	   in	   part	  responsible	   for	   the	   kinds	   of	   epistemological	   trouble	   I	   have	   discussed	   in	   the	  context	  of	  methodology	  in	  chapter	  3,	  namely	  the	  wholesale	  abdication	  of	  notions	  of	  ‘Truth’	  or	  ‘Reason’	  that	  has	  led	  anthropology	  to	  its	  current	  impasse.	  While	  the	  proponents	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  theory	  in	  anthropology	  are	  doubtlessly	  motivated	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  ‘(Coming)	  home	  into	  the	  Reich‘,	  a	  Nazi	  slogan	  encouraging	  the	  Volksdeutschen	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  1933	  to	  return	  to	  the	  homeland.	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the	  impetus	  to	  empower	  their	  respondents	  rather	  than	  to	  shut	  them	  up,	  as	  I	  have	  already	   pointed	   out,	   this	   project	   is	   riddled	  with	   contradiction.	   In	   the	   light	   of	  Heidegger’s	  sizeable	  contribution,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  problem	  stems	  in	  part	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  theories	  were,	  in	  their	  origins,	  never	  intended	  to	  be	   ‘emancipatory’.	  Although	  Nietzsche	   is	  most	  often	  cited	  as	   the	  source	  of	   the	  anti-­‐‑universalist	  impulse	  in	  French	  philosophy,	  it	  was	  Heidegger	  who,	  in	  concert	  with	   some	   of	   his	   students	   such	   as	   Gadamer,	   turned	   a	   valid	   critique	   into	   an	  intellectual	  weapon	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  Wolin	   (2004)	  demonstrates	  how	   the	  anti-­‐‑Enlightenment	  impulse	  of	  the	  German	  Lebensphilosophie	  –	  that	  is,	  precisely	  the	  disdain	  for	  reason,	  humanism	  and	  other	  values	  of	  the	  French	  revolution	  that	  led	  Goebbels	  to	  declare	  that	  “the	  year	  1789	  is	  hereby	  erased	  from	  history”	  (3)	  –	  has	  come	  to	  inform	  the	  philosophies	  of	  Derrida,	  Foucault,	  Deleuze	  and	  others.	  As	  a	  result,	  	  	  “paradoxically,	  a	  thouroughgoing	  cynicism	  about	  reason	  and	  democracy,	  once	  the	  
hallmark	  of	  reactionary	  thought,	  became	  the	  stock-­‐‑in-­‐‑trade	  of	  the	  postmodern	  left.	  
As	   observers	   of	   the	   French	   intellectual	   scene	   have	   frequently	   noted,	   although	  
Germany	  lost	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  it	  triumphed	  in	  the	  seminar	  rooms,	  bookstores	  and	  
cafes	  of	  the	  Latin	  Quarter”	  (4).	  	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  not	  all	  that	  paradoxical	  that	  a	  number	  of	  white,	  western	  men	  should	  find	  comfort	  in	  a	  philosophy	  that	  ensured	  that	  they	  could	  present	  themselves	  as	  fashionably	   radical,	   while	   removing	   the	   ontological	   possibility	   of	   truth	   from	  those	  who	  might	  have	  a	  valid	  reason	  to	  demand	  such	  things	  as	  democracy,	  human	  rights	  or	  a	  recognition	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  reason.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  emphasise	  here	  is	   that	   this	   outcome	   is	   by	   no	  means	   an	   accident	   –	   it	   is	   exactly	  what	   the	  Nazi	  Heidegger	   intended,	   and	   therefore,	   as	   Faye	   puts	   it,	   it	   is	   imperative	   to	   be	  absolutely	   clear	   about	   this	   endeavour	   and	   to	   “resist	   its	   influence	   on	   thinking,	  before	  it	  is	  too	  late”	  (2009,	  iv).	  	  We	  will	  return	  to	  this	  point	  once	  more	  in	  chapter	  12.	  For	  now,	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  together	  what	  we	  have	  said	  about	  the	  gendered	  and	  racial	  aspects	  of	  Heidegger’s	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account	   of	   ‘home’,	   which	   we	   have	   characterised	   as	   involving	   a	   dual	   mode	   of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.	  It	  therefore	  constructs	  a	  ‘secure	  space’,	  that	  is,	  space	  that	  rests	   on	   the	   control	   of	   the	   movement	   and	   spatial	   existence	   of	   gendered	   and	  racialised	  others,	  who	  are	  either	  seen	  as	  functional	  objects	  serving	  a	  purpose,	  or	  as	   territorial	   enemies	   who	   threaten	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   territorial	   subject.	  Gendered	   and	   racialized	   constructions	   of	   spatial	   domination	   certainly	   differ	  greatly	  in	  the	  ideologies	  justifying	  them,	  the	  identities	  they	  construct,	  and	  their	  historically	   situated	  modes	  of	   institutionalisation.	   In	   reading	   them	  together	   in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  want	  to	  emphasise,	  however,	  that	  they	  are	  connected	  not	  only	  by	  the	  general	  logic	  of	  white	  male	  domination	  that	  produces	  them	  both	  –	  they	  are	  also	  related	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  intersect	  in	  the	  production	  of	  concrete,	  historical	  configurations	  of	  ‘secure	  space’.	  Andrea	  Dworkin	  has	  discussed	  this	  convergence	  of	  territorial	  nationalism	  and	  the	  subjugation	  of	  women	  at	  length,	  examining	  it	  explicitly	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  both	  a	  woman	  and	  a	  Jew.	  While	  discussing	  the	  Nazi	  murder	   and	   persecution	   of	   Jews	   and	   Gypsies	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   she	   also	  critically	  reflects	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  ‘the	   Palestinians’	   as	   its	   spatial	   other,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	  masculine	  subjectivity:	  	  	  
“I	   think	  that	  women	  are	  the	   internal	  enemy	  regardless	  of	   the	  ethnic	  or	  racial	  or	  
nationalist	  status	  of	  the	  groups	  men;	  and	  that	  Israel	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  how	  
male	  dominance	  grows	   in	  a	  new	  state—it	  needs	   the	   subordination	  of	  one’s	  own	  
women	   and	   the	   subordination	   of	   a	   racial	   or	   ethnic	   other:	   it	   needs	   internal	   and	  
external	  scapegoats.	  The	  internal,	  intraethnic	  contempt	  for	  women	  is	  apparent	  in	  
victors	  and	  losers.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  hated	  ethnic	  marginal	  and	  
menial	  class	  that	  sustains	  success	  in	  creating	  a	  dominant	  sovereignty”	  (2000,	  xi)	  	  While	   the	   oppression	   of	   women	   is	   therefore	   for	   her	   a	   universal	   feature	   of	  patriarchal	   societies,	   it	   serves	   a	   specific	   purpose	   in	   establishing	   territorial	  dominance,	  by	  constructing	  a	  spatial	  other	  on	  the	  inside.	  This	  other	   is	  defined	  differently	  from	  the	  other	  on	  the	  outside,	  but	  both	  are	  constructed	  in	  opposition	  to,	  and	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  with,	  the	  dominant	  masculine	  subjectivity	  that	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is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   nation	   state.	   The	   connection	   was	   not	   lost	   on	   the	   Nazis	  themselves:	  “Nazi	  theorist	  Gottfried	  Feder	  argued,	  ‘The	  insane	  dogma	  of	  equality	  led	  as	  surely	  to	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  Jews	  as	  to	  the	  emancipation	  of	  women.	  The	  Jew	  stole	  the	  woman	  from	  us.	  .	  .	  We	  must	  kill	  the	  dragon	  to	  restore	  her	  to	  her	  holy	  position	  as	  servant	  and	  maid’”	  (cited	  in	  Dworkin,	  2000,	  31).	  The	  movement	  of	  both	   these	  others	  within	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	   ‘home’	  and	  of	   the	  state,	  and	  their	  crossing	  of	  these	  boundaries,	  must	  therefore	  be	  strictly	  controlled,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  violent	  retribution	  for	  transgressions.	  While	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  involves	  the	  fixing	  of	  bodies	  in	  space,	  in	  others	  it	  means	  preventing	  them	  from	  standing	  still,	  while	   in	   some	  cases	   it	  means	   stopping	   them	   from	  coming	   in,	   in	  others	   it	  means	  keeping	  them	  from	  leaving.	  The	  dynamics	  of	   locking-­‐‑in	  and	  locking-­‐‑out	  can	  come	  to	   transform	  into	  each	  other,	   “exile	  can	  be	   internal,	  being	  separated	  from	  the	  common	  life,	  one’s	  human	  dignity	  and	  social	  legitimacy	  denied"	  (ibid,	  16).	  The	  common	  element,	  however,	  is	  the	  masculine	  subject’s	  claim	  to	  absolute	  spatial	  control	  over	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  the	  bodies	  of	  both	  the	  gendered	  and	  the	  racial	  other.	   Since	  both	  are	  constructed	  as	   lacking	  a	   territorial	   claim,	   they	  are	  seen	  as,	  in	  Heidegger’s	  terms,	  not	  fully	  ‘being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world’	  (woman	  because	  she	  does	  not	  ‘build’,	  and	  the	  racial	  other	  because	  he	  does	  not	  ‘dwell’,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  biological	  rootedness	  in	  the	  soil).	  Their	  individual	  bodies	  are	  thus	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  occupy	  space,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  are	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  be	  their	  own	  space,	  i.e.	  to	  have	  physical	  and	  emotional	  boundaries	  that	  preserve	  their	  inside.	  This	  position	  of	  absolute	  spatial	  abjection	  is	  the	  extreme	  result	   of	   a	   power	   imbalance,	  which	   ultimately	   aims	   at	   the	   annihilation	   of	   the	  spatial	  other.	  	  	  The	   title	  of	  Dworkin’s	  book,	   ‘Scapegoat’,	   also	  points	   to	   the	  socio-­‐‑psychological	  dynamics	  of	  this	  arrangement,	  which	  mirror	  those	  by	  which	  the	  territorial	  self	  splits	   off	   its	   undesirable	   aspects,	   and	   then	   seeks	   to	   either	   repress	   (intern)	   or	  project	   (exclude)	   them.	   Of	   course,	   it	   would	   be	   too	   simplified	   to	   infer	   that	  therefore,	   ‘cultures	   work	   exactly	   like	   individual	   psyches’,	   which	   could	   be	  understood	  to	  mean	  that	  ‘culture’	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  collective	  subject	  in	  the	  sense	  of	   a	   monolithic	   ‘national	   character’.	   Rather,	   I	   would	   argue	   the	   opposite	   –	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individual	   ‘character’	   is	   by	  no	  means	  monolithic,	   but	   rather,	   underlies	   similar	  inner	   dynamics	   and	   contradictions	   as	   ‘culture’	   does.	   The	   ‘mind’	   can	   thus	   be	  integrated	  or	  fragmented,	  it	  can	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  itself	  or	  based	  on	  consensus,	  it	  can	   be	   governed	   by	   a	   dictatorial	   self,	   or	   it	   can	   involve	   the	   ‘democratic’	  collaboration	  of	  different	  parts.	  Cognitive	  scientist	  Daniel	  Dennett	  plays	  on	  just	  such	  an	  analogy	  when	  he	  describes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  conscious	  self	  within	  the	  ‘mind’	  as	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  a	  ‘head	  of	  state’	  –	  as	  he	  argues,	  while	  neither	  the	  mind	  nor	  the	  state	  are	  monolithic,	  unified	  wholes,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  transnational	  politics	  or	  interpersonal	  communication,	  it	  is	  a	  good-­‐‑enough	  model	  to	  take	  the	  ‘president’	  as	   a	   symbolic	   representation	   of	   the	   ‘nation’,	   or	   analogously,	   the	   ‘self’	   as	   a	  representation	   of	   the	   embodied	  mind.	   (Dennett/Humphrey,	   1989).	  While	   the	  analogy	  between	  national	  politics	   and	   the	   inner	  dynamics	  of	   the	  mind	   is	   thus	  strictly	   metaphorical,	   Dennett’s	   example	   shows	   that	   a	   parallel	   reading	   can	  elucidate	   some	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   social	   relations	   are	   internalised	   and	  replicated	  within	  the	  mind.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  thus	  really	  does	  resemble	   that	  of	  a	   territorial	  state,	  and	  the	   ‘despotic	  dominion’	  of	   the	  rational	  mind	  fulfils	  a	  similar	  role	  for	  embodied	  consciousness	  as	  a	  fascist	  dictator	  does	  for	  a	  people.	  Indeed,	  it	  could	  be	  asked	  that	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  ‘software	  architecture’	  of	   the	   mind	   is	   ‘encoded’	   through	   exposure	   to	   social	   relations,	   why,	   as	   a	  consequence,	  the	  mind	  should	  not	  be	  organized	  in	  a	  structurally	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  culture	  an	  individual	  is	  socialized	  in.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  with	  gender	  –	  individual	  psyches	  contain	  elements	  that	  are	  symbolically	  coded	  as	  ‘masculine’	  and	  ‘feminine’,	  and	  psychoanalysts	  like	  to	  refer	  to	  things	  line	  an	  ‘inner	  child’	  or	  an	  ‘inner	  parent’.	  If	  this	  can	  be	  the	  case,	  then	  why	  should	  a	  psyche	  not	  contain,	  for	  example,	  an	  ‘inner	  homeless	  person’,	  or,	  as	  anarchists	  like	  to	  say,	  a	  ‘cop	  inside	  your	  head’	  that	  must	  be	  ‘killed’?	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  becomes	  clearer	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  ethical	  patterns	  within	  the	  mind	  can	  also	  be	  found	  on	  the	  level	  of	  culture	  and	  vice	  versa	  –	  the	  mediation	  between	  the	  two	  –	  i.e.	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  one	  translates	  into	  the	  other	  –	  can	  then	  be	  found	  in	  the	  complex	  cultural	  ‘superstructures’	   that	   humans	   have	   created	   in	   order	   to	   organise	   things	   like	  territorial	   dominance	   on	   a	   large	   scale.	   For	   example,	   as	  Hobbes	   recognised,	   in	  order	   to	   avoid	   total	   war	   of	   all	   against	   all,	   the	   individual	   claims	   of	   territorial	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dominants	  (i.e.	  predominantly	  men)	  have	  to	  be	  mediated	  by	  a	  structure	  such	  as	  the	  state,	  or,	  as	  we	  will	  discuss	  next,	  the	  institution	  of	  private	  property.	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“You	  have	  got	  to	  be	  kidding	  me”	  
	  
I	  have	  just	  walked	  through	  the	  door	  of	  the	  HUB	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  turning	  a	  corner	  
to	   the	  right	  and	  stepping	   into	  the	   large	   front	  room	  that	  until	   recently	  used	  to	  
serve	  as	  a	  drop-­‐‑in	  centre	  for	  the	  homeless.	  In	  the	  far	  corner,	  behind	  the	  bulwark	  
of	  desks	  that	  separated	  the	  service	  providers	  from	  the	  service	  users,	  is	  a	  group	  of	  
squatters	  crowded	  around	  a	  screen.	  On	  it	  I	  can	  see	  my	  own	  face.	  	  
	  
“Check	  this	  out!”	  Tom	  spins	  around	  on	  his	  swivel	  chair	  and	  points	  to	  the	  camera	  
in	  the	  ceiling	  that	  transmits	  my	  image.	  “We	  have	  CCTV!”	  
	  
“So	  I	  see”	  I	  say,	  not	  wholly	  sharing	  his	  enthusiasm,	  “why	  is	  it	  still	  on?”	  
	  
“We	  were	  going	  to	  turn	  it	  off,	  but	  look,	  it	  is	  pretty	  cool”.	  Joe	  pushes	  a	  button	  on	  
the	  switchboard	  below	  the	  screen	  and	  instead	  of	  me	  it	  now	  shows	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  
street	  outside	  at	  an	  awkward	  angle.	  At	  the	  push	  of	  a	  joystick,	  the	  camera	  swings	  
around	  to	  display	  a	  180-­‐‑degree	  panorama	  view	  of	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  	  
	  
“No	   one’s	   gonna	   creep	   up	   on	   us	   now!”	   Tom	   announces.	   He	   seems	   unusually	  
pleased.	  	  
	  
“Can	  anyone	  else	  see	  us?”	  
	  
“Don’t	  think	  so.	  If	  we	  can	  turn	  off	  the	  inside	  cameras,	  we	  can	  keep	  the	  outside	  one	  
for	  security”	  
	  
“Starting	  right	  now”	  Joe	  grins.	  He	  has	  homed	  in	  on	  two	  figures	  leisurely	  strolling	  
down	  the	  road,	  giving	  the	  house	  a	  once-­‐‑over	  and	  coming	  to	  a	  halt	  at	  our	  front	  
door.	  The	  camera	  follows	  them	  and	  with	  the	  push	  of	  a	  button	  Joe	  zooms	  in	  on	  two	  
familiar	   faces.	   They	   belong	   to	   Pete	   and	   Jim,	   two	   squatters	   from	   across	   town,	  
presumably	  here	  to	  check	  out	  our	  new	  premises.	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Sam	  is	  already	  at	  the	  door	  and	  opens	  before	  they	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  knock.	  
The	  befuddlement	  on	  their	  faces	  causes	  hilarity	  inside.	  Every	  squatter	  knows	  to	  
never,	  ever	  open	  the	  door	  without	  asking	  who	   is	  outside	  –	  after	  all,	   if	   it	   is	   the	  
landlord,	   all	   he	   has	   to	   do	   is	   to	  walk	   through	   the	   door	   to	  make	   the	   squatter’s	  
temporary	  claim	  to	  possession	  null	  and	  void.	  The	  confusion	  clears	  as	  the	  two	  walk	  
into	  the	  room	  and	  get	  a	  look	  at	  our	  technology.	  	  
	  
“What	  the	  fuck!”	  Pete	  exclaims	  “Turn	  that	  thing	  off!	  It’s	  evil”	  
	  
“But	  fun”	  Tom	  has	  taken	  the	  controller	  again	  and	  switched	  to	  inside	  view.	  On	  the	  
screen	  is	  a	  close-­‐‑up	  of	  Pete’s	  outraged	  face.	  	  
	  
Pete	  pulls	  up	  his	  hood	  and	  tries	  to	  disappear	  into	  his	  clothing,	  while	  Tom	  is	  doing	  
his	  best	  to	  follow	  him	  with	  the	  camera.	  Suddenly	  shouts	  of	  “car,	  car,	  car!!”	  prompt	  
him	  to	  switch	  back	  to	  outside.	  A	  silver	  BMW	  -­‐‑	  a	  potential	  landlord	  car	  –	  has	  pulled	  
up	  and	  for	  a	  minute	  there	  is	  mayhem	  in	  the	  HUB.	  But	  the	  car	  only	  waits	  for	  the	  
metal	  doors	  to	  the	  next	  property	  to	  swing	  open	  and	  disappears	  into	  a	  parking	  
garage	  while	  the	  camera	  follows.	  False	  alarm.	  	  
	  
“Can	  I	  have	  a	  go?”	  asks	  Pete.	  	  
	  
Ten	  minutes	  later	  he	  is	  perched	  in	  the	  swivel	  chair,	  trying	  to	  focus	  the	  camera	  on	  
passer’s-­‐‑by	  at	  the	  far	  end	  of	  the	  cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sac,	  and	  engaged	  in	  lively	  speculation	  with	  
the	  others	  as	   to	  what	   said	  pedestrians	  might	  be	  up	   to:	   “That	  one	   is	   selling”	   –	  
“naah,	  he’s	  just	  hanging	  out”	  –	  “Bollox,	  look	  at	  him,	  definitely	  selling!”	  
	  
Tom	  strolls	  over	  and	  hands	  me	  a	  beer.	  “Oh	  shit”	  he	  says	  with	  a	  grin,	  “looks	  like	  
we’ve	  created	  a	  monster”.	  
	  
I’m	  not	  sure	  I’m	  going	  to	  argue.	  	  	  Figure	  9:	  Fieldnote	  3	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Unfortunately,	  there	  was	  a	  persistent	  
tendency	  in	  polite	  circles	  to	  consider	  all	  
the	  ’roofless’	  as	  victims	  of	  middle-­‐‑class	  
society,	  rather	  than	  middle-­‐‑class	  society	  
as	  victim	  of	  the	  ’roofless’.	  Margaret	  Thatcher	  	  	  Let	  us	  briefly	  sum	  up	  where	  we	  stand.	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  produces	  a	  kind	  of	  space	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	   dual	  mode	   of	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion,	   and	   in	   this	  way,	   is	   implicated	   in	   the	  production	  of	  gendered	  and	  racialised	  others.	  But	  while	  gender	  and	  race	  are	  the	  most	  prominent	  examples	  of	  spatially	  constructed	  identities,	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  ‘secure	  space’	  is	  also	  not	  limited	  to	  just	  these	  two.	  As	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  show,	  underlying	  ‘secure	  space’	  is	  precisely	  not	  any	  particular	  combination	  of	  identity	  categories,	  but	  rather,	  a	  way	  of	  socially	  constructing	  space	  that,	  in	  the	  abstract,	  comes	   to	   appear	   as	   a	   relation	   between	   what	   we	   have	   called	   a	   ‘territorial	  dominant’	   and	   an	   objectified	   and	   subjugated	   ‘territorial	   other’.	   Individual	  identity	  categories,	  such	  as	  gender	  and	  race	  (but	  also	  class,	  sexuality,	  disability	  etc.)	  then	  form	  the	  ideological	  ‘superstructure’	  through	  which	  territorial	  claims	  are	  legitimised	  and	  symbolically	  encoded	  in	  individual	  ‘minds’.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  while	   particular	   identity	   categories	   can	   give	   important	   clues	   as	   to	   the	  
legitimisation	  of	  territorial	  dominance,	  they	  do	  not	  per	  se	  produce	  it,	  rather,	  it	  is	  the	   other	   way	   around	   –	   territorial	   power	   is	   involved	   in	   producing	   specific	  identities138.	   This	   difference	   matters,	   because	   unless	   we	   are	   absolutely	   clear	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  identity	  and	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  produce	  it,	  we	   risk	   falling	   into	   an	   essentialism	   that	   sees	   territoriality	   as	   ‘naturally’	  emanating	  from	  particular	  bodies,	  neglecting	  that	  the	  words	  we	  use	  to	  describe	  these	  bodies	  –	  ‘white’,	  ‘feminine’	  etc.	  –	  all	  describe	  the	  same	  thing:	  a	  position	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  For	  example	  the	  territorial	  dominance	  of	  whites	  vis	  a	  vis	  people	  of	  colour	  is	  not	  a	  function	  of	  ‘whiteness’,	  but	  rather	  ‘whiteness’	  is	  a	  function	  (i.e.	  a	  historically	  situated	  legitimisation)	  of	  territorial	  dominance.	  Similarly,	  the	  territorial	  dominance	  of	  males	  vis	  a	  vis	  females	  is	  not	  a	  function	  of	  their	  ‘masculinity’,	  but	  ‘masculinity’	  and	  ‘femininity’	  are,	  in	  part,	  produced	  through	  territorial	  power	  relations.	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dyadic	  relationship	  of	  dominance	  and	  subjugation139.	  While	  particular	   identity	  categories	  can	   therefore	  give	   important	  clues	  as	   to	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  specific	  persons	  come	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  state	  of	  spatial	  abjection,	  this	  state	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  can	  be	   diagnosed	   independent	   from	   and	   across	   a	   variety	   of	   identities.	   It	   simply	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  person	  is	  seen	  not	  to	  have	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  occupy	  space,	  and	  thus	  must	  either	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  dominant	  rule	  of	  those	  who	  have	  such	  a	  claim,	  or	  must	  cease	  to	  exist.	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  all	  fairly	  abstract,	  and	  while	  the	   previous	   example	   of	   the	   Nazi	   state	   can	   give	   us	   a	   good	   impression	   of	   the	  general	  dynamics	  of	  ‘malevolent	  territoriality’,	  the	  question	  is	  what	  this	  has	  to	  do	  with	  our	  cultural	  focus	  on	  Britain.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  return	  to	  my	  ethnographic	  narrative,	  and	  give	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  safe	  space	  can	  come	  into	  direct	  conflict	  with	  its	  opposite.	  	  	  The	  building	  that	  came	  to	  be	  the	  site	  of	  this	  struggle	  sat	  nestled	  in	  the	  far	  corner	  of	  a	  quiet	   cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sac	   in	  St	  Pauls,	   sporting	  a	  handsome	  red	  brick	   façade	  with	  a	  purple	   shop	   front	   such	   as	   one	   would	   expect	   from	   a	   solicitor	   or	   architect.	  Historically	  known	  as	  ‘Schooner	  House’,	  the	  place	  had	  until	  the	  winter	  of	  2010	  accommodated	   the	   ‘HUB’	   drop-­‐‑in	   service	   for	   homeless	   people,	   guided,	   per	   its	  own	  assessment,	  by	  a	   ‘holistic’	  approach	   that	   took	   into	  account	   the	  numerous	  problems	  homeless	  people	  experience	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  mere	  homelessness140.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  This	  description	  may	  possibly	  appear	  questionable	  to	  those	  who,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  mainstream	  of	  postmodern	  thought,	  are	  critical	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  binary,	  also	  and	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  power	  relations.	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  tendency,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  queer	  theory,	  to	  vulgarize	  a	  valid	  critique	  of	  binary	  oppositions	  in	  Western	  thought	  (such	  as	  e.g.	  in	  Derrida,	  1978)	  into	  the	  assumption	  that	  therefore,	  such	  binaries	  do	  not	  describe	  real	  social	  relations	  (e.g.	  critical:	  Jeffreys,	  2014).	  	  This	  is	  somewhat	  equivalent	  to	  translating	  a	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  historically	  situated	  concept	  of	  ‘homelessness’	  into	  the	  assumption	  that	  therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  homeless	  person;	  and	  constitutes	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  epistemic	  fallacy	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  I	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  point	  this	  out,	  since	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘gender’	  describes	  a	  basic	  relationship	  of	  dominance	  and	  subjugation	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticized	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Queer	  theory	  (e.g.	  Lorber,	  1996;	  Butler,	  2004)	  and	  feminist	  praxis.	  While	  I	  therefore	  agree	  that	  such	  binaries	  must	  be	  deconstructed,	  such	  deconstruction	  must	  however	  address	  the	  material	  
manifestations	  of	  power	  differentials	  and	  not	  just	  their	  symbolic	  equivalents	  on	  the	  level	  of	  ‘discourse’.	  To	  assume	  that	  a	  deconstruction	  of	  anything	  on	  the	  level	  of	  symbolic	  representation	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  departure	  of	  this	  thing	  from	  reality	  is	  essentially	  a	  philosophical	  version	  of	  magical	  thinking.	  	  140	  “A	  multi-­‐‑agency	  advice	  centre	  /	  one-­‐‑stop-­‐‑shop	  and	  outreach	  project	  for	  single	  homeless	  people	  that	  coordinates	  service	  provision	  and	  planning	  concerning	  housing,	  employment,	  social	  benefits,	  social	  services,	  health,	  training	  agencies	  and	  departments	  from	  public,	  voluntary	  and	  private	  sector	  agencies”	  (former	  HUB	  website,	  retrieved	  October	  2013)	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Just	  after	  Christmas,	  word	  on	  the	  street	  was	  that	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  centre	  was	  but	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  wave	  of	  government	  cuts	  to	  social	  services	  and	  welfare	  that	  the	  Coalition	  government	  had	  announced	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  Reducing	  the	  budget	  deficit	  had	  already	  been	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  previous	  New	  Labour	  government,	  but	  the	  financial	  crash	  of	  2008	  meant	  that	  the	  Coalition	  had	  a	  considerably	  easier	  discursive	  field	  to	  play	  in	  justifying	  more,	  faster	  and	  harsher	  cuts.	  Squatters,	  who	  were	  on	   the	  whole	  more	  avid	  consumers	  of	  news	  media	   than	  most	  university	  students	  I	  have	  met,	  were	  keenly	  aware	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  global	  financial	  crisis	  with	  a	  Tory	  government	  could	  only	  mean	  trouble.	  It	  was	  no	  secret	  that,	  as	  the	  Institute	  for	  Fiscal	  Studies	  put	  it,	  the	  proposed	  cuts	  were	  „clearly	  regressive	  as,	  on	  average,	   they	  hit	   the	  poorest	  households	  more	  than	  those	   in	  the	  upper-­‐‑middle	   of	   the	   income	   distribution	   in	   cash,	   let	   alone	   percentage,	   terms“	  (Hodkinson/Robbins,	   2013,	   58).	   For	   the	   squatters,	   the	   closure	   of	   the	   HUB	  therefore	  represented	  the	  first	  tangible	  sign	  that	  the	  cuts	  had	  indeed	  arrived	  in	  Bristol.	  Although	  the	  council	  officially	  cited	  a	  series	  of	  violent	  attacks	  on	  staff	  as	  the	  reason	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  centre,	  previous	  employees	  indicated	  that	  this	  was	  merely	   a	   guise	   for	   the	   enormous	   re-­‐‑structuring	   process	   of	   the	   social	   services	  landscape	   that	   was	   under	   way.	   The	   real	   reason	   for	   the	   closure	   was	   never	  established	  beyond	  all	  doubt141,	  but	  if	  the	  HUB’s	  end	  was	  not	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  cuts,	  then	  it	  certainly	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  resistance	  against	  them.	  In	  the	  early	  weeks	  of	  2011,	  the	  following	  press	  release	  landed	  on	  the	  desks	  of	  local	  journalists	  (overleaf):	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  A	  consultation	  document	  by	  Bristol	  City	  Council	  from	  October	  2011	  states	  that	  “the	  council	  needs	  to	  save	  20%”	  in	  the	  commissioning	  of	  Homelessness	  Prevention	  High	  Support	  Services.	  The	  same	  report	  states	  that	  the	  number	  of	  accommodation	  spaces	  has	  had	  to	  be	  reduced	  through	  the	  consultation	  from	  521	  to	  436	  due	  to	  the	  low	  standard	  of	  existing	  accommodation,	  see	  part	  4	  of	  this	  chapter.	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The  Hub  Drop-­In  centre  re-­opened  by  Squatters  
  
The  Hub  Drop-­In  Centre  for  the  Homeless,  in  Brunswick  Square,  Stokes  Croft,  
has  been  re-­opened  by  a  group  of  squatters  this  week.  The  group  are  providing  
advice  on  housing  and  squatting,  hot  drinks  and  free  English  classes  for  the  
homeless.    
  
The  drop-­in  centre  closed  down  three  weeks  ago  due  to  funding  cuts  to  services  
for  the  homeless,  though  the  Council  cite  problems  with  violence  and  threats  to  
staff  as  the  official  reason.  Disgruntled  ex-­employees  contacted  local  housing  
action  group  BHAM  (Bristol  Housing  Action  Movement)  regarding  the  closure  and  
helped  the  group  to  enter  the  building  last  week.  The  group  of  formerly  homeless  
men  and  women  took  up  residence  on  the  top  floor  of  the  building  and  decided  to  
re-­open  the  centre  in  protest  against  the  massive  cuts  to  service  for  the  
homeless.  
  
Housing  benefit  has  been  cut  by  £1.8  billion,  affecting  over  83,180  households  in  
the  South  West  and  leaving  200  families  homeless  over  the  Christmas  period.  
Bristol  City  Council  is  cutting  funding  to  sheltered  housing  and  homeless  services  
by  20%.  The  result  is  that  thousands  of  vulnerable  Bristolians  will  be  left  without  
access  to  emergency  accomodation  or  advice  on  how  to  cope  with  
homelessness,  and  its  relation  with  debt,  unemployment,  poverty,  alcohol  and  
drug  abuse,  sexual  abuse  and  exploitation  and  other  social  problems.    
  
Homeless  figures  have  grown  by  10%  in  the  West  in  the  last  year  and  house  
repossessions  have  tripled  in  the  last  three  year.  The  figures  are  forecast  to  rise  
as  recession  deepens  and  many  newly  homeless  are  left  with  nowhere  to  turn  but  
criminal  gangs  and  fundamentalist  groups  such  as  the  Evangelical  Crisis  
Ministries.  Those  most  at  risk  are  single  young  people  without  children  and  
council  tenants  who  may  now  be  evicted  from  homes  they  thought  they  would  be  
able  to  keep  for  life.  
  
The  squatters  maintain  that  politicians  have  chosen  an  easy  target  who  may  be  
slow  to  react  to  attacks  on  welfare.  However,  like  the  students,  the  homeless  and  
those  threatened  with  repossession  and  rising  rents  will  fight  back.  This  is  just  the  
beginning.  
  
The  drop-­in  centre  is  open  X  Y  and  Z  day.  Anyone  is  welcome  for  advice,  support  









homeless-­this-­christmas-­-­5286	  Figure	  10:	  The	  HUB's	  first	  press	  release,	  Jan.	  2011,	  hyperlinks	  original	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I	   first	   walked	   into	   Schooner	   House	   the	   morning	   after	   it	   was	   occupied,	   to	  encounter	   the	   fairly	   bizarre	   situation	   documented	   in	   the	   field-­‐‑note	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  architectural	  arrangement	  of	  the	  building	  was	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  how	  the	  territorial	  logic	  of	  ‘secure	  space’	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  architects	  and	  planners	  to	  structure	  the	  material	  environment,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  Oscar	  Newman	  (1972)	  has	  popularised	  under	  the	  title	  ‘Defensible	  Space’.	  Newman	  argues	  that	  particular	  ways	  of	  organising	  the	  built	  environment	  can	  serve	  to	  enhance	  security	  for	  residents	  and	  ‘design	  out	  crime’142,	  and	  makes	  explicit	   reference	   to	   ‘territoriality’	   in	  order	   to	  argue	   that	  a	   sense	  of	   territorial	  ownership	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  people’s	  willingness	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  ‘patch’	  (Minton,	  2009,	  73).	  Architectural	  design,	  therefore,	  can	  not	  only	  serve	  to	  produce	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership,	   it	  can	  also	  help	   to	  stop	  crime	  by	  enabling	  surveillance	  and	  social	  control,	  and	  by	  visibly	  excluding	  undesirable	   intruders	  through	  both	  aesthetics	  and	  security	  features	  such	  as	  gates	  and	  fences.	  Strangers	  and	   outsiders,	   in	   this	   model,	   are	   by	   definition	   suspicious	   and	   potentially	  dangerous,	   and	   thus	   ‘Defensible	   Space’	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   means	   a	   spatial	  arrangement	  that	  is	  designed	  ameliorate	  the	  fear	  of	  those	  inside	  (ibid.	  142).	  In	  other	  words,	  had	  the	  Hobbesian	  self	  commissioned	  an	  architect,	  Newman	  would	  have	  been	  candidate	  of	  choice.	  	  	  The	  HUB	  was	  arranged	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reflected	  all	  the	  key	  features	  of	  ‘Defensible	  space’.	  The	  open	  plan	  ground	  floor	  area	  was	  cut	  in	  two	  halves	  by	  a	  wall	  of	  desks,	  which	  had	  once	  formed	  the	  material	  ‘front	  line’	  on	  which	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  welfare	  system	  had	  encountered	  their	  charges.	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘front	  line’	  (as	  implied	   in	   the	   term	   ‘frontline	  worker’	   for	   public	   service	  workers)	   invokes	   an	  imagery	   of	  war,	   in	  which	   servants	   of	   the	   state	   throw	   themselves	   into	   deadly	  trenches	   to	   defend	   the	   boundary	   between	   the	   safe	   hinterland	   and	   enemy	  territory.	  As	  if	  to	  emphasize	  this	  reading,	  the	  desks	  that	  divided	  the	  battlefield	  were	   set	  up	   in	   little	   compartments,	   and	  on	   the	   social	  worker’s	   side,	   each	  was	  fitted	  with	  a	  panic	  button	  that	  was	  directly	  wired	  up	  to	  the	  police.	  On	  one	  side	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  In	  the	  UK,	  this	  approach	  has	  become	  popular	  under	  the	  title	  “Secured	  by	  Design“	  (Minton,	  2009,	  72)	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the	  room,	  there	  was	  a	  row	  of	  small	  cell-­‐‑like	  rooms	  with	  secure	  doors,	  presumably	  for	  private	  conversations,	  and	  all	  doors	  had	  heavy	  code	  locks.	  The	  entire	  inside	  of	  the	  space	  was	  fitted	  with	  cameras,	  and	  the	  CCTV	  system	  was	  –	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  –	  fully	  functional.	  	  	  ‘Secure	  Space’	  architectures	  such	  as	  this	  have	  frequently	  been	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  Foucauldian	  ‘technologies	  of	  power’	  serving	  to	  produce	  docile	  bodies	  through	  discipline,	  control	  and	  surveillance.	  Williams	  (1996)	  argues	  for	  example	  that	  the	  spatial	   structure	   of	   homeless	   shelters	   is	   produced	   in	   a	  way	   that	   allows	   social	  workers	   to	   intimately	   ‘know’	   their	   clients	   through	   a	   range	   of	   observation	  techniques,	  and	  thus	  serves	  to	  construct	  the	  homeless	  person	  not	  as	  somebody	  who	  has	  a	  problem,	  but	  somebody	  who	  is	  a	  problem	  (81)143.	  	  Williams	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  institutional	  task	  of	  ‘fixing’	  the	  homeless	  person	  (as	  opposed	  to	  changing	  the	  social	  order)	  leads	  to	  individualising	  and	  blaming	  attitudes	  among	  social	  workers,	   and	   thus	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	  architectural	  arrangements	  that	  attempt	  to	  remove	  the	  personal	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  homeless	  by	  means	  of	  an	  ever	  tighter	  mesh	  of	  social	  control.	  Williams	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	   frame	  the	  causes	  of	  homelessness	   in	   individualising	  terms,	  such	  as	  the	   idea	  that	   homeless	   people	   come	   from	   ‘dysfunctional	   families’,	   is	   ideologically	  motivated	  per	  se	  and	  aimed	  to	  obscure	  real	  structures	  of	  oppression.	  I	  disagree	  somewhat	  with	  this	  view.	  To	  see	  explanations	  of	  homelessness	  that	  account	  for	  things	  like	  mental	  illness,	  addiction	  or	  domestic	  violence,	  solely	  as	  strategies	  to	  reify	   the	   homeless	   as	   ‘the	   problem’,	   fails	   to	   recognise	   how	   these	   individual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  As	   a	   former	   social	  worker,	   I	   am	   all	   too	   familiar	  with	   the	   notorious	   ‘double	  mandate’	   that	  makes	  the	  ‘helping	  profession’	  equally	  accountable	  to	  its	  clients	  and	  to	  the	  state	  (or,	  increasingly,	  the	  market),	  which	  in	  practice	  demands	  a	  level	  of	  double-­‐‑think	  that	  I	  have	  found	  myself	  unable	  to	  sustain.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  I	  am	  somewhat	  sympathetic	  to	  a	  profession	  which,	  by	  and	  large,	   is	   sent	   to	   the	   trenches	   of	   class	  warfare	  without	   any	   adequate	  means	   of	   addressing	   the	  problems	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  solve.	  Social	  workers	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  administrate	  the	  most	  desperate	  and	  destitute,	  to	  hand	  out	  or	  deny	  subsistence	  levels	  of	  material	  help,	  grant	  physical	  shelter	   or	   not,	   and	   generally	   give	   or	  withhold	   necessary	  means	   of	   survival	   from	   parts	   of	   the	  population	  whose	  physical	  and	  psychological	  survival	  is	  not	  guaranteed.	  As	  a	  result,	   it	   is	  often	  these	   workers	   who	   are	   first	   in	   line	   to	   feel	   the	   rage	   that	   desperation	   lends,	   when	   rules	   and	  regulations	  that	  they	  have	  not	  made	  compel	  them	  to	  deny	  access	  to	  essential	  services.	  While	  thus	  architectures	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  HUB	  certainly	  reflect	  an	  impetus	  to	  control	  and	  contain	  the	  poor,	  they	   equally	   reflect	   the	   fear	   of	   a	   profession	  which	   (despite	   its	   continuous	   and	   futile	   effort	   at	  playing	   by	   its	   own	   rules)	   knows	   full	   well	   that	   no	   amount	   of	   control	   can	   prevent	   it	   from	  occasionally	  bearing	  the	  brunt	  of	  client’s	  discontent	  with	  the	  system	  it	  represents.	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manifestations	   of	   ‘dysfunction’	   are	   in	   themselves	   politically	   constituted.	   For	  example,	   taking	   into	   account	   in	   what	   way	   ‘dysfunctional	   families’	   reflect	  structures	   of	   patriarchal	   violence,	   which	   in	   turn	   originate	   in	   larger	   social	  structures,	  can	  result	  in	  a	  view	  that	  avoids	  polarisation	  between	  ‘individual’	  and	  ‘society’	   and	   instead	   assumes	   a	   mediated	   and	   mutually	   constituting	   relation	  between	  the	  two.	  	  	  Surveillance	   technologies	   are	   among	   the	   chief	   weapons	   of	   this	   disciplinary	  power,	  not	  only	  in	  social	  service	  institutions,	  but	  also	  in	  public	  space.	  Tosi	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  	  	  “practices	  which	  restrict	  the	  use	  of	  urban	  space	  are	  targeted	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  street	  
users,	  which	  are	  considered	  ‘undesirable’	  in	  public	  space.	  Their	  presence,	  or	  their	  
activity,	  is	  seen	  as	  constituting	  a	  danger,	  or	  a	  disturbance	  of	  the	  normal	  activities	  
for	  which	  public	  spaces	  are	  intended,	  or	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  contradicting	  the	  images	  
and	  symbols	  of	  those	  spaces“	  (226).	  	  	  Such	   ‘disturbances’	   can	   include	  busking,	   sleeping,	   camping	  or	  begging,	   or	   any	  other	  aspect	  of	  personal	  life	  which	  the	  street	  homeless	  are	  forced	  to	  conduct	  in	  public,	   such	   as	   personal	   hygiene144 .	   In	   addition,	   as	   Tosi	   argues,	   control	   and	  regulation	   of	   public	   space	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   social	  service	   sector	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   contain	   the	   homeless	   so	   that	   they	   do	   not	  ‘disturb’	  the	  dominant	  vision	  of	  the	  city.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  measures	  to	   remove	   them	   from	   public	   space	   and	   subject	   them	   to	   the	   ‘normalisation	  regimes’	  of	  homelessness	  provision	  (228),	  or	  increasingly,	  to	  just	  ship	  them	  to	  the	  periphery	  and	  leave	  them	  there145.	  While	  homeless	  persons	  are	  thus	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  While,	  as	  Wacquant	  notes,	  the	  penalisaton	  of	  poverty	  that	  characterises	  the	  US	  context	  is	  not	  as	  strongly	  developed	  in	  Europe	  (Wacquant,	  2001,	  409)144,	  restrictions	  on	  the	  use	  of	  public	  space	  through	  regulation	  and	  policing	  thus	  nevertheless	  affect	  the	  homeless	  in	  more	  and	  different	  ways	  than	  the	  settled	  population.	  145	  For	  example,	  in	  2012,	  homeless	  families	  from	  London	  were	  relocated	  outside	  of	  the	  city	  to	  avoid	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  housing	  them	  within	  the	  capital	  http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/nov/04/london-­‐‑boroughs-­‐‑housing-­‐‑families-­‐‑outside-­‐‑capital	  and	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  Blackpool	  in	  2013,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  town’s	  many	  B&B’s	  were	  mostly	  occupied	  by	  homeless	  families	  from	  urban	  areas	  in	  the	  south.	  See	  also	  further	  discussion	  below.	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one	  hand	  denied	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  occupy	  space,	  their	  spatial	  whereabouts	  are	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   tightly	   controlled	   and	   policed,	   and	   this	   control	   is	  legitimised	  by	  their	  construction	  as	  alien	  and	  ‘dangerous’	  elements.	  	  CCTV	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  this	  construction	  of	  secure	  space.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  for	   street	   homeless	   persons	   the	   continuous	   presence	   of	   an	   anonymous	   gaze	  cannot,	  as	  for	  settled	  people,	  be	  escaped	  into	  the	  private	  space	  of	  the	  home,	  and	  thus	  constitutes	  an	  even	  greater	  infringement	  on	  their	  privacy146.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   as	  politically	   literate	  people,	  most	   squatters	  hated	  CCTV	  with	   a	  passion	  simply	   because	   for	   them	   it	   represented	   the	   all-­‐‑seeing	   eye	   of	   the	   very	   power	  structures	  that	  their	  struggles	  were	  set	  up	  against.	  Consequently,	  the	  scene	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  –	  squatters	  reacting	  with	  horror	  and	  repulsion	  to	  the	  CCTV	  equipment	  –	  repeated	  itself	  regularly	  over	  the	  first	   few	  days	  of	  the	  HUB	  occupation	  whenever	  new	  visitors	  caught	   first	  sight	  of	   the	   technology.	  Almost	  without	  fail,	  however,	  this	  rejection	  quickly	  turned	  into	  its	  opposite	  when	  they	  realised	   that	   the	   equipment	   was	   now	   in	   their	   hands.	   Foucault’s	   saying	   that	  “visibility	  is	  a	  trap”	  here	  worked	  in	  reverse	  –	  the	  squatters	  were	  entrapped	  by	  the	  fascination	  of	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  from	  behind	  a	  camera	  that	  was	  usually	  pointed	  at	  them	  in	  a	  hostile	  manner.	  They	  had	  gone	  from	  being	  the	  observed	  to	  being	  the	  observers,	  and	  while	  it	  would	  be	  too	  much	  to	  say	  that	  they	  participated	  in	  disciplinary	  power	  (seeing	  as	  they	  usually	  hoped	  the	  public	  would	  misbehave	  to	  make	  their	  viewing	  more	  interesting),	  some	  seemed	  to	  thoroughly	  enjoy	  the	  possibilities	  of	  watching	  others	  without	  their	  knowledge.	  The	  amount	  of	  public	  life	  on	  Cumberland	  Street	  was	  limited,	  but	  in	  time,	  regularities	  were	  observed	  –	  who	  lived	  where,	  who	  visited,	  who	  dumped	  their	  trash,	  who	  hid	  their	  drugs	  and	  who	  picked	  them	  up.	  Stories	  were	  spun	  about	  the	  locals,	  based	  on	  the	  flimsiest	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  This	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  for	  other	  users	  of	  public	  space,	  surveillance	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  causing	  the	  observed	  to	  at	  all	  times	  behave	  as	  if	  they	  were	  being	  watched	  and	  thus	  enforces	  certain	  types	  of	  self-­‐‑regulation:	  “A	  real	  subjection	  is	  born	  mechanically	  from	  a	  fictitious	  relation	  [...]	  He	  who	  is	  subjected	  to	  a	  field	  of	  visibility,	  and	  who	  knows	  it,	  assumes	  responsibility	  for	  the	  constraints	  of	  power;	  he	  makes	  them	  play	  spontaneously	  upon	  himself;	  he	  inscribed	  in	  himself	  the	  power	  relation	  in	  which	  he	  simultaneously	  plays	  both	  roles;	  he	  becomes	  the	  principle	  of	  his	  own	  subjection.”	  (Foucault,	  1977,	  202)	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observations,	   and	   speculation	   about	   people’s	   relationships	   ensued.	   As	   an	  anthropologist,	  I	  was	  in	  a	  very	  bad	  position	  to	  raise	  moral	  objections.	  	  When	  the	  fascination	  with	  the	  CCTV	  finally	  faded,	  work	  began	  on	  restructuring	  the	   space.	   The	   desks	   were	   dismantled	   and	   from	   their	   parts,	   the	   squatters	  constructed	  small	  benches	  and	  tables,	  arranged	  in	  a	  number	  of	  circles	  across	  the	  room.	   A	   few	   donated	   sofas	   complemented	   the	   café-­‐‑like	   arrangement	   and	   the	  walls	   had	   been	   painted	   a	   bright	   red	   colour	   that	   somewhat	   clashed	   with	   the	  turquoise	  floor.	  In	  front	  of	  the	  little	  kitchen	  was	  a	  long	  bar	  that	  served	  tea	  and	  coffee,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  table	  with	  brochures	  of	  other	  services,	  political	  literature,	  flyers	  and	  the	  ubiquitous	  “handbook	  for	  squatters”.	  The	  result	  resembled	  a	  very	  badly	   decorated	   living	   room,	   but	   the	   difference	   to	   the	   initial	   institutional	  architecture	   was	   immediately	   obvious.	   The	   way	   the	   space	   was	   ordered	  encouraged	  sitting	  comfortably	   in	  small	  circles	  without	  barriers,	  and	  although	  there	  were	  signs	  on	  the	  wall	  saying	  “No	  drugs,	  no	  alcohol,	  no	  abuse”,	  these	  were	  consensually	   decided	   rules	   which	   applied	   to	   the	   occupiers	   as	   much	   as	   any	  visitors.	   In	   short,	   the	   space	  was	  materially	   and	   socially	   constructed	   to	   enable	  relations	   between	   equals,	   and	   therefore,	   potential	   relations	   of	   recognition	   of	  mutually	  shared	  vulnerability	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  	  This	  implies,	  by	  extension,	  a	  commitment	  to	  material	  and	  political	  equality,	  but	  even	  more	  centrally	  involves	  the	  insight	  that	  the	  other	  is,	  in	  fundamental	  ways,	  comparable	  to	  oneself.	  Authors	  such	  as	  Titmuss	  (1950)	  and	  Minton	  (2009)	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  an	  observable	  connection	  between	  this	  kind	  of	  equality	  and	  interpersonal	  trust	  –	  where	  people	  conceive	  of	  each	  other	  as	  equals,	  or	  at	  least	   aspire	   to,	   they	   also	   report	   lower	   levels	   of	   anxiety	   in	   public	   or	   fear	   of	  strangers.	  Conversely,	  the	  greater	   inequality	  is,	  the	  greater	  social	  mistrust	  and	  subjective	  feelings	  of	  danger.	  As	  Minton	  discusses,	  this	  finding	  may	  provide	  an	  important	  clue	  as	  to	  the	  increasing	  ‘securisation’	  of	  public	  space,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  crimes	  is	  falling	  –	  according	  to	  her,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  actual	   violence,	   but	   the	   potential	   violence	   inherent	   in	   unequal	   social	  relationships	   that	   motivates	   the	   building	   of	   ‘gated	   communities’	   and	   the	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surveillance	  of	  public	  space.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  recognise	  in	  this	  the	  paranoia	  of	  the	  Hobbesian	  self,	  who	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  keeping	  the	  ‘not-­‐‑I’	  out	  at	  all	  costs.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   homeless	   people,	   this	   is	   achieved	   in	   part	   by	   ascribing	   to	   them	  characteristics	  –	  ‘personality	  disorders’,	  a	  lack	  of	  work	  ethic,	  a	  lack	  of	  ‘will’,	  etc.	  –	  that	  mark	  them	  out	  as	  different	  from	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dominant	  self,	  and	  thus	   both	   ‘explain’	   and	   legitimise	   their	   exclusion.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   capitalist	  relations,	  this	  argumentative	  figure	  has	  the	  added	  effect	  of	  casting	  the	  homeless	  as	  so	  ‘other’	  that	  the	  settled	  person	  can	  suppress	  all	  fear	  that,	  but	  for	  the	  grace	  of	  the	  market,	  it	  could	  be	  them	  huddling	  in	  a	  doorway	  next.	  	  In	  reconstructing	  physical	  space	  to	  reflect	  and	  enable	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  social	  relations,	  the	  occupiers	  therefore	  defied	  the	  division	  that	  sets	  the	  homeless	  apart	  from	  ‘normal’	  society.	  The	  ‘formerly	  homeless	  men	  and	  women’	  the	  press	  release	  refers	  to	  –	  ‘formerly’,	  because,	  in	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  logic,	  they	  now	  were	  squatters	   –	   countered	   the	   previous	   institutional	   logic	   of	   the	   ‘front	   line’	   by	  constructing	  a	  material	  spatial	  arrangement	  that	  emphasised	  horizontality	  and	  barrier-­‐‑free	   communication.	   The	   ‘front	   line’	   can	   here	   also	   remind	   of	   the	  previously	  discussed	  split	  of	   the	  spatial	  self	  by	  what	  Winstanley	  refers	   to	  as	  a	  ‘dam’	  or	  ‘hedge’,	  and	  what	  psychoanalysis	  calls	   ‘dissociation’:	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  splitting	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  and	  the	  spaces	  it	  creates,	  and	  if	  the	  squatters	  removed	  the	  physical	  ‘dam’,	  then	  this	  sent	  a	  clear	  signal	  that	  they	  rejected	  the	  division.	  Hegel’s	  remark	  about	   ‘taking	  a	  contradiction	   into	  reason	  and	  leaving	  it	  unresolved’	  was	  here	  reversed	  –	  in	  removing	  the	  internal	  barriers	  that	   symbolised	   the	   contradiction	   between	   the	   ‘helpers’	   and	   the	   ‘helped’,	   the	  squatters	  in	  a	  sense	  pushed	  the	  division	  back	  out	  into	  the	  world	  where	  it	  came	  from.	   But	   since	   contradictions	   do	   not	   simply	   disappear	  without	   the	   requisite	  sublation,	   they	   come	   to	   assert	   themselves	   in	   a	   different	   form,	   and	   the	   HUB	  therefore	  soon	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  contradiction	  between	  its	  internal	  logic	  and	  the	  territorial	  logic	  of	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  occupier’s	  own	  understanding,	  this	  involved	  a	  confrontation	  with	  what	  they	  consistently	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘ruling	  class’.	  Although	  many	  of	  them	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were	  familiar	  with	  both	  sociological	  and	  Marxist	  understandings	  of	  class,	  ‘ruling	  class’	   referred	   not	   so	   much	   to	   a	   model	   of	   complex	   social	   stratification	   or	  economic	   exploitation	   (although	   these	   figured	   into	   it),	   but	   explicitly	   to	   an	  analysis	  of	  social	  domination.	  ‘Ruling	  class’	  was	  here	  constructed	  in	  opposition	  to	   a	   subjugated	   class,	   which	   the	   occupiers	   saw	   both	   themselves	   and	   other	  homeless	  and	  poor	  people	  belonging	  to.	  As	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘Safe	   Space’	   policies,	   this	   understanding	   reflects	   a	   social	   ontology	   of	   power	  typical	  for	  anarchist	  thought:	  the	  ruling	  and	  the	  subjugated	  class	  are	  understood	  as	  collective	  categories	  signifying	  dominance	  and	  subjugation	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  binary	  identity	  constructions,	  and	  what	  is	  being	  opposed	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  domination	  as	  such.	  Although	  the	  HUB	  was	  not	  explicitly	  defined	  as	  a	  safe	  space,	  it	  therefore	  reflected	  a	  very	  similar	  logic	  to	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7:	  the	  point	  was	  to	   side	   with	   the	   more	   vulnerable	   party	   (here:	   homeless	   people)	   against	   an	  aggressor.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  who	  this	  aggressor	  was	  seen	  to	  be.	  	  	  	  
The	  Big	  Society	  Strikes	  Back	  
	  
	  As	  a	   result	  of	   the	  HUB’s	   first	  press	   release,	   local	  newspapers	  were	   calling	   the	  council	  for	  a	  response,	  and	  the	  council	  therefore	  saw	  itself	  forced	  to	  reluctantly	  engage	   with	   the	   occupation.	   Utilising	   news	   media	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   their	  campaign	  thus	  put	  the	  occupiers	  in	  a	  position	  that	  is	  rarely	  available	  to	  homeless	  people	  –	  that	  of	  having	  a	  voice	  in	  a	  public	  discourse.	  The	  homeless	  are	  not	  usually	  asked	  their	  opinions	  on	  social	  policy,	  their	  role	  consists	  in	  putting	  their	  bodies	  in	  the	  locations	  assigned	  to	  them	  by	  social	  service	  agencies	  or	  police	  and	  security	  personnel,	  and	  to	  show	  appropriate	  gratitude	  that	  a	  place	  is	  assigned	  to	  them	  at	  all.	  For	  them	  to	  ostensibly	  take	  up	  space	  of	  their	  own	  accord,	  and	  then	  write	  press	  releases	  about	  it,	  was,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  unusual.	  The	  ensuing	  confusion	  on	  part	  of	  press	  and	  council	  reminded	  of	  the	  words	  of	  political	  scientist	  Corey	  Robin:	  	  
“Every	  once	  in	  a	  while	  (…)	  the	  subordinates	  of	  this	  world	  contest	  their	  fates.	  They	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protest	   their	   conditions,	   write	   letters	   and	   petitions,	   join	   movements,	   and	   make	  
demands.	   Their	   goals	   may	   be	   minimal	   and	   discrete—better	   safety	   guards	   on	  
factory	   machines,	   an	   end	   to	   marital	   rape—but	   in	   voicing	   them,	   they	   raise	   the	  
specter	   of	   a	   more	   fundamental	   change	   in	   power.	   They	   cease	   to	   be	   servants	   or	  
supplicants	  and	  become	  agents,	  speaking	  and	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  behalf.	  More	  than	  
the	   reforms	   themselves,	   it	   is	   this	   assertion	   of	   agency	   by	   the	   subject	   class—the	  
appearance	   of	   an	   insistent	   and	   independent	   voice	   of	   demand—that	   vexes	   their	  
superiors”	  (Robin,	  2011,	  5)	  	  Despite	  the	  council’s	  quick	  assurances	  that	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  HUB	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  spending	  cuts	  and	  everything	  to	  do	  with	  “saving	  taxpayers	  money”147,	  the	   squatters	  had	  hit	   a	  nerve.	  Their	   intervention	  was	   situated	  within	  a	  public	  discourse	  that	  at	  the	  time	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  ‘Big	  Society’,	  the	  guiding	  concept	  behind	  the	  Conservative	  Party’s	  pre-­‐‑election	  campaign,	  and	  in	  2010,	  the	  main	  ideological	  vehicle	  for	  the	  coalition’s	  restructuring	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  The	  concept	  described	  a	  varied	  political	  programme	  that	  was	  based	  on	  a	  juxtaposition	  of	  a	  paternalistic	   ‘Big	  State’	  with	  a	  bottom-­‐‑up,	  community-­‐‑based	  ‘Big	  Society’.	  The	  temporal	  proximity	  of	  the	  campaign	  to	  the	  announcement	  of	  local	  government	  funding	  cuts	  caused	  critics,	  first	  of	  all	  the	  opposition,	  to	  accuse	  the	  government	  of	  “cynically	  attempting	  to	  dignify	  its	  cuts	  agenda,	  by	  dressing	  up	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  support	  with	  the	  language	  of	  reinvigorating	  civic	  society”	  (Ed	  Miliband148).	  But	  as	  some	  commentators	  have	  noted,	  the	  ‘Big	  Society’	  was	  not	  merely	  PR	  icing	  on	  a	  bitter	  austerity	  cake.	  Wrapped	  in	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  localism,	  self-­‐‑help	   and	   social	   entrepreneurship,	   it	   appeared	   to	   be	   grounded	   in	   a	   peculiar	  combination	  of	  a	  conservative	  understanding	  of	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘community’	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   and	   (neo)liberal	   market	   radicalism	   on	   the	   other;	   and	   despite	   its	  communitarian	  rhetoric,	  contained	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  serious	  destabilisation	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Bristol	  Post,	  2.2.2011	  http://www.bristolpost.co.uk/Council-­‐‑hits-­‐‑claim-­‐‑squatters/story-­‐‑11235566-­‐‑detail/story.html	  	  	  148	  The	  Guardian,	  19.7.2010,	  http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/19/david-­‐‑cameron-­‐‑big-­‐‑society-­‐‑cuts	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The	   agenda	   was	   framed	   in	   an	   emotional	   language	   that	   invoked	   images	   of	  community,	   belonging	   and	   local	   autonomy,	   delivered	   with	   a	   moralistic	  undertone.	   In	   July	   2010,	  David	  Cameron	  described	  his	   vision	   in	   the	   following	  words:	  	  
“For	   a	   long	   time,	   the	   way	   government	   has	   worked—top	   down,	   top-­‐‑heavy,	  
controlling—	   has	   frequently	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   sapping	   responsibility,	   local	  
innovation	  and	   civic	   action…It	   has	   turned	  able,	   capable	   individuals	   into	   passive	  
recipients	   of	   state	   help	   with	   little	   hope	   for	   a	   better	   future.	   It	   has	   turned	   lively	  
communities	   into	   dull,	   soul-­‐‑	   less	   clones	   of	   one	   another.	   So	   we	   need	   to	   turn	  
government	  completely	  on	  its	  head.	  The	  rule	  of	  this	  government	  should	  be	  this:	  if	  it	  
unleashes	  community	  engagement,	  we	  should	  do	  it;	  if	  it	  crushes	  it,	  we	  shouldn’t.”	  (Cameron	  cited	  in:	  Kisby,	  2010)	  
	  Cameron	  here	  played	  on	  a	  number	  of	  tropes	  that	  characterise	  not	  only	  the	  Big	  Society	   discourse	   but	   conservative	   politics	   in	   general 149 .	   As	   Brace	   (2004)	  elaborates,	  conservatism	  frequently	  plays	  on	  an	  opposition	  between	  a	  state	  that	  is	  generally	  suspected	  of	  a	  tendency	  toward	  authoritarianism,	  and	  civil	  society,	  which	  is	  set	  up	  as	  a	  “crucial	  line	  of	  defence”	  (150)	  against	  it150.	  “The	  danger	  of	  limiting	   the	  autonomy	  of	   civil	   society	  and	  allowing	   the	   state	   to	  determine	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  I	  would	  like	  to	  explicitly	  state	  that	  if	  in	  the	  following	  I	  focus	  on	  conservative	  politics	  and	  ideology	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  I	  therefore	  consider	  any	  of	  the	  political	  alternatives	  (in	  terms	  of	  party	  politics)	  preferable.	  But	  since	  national	  politics,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  fieldwork,	  was	  strongly	  determined	  by	  conservatism,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  direct	  impact	  I	  could	  observe	  it	  having	  150	  Conservative	  arguments	  of	  this	  kind	  occasionally	  make	  reference	  to	  German	  fascism	  to	  illustrate	  what	  happens	  when	  the	  state	  becomes	  too	  strong	  and	  smothers	  civil	  society	  (e.g.	  Pipes,	  1999).	  This	  appropriation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  widespread	  misconception,	  namely	  that	  the	  3rd	  Reich	  was	  a	  system	  that	  was	  imposed,	  top-­‐‑down,	  on	  a	  passive	  populace	  by	  an	  ‘authoritarian’	  state.	  This	  account	  is	  a	  blatant	  historical	  lie,	  perpetuated	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  themselves,	  whose	  populations	  have,	  until	  the	  present	  day,	  a	  tendency	  to	  pass	  themselves	  off	  as	  ‘Hitler’s	  victims’.	  More	  historically	  accurate	  is	  a	  description	  of	  Nazism	  as	  a	  bottom-­‐‑up	  social	  movement,	  in	  which	  civil	  society	  merged	  with	  the	  Nazi	  state	  as	  part	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  organic	  
Volksgemeinschaft.	  The	  fact	  of	  Hitler’s	  democratic	  election	  and	  the	  enthusiastic	  welcome	  he	  received	  at	  his	  arrival	  in	  Vienna	  (one	  cannot	  really	  call	  it	  an	  invasion)	  points	  to	  something	  profoundly	  different	  than	  a	  totalitarian	  state	  apparatus	  turning	  on	  its	  citizenry,	  namely	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  in	  Nazi	  Germany	  an	  authoritarian	  state	  was	  created,	  enabled	  and	  supported	  by	  civil	  society.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  Nazi	  leadership	  did	  not	  originally	  come	  from	  a	  position	  of	  authority,	  they	  were	  ‘carried	  up’	  through	  the	  ranks,	  in	  Hitler’s	  case	  all	  the	  way	  from	  a	  homeless	  shelter	  in	  Vienna	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Reichskanzler.	  The	  ‘totalitarianism-­‐‑hypothesis’	  of	  German	  fascism	  is	  therefore	  seriously	  flawed,	  and	  as	  an	  antifascist,	  I	  object	  to	  the	  instrumentalisation	  of	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  for	  the	  nefarious	  ends	  of	  conservatives	  such	  as	  Pipes.	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public	  good	  is	  obvious	  to	  conservatives,	  who	  emphasise	  individuals	  as	  the	  source	  of	   property	   and	   power”	   (ibid).	   In	   order	   for	   the	   state	   to	   not	   suffocate	   civic	  engagement	  and	  individual	  enterprise,	  intervention	  therefore	  has	  to	  be	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum.	  In	  its	  most	  market-­‐‑radical	  variants	  (such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  Thatcher	  government),	   this	   translates	   into	   a	   “’roll(ing)	   back	   the	   frontiers	   of	   the	   state’,	  stressing	   the	   values	   of	   personal	   responsibility,	   force	   of	   character	   and	  independence151…the	  agencies	  of	  civil	  society	  needed	  to	  be	  strengthened	  so	  that	  charity,	  philanthropy,	  entrepreneurship	  and	  benevolence	  could	  flourish”	  (153).	  This,	  as	  Cameron’s	  statement	  sums	  up,	  is	  also	  essentially	  the	  programme	  the	  ‘Big	  Society’	  stood	  for,	  and	  it	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  contemporary	  re-­‐‑packaging	  of	  traditional	  conservative	  values.	  	  	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  impeding	  the	  functioning	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  also	  expressed	  by	   Burke,	   who	   claims:	   “Everybody	   is	   satisfied,	   that	   a	   conservation	   and	   secure	  
enjoyment	  of	  our	  natural	  rights	  is	  the	  great	  and	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  civil	  society;	  
and	  that	  therefore	  all	  forms	  whatsoever	  of	  government	  are	  only	  good	  as	  they	  are	  
subservient	  to	  that	  purpose	  to	  which	  they	  are	  entirely	  subordinate.	  Now,	  to	  aim	  at	  
the	  establishment	  of	  any	  form	  of	  government	  by	  sacrificing	  what	  is	  the	  substance	  
of	   it;	   to	   take	   away,	   or	   at	   least	   to	   suspend,	   the	   rights	   of	   nature,	   in	   order	   to	   an	  
approved	  system	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  them	  .	  .	  .	  is	  a	  procedure	  as	  preposterous	  and	  
absurd	  in	  argument	  as	  it	   is	  oppressive	  and	  cruel	   in	  its	  effect”	  [cited	  in	  Dinwiddy,	  
1992,	  236]	  
	  In	  contrast,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  Hegel	  is	  more	  ambiguous.	  In	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Right	  (PoR)	  he	  writes:	  	  “Just	  as	  civil	  society	  is	  the	  battlefield	  where	  everyone's	  individual	  private	  interest	  
meets	  everyone	  else's,	  so	  here	  we	  have	  the	  struggle	  (a)	  of	  private	  interests	  against	  
particular	  matters	  of	  common	  concern	  and	  (b)	  of	  both	  of	  these	  together	  against	  the	  
organisation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  higher	  outlook”	  (289)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  The	  values,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  boarding	  school	  system	  seeks	  to	  install	  in	  its	  charges,	  see	  chapter	  5	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  The	  state	  for	  Hegel	  has	  is	  the	  highest	  expression	  of	  Geist	  expressing	  itself	  in	  the	  symbolic	  unity	  of	  a	  nation’s	  collective	  life.	  It	  has	  an	  integrative	  function,	  which	  prevents	  individual	  self-­‐‑interests	  from	  putting	  the	  whole	  into	  jeopardy:	  	  	  
“[Particularity	   by	   itself,	   given	   free	   rein	   in	   every	   direction	   to	   satisfy	   its	   needs,	  
accidental	   caprices,	   and	   subjective	   desires,	   destroys	   itself	   and	   its	   substantive	  
concept	  in	  this	  process	  of	  gratification.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  need,	  
necessary	  and	  accidental	  alike,	  is	  accidental	  because	  it	  breeds	  new	  desires	  without	  
end,	  is	  in	  thoroughgoing	  dependence	  on	  caprice	  and	  external	  accident,	  and	  is	  held	  
in	  check	  by	  the	  power	  of	  universality.	  In	  these	  contrasts	  and	  their	  complexity,	  civil	  
society	  affords	  a	  spectacle	  of	  extravagance	  and	  want	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  
ethical	  degeneration	  common	  to	  them	  both”	  (185)	  
	  The	  ‘spectacle	  of	  extravagance	  and	  want’	  that	  civil	  society	  inevitably	  engenders	  therefore	  produces	  a	  class	  of	  people	  who	  are	  socially	  excluded	  through	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  absolute	  destitution,	  or	  what	  Hegel	  calls	  the	  rabble	  (see	  also	  Hampsher-­‐‑Monk,	  1992):	  	  
	  
“When	   the	   standard	   of	   living	   of	   a	   large	   mass	   of	   people	   falls	   below	   a	   certain	  
subsistence	   level	   –	   a	   level	   regulated	   automatically	   as	   the	   one	   necessary	   for	   a	  
member	  of	  the	  society	  –	  and	  when	  there	  is	  a	  consequent	  loss	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  right	  
and	   wrong,	   of	   honesty	   and	   the	   self-­‐‑respect	   which	   makes	   a	   man	   insist	   on	  
maintaining	  himself	  by	  his	  own	  work	  and	  effort,	  the	  result	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  rabble	  
of	  paupers.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  this	  brings	  with	  it,	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  social	  scale,	  
conditions	  which	  greatly	  facilitate	  the	  concentration	  of	  disproportionate	  wealth	  in	  
a	  few	  hands”	  (PoR,	  244)	  
	  Poverty,	   therefore,	   produces	   social	   discord	   by	   creating	   great	   inequalities	   in	  wealth	  and	  status,	  which,	  because	  they	  are	  socially	  mediated,	  take	  the	  form	  of	  “a	  wrong	  done	  to	  one	  class	  by	  another”	  (ibid),	  or	  what	  Marx	  would	  later	  formulate	  as	  ‘class	  struggle’:	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“Poverty	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  make	  men	  into	  a	  rabble;	  a	  rabble	  is	  created	  only	  when	  
there	  is	   joined	  to	  poverty	  a	  disposition	  of	  mind,	  an	  inner	  indignation	  against	  the	  
rich,	  against	  society,	  against	  the	  government.	  A	  further	  consequence	  of	  this	  attitude	  
is	  that	  through	  their	  dependence	  on	  chance	  men	  become	  frivolous	  and	  idle,	  like	  the	  
Neapolitan	  lazzaroni	  for	  example.	  In	  this	  way	  there	  is	  born	  in	  the	  rabble	  the	  evil	  of	  
lacking	  self-­‐‑respect	  enough	  to	  secure	  subsistence	  by	  its	  own	  labour	  and	  yet	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  of	  claiming	  to	  receive	  subsistence	  as	  its	  right.	  Against	  nature	  man	  can	  
claim	  no	  right,	  but	  once	  society	  is	  established,	  poverty	  immediately	  takes	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  wrong	  done	  to	  one	  class	  by	  another.	  The	  important	  question	  of	  how	  poverty	  is	  
to	   be	   abolished	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   disturbing	   problems	   which	   agitate	   modern	  
society”	  (244)	  
	  Since	  these	  inequalities	  are	  produced	  through	  the	  unbridled	  pursuit	  of	  individual	  desires,	  Hegel	  assumes	  that	  only	  the	  state	  can	  prevent	  inequality	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  does	  not	  begin	  to	  threaten	  the	  social	  fabric	  itself.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Burke,	  he	  therefore	  advocates	  that	  the	  state	  act	  to	  mediate	  discord	  in	  society	  and	  ‘bring	  it	  into	  harmony’:	  	  
“Particularity	   by	   itself	   is	   measureless	   excess,	   and	   the	   forms	   of	   this	   excess	   are	  
themselves	  measureless.	   By	  means	   of	   his	   ideas	   and	   reflections	  man	   expands	   his	  
desires,	  which	  are	  not	  a	  closed	  circle	  like	  animal	  instinct,	  and	  carries	  them	  on	  to	  the	  
false	   infinite.	   At	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   scale,	   however,	   want	   and	   destitution	   are	  
measureless	  too,	  and	  the	  discord	  of	  this	  situation	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  a	  harmony	  
only	  by	  the	  state	  which	  has	  powers	  over	  it”	  (185)	  
	  The	  basis	   for	   the	  harmony	  of	   civil	   society	   is,	   for	  Hegel,	  once	  again	   the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  its	  participants	  as	  subjects,	  particularly	  through	  their	  recognition	  of	  each	  other	  as	  the	  kinds	  of	  people	  who	  can	  be	  property	  owners	  (Christi,	  1978)	  and	   as	   such,	  who	   are	   fit	   to	   enter	   into	   contracts	   and	   be	   accountable	   to	   others	  (Brace	   2004,	   76,	   Connolly,	   1988).	   Therefore,	   “freedom	   required	   this	  accountability;	   liberty	   needed	   restrictions,	   freedom	   and	   duty	   relied	   on	   civil	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society	   for	   their	   fullest	   expression”	   (Brace,	   2004,	   76).	  Hegel	   thus	   takes	   as	   his	  starting	   point	   the	   ‘web	   of	   attachments’	   that	   constitute	   the	   basis	   for	   people’s	  ability	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   property	   owners	   and	   thus,	   for	   him,	   “freedom	   and	  belonging	  were	  inextricable”	  (ibid),	  although	  this	  freedom	  was	  restricted	  to	  men	  as	  the	  ones	  whose	  community	  constitutes	  both	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state	  (Landes,	  1981).	   “Civil	   society	   thus	   involved	   a	   complex	   interdependence	  of	   each	  on	   all”	  (79),	   whereby	   its	   members	   simultaneously	   emerged	   as	   individual	   property	  owners	  and	  constituent	  parts	  of	  the	  social	  whole	  (see	  also	  Williams,	  1998).	  The	  problem	   of	   poverty	   thus	   becomes	   explainable	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   a	   lack	   of	  integration	  of	  the	  poor	  into	  the	  social	  (80),	  i.e.	  their	  lack	  of	  property	  meant	  that	  they	  could	  not	  find	  belonging	  and	  recognition	  in	  the	  society	  of	  property	  owners,	  and	  thus	  their	  very	  existence	  constituted	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  social	   fabric	  (see	  also	  Plant,	  1977;	  Wood,	  1990).	  	  	  On	   the	   face	   of	   things,	   ‘unleashing	   community	   engagement’	   and	   ‘turning	  government	  on	  its	  head’	  was	  exactly	  what	  the	  HUB	  occupiers	  were	  doing,	  and	  the	  irony	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  press,	  who	  gave	  the	  occupation	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  airtime.	  I	  can	  relate	  from	  conversations	  with	  the	  squatters	  that	  they	  were	  genuinely	  not	  planning	  to	  stage	  a	  parody	  –	  some	  had	  real	  hopes	  that	  the	  ubiquitous	  ‘Big	  Society’	  rhetoric	   would	   help	   to	   sway	   public	   opinion	   in	   their	   favour.	   As	   a	   number	   of	  commentators	   have	   pointed	   out,	   the	   language	   of	   ‘community	   organising’	   and	  grassroots	   solidarity	   the	   agenda	   was	   framed	   in	   was	   designed	   to	   invoke	  associations	   of	   traditional	   working	   class	   solidarity	   and	   emancipatory	   politics	  (Levitas,	   2012,	   334;	   North,	   2011,	   821),	   and	   the	   squatters	   could	   therefore	   be	  forgiven	  for	  believing	  that	  it	  was	  addressed	  to	  them.	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  HUB	   instead	   became	   a	   material	   example	   of	   the	   ideological	   nature	   of	   the	   Big	  Society	  concept	  and	  its	  roots	  in	  a	  reactionary	  political	  position.	  It	  combined	  two,	  at	  first	  glance	  contradictory,	  elements:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  ‘localism’	  that	   invokes	   an	   idealised	   past;	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   a	   program	   of	   increased	  marketization	  of	  those	  services	  which	  for	  the	  political	  left	  are	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  (Teasdale	  et	  al,	  2012).	  This	  contradiction	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  reflect	  a	   tension	   between	   the	   two	   major	   currents	   within	   conservatism,	   namely	   the	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‘paternalistic’	  and	  the	  ‘libertarian’	  branch	  (Brace,	  2004,	  152f),	  or	  as	  Teasdale	  et	  al	  frame	  it,	  between	  traditional	  communitarianism	  (in	  its	  current	  incarnation	  of	  ‘Red	   Toryism’)	   and	   market	   liberalism 152 .	   At	   closer	   inspection	   however,	   it	  becomes	   obvious	   that	   while	   these	   two	   positions	   represent	   slightly	   different	  perspectives,	  what	  they	  share	  in	  common	  is	  a	  convergence	  of	  class	  interests	  that	  identifies	  conservatism	  –	  not	  only	  that	  of	  the	  Tory	  Party,	  but	  conservative	  politics	  in	  general	  –	  as	  first	  and	  foremost	  an	  ideology	  of	  power:	  	  
“These	   ideas,	  which	  occupy	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum,	  are	  forged	  in	  
battle.	  They	  always	  have	  been,	  at	  least	  since	  they	  first	  emerged	  as	  formal	  ideologies	  
during	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  battles	  between	  social	  groups	  rather	  than	  nations;	  
roughly	  speaking,	  between	  those	  with	  more	  power	  and	  those	  with	  less...For	  that	  is	  
what	   conservatism	   is:	   a	   meditation	   on—and	   theoretical	   rendition	   of—the	   felt	  
experience	  of	  having	  power,	  seeing	  it	  threatened,	  and	  trying	  to	  win	  it	  back”	  (Robin,	  2011,	  4).	  	  Robin	   therefore	   sees	   conservatism	  as,	   in	   essence,	   the	  political	   ideology	  of	   the	  very	  people	  the	  squatters	  identified	  as	  the	  ‘ruling	  class’.	  British	  conservatism	  has,	  in	   this	   context,	   taken	   a	   different	   historical	   trajectory	   from	   its	   European	  counterparts	   since	   the	   ‘great	   transformation’	   (Polanyi)	   from	   feudalism	   to	  modern	  capitalism.	  Eccleshall	  (1980)	  argues	  that	  while	  in	  Europe	  this	  transition	  led	  to	  protracted	  confrontations	  between	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  the	  ancient	  regime,	  resulting	  in	  two	  largely	  incommensurable	  ideological	  positions,	  in	  post-­‐‑civil-­‐‑war	  England	  the	  new	  elites	  were	  gradually	  incorporated	  into	  existing	  structures	  of	  power:	  	  	  “new	  ideological	  expressions	  were	  consequently	  grafted	  on	  to	  a	  set	  of	  pre-­‐‑modern	  
values,	   permitting	   an	   aristocratic	   ethos	   to	   persist	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	  
articulation	   of	   newer,	   bourgeois	   ideas…(blending)…traditional	   and	   modern	  
ideological	  strands	  into	  a	  coherent	  and	  robust	  defence	  of	  class	  inequality“	  (4).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Other	  commentators	  see	  it	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  reconcile	  Conservative	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	  agendas	  within	  the	  coalition	  government	  (Hodkinson/Roberts,	  2012,	  64).	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  This	  convergence,	  centred	  around	  the	  mutual	  interests	  of	  property	  ownership	  on	  either	  side,	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  seemingly	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  the	  Big	  Society	  agenda.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   its	   ‘localism’	  agenda	  it	   is	   ideologically	  rooted	  in	  pre-­‐‑modern	   aristocratic	   ideas	   of	   ‘natural’	   social	   hierarchy,	   representing	   the	  organicist	  strand	  of	  conservatism	  which	  seeks	  to	  preserve	  a	  social	  order	  based	  on	  obedience,	  submission	  and	  ‘belonging’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  knowing	  one’s	  place.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  its	  market-­‐‑radical	  aspect,	  exemplified	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  rolling	  back	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  replacing	   it	  with	  a	  programme	  of	   ‘venture	  philanthropy’	  (Buckland	   et	   al	   2013),	   pointed	   to	   bourgeois	   notions	   of	   individualism	   and	   a	  meritocracy	   based	   on	   self-­‐‑interest.	   What	   pulls	   these	   two	   strands	   together,	  according	   to	   Eccleshall,	   is	   the	   combined	   class	   interest	   of	   propertied	   groups,	  defended	  by	  an	  ideology	  of	  morality	  and	  virtue	  that	  serves	  to	  obscure	  the	  classed	  nature	  of	  its	  discourse	  (ibid).	  In	  thus	  combining	  the	  class	  interests	  of	  capitalists	  and	  the	  aristocracy,	  British	  conservatism	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  collaboration	  of	  two	  dominant	   parties	   vis	   a	   vis	   the	   groups	   that	   would	   challenge	   their	   respective	  power:	  in	  case	  of	  the	  bourgeois,	  the	  working	  class;	  and	  in	  case	  of	  the	  aristocrat,	  the	   peasant.	   It	   is	   therefore	   no	   surprise	   that	   that	   conservatism,	   in	   general,	   is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  members	  of	  the	  traditionally	  dominant	  ‘race’	  and	  class	  groups	   (Boston,	   1988)	   and	   that	   their	   ‘primary	   fetish’153,	   namely	   property,	   “is	  firmly	  attached	  to	  inequalities	  of	  power	  and	  is	  always	  about	  hierarchy”	  (Brace,	  2004,	  140).	  	  	  The	  moral	   legitimisation	  of	   this	  hierarchy	  based	   in	  a	  paternalistic	  view	  of	   the	  poor	  as	  morally	   corrupted	  and	   thus	  unable	   to	  govern	   themselves,	   a	  view	   that	  explicitly	  informed	  the	  Big	  Society	  initiative.	  As	  David	  Cameron	  put	  it:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  The	  word	  of	  the	  ‘primary	  fetish’	  here	  applies	  in	  a	  double	  sense:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  describes	  the	  ferocious	  attachment	  of	  conservative	  ideology	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  property	  alone	  can	  guarantee	  ‘liberty	  and	  civilised	  life’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  it	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  property,	  as	  I	  have	  previously	  alluded	  to,	  is	  what	  Marxists	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  ‘fetish	  category’:	  namely	  a	  reified	  abstract	  concept	  that	  simultaneously	  describes	  and	  obscures	  a	  social	  relation,	  see	  next	  chapter.	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“Irresponsibility.	   Selfishness.	   Behaving	   as	   if	   your	   choices	   have	   no	   consequences.	  
Children	  without	  fathers.	  Schools	  without	  discipline.	  Reward	  without	  effort.	  Crime	  
without	  punishment.	  Rights	  without	  responsibilities.	  Communities	  without	  control.	  
Some	  of	  the	  worst	  aspects	  of	  human	  nature	  tolerated,	  indulged	  -­‐‑	  sometimes	  even	  
incentivised	   -­‐‑	  by	  a	   state	  and	   its	  agencies	   that	   in	  parts	  have	  become	   literally	  de-­‐‑
moralised”.	  (David	  Cameron	  2010,	  cited	  in	  Kisby	  2010)	  	  These	  moralistic	  admonishments	  of	  ‘broken	  Britain’	  echo	  the	  aristocratic	  motif	  within	  conservatism,	  which	  bases	  its	  justification	  of	  inequality	  on	  the	  prerogative	  –	  if	  not	  duty	  -­‐‑	  of	  the	  morally	  superior	  to	  govern	  the	  morally	  weak.	  According	  to	  Robin	  (2011),	  the	  conservative	  mind-­‐‑set	  equates	  excellence,	  also	  and	  especially	  the	  moral	  excellence	  of	  an	  ‘aristocracy	  of	  virtue’154,	  with	  a	  natural	  right	  to	  rule.	  Conservatism,	  in	  its	  aristocratic	  current,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘natural	  order’	  of	   organically	   grown	  hierarchy,	   an	   image	   that	   recalls	   romanticised	   notions	   of	  feudal	  society,	  where	  the	  lord	  of	  the	  manor	  is	  obliged	  by	  noblesse	  to	  protect	  and	  discipline	   his	   subjects	   in	   the	   fashion	   of	   a	   father	   figure 155 .	   	   Consequently,	  conservative	  discourse	  has	  traditionally	  contained	  an	  element	  of	  paternalism,	  in	  that	  government	  by	  elites	  was	  justified	  with	  an	  otherwise	  inevitable	  decline	  in	  public	  morals	  that	  was	  assumed	  to	  directly	  lead	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  social	  (ibid	  p	  12f).	  This	  idea	  of	  ‘natural’	  authority	  can	  be	  traced	  through	  the	  intellectual	  history	  of	  the	  Big	  Society	  back	  to	  Edmund	  Burke,	  widely	  held	  to	  be	  the	  ‘father	  of	  modern	  conservatism’.	  	  	  Burke’s	  direct	  influence	  on	  coalition	  policy	  is	  far	  from	  obscure	  –	  he	  was	  openly	  hailed	  the	  ‘hottest	  thinker	  of	  2010’156	  and	  ‘patron	  saint	  of	  the	  Big	  Society’157	  by	  the	  media,	   and	   the	   authors	   of	   the	   Big	   Society	   agenda	  made	   liberal	   use	   of	   his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  In	  the	  light	  of	  my	  previous	  argument	  that	  ‘virtues’	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  patterns	  of	  social	  relations,	  the	  moral	  stance	  of	  conservatism	  thus	  quite	  explicitly	  involves	  an	  ethics	  of	  dominance	  and	  submission.	  This	  also	  again	  illustrates	  my	  argument	  that	  a	  ‘virtue	  ethics’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  point	  to	  social	  justice.	  	  155	  A	  romanticised	  version	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  society	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  popular	  British	  TV	  series	  “Downton	  Abbey”	  which	  was	  screened	  from	  2010	  onwards	  156	  The	  Independent,	  1.10.2010	  157	  David	  Marquand	  in	  Prospect	  magazine,	  5.10.2010	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terminology	  (e.g.	  Blond	  2010)158.	  It	  is	  therefore	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  a	  man	  whose	  argument	   can	  be	   summed	  up	  as	   “a	  defence	  of	   the	  aristocratic	   social	   hierarchy	  against	   the	   forces	  of	   individualism”	   (Brace,	   2004,	  144)	  Burke	  is	  well	  known	  for	  his	  diatribes	  against	  the	  French	  revolution,	  which	  would	  create	  “a	  nation	  of	  gross,	  stupid,	  ferocious,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  poor	  and	  sordid	  barbarians,	  destitute	  of	  religion,	  honour,	  or	  manly	  pride”	  (Burke,	  1790).	  In	  particular,	   this	  danger	   lay	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   a	  disruption	   in	  one	   set	   of	   power	  relations	   would	   inevitably	   cause	   a	   ripple	   effect	   that	   affects	   others,	   thereby	  overthrowing	  an	  entire	  social	  order	  based	  on	  social	  deference	  and	  subordination	  on	  part	  of	  the	  subjugated.	  The	  revolution	  would	  	  	  “break	  all	  those	  connexions,	  natural	  and	  civil,	  that	  regulate	  and	  hold	  together	  the	  
community	   by	   a	   chain	   of	   subordination;	   to	   raise	   soldiers	   against	   their	   officers;	  
servants	   against	   their	   masters;	   tradesmen	   against	   their	   customers;	   artificers	  
against	   their	   employers;	   tenants	   against	   their	   landlords;	   curates	   against	   their	  
bishops;	  and	  children	  against	  their	  parents.”	  (Burke	  1790)	  	  Particularly	   the	  spill-­‐‑over	  of	   insurrection	   from	  the	  public	   to	   the	  private	  realm	  troubled	   Burke,	   because,	   as	   Robin	   notes,	   conservatism	   conceives	   of	   power	  relations	   fundamentally	   as	   personal	   obligations:	   “the	   priority	   of	   conservative	  political	  argument	  has	  been	  the	  maintenance	  of	  private	  regimes	  of	  power—even	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  strength	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  state“,	  and	  therefore,	  “no	  matter	  how	  democratic	  the	  state,	  it	  was	  imperative	  that	  society	  remain	  a	  federation	  of	  private	   dominions,	   where	   husbands	   ruled	   over	   wives,	   masters	   governed	  apprentices,	  and	  each	  ‘should	  know	  his	  place	  and	  be	  made	  to	  keep	  it’“	  (2011,	  15).	  This	  formulation	  of	  ‘private	  dominions’	  should	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  territorial	  self,	  and	  if	  Brace	  argues	  that	  the	  conservative	  view	  of	  civil	  society	  implies	  that	  “the	  individual	  cannot	  be	  a	  territorial	  self”	  (145)	  then	  the	  emphasis	  here	  would	  have	  to	   be	   on	   individual.	   	   Conservative	   territoriality	   applies	   instead	   to	   corporate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Some	  commentators	  have	  attributed	  the	  revival	  of	  Burke’s	  ideas	  in	  the	  Big	  Society	  debate	  to	  a	  ‘rebranding’	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  who,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Thatcherite	  dogma	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  society’,	  had	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘nasty	  party’	  (e.g.	  Jacobs/Manzi	  2013;	  Bale,	  2008)	  –	  one	  wonders	  what	  the	  enlisting	  of	  Burke	  did	  to	  resolve	  this	  problem.	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entities,	  such	  as	  the	  feudal	  estate,	  and	  therefore	  becomes	  a	  collective	  endeavour,	  in	   which	   the	   “bonds	   of	   honour	   between	   gentlemen”	   (152)	   ensure	   that	   said	  gentlemen	   take	   their	   taste	   for	   dominance	   out	   on	  women,	   serfs	   and	   colonised	  peoples	  instead	  of	  each	  other159.	  As	  Robin	  recognises,	  the	  state	  in	  this	  context	  has	  the	   function	   to	  mediate	   the	   territorial	   interests	  of	  dominants,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  its	  existence	  is	  contingent	  and	  secondary	  to	  those	  interests	  –	  if	  the	  power	  structure	   of	   the	   ‘dominions’	   (i.e.	   what	   we	   have	   called	   secure	   spaces)	   can	   be	  maintained	  otherwise,	  the	  state	  becomes	  dispensable.	  	  	  The	  Big	  Society	  agenda’s	  impact	  on	  women	  gives	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  Burke’s	  concern	   about	   increasing	   independence	   and	   insubordination	   translates	   into	   a	  political	  programme.	  Levitas	  (2012)	  and	  others	  have	  argued	  that	  for	  example	  the	  attempt	   to	   roll	   back	   state	   provision	   of	   socially	   necessary	   care	   work	   and	   to	  encourage	  ‘voluntary’	  social	  care	  has	  a	  disproportionate	  effect	  on	  women,	  who	  constitute	  the	  majority	  of	  workers	  in	  these	  jobs.	  The	  accompanying	  cuts	  to	  social	  services	  such	  as	  child	  care	  or	  care	  for	  the	  elderly	  mean	  that	  much	  of	  the	  unpaid	  care	  work	  traditionally	  done	  by	  women	  will	  fall	  back	  into	  their	  responsibility.	  In	  combination	  with	  the	  reduction	  in	  welfare	  payments	  for	  women,	  especially	  those	  raising	   children 160 ,	   this	   means	   that	   overall,	   women	   will	   be	   increasingly	  dependent	  on	  male	  income,	  and	  thus	  at	  a	  higher	  economic	  and	  personal	  risk.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   the	   domestic	   violence	   sector	   has	   been	   severely	   decimated	   by	  austerity,	   and	   remaining	   women’s	   shelters	   and	   charities	   are	   struggling	   to	  continue	   to	  provide	   services,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   times	  of	   economic	   crisis,	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  girls	  usually	  rises	  (McRobie,	  2012).	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  moral	   agenda	   for	   ‘broken’	   Britain	   distilled	   from	   Cameron’s	   speech	   –	   ‘fathers,	  discipline,	   effort,	   punishment,	   responsibilities,	   control’	   –	   echoes	   a	   return	   to	   a	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  The	  feudal	  model	  therefore	  deals	  with	  male	  competition	  in	  a	  way	  comparable	  to	  the	  structures	  Stoltenberg	  (2000,	  2005)	  identifies	  in	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  military,	  by	  introducing	  strict	  hierarchies	  of	  rank,	  see	  chapter	  8.	  160	  The	  independent	  Women’s	  Budget	  Group,	  “made	  up	  of	  policy	  experts	  and	  academics”	  calculated	  that	  women	  “face	  cuts	  during	  the	  period	  2010-­‐‑15	  of	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  their	  disposable	  income,	  with	  single	  mothers	  losing	  15.6%.	  Couples	  with	  children	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  losing	  9.7%,	  while	  couples	  without	  children	  are	  losing	  4.1%.	  Women	  pensioners	  are	  losing	  12.5%	  compared	  with	  men,	  who	  lose	  9.5%,	  and	  couples,	  who	  lose	  8.6%”	  http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/21/spending-­‐‑cuts-­‐‑women-­‐‑report.	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patriarchal	  and	  authoritarian	  form	  of	  localism.	  This	  line	  of	  attack	  is	  by	  no	  means	  accidental:	   it	  reflects	  the	  conservative	  view	  that	  “women…are	  expected	  to	  find	  their	   substantive	   destiny	   in	   the	   family,	   and	   not	   to	   aspire	   to	  move	   beyond	   or	  transcend	  it”	  (Brace	  2004,	  139),	  and	  within	  the	  family,	  should	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  total	  control	  of	  a	  man	  with	  no	  option	  of	  escaping	  him	  should	  he	  deem	  it	  necessary	  to	   ‘discipline’	   her	   through	   violence.	   The	   positive	   evaluation	   of	   ‘traditional’	  hierarchical	  social	  relations	  along	  with	  the	  deconstruction	  of	   the	  public	  sector	  therefore	   threatens	   to	   push	   many	   women	   back	   into	   the	   same	   relations	   of	  personalised	  subjugation	  that	  feminist	  movements	  of	  the	  past	  have	  struggled	  to	  overcome.	  	  	  The	  same	  ideology	  of	  personal	  ties	  of	  dominance	  and	  submission	  infuses	  Burke’s	  approach	  to	  ‘localism’,	  reflected	  in	  the	  aptly	  titled	  forerunner	  of	  the	  Big	  Society	  agenda,	  ‘Total	  Place’.	  For	  Burke,	  the	  family	  is	  the	  basic	  social	  unit,	  followed	  by	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	   “our	  habitual	  provincial	   connection”	   (Burke	  1790	  cited	   in	  Davies/Pill,	   2012,	  p	  194).	  These	   social	   relations	  are	   “inns	  and	   resting	  places”,	  traditionally	  grown	  and	  locally	  situated	  in	  “little	  images	  of	  the	  great	  country161”	  (ibid).	  His	  localism	  is	  spatial	  and	  social	  at	  the	  same	  time:	  “to	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  subdivision,	   to	   love	   the	   little	   platoon162 	  we	   belong	   to	   in	   society,	   is	   the	   first	  principle	  (the	  germ	  as	  it	  were)	  of	  public	  affections.	  It	  is	  the	  first	  link	  in	  the	  series	  by	  which	  we	  proceed	  towards	  a	   love	   to	  our	  country,	  and	  to	  mankind”	  (Burke,	  1790).	  This	  view	  reflects	  the	  conservative	  notion	  of	  ‘being	  at	  home’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘being	  let	  loose’	  (Brace,	  2004,	  139)	  and	  underscores	  the	  connection	  of	  these	  ideas	  to	  property	  through	  the	  importance	  of	  inherited	  wealth	  for	  belonging:	  “for	  conservatives,	   there	   is	  a	  deep	  connection	  between…property	  and	   the	  sense	  of	  home	  as	  ‘the	  place	  where	  private	  property	  accumulates”	  (ibid).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	   emphasis	   on	   organically	   grown	   local	   ‘community’,	   implies	   an	   outright	  “rejection	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  state”	  (ibid,	  148).	  Society	  here	  “exists	  through	  authority,	  and	  the	  recognition	  on	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  Note	  here	  the	  nod	  to	  the	  structural	  similarity	  of	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  individual	  ‘home’.	  162	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘little	  platoons’	  was	  taken	  up	  by	  Blond	  (2010),	  whose	  book	  Red	  Tory	  is	  a	  core	  text	  of	  the	  Big	  Society	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this	   authority	   require(s)	   the	   allegiance	   to	   a	   bond	   that	   is	   not	   contractual	   but	  transcendent”	   (Scruton,	   1980/2000,	   45).	   Considering	   that	  we	   are	   still	   talking	  about	  the	   ‘hottest	  thinker	  of	  2010’,	   it	   is	  therefore	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  idyllic	  image	   of	   ‘inns	   and	   resting	   places’	   contains	   an	   implicit	   declaration	   of	   war	   on	  democracy.	   Burke	   himself	   then	   also	   leaves	   little	   doubt	   that	   democracy	   could	  ultimately	  “only	  change	  and	  pervert	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things“	  (Burke	  1790),	  since	   some	   parts	   of	   society	   could	   simply	   not	   be	   trusted	   in	   sharing	   “power,	  authority,	  and	  direction	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  state”	  (ibid):	  	  
“The	  occupation	  of	  an	  (sic)	  hair-­‐‑dresser,	  or	  of	  a	  working	  tallow-­‐‑	  chandler,	  cannot	  
be	  a	  matter	  of	  honour	  to	  any	  person	  –	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  a	  number	  of	  other	  more	  
servile	  employments.	  Such	  descriptions	  of	  men	  ought	  not	  to	  suffer	  oppression	  from	  
the	   state;	   but	   the	   state	   suffers	   oppression,	   if	   such	   as	   they,	   either	   individually	   or	  
collectively,	  are	  permitted	  to	  rule”	  (ibid)	  	  Burke,	  like	  most	  conservatives,	  thus	  sees	  government	  as	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  worthy	  elite,	  and	  the	  striving	  for	  democratic	  representation	  on	  part	  of	  the	  proles	  as	  a	   threat	   to	   its	  power.	  This	  philosophical	  background	  provides	  a	  context	   for	  David	  Cameron’s	  claim	  that	  	  	  
"The	  size,	  scope	  and	  role	  of	  government	  in	  Britain	  has	  reached	  a	  point	  where	  it	  is	  
now	  inhibiting,	  not	  advancing,	  the	  progressive	  aims	  of	  reducing	  poverty,	  fighting	  
inequality,	  and	  increasing	  general	  wellbeing	  ...	  The	  once	  natural	  bonds	  that	  existed	  
between	  people,	  of	  duty	  and	  responsibility,	  have	  been	  replaced	  with	  the	  synthetic	  
bonds	  of	  the	  state:	  regulation	  and	  bureaucracy"	  (November	  2009)	  
	  The	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  ‘synthetic’	  modern	  state	  and	  the	  ‘natural	  bonds	  of	  duty’	   cites	   Burke’s	   view	   that	   “we	   can	   bring	   our	   artificial	   institutions	   into	  conformity	  with	  nature”	  (Brace,	  2004,	  148),	  and	  nature’	  for	  conservatives	  means	  first	  and	  foremost	  ‘natural’	  inequality	  (ibid).	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  general	  democratic	  participation	  of	  workers,	  women,	  or	  people	  of	  colour	  (also	  and	  especially	  through	  the	  welfare	   state	  with	   its	   function	  of	   re-­‐‑distributing	   social	  wealth)	  appears	  as	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essentially	  a	   temporary	  aberration	  within	   the	  natural	  order	  of	   things	   (Levitas	  2012,	  330),	  which	  involves	  a	  quasi-­‐‑feudal	  federation	  of	  territorial	  dominants	  and	  their	  assorted	  chattel	  –	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  Shearing	  (1983,	  2001)	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘neo-­‐‑feudalism’.	  	  	  In	   its	  essence,	  the	   ‘Big	  Society’	  therefore	  implies	  a	  social	  ontology	  that	   is,	  very	  explicitly,	   about	   establishing	   and	   maintaining	   spatially	   defined	   relations	   of	  dominance	  and	  submission.	  This	  ideological	  bent	  is	  further	  underscored	  by	  the	  agenda’s	   “un-­‐‑gendered,	   un-­‐‑racialised	   and	   non-­‐‑antagonistic	   conceptions	   of	   the	  ‘public’”	   (Hughes	   &	  Mooney	   1998,	   Newman	   2001,	   136).	   Newman	  warns	   of	   a	  homogenisation	  of	  public	  discourse	  resulting	  in	  “hegemony	  of	  local	  elites”,	  which	  are	  “unlikely	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  validity	  of	  challenges	  to	  dominant	  norms	  and	  discourses”	  (ibid),	  although	  perhaps	  this	  assessment	  underestimates	  the	  degree	  to	   which	   this	   is	   precisely	   the	   point.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   moral	   discipline,	  paternalism	  and	  deference	  to	  one’s	  superiors	  that	  runs	  through	  the	  Big	  Society	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  opposed	  to	  dissent,	  because	  dissent	  implies	  insubordination.	  Thus,	  political	  conflicts	  based	  on	  class,	  race	  or	  gender	  inequalities	  come	  to	  be	  glossed	  over	  in	  romanticised	  notions	  of	  spatial	  belonging	  (Jacobs/Manzi,	  2013,	  39),	  and	  whoever	  does	  not	  agree	  comes	  under	  suspicion	  of	  actually	  being	  an	   ‘outsider’.	  This	  localism	  is	  therefore	  not	  wholly	  unlike	  that	  of	  Heidegger	  who	  emphasised	  the	   ‘natural’	   connection	   of	   the	   German	   to	   his	   soil	   –	   while	   in	   this	   case	   not	  biologically	   but	   morally	   legitimised	   (Levitas,	   2012),	   conservative	   ideology	  nevertheless	  reflects	  a	  similar	  naturalisation	  of	  spatial	  power	  relations	   in	   that	  each	  has	  its	  ‘natural’	  place	  and	  some,	  by	  implication,	  are	  out	  of	  place.	  He	  or	  she	  who	  challenges	   ‘dominant	  norms	  and	  discourses’	   is	   therefore	  by	  virtue	  of	   this	  fact	   identified	   as	   not	   belonging	   to	   the	   ‘natural’	   organic	   community,	   and	   thus	  becomes	  cast	  as	  the	  spatial	  other.	  	  	  The	  effect	  of	  Big	  Society	  localism	  on	  those	  who	  are	  homeless	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  local	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  structural	  blindness	  to	  those	  causes	  of	  social	  problems	  that	  lie	  beyond	  its	  limits:	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“A	   weak	   state	   will	   effectively	   privatize	   many	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   are	   widely	  
recognized	  as	  collective	  issues.	  So	  for	  example,	  homelessness	  and	  problems	  in	  the	  
rental	   market	   will	   be	   less	   conspicuous,	   buried	   from	   the	   gaze	   of	   politics	   and	  
effectively	  seen	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  individual,	  private	  problems,	  often	  associated	  
with	  deficiency	  in	  character,	  if	  not	  amorality”(Jacobs/Manzi,	  2013,	  39).	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  ‘naturally	  grown’	  local	  relationships	  that	  Burke	  fetishizes	  are	  inherently	  ‘settled’	  –	  they	  tie	  people	  to	  each	  other	  as	  much	  as	  to	  their	  “inns	  and	   resting	   places”.	   Again,	   this	   view	   echoes	   Heidegger	   -­‐‑	   those	   who	   have	   no	  resting	  places	  are	  by	  definition	  excluded	  from	  such	  a	  way	  of	  being	  in	  space,	  they	  are	   not	   part	   of	   the	   ‘local’	   because	   they	   are	   ‘unrooted’	   and	   ‘unroofed’	   and	  therefore,	  have	  no	  business	  hanging	  around.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  centuries-­‐‑old	  practice	  of	  rounding	  up	  and	  deporting	  the	  homeless	  (e.g.	  Beier	  et	  al,	  2008),	  has	  had	  a	  recent	  revival	  for	  example	  in	  London,	  where	  local	  authorities	  ‘outsource’	  statutory	   homeless	   families	   to	   the	   north	   of	   the	   country	   because	   of	   cheaper	  accommodation 163 .	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   idea	   that	   state	   welfare	   fosters	  dependency	   and	  undermines	   individual	   enterprise	   led	   to	   precisely	   the	   severe	  cuts	  in	  public	  spending	  on	  homelessness	  services	  that	  the	  HUB	  occupiers	  were	  protesting	  against.	  	  	  If	  the	  occupiers	  therefore	  identified	  a	  ‘ruling	  class’	  as	  their	  opponent,	  then	  this	  reading	  was	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways	  more	  ‘practically	  adequate’	  than	  sociological	  or	  even	  Marxist	   renditions	   of	   ‘class’	   would	   suggest.	   It	   certainly	   mirrored	   the	  understanding	  of	  conservative	  politics,	  which	  agrees	  with	  anarchist	  thought	  at	  least	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   there	   really	   is	   a	   fundamental	   battle	   going	   on	   that	  transcends	  conventional	  notions	  of	  class	  –	  a	  battle	  between	  the	  forces	  who	  want	  to	  see	  relations	  of	  dominance	  and	  submission	  abolished,	  and	  those	  who	  want	  to	  see	  them	  maintained.	  It	  is	  not	  altogether	  surprising	  that	  the	  latter	  point	  of	  view	  should	  identify	  property	  as	  its	  pivotal	  concept	  –	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  property	  is	  both	  a	  result	  of	  unequal	  power	  and	  a	  way	  to	  maintain	  this	  inequality.	  But	  the	  emphasis	  on	  property	  should	  not	  obscure	  that	  in	  conservative	  ideology,	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property	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  –	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  and	  that	  end	  is,	  ultimately,	   power.	   In	   this	   way,	   by	   taking	   on	   the	   Big	   Society	   agenda	   and	   the	  ideology	  that	  sustained	  it,	  the	  squatters	  had	  quite	  literally	  challenged	  their	  arch-­‐‑nemesis,	  and	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  this	  battle	  turned	  out.	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Chapter	  Ten:	  The	  Enemy	  Within.	  	  
	  
	  
It’s	  really	  nothing	  personal.	  I	  find	  you	  offensive	  	  
as	  a	  concept.	  Mike	  Carey	  	  	  When	  the	  HUB	  finally	  opened	  its	  doors	  to	  the	  public	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  February,	  the	  influx	  of	  people	  seeking	  help	  and	  advice	  was	  slow	  at	  first.	  But	  within	  a	  couple	  of	  days,	  word	  had	  got	  around,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  people	  dropped	  by	  to	  see	  what	  the	  place	  had	  to	  offer.	  The	  eagerness	  of	   the	  occupiers	   to	  provide	  support	  may	  have	  been	  slightly	  intimidating	  to	  the	  first	  few	  visitors,	  who	  were	  all	  but	  picked	  up,	  wrapped	  in	  a	  blanket	  and	  forced	  to	  drink	  multiple	  cups	  of	  tea	  while	  discussing	  their	   problems.	   The	   clientele	  mainly	   consisted	   in	   persons	  who	  were	   either	   at	  acute	  risk	  of	  becoming	  homeless,	  or	  had	  already	  done	  so	  and	  were	  now	  trying	  to	  find	   out	   what	   options	   were	   available	   to	   them.	   The	   HUB	   crew	   had	   a	   good	  understanding	  of	  tenancy	  law	  and	  court	  proceedings	  regarding	  evictions	  	  -­‐‑	  the	  members	  had	  gone	  through	  this	  procedure	  more	  times	  than	  most	  people	  move	  house	  in	  their	  lives	  –	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  evictions	  could	  be	  stalled	  or	  prevented	  until	  the	  tenant	  had	  found	  new	  accommodation.	  In	  other	  cases,	  persons	  who	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  prevent	  eviction	  were	  referred	  to	  agencies	  providing	  emergency	  accommodation,	  and	  were	  made	  aware	  of	  places	  they	  could	  get	  food,	  clothes	  or	  showers.	  	  	  Although	  issues	  could	  be	  discussed	  in	  private	  (in	  the	  ‘cells’),	  the	  open	  plan	  layout	  of	  the	  main	  service	  area	  facilitated	  spontaneous	  group	  sessions	  which	  permitted	  people	   to	   vent	   to	   their	   heart’s	   content.	   Political	   debate	   was	   always	   a	   central	  aspect	  of	  the	  squatting	  scene,	  and	  the	  minutiae	  of	  welfare	  reform	  were	  discussed	  as	   intensely	  as	  any	  other	  matters	  of	  great	  personal	   importance.	  For	  the	  newly	  homeless,	   however,	   these	   conversations	   also	   had	   the	   important	   function	   of	  integrating	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  exclusion	  into	  a	  wider	  social	  narrative.	  It	   is	  widely	   recognised	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   homelessness	   that	  while	   previous	  psychological	   trauma	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   risk	   factors	   associated	   with	  homelessness	  (e.g.	  Hopper	  et	  al	  2010),	  the	  experience	  of	  homelessness	  is	  also	  in	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and	  of	  itself	  traumatic	  (Goodman	  et	  al,	  1991)164.	  Spatial	  abjection	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  social	  condition	  –	  becoming	  the	  territorial	  other	  means	  not	  only	  being	  excluded	  from	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  space,	  but	  by	  virtue	  of	  that,	  from	  a	  legitimate	  place	  in	  society.	  Goodman	  et	  al	  note:	  “homelessness,	  like	  other	  traumas,	  may	  produce	  a	  psychological	   sense	  of	   isolation	  or	  distrust	   as	  well	   as	   the	   actual	   disruption	  of	  social	  bonds.	  Anecdotal	  accounts…reveal	  how	  becoming	  homeless	  strips	  people	  of	   most	   of	   their	   accustomed	   social	   roles”	   (1991,	   1220).	   	   Becoming	   homeless	  therefore	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  (Ruddick	  2002;	  Patterson,	  1985165),	   pointing	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   breakdown	   of	   the	   social	   affiliations	   that	  inform	  a	  person’s	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  traumatic	  experience.	  For	  the	  people	  who	  visited	  the	  HUB,	  the	  opportunity	  to	  find	  that	  there	  were	  others	  in	  the	  same	  situation,	  indeed	  that	  they	  could	  become	  members	  of	  a	  different	  part	  of	  society	  rather	   than	  being	   left	   to	   their	   individual	   struggle	   for	   survival,	  was	   as	   least	   as	  important	   as	   practical	   help.	   The	   occupiers	   did	   not	   hesitate	   to	   publicise	   their	  activities,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  council	  (overleaf):	  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  I	  will	  discuss	  trauma	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  homelessness	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapters	  eleven	  and	  twelve	  165	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  12	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Squatters:  Council  understates  homeless  problem  
  
The  squatters  occupying  the  former  “HUB”  drop  in  centre  for  the  homeless  
reject  claims  that  their  protest  against  council  spending  cuts  is  unjustified.  
“We  accept  that  the  Council  are  doing  their  best  to  protect  frontline  
services.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  cutting  housing  benefit  by  80%,  
combined  with  smaller  housing  budgets  and  the  aftershock  of  the  
recession  that  is  still  causing  people  to  lose  their  homes,  is  bound  to  cause  
a  massive  surge  in  homelessness.”  says  the  group’s  spokesman  Simon  
Clarke.    
  
The  group  also  claims  that  the  Council  is  massively  understating  the  
number  of  rough  sleepers  in  Bristol:  “We  have  been  told  that  there  are  
about  6  or  7  people  sleeping  rough  in  Bristol.  Anyone  who  has  worked  with  
the  homeless  in  this  city  can  tell  you  it’s  at  least  ten  times  as  many,  people  
the  council  just  pretends  don’t  exist”.    
  
The  first  opening  week  of  the  former  HUB  has  been  a  success,  the  
squatters  claim.  “Within  the  first  three  days,  we’ve  had  about  20  people  
come  in,  most  with  housing  related  problems.  We  have  been  able  to  
advise  them  on  various  options,  such  as  council  run  services  and  self-­help  
alternatives,  which  the  council  does  not  make  people  aware  of  as  a  policy.”  
Simon  says.  
  
Meanwhile,  the  group  are  preparing  for  legal  proceedings  to  evict  them  
from  the  unused  building.  “We  are  providing  a  vital  service  to  Bristol’s  most  
vulnerable  in  an  area  that  the  Council  does  not  even  acknowledge  exist”  
says  Simon.  
  Figure	  11:	  The	  HUB's	  second	  press	  release,	  Feb.	  2011	  	  An	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  advice	  the	  HUB	  offered	  was,	  of	  course,	  related	  to	  squatting.	  Many	  newly	  homeless	  persons	  were	  not	  aware	  that	  squatting	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  entirely	   legal,	   and	   they	   had	   no	   idea	   how	   to	   go	   about	   it.	   More	   experienced	  squatters	  from	  the	  social	  environment	  of	  the	  occupation	  therefore	  regularly	  ran	  information	  sessions	  and	  provided	  practical	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  information	  about	  empties,	  and	  the	  lending	  of	  tools	  and	  muscle	  power	  for	  the	  new	  squatter’s	  acquisition	  of	  living	  space.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  press	  release	  above,	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  central	  criticisms	  the	  occupiers	  levelled	  against	  the	  council	  that	  regular	  homeless	  services	  did	  not	  make	  people	   aware	  of	   the	  possibility	   of	   squatting	  or	   actively	  discouraged	   them	   from	   doing	   so.	   Of	   course,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   housing	  services,	   advocating	   squatting	   was	   tantamount	   to	   telling	   people	   to	   just	   sleep	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under	  a	  bridge	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  squatters	  were	  legally	  homeless,	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  only	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  –	  and	  this	  was	  presumably	  the	  reason	  the	  council	  responded	  to	  the	   challenge	   in	   the	   first	   place	   –	   the	   squatters	  were	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	  sensitive	   topic	   of	  welfare	   reform	  more	   generally.	   	   In	   early	   2011,	  many	   of	   the	  details	  of	  the	  proposed	  reform	  were	  only	  theoretically	  formulated,	  but	  several	  notable	  institutions	  –	  among	  them	  the	  Institute	  for	  Fiscal	  Studies	  –	  had	  issued	  warnings	   that	   the	   poor	   would	   be	   disproportionally	   affected	   by	   austerity	  (Hodkinson/Robbins,	   2012,	   58),	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   social	   unrest	   had	   already	  begun	  to	  loom	  large	  (invoked,	  among	  others,	  by	  the	  police,	  who	  argued	  against	  cuts	  to	  their	  own	  budget	  by	  predicting	  “widespread	  disorder”166).	  	  It	  would	  seem	  plausible	   that	   under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   council	   had	   little	   interest	   in	  initiatives	  that	  highlighted	  the	  coming	  cuts	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  council’s	  role	  in	  administrating	  them.	  Although	  the	  ‘Spending	  Review’	  was	  ostensibly	  driven	  by	  the	   government,	   the	   new	   ‘autonomy’	   for	   local	   councils	   that	   the	   Big	   Society	  promoted	  meant	   that	   local	   resistance	   could	   very	   likely	   be	  mounted	   first	   and	  foremost	  against	  those	  who	  were	  seen	  to	  implement	  the	  cuts.	  According	  to	  the	  council’s	   2011	   consultation	  paper,	   the	   budget	   for	  High	   Support	   homelessness	  prevention	  services	  was	  to	  be	  reduced	  by	  23%,	  and	  an	  additional	  85	  supported	  accommodation	  spaces	  were	  to	  go	  for	  this	  client	  group.	  This	  was	  before	  the	  2012	  and	   2013	   budgets	   bringing	   further	   cuts,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   reduction	   in	   housing	  benefit	  and	  other	  benefits	  that	  were	  expected	  to	  negatively	  affect	  homelessness	  rates.	  Charities	  were	  already	  warning	  that	  a	  storm	  was	  brewing	  all	  over	  the	  UK	  –	  and	  the	  squatters	  were	  reminding	  the	  public	  of	  this.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  legal	  owner	  of	  Schooner	  House	  –	  a	  London	  based	  property	  firm	  named	  Daejan	  Holdings	  Plc	  –	  had	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  occupation,	  and	  had	  taken	  the	   usual	   measures	   to	   remove	   the	   squatters.	   Before	   ‘Weatherley’s	   law’,	   this	  meant	   making	   a	   claim	   to	   possession	   at	   the	   local	   magistrate’s	   court	   and,	   if	  possession	   was	   granted	   (which	   it	   nearly	   always	   was)	   to	   wait	   until	   bailiffs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  The	  Guardian,	  13.09.2010	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employed	  by	  the	  magistrate	  performed	  the	  eviction.	  Daejan,	  however,	  was	  not	  a	  landlord	   like	   any	   other	   –	   with	   investment	   property	   assets	   of	   over	   GBP	  1,546,718,000	   in	   2014,	   up	   from	  GBP	   1,407,544,000	   in	   2013,	   or	   net	   valuation	  surplus	  for	  the	  year	  of	  £119,648,000	  (2013	  -­‐‑	  £82,694,000)167,	  Daejan	  is	  part	  of	  a	  complex	   network	   of	   companies	   known	   as	   the	   Freshwater	   Group,	   one	   of	   the	  country’s	   largest	   private	   landlords	   (Kincaid,	   1972).	   In	   2002,	   the	   ‘Evening	  Standard’	  placed	  its	  director	  16th	  on	  its	  list	  of	  ‘who	  owns	  London’,	  with	  a	  total	  of	  35	   acres	   of	   land	   ownership.	   Daejan	   Holdings	   plc	   is	   part	   of	   the	   Freshwater	  ‘empire’,	   a	   complex	   network	   of	   135	   companies	   and	   subsidiaries,	  with	   Daejan	  itself	  seeing	  a	  total	  growth	  in	  share	  value	  of	  ca	  12%	  and	  a	  net	  profit	  of	  £90m	  in	  2013.	  The	  company	  had	  been	  founded	  in	  1939,	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  several	  rubber	  and	  coffee	  plantations	  in	  what	  was	  then	  the	  Dutch	  West	  Indies.	  The	  insurgencies	  in	   the	   region	   from	  1949,	  which	   subsequently	   led	   to	   the	   formation	   of	  modern	  Indonesia,	  had	  seen	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  plantation	  business	  destroyed	  and	  the	  rest	  sold	  due	  to	  inoperability.	  The	  company	  was	  dormant	  until	  1957,	  when	  it	  was	  turned	  into	  a	  property	  business	  via	  a	  reverse	  merger.	  Today,	  Daejan	  is	  headed	  by	  director	  Mr	  Freshwater	  whose	  personal	  wealth	  is	  estimated	  around	  £785m168.	  The	   company	   has	   been	   involved	   in	   several	   high-­‐‑profile	   tenant	   disputes,	  most	  recently	  the	  landmark	  ‘Daejan	  Investments	  vs	  Benson’	  (March	  2013),	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	   ruled	   in	   favour	  of	  Daejan	  and	  against	   several	   tenants	  who	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  pay	  extortionate	  maintenance	  charges	  for	  the	  buildings	   they	   rented	   in.	  While	   the	   company	  has	  not	  been	   strongly	   in	   the	  focus	  of	  the	  public	  eye,	  they	  have	  informally	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘slum	  landlords’	  (citation)	  and	  have	  come	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  various	  activist	  groups.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  prosecution	  of	  the	  1970’s	  Angry	  Brigade169,	  a	  plan	  was	  alleged	  to	  target	  the	  Freshwater	  Group	  because	  of	  its	  lobbying	  activities	  for	  the	  1972	  Housing	  Finance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Unaudited	   Preliminary	   Results	   Announcement	   for	   the	   year	   ended	   31	   March	   2014,	   from:	  http://www.daejanholdings.com	  168	  Estates	  Gazette	  Rich	  List	  2011	  169	  	  The	  Angry	  Brigade	  was	  a	  militant	  organisation	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘British	  Baader	  Meinhof’,	  whose	  members	  were	  accused	  and	  convicted	  of	  several	  bombings	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  The	  bombings,	  which	  were	  aimed	  at	  Tory	  politicians	  as	  well	  as	  government	  and	  corporate	  targets,	  only	  led	  to	  one	  instant	  of	  a	  minor	  injury	  and	  no	  deaths,	  but	  were	  nevertheless	  seen	  as	  a	  provocation	  of	  and	  embarrassment	  for	  government	  and	  ardently	  investigated	  and	  prosecuted.	  In	  1971/72	  several	  activists	  were	  sentenced	  to	  10	  year	  prison	  terms.	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Act,	   which	   undermined	   tenant	   rights	   and	   promised	   higher	   profit	   margins	   to	  landlords	  (Carr	  2010,	  137/162).	  	  	  With	  charitable	  donations	  of	  over	  £23m	  in	  2013170,	  Mr	  Freshwater	  himself	  may	  be	   precisely	   the	   kind	   of	   ‘venture	   philanthropist’	   the	   Big	   Society	   discourse	  favours.	  He	  is	  a	  director	  of	  Mayfair	  Charities	  Limited,	  an	  organisation	  which	  by	  its	   own	   description	   “receives	   income	   from	   its	   investment	   properties,	   cash	  deposit	   fixed	  asset	   listed	   investments	   and	   subsidiaries	  which	   it	   utilises	   in	   the	  provision	  and	  distribution	  of	  grants,	  donations	  and	  loans	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  to	   organisations	   &institutions	   engaged	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   education…for	   the	  relief	   of	   poverty”	   (Charity	   Commission).	   A	   2010	   inquest	   by	   the	   Charity	  Commission	   describes	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   charity	   as	   follows:	   “The	   property	  assets	  are	  recorded	  in	  the	  Charity’s	  Accounts	  as	  having	  a	  value	  of	  £33,945,000.	  The	  properties	  are	  rented	  out	  (residentially	  and	  commercially)	  at	  market	  rate	  and	  the	  Charity	  uses	  the	   income	  this	  generates,	   together	  with	  other	  donations	  regularly	  received	  from	  the	  Freshwater	  Group,	  to	  make	  donations	  to	  charitable	  causes”	  (CC	  report	  2013).	  The	  income	  received	  from	  other	  companies	  within	  the	  Freshwater	  Group	  include,	  for	  example,	  the	  1985	  gift	  of	  the	  entire	  issued	  share	  capital	   of	   Freshwater	   Property	   Management,	   the	   company	   that	   had	   acted	   on	  behalf	   of	   Daejan	   in	   the	   2013	   Supreme	   Court	   case	   mentioned	   above.	   As	   the	  trustees	  explained	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission,	  “the	  gift	  was	  made	  to	  enable	  the	  company,	   at	   the	   time,	   to	   donate	   its	   profits	   to	   the	   Charity	   without	   tax	   being	  deducted	   at	   source”	   (CC	   report	   2013).	  While	   property	  management	   and	   rent	  collection	  is	  formally	  conducted	  by	  other	  companies	  in	  the	  group,	  these	  incomes	  are	  subsequently	  transferred	  to	  Mayfair,	  which	  in	  turn,	  due	  to	  its	  charity	  status,	  is	  legally	  tax	  exempt	  for	  income	  from	  rents	  and	  property	  assets	  as	  long	  as	  this	  income	   is	  used	   for	   “charitable	  purposes	  only”.	  Among	   these	  purposes	  was	   for	  example	  a	  1986	  grant	  of	  £3m,	  made	  to	  another	  Freshwater	  subsidiary,	  Haysgrans	  Property	   Co	   Ltd,	  which	   ominously	  was	   never	   repaid.	   This	  was	   one	   of	   several	  loans	   that	   sparked	   the	   Charities	   Commission’s	   inquiry	   and	   its	   subsequent	  expression	   of	   ‘concern’	   over	  Mayfair’s	   practices,	  with	   the	   recommendation	   to	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appoint	  at	  least	  one	  independent	  trustee.	  The	  latter	  was	  seen	  as	  necessary,	  given	  that	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  companies	  on	  both	  the	  giving	  and	  the	  receiving	  ends	  of	  some	  of	  Mayfair’s	  charitable	  activities	  were	  the	  same	  three	  persons	  (CC	  report	  2013).	   Meanwhile,	   Mayfair	   was	   fined	   by	  Wellingborough	   council	   in	   2012	   for	  failing	  to	  maintain	  one	  of	  its	  numerous	  empty	  properties	  to	  the	  point	  of	  it	  falling	  into	  abject	  disrepair171.	  	  Daejan,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  not	  known	  to	  pull	  punches	  when	  it	  came	  to	  settling	  territorial	  disputes.	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  February,	  court	  papers	  had	  been	  served	  and	  the	  clock	  for	  eviction	  began	  to	  tick,	  but	  for	  the	  occupiers	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  ‘normal’	  eviction.	  Instead	  of	  waiting	  for	  court	  bailiffs	  to	  enforce	  its	  claim,	  Daejan	  had	  hired	  its	  own	  private	  army	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  bailiff	  company	  Constant	  &	   Co.	   This	   company	   specialises	   in	   ‘Investigation	   and	   Enforcement	   Services’,	  which	  include	  the	  eviction	  of	  Travellers	  and	  squatters	  as	  well	  as	  rent	  recovery	  and	   repossessions.	   Since	  2008,	   they	   	   also	   operate	   as	  High	  Court	   Enforcement	  Officers,	  authorised	  by	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  to	  enforce	  High	  Court	  writs,	  a	  position	  previously	   known	   under	   the	   name	   of	   ‘Sheriff’.	   ‘Cunts	   &	   Co’,	   as	   they	   were	  frequently	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  squatters,	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  several	  high-­‐‑profile	  evictions,	   among	   them	   the	   Twin	   Oaks	   Traveller	   site	   in	   2004	   and	   the	   land	  occupation	   ‘Bristol	   Eco	   Village’	   in	   2010,	   and	   were	   scheduled	   to	   execute	   the	  clearing	  of	  the	  Traveller	  site	  at	  Dale	  farm	  later	  in	  2011.	  Both	  previous	  evictions	  had	  been	  brutal,	  with	  property	  and	  dwellings	  purposely	  destroyed	  or	  burned,	  and	  several	  persons	  seriously	  injured	  –	  one	  man	  told	  me	  how	  his	  leg	  had	  been	  broken	   when	   a	   Constant	   bailiff	   had	   purposefully	   driven	   a	   bulldozer	   at	   him.	  Constant’s	  reputation,	  in	  short,	  was	  enough	  to	  make	  this	  eviction	  a	  higher	  threat	  to	   the	   HUB	   occupiers	   than	   that	   of	   ‘normal’	   squats,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  contributing	  to	   the	  solidarity	  between	  squatters	  and	  Travellers	   that	   led	  to	   the	  strong	  support	  of	  the	  resistance	  at	  Dale	  Farm	  (see	  chapter	  12).	  In	  the	  occupiers	  own	  words	  (overleaf):	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The  Hub  Homeless  centre  facing  eviction  
  
  
The   Squatters   who   have   reopened   the   former   Hub   Homeless   Drop-­   in  
Centre  are  facing  eviction  this  week  after  a  court  hearing  is  to  take  place  on  
Friday.   If   possession   is   granted,   the   Squatters   are   expecting   immediate  
eviction  by  notorious  bailiffs  Constant  &  Co.  The  group  claims  that  evicting  
the  homeless  from  a  closed  down  homeless  centre  is  strongly  contradicting  
the  government’s  recent  line:  
  
“This  is  quite  ironic  in  the  light  of  Mr  Cameron’s  recent  commitment  to  self-­
organised  community  services”  says  the  group’s  spokesman  Simon  Clarke.  
He  claims   that   the  Hub’s  situation  highlights   the  problems   inherent   in   the  
idea  of  a  ‘Big  
Society’:  “If  people  are  to  organize  their  own  services,  they  need  resources  
such  as  buildings.  Despite  there  being  plenty  of  empty  properties,  some  of  
them   unused   for   years,   groups   such   as   ours   are   regularly   evicted  when  
trying  to  set  up  volunteer  projects”.  
  
The  former  Hub  building  is  owned  by  Daejan  Holdings  Ltd,  one  of  the  UK’s  
biggest   property   developers   and   landlords.   “They   are   currently   spending  
thousands  of  pounds  on  evicting  homeless  people  from  an  adjacent  building  
that  has  been  empty   for  nine  years.  This   is   just  one  example  of  how   the  
interests   of   property   speculation  are   regularly   put   above   those  of   people  
trying  to  organize  themselves”.  
  
Constant  &  Co,  the  bailiffs  that  will  evict  the  Squatters  if  their  court  case  is  
lost,  have  a  track  record  of  brutality  and  unlawful  conduct.  They  have  been  
under  investigation  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  following  evictions  
of  Traveller  sites  across  the  country  and  were  responsible  for  the  bulldozing  
of  the  Bristol  Eco  village  last  year.    
  
“We  do  not  expect   to  get  any  notice  before   they   remove  us”  says  Simon  
Clarke.   “We   are   basically   prepared   to   be   made   homeless   again   by   the  
weekend.”  Still,  the  group  are  determined  to  keep  up  their  work:  “We  simply  
hold  that  people  are  more  





Simon  Clarke,  0718630361,  thenewhub@yahoo.co.uk,syfly5@hotmail.co.u  	  Figure	  12:	  The	  HUB's	  third	  press	  release,	  Feb	  2011	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The	   HUB	   went	   to	   court	   a	   total	   of	   three	   times	   within	   one	   month,	   and	   was	  adjourned	  on	  each	  occasion.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   this	  was	  due	   to	   the	   impressive	  work	  of	   certain	   squatters	  who,	  without	   any	   formal	   legal	   training,	  managed	   to	  mount	  a	  sophisticated	  defence	  after	  many	  nights	  of	  poring	  over	  huge	  tomes	  full	  of	  legalese.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	  case	  was	  aptly	  supported	  by	  the	  plaintiff’s	  legal	  representatives,	  whose	  astonishing	  incompetence	  prompted	  the	  occupiers	  to	   thank	   them	   for	   their	   efforts.	   The	   court	   dates	   were	   tense	   affairs,	   since	  theoretically,	  an	  eviction	  could	  take	  place	  within	  hours	  of	  a	  decision	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  landlord,	  and	  Constant	  &	  Co	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  generous	  in	  granting	  the	  squatters	  time	  to	  pack.	  For	  every	  court	  day,	  all	  occupants	  of	  the	  HUB	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  at	  the	  ready	  to	  move	  out	  all	  their	  belongings,	  only	  to	  unpack	  again	  after	  each	  adjournment.	   It	  was	  a	  nerve-­‐‑wracking	  situation,	  and	  tensions	  in	  the	  HUB	  mounted	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  sometimes	  tempers	  began	  to	  flare.	  Imminent	  eviction	  was	  of	  course	  not	  a	  new	  situation	  for	  most,	  but	  what	  distinguished	  the	  HUB	  from	  other	  squats	  was	  that	  the	  occupants	  genuinely	  wished	  to	  contribute	  something	  useful	  to	  the	  city	  at	  large,	  only	  to	  discover	  that	  their	  contribution	  was	  not	  needed	  or	  wanted.	  The	  more	  cynical	  activists	  saw	  this	  as	  no	  big	  surprise	  –	  after	  all	  many	  squatted	  community	  projects	  have	  suffered	  the	  same	  fate	  –	  but	  for	  some,	  this	  was	  the	  first	  experience	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  society	  regarded	  them	  as	  useless	  even	  when	  they	   were	   actively	   and	   without	   compensation	   trying	   to	   help.	   One	   occupier	  expressed	  his	  frustration	  in	  these	  words:	  	  “We’re	  doing	  their	  work	  for	  free	  here…for	  a	  place	  to	  sleep,	  no	  money,	  nothing.	  We	  
get	  evicted,	  (which	  means)	  it’s	  more	  homeless,	  (which	  means)	  we	  go	  back	  in	  the	  
system,	   it	   cost	   them	  money	   and	   they	   let	   this	   building	   rot.	  What	   sense	   does	   that	  
make?”	  	  	  It	  did,	  of	   course,	  make	  perfect	   sense	   in	   the	   light	  of	  a	  political	   ideology	  whose	  concept	  of	  ‘society’,	  big	  or	  otherwise,	  was	  never	  designed	  to	  include	  people	  like	  the	   squatters.	   As	   Hodkinson	   and	   Robbins	   (2012)	   point	   out,	   the	   Big	   Society	  approach	   to	  property	   (here	   in	   the	  narrower	   sense	  of	   land	  and	  dwellings)	   is	   a	  continuation	   of	   a	   conservative	   housing	   market	   politics	   that	   has	   since	   the	  Thatcher	  government	  pushed	  for	  the	  privatisation	  of	  space	  as	  a	  central	  theme.	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This	  strategy,	  which	  David	  Harvey	  refers	  to	  as	  “the	  cutting	  edge	  of	  accumulation	  through	  dispossession”	  (2003,	  157),	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  intimately	  connected	  to	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  which,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  re-­‐‑creates	  essentially	  feudal	  social	   structures172	  under	   the	   guise	   of	   ‘neo-­‐‑liberalism’173	  through	   establishing	  new	  hierarchies	  of	  property	  ownership.	  I	  put	  ‘neo-­‐‑liberalism’	  in	  quotes	  because	  I	   identify	   it	   as	   a	   backwards	   move,	   rather	   than	   a	   new	   economic	   and	   political	  paradigm.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   it	   attempts	   to	   re-­‐‑create	   a	   pre-­‐‑capitalist	  
economy	  (far	  from	  it),	  but	  it	  attempts	  to	  mediate	  its	  new	  cycle	  of	  accumulation	  by	  popularising	  a	  form	  of	  social	  discourse	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  resembles	  a	  return	  to	  feudal	  justifications	  of	  power	  (Robin,	  2011,	  35),	  such	  as	  those	  we	  have	  identified	  in	   the	   last	   chapter.	   While	   liberal	   in	   economic	   discourse	   and	   jargon,	   these	  narratives	  of	  power	  come	  to	  infuse	  the	  public	  imagination	  with	  the	  promise	  that	  power	  can	  be	  shared	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  individual	  allegiance	  to	  its	  values	  –	  thereby	  successfully	   undermining	   the	   collective	   interests	   that	   have	   historically	   driven	  working	  class	  struggles	  for	  public	  ownership	  of	  wealth.	  	  	  Before	  having	  a	  closer	   look	  at	   this	  dynamic,	   two	  qualifying	  remarks:	   first,	  as	   I	  have	   already	   mentioned,	   it	   is	   one	   of	   the	   charming	   idiosyncrasies	   of	   British	  English	   that	   the	  word	   ‘property’	   can	   refer	   to	   both	   possessions	   in	   the	   general	  sense,	  and	   to	  what	  Americans	  prefer	   to	  call	   ‘real	  estate’.	  As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	  following,	   this	   linguistic	   convergence	   is	   not	   entirely	   accidental,	   since	   the	  connection	   of	   power	   and	   property	   implied	   in	   British	   conservatism	  fundamentally	  rests	  on	  land	  ownership	  and	  territorial	  expansion	  in	  the	  form	  of	  colonialism.	   While	   ‘property’	   in	   this	   chapter	   will	   therefore	   mainly	   refer	   to	  ownership	  of	  space,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  of	  property	  for	  the	  political	  discourse	  we	  are	  examining,	  both	  meanings	  can,	   for	  the	  most	  part,	  be	  read	  interchangeably.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘feudalism’	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Robin’s	  term	  “democratic	  feudalism”	  (2011,	  35,	  55,	  57,100)	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  and	  authoritarian	  form	  of	  social	  relations	  mediated	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  traditional	  social	  structures	  and	  mores,	  see	  further	  discussion	  of	  Robin	  as	  well	  as	  Eccleshall	  and	  others	  throughout	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  173	  Following	  Harvey,	  “Neoliberalism	  is	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  a	  theory	  of	  political	  economic	  practices	  that	  proposes	  that	  human	  well-­‐‑being	  can	  best	  be	  advanced	  by	  liberating	  individual	  entrepreneurial	  freedoms	  and	  skills	  within	  an	  institutional	  framework	  characterized	  by	  strong	  private	  property	  rights,	  free	  markets,	  and	  free	  trade.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  to	  create	  and	  preserve	  an	  institutional	  framework	  appropriate	  to	  such	  practices”	  (2005,	  2)	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Second,	  as	   I	  have	  also	  briefly	   touched	  upon,	  when	   talking	  about	  property	   it	   is	  worth	   asking	   what	   exactly	   this	   refers	   to.	   As	   Brace	   (2004)	   details,	   ‘property’	  means	  different	  things	  to	  different	  people,	  and	  discourses	  of	  property	  frequently	  mix	   legal,	   economic,	   political	   and	   socio-­‐‑psychological	   conceptions.	   For	   my	  purposes	  here,	   I	  want	   to	   take	   the	  Marxist	   view	   that	   ‘property’	   is	   essentially	   a	  ‘fetish	  category’	  –	  i.e.	  a	  reified	  abstraction	  that	  both	  describes	  and	  obscures	  an	  underlying	  social	  relation.	  We	  have	  already	  encountered	  the	  notion	  of	  a	   fetish	  category	   in	   the	  discussion	  of	   ‘virtues’,	  when	   I	  have	  argued	   that	   ‘virtues’	   really	  describe	  particular	  types	  of	  relationships	  between	  people.	  The	  question	  would	  then	  be,	  what	  kind	  of	  social	  relation	  does	  ‘property’	  refer	  to?	  	  Within	   anthropology,	   the	   concept	   has	  most	   often	   been	   treated	   by	   authors	   in	  economic	  anthropology,	  such	  as	  Hann	  (1993,	  1998,	  2003,	  2007),	  Hann	  and	  Hart	  (2009),	   Carrier	   (1998),	   Bloch	   (1975,	   2013),	   Nugent	   (1993),	   Strathern,	   (1996,	  1999,	  2009),	  Graeber	  (1997,	  2006),	  MacPherson	  (1978)	  and	  Meillassoux	  (1972).	  As	   Carrier	   (1998)	   outlines,	   within	   anthropology,	   interest	   in	   property	   has	  somewhat	  declined	  with	  decolonisation,	  and	  has	  experienced	  a	  resurgence	  only	  relatively	   recently	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   property	   such	   as	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   (116).	   Hann	   (1998)	   adds	   that	   anthropological	  discussions	   of	   property	   have	  most	   often	   understood	   the	   concept	   to	   denote	   a	  “bundle	   of	   rights”	   (8),	   or	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   MacPherson:	   “the	   concept	   of	  property	   is,	   historically	   and	   logically,	   a	   concept	   of	   rights	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  enforceable	  claims”	  (1978,	  4).	  MacPherson	  emphasises	  that	  therefore,	  both	  the	  common	  usage	  of	   the	  word	  property	  to	  denote	  material	   things	  (such	  as	   in	  the	  context	   of	   this	   thesis,	   houses),	   and	   the	   assumption	   that	   property	   necessarily	  means	  individual	  private	  property	  are	  misconceptions,	  since,	  as	  he	  argues,	  there	  also	  exist	  forms	  of	  ‘common	  property’,	  whereby	  enforceable	  claims	  do	  not	  attach	  to	  merely	  individuals	  but	  to	  groups	  or	  potentially,	  whole	  societies	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  state-­‐‑owned	  property)	  (4).	  	  	  MacPherson’s	  assertion	  that	  enforceable	  property	  claims	  are	  largely	  the	  domain	  of	  state	  law	  has	  been	  challenged	  for	  example	  by	  Cooper	  (1997),	  who	  draws	  on	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qualitative	   data	   from	  Summerhill,	   a	   residential	   school	   in	   England,	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   “in	   contexts	   where	   other	   institutional	   authorities	   have	  significant	   effects,	   where	   property	   interests	   are	   fragmented,	   and	   the	   power	  ensuing	  from	  such	  interests	  is	  limited,	  fluid,	  and	  contested,	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  open	  approach	  to	  what	  counts	  as	  propertied	  things	  and	  relations,	  which	  can	  look	  beyond	  the	  kinds	  of	  property	  forms	  recognized	  by	  state	  law,	  is	  important”	  (35).	  Cooper	  argues	  that	  contrary	  to	  the	  view	  that	  communal	  property	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  productivity,	  “community	  property	  practices	   that	   integrate	   individual	   and	   collective	   rights	   can	   prove	   relatively	  stable	   and	   enduring”	   and	   that	   “the	   prevailing	   and	   reified	   dichotomy	   between	  public	  and	  private	  ownership	  can	  be	  misleading”	  (34).	  Cooper	  aims	  to	  trouble	  the	  dominant	  legal	  understanding	  of	  property	  as	  exclusion,	  and	  argues	  for	  a	  broader	  definition	  that	  regards	  property	  under	  the	  aspect	  of	  belonging	  “as	  a	  relationship	  of	   connection	   of	   part	   to	   whole”	   (6),	   and	   thus	   as	   performing	   an	   integrative	  function	   that	   at	   the	   same	   time	   allows	   for	   a	   differentiated	   and	   pluralistic	  community	  life,	  combining	  individual	  and	  collective	  property	  interests	  (35).	  In	  this	  way,	  she	  wants	  to	  encourage	  “thinking	  about	  property	  as	  a	  set	  of	  networked	  relations	   in	   which	   the	   subject	   is	   embedded,	   rather	   than	   as	   simply	   exercising	  mastery	  or	  control	  over	  an	  object”	  (12).	  	  Similar	   arguments	   about	   the	   diverse	   nature	   and	   function	   of	   property	   in	   the	  context	  of	  community	  are	  made	  by	  the	  contributors	  to	  the	  2009	  Special	  Edition	  of	  the	  journal	  Theoretical	  Inquiries	  in	  Law174.	  The	  authors	  are	  united	  by	  the	  aim	  to	   question	   the	   assumption	   that	   community	   and	   property	   function	   as	   “polar	  opposites…since	   paradigmatically	   community	   stands	   for	   collectivism,	   while	  property	  represents	  individualism”	  (Makiel,	  2009,	  1)	  and	  demonstrate	  in	  their	  contributions	  that	  this	  distinction	  in	  practice	  is	  often	  far	  from	  clear.	  Smith	  (5)	  for	  example	   explores	   the	   interaction	   between	   law	   and	   community	   custom	   and	  argues	   that	   how	   readily	   customs	   are	   incorporated	   in	   legal	   practice	   depends	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  With	  regard	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  contributions	  to	  this	  volume,	  I	  must	  stress	  that	  I	  have	  no	  particular	  legal	  knowledge	  or	  training,	  and	  that	  therefore	  my	  interpretation	  of	  the	  legal	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  authors	  is	  that	  of	  a	  layperson	  based	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  disciplinary	  context.	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largely	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   generalisation	   of	   a	   particular	   custom	   and	   thus	   the	  amount	  of	  effort	  required	  to	  process	  claims	  based	  in	  such	  custom.	  Lehavi	  (43)	  examines	   three	   different	   types	   of	   ‘communities’	   -­‐‑	   intentional,	   planned,	   and	  spontaneous	  –	  and	  argues	   that	   they	  all	  have	  different	   requirements	  regarding	  property	   law,	   and	   that	  property	   law	  plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   supporting	  or	  hindering	   their	   functioning.	   Bell	   and	   Parchomovski	   (77)	   discuss	   forms	   of	  communal	   property	   such	   as	   commons	   or	   open	   access,	   and,	   based	   on	   an	  understanding	  of	  property	  incorporating	  three	  dimensions,	  namely	  a)	  number	  of	  owners,	  b)	  scope	  of	  owners’	  dominion,	  and	  c)	  asset	  configuration,	  argue	  that	  such	  forms	  of	  property	  are	  situated	  in	  an	  intermediary	  position	  between	  private	  and	  communal	   property.	   Schorr	   (103)	   undertakes	   a	   historical	   inquiry	   as	   to	   the	  significance	  of	  Blackstone’s	  concept	  of	  property	  as	   ‘sole	  despotic	  dominion’	   in	  property	   law,	   and	   outlines	   how	   and	  why	   Blackstone	   has	   conventionally	   been	  credited	  with	   this	  approach.	  Alexander	  and	  Peñalver	   (127)	  use	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘human	  flourishing’	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  normative	  basis	  of	  property	  law	  that	  takes	  into	  account	   the	   mutual	   interdependence	   of	   individual	   and	   community.	   Waldron	  (161),	   providing	   an	   intriguing	   counterpoint	   to	   the	   above	   authors,	   argues	   that	  both	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘community’	  and	   ‘property’	  are	  exclusionary	  and	  based	  on	  false	  assumptions	  about	  the	  access	  excluded	  individuals	  have	  to	  resources.	  Using	  the	   example	   of	   homelessness,	  Waldron	   demonstrates	   that	   both	   property	   and	  ‘community’	  work	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	  people	  who	  are	  excluded	   from	  one	  have	   another	   to	   go	   to,	   which	   results,	   for	   example,	   in	   homeless	   people	   being	  effectively	  excluded	  from	  public	  spaces,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  have	  an	  axiomatically	  assumed	  ‘home’	  to	  go	  back	  to.	  He	  therefore	  argues	  that	  the	  combined	  effect	  of	  property	   and	   community	   serves	   as	   a	   bulwark	   for	   the	   interests	   of	   privileged	  groups.	   Margalit	   (217)	   then	   discusses	   the	   connection	   between	   property	   and	  belonging	  in	  the	  context	  of	  football	  fans	  and	  argues	  that	  since	  the	  community	  of	  fans	  is	  a	  constituent	  element	  of	  the	  club	  and	  since	  decisions	  made	  about	  the	  club	  have	  a	  considerable	  impact	  on	  them,	  they	  should	  have	  protected	  social	  or	  moral	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  club.	  Finally	  Getzler	  (241)	  discusses	  communal	  forms	  of	  property,	  and	  argues	  that	  legal	  conceptions	  of	  communal	  property	  as	  aggregates	  of	   individual	   interests	  and	  as	   legal	  entities	   in	   their	  own	  right	   can	  coexist,	   and	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Munzer	   (271)	  makes	   a	   similar	   argument	   about	   the	  mutual	   co-­‐‑constitution	   of	  community	  and	  property	  in	  Biotechnological	  assets.	  	  	  Among	   these	   approaches,	   my	   own	   is	   closest	   to	   that	   of	   Penner	   (193),	   who	  contributes	   an	   argument	   close	   to	   my	   own	   in	   discussing	   property	   and	  redistribution	  under	  a	  Hegelian-­‐‑Marxist	  paradigm.	  The	  author	  argues	  that	  “if	  one	  were	  to	  explain	  property	  fetishism	  in	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  way	  that	  a	  Marxist	  would	  explain	  commodity	  fetishism,	  one	  would	  say	  that	  it	  obscures	  the	  social	  division	  of	   labor,	  and	  that,	   to	  the	  extent	  the	  social	  division	  of	   labor	   is	  appreciated,	   it	   is	  distorted”	   (196),	   a	   point	   I	   refer	   to	   below	   as	   property	   being	   a	   fetish	   category.	  Penner	   then	   proceeds	   to	   critique	   the	   concept	   of	   distributive	   justice	   as	  exemplified	  in	  Rawls	  and	  contrasts	  it	  with	  a	  Hegelian	  conception of	  Sittlichkeit,	  since	   “The	   question	   for	   Hegel	   is	   not,	   as	   it	   is	   for	   Rawls,	   one	   of	   distributing	  something	  fairly	  to	  win	  acceptance	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  order	  and	  inhibit	  the	  loss	  of	   self-­‐‑respect	   in	   individuals,	   but	   rather	  one	  of	   elaborating	  how	  society	   is	   the	  precondition	   for	   the	   realization	   of	   any	   genuinely	   human	   values,	   through	   the	  exercise	  of	  freedom	  (which	  thereby	  also	  expresses	  itself).	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  zero-­‐‑sum	   game	   of	   distributive	   justice,	   political	   morality	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   our	  realizing	  any	  truly	  human	  values	  at	  all”	  (207f).	  However,	  Penner	  remarks	  that	  Hegel	  himself	  does	  not	  fully	  transcend	  property	  fetishism,	  although	  “his	  fetishism	  of	  property	  is	  the	  common	  one	  of	  not	  only	  treating	  property	  rights	  as	  the	  model	  of	  all	  subjective	  or	  private	  rights,	  but	  treating	  all	  subjective	  or	  private	  rights	  as	  property	  rights	  of	  different	  kinds”	  (209),	  and	  demonstrates	  this	  with	  the	  example	  of	  Hegel’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  rabble	  as	  discussed	  earlier.	  It	  eventually	  fell	  to	  Marx	  to	   fully	   transcend	   the	   fetish	   and	   specify	   property	   as	   “only	   the	   perceptible	  expression	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  man	  becomes	  objective	   for	  himself	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  becomes	  to	  himself	  a	  strange	  and	  inhuman	  object;	  just	  as	  it	  expresses	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  manifestation	  of	  his	  life	  is	  the	  alienation	  of	  his	  life,	  that	  his	  realisation	  is	  his	  loss	  of	  reality,	  is	  an	  alien	  reality”	  (1844,	  45),	  which	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  ‘fetish	  category’.	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In	  terms	  of	  this	  ethnography,	  we	  can	  say	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  different	  meanings	  of	  ‘property’	  at	  stake	  for	  the	  squatters,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  two	  types	  of	  selves	  and	  spaces	  we	  have	  discussed.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  have	  the	  territorial	  self	  with	  its	  predilection	  for	  control	  and	  exclusion.	  Such	  a	  self	  would	  therefore	  correspond	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  property	  that	  emphasises	  unlimited	  control	  over	   that	   which	   is	   owned,	   and	   the	   possibility	   to	   exclude	   others	   from	   it.	   As	  Patterson	  (1985)	  outlines,	  this	  conception	  of	  property	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  originate	  in	  Roman	  law	  and	  describes	  a	  relation	  of	  absolute	  power	  of	  a	  person	  over	  an	  object	  (‘dominium’)175.	  This	  notion	  informs	  the	  territorial	  self’s	  attitude	  to	  property	  in	  the	   sense	  of	   ‘real	   estate’	   –	  by	   turning	   its	  habitat	   into	  a	   fortress,	  demonstrates	  ownership	   through	   its	   capacity	   to	   control	   and	   exclude.	   The	   same	   notion	   of	  absolute	  control	  underlies	  certain	  notions	  of	  ‘self-­‐‑ownership’,	  e.g.	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘despotic	  dominion’	  of	  the	  self	  over	  the	  body	  (see	  chapter	  5).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	   have	   talked	   about	   the	   spatial	   self	   and	   its	   inhabiting	   of	   a	   ‘domain’	   –	   the	  emphasis	  here	  was	  not	  so	  much	  on	  control	  and	  exclusion,	  but	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  
need.	  For	  this	  self,	  its	  domain	  is	  a	  necessary	  extension	  of	  itself,	  a	  space	  it	  requires	  in	  order	  to	  function.	  Others	  are	  not	  excluded	  primarily	  to	  exercise	  ‘dominium’,	  but	  they	  are	  asked	  to	  respect	  the	  spatial	  self’s	  peaceful	  habitation	  and	  thus,	  its	  integrity.	  If	  such	  a	  self	  comes	  to	  own	  property,	  then	  this	  property,	  too,	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  fulfil	  a	  need,	  and	  if	  others	  are	  asked	  not	  to	  take	  it	  away,	  then	  because	  doing	  so	  would	   compromise	   the	   spatial	   self’s	   ability	   to	   function176 .	   We	   have	   seen	   an	  example	  of	  this	  idea	  of	  property	  in	  chapter	  two	  –	  squatters	  did	  not	  act	  as	  ‘total	  communists’	   in	   that	   private	   property	  was	   completely	   absent,	   but	   rather,	   they	  respected	   each	   others	   personal	   belongings	   because	   it	  was	   assumed	   that	   they	  were	   important	   for	   their	   owner’s	   functioning	   and	   flourishing.	   Although	   both	  these	  things	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘property’,	  they	  therefore	  point	  to	  substantially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Patterson	  argues	  that	  this	  notion	  of	  property	  emerged	  due	  to	  the	  necessity	  in	  Roman	  society	  to	  codify	  the	  relations	  between	  slaveholders	  and	  slaves:	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  condition	  of	  slavery	  that	  must	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  absolute	  notions	  of	  property,	  as	  is	  so	  often	  attempted;	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  absolute	  property	  that	  must	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  ancient	  Roman	  slavery”	  (32).	  Patterson	  therefore	  argues	  that	  in	  legally	  codifying	  slavery,	  the	  Romans	  essentially	  invented	  the	  notion	  that	  human	  beings	  can	  be	  ‘things’,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  law.	  	  176	  This	  also	  limits	  the	  acquisition	  of	  property	  to	  what	  falls	  within	  a	  reasonable	  quantity	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  satisfying	  a	  need,	  although	  what	  precisely	  this	  quantity	  is	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  debate	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different	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations	  –	  the	  latter	  resembles	  more	  closely	  the	  notion	  of	  usufruct	  as	  it	  is	  known	  in	  British	  Common	  Law.	  	  These	   distinctions	   are	   important	   because,	   as	   I	   have	   argued,	   indiscriminately	  applying	  notions	  of	  ‘property’	  or	  ‘ownership’	  to	  the	  relations	  between	  people	  and	  their	  objects	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  number	  of	  conceptual	  difficulties,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  notion	   of	   ‘self-­‐‑ownership’	   as	   implied	   e.g.	   in	   discussions	   of	   slavery	   (see	   also	  Penner,	   2009).	   If	   we	   look	   behind	   the	   fetish	   concept,	   it	  makes	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  difference	  if	  we	  read	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  should	  ‘own	  themselves’	  as	  a	  relation	  between	  an	  abstract	  self	  and	  its	  material	  possessions	  (including	  the	  body),	  or	  if	  we	  read	   it	  as	  the	   idea	  that	  people	  should	  have	  sole	  and	  undisturbed	  use	  of	  all	  parts	  of	   themselves	   that	   they	  need	   to	  be	  a	   functioning	  human,	   including	   their	  agency.	   The	   scandal	   of	   slavery	   is	   not	   simply	   that	   a	   person	   has	   a	   legal	   title	   to	  ownership	  of	  another,	  but	  that	  this	  leads	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  owned	  person	  loses	  the	  possibility	  for	  self-­‐‑determination,	  and	  thus	  that	  ‘property’	  here	  comes	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  an	  extremely	  polarised	  power	  relation	  (see	  also	  Patterson,	  1985,	  21)177.	  ‘Freedom’	  therefore	  cannot	  mean	  to	  simply	  transfer	  a	  title	  of	  ownership	  from	  the	  master	  to	  the	  slave,	  rather,	  it	  must	  mean	  putting	  the	  slave	  in	  a	  position	  of	  being	  able	  to	  be	  wholly	  determined	  by	  his/her	  own	  will	  and	  thus,	  to	  no	  longer	  appear	  as	  an	  object	  that	  can	  be	  ‘owned’	  by	  anyone178.	  With	  this	  caveat,	  back	  to	  the	  ‘Big	  Society’	  and	  its	  notion	  of	  property	  –	  as	  will	  come	  as	  no	  big	  surprise,	  this	  notion	  corresponds	   to	   the	   type	  of	  property	  ownership	  a	   territorial	   self	  would	  prefer.	  	  	  The	   Big	   Society	   narrative	   of	   property	   and	   property	   ownership	   recalls	   the	  “historical	   point	   of	   rupture”	   (Hodkinson/Robbins,	   2012,	   59)	   that	   the	  conservative	   government	   under	   Margaret	   Thatcher	   marked	   for	   the	   post-­‐‑war	  social-­‐‑democratic	  “class	  compromise”	  (ibid)	  embodied	  in	  the	  welfare	  state.	  The	  authors	  identify	  three	  overarching	  aims	  of	  Thatcherism:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Although	  I	  agree	  with	  Patterson	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  category	  of	  ‘property’	  comes	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  a	  power	  relation,	  in	  other	  regards	  I	  see	  grave	  issues	  with	  his	  discussion	  of	  slavery	  and	  ‘social	  death’,	  which	  I	  discuss	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  12	  178	  This	  is	  how	  I	  would	  interpret	  Hegel	  in	  §66	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Right,	  also	  cited	  in	  Brace	  (2004)	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  “first,	  to	  unite	  the	  factions	  of	  the	  ‘New	  Right’	  and	  restore	  the	  political	  dominance	  of	  
the	   Conservatives...second,	   to	   replace	   the	   post-­‐‑war	   consensus	   with	   a	   ‘new	  
conservative’	   common	   sense...and	   third,	   to	   restore	   ‘the	   conditions	   for	   profitable	  
capital	   accumulation’	   through	   restructuring	   the	   British	   economy	   and	   attacking	  
trade	  union	  power“	  (ibid,	  60)	  	  	  A	  large	  part	  of	  the	  latter	  objective	  was	  the	  privatisation	  of	  public	  assets,	  a	  move	  that	   Harvey	   (2003)	   argues,	   attempts	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   the	  overaccumulation	  of	  capital	  that	  plagues	  ‘neo-­‐‑liberal’	  economies	  by	  opening	  up	  new	  markets	  for	  private	  investment.	  In	  terms	  of	  housing,	  this	  meant	  the	  rapid	  privatisation	  of	  public	  housing	  stock,	  accompanied	  by	  an	  ideological	  push	  toward	  promoting	  and	  normalising	  private	  home	  ownership.	  As	  a	  new	  migrant	  from	  a	  country	  where	  renting	  is	  perfectly	  acceptable	  and	  does	  not	  per	  se	  indicate	  low	  social	   status,	   the	   importance	   British	   people	   place	   on	   home	   ownership	   has	  puzzled	  me	  a	  great	  deal	  over	  the	  past	  years.	  Although	  I	  soon	  realised	  that	  British	  tenants	   enjoy	   much	   fewer	   rights	   and	   legal	   protection	   than	   those	   in	   other	  European	  countries,	  this	  to	  me	  seemed	  to	  imply	  campaigning	  for	  tighter	  controls	  of	  landlords,	  rather	  than	  buying	  a	  house.	  What	  struck	  me	  as	  even	  stranger	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  English	  people	  would	  refer	  to	  themselves	  as	  ‘home-­‐‑owners’	  when	  really	  what	  they	  meant	  was	  that	  they	  had	  a	  mortgage,	  and,	  effectively,	  the	  bank	  owned	  the	  house	  until	  it	  was	  paid	  off.	  On	  the	  few	  occasions	  I	  voiced	  these	  concerns	  –	  doubtlessly	  the	  product	  of	  a	  mind	  formed	  by	  a	  global	  centre	  of	  social	  democracy,	  the	  city	  of	   ‘Red	  Vienna’	   	  –	  my	   ‘home-­‐‑owning’	  English	  interlocutors	  would	   turn	   away	  with	   a	   disapproving	   look,	   as	   if	   I	   had	  mentioned	   something	  inappropriate	  and	  embarrassing.	  Not	  wanting	  to	  be	  rude,	   I	  eventually	  stopped	  bringing	   up	   the	   issue	   altogether	   –	   but	   the	   mystery	   of	   the	   ‘housing	   ladder’	  remained	  a	  source	  of	  fascination	  and	  anthropological	  interest.	  	  One	  important	  step	  in	  selling	  this	  idea	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  discourse	  that	  linked	  home	   ownership	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   full	   citizenship.	   In	   current	   debates,	   it	   is	   for	  example	  often	  claimed	  that	  young	  people	  are	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ‘grow	  up’	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and	  ‘start	  a	  life’,	  because,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crash,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  earn	   or	   save	   enough	   to	   get	   a	  mortgage.	   The	   idea	   that,	  with	   appropriate	   legal	  protection	   through	   tenant’s	   rights,	   young	   people	   could	   ‘start	   a	   life’	   in	   rented	  accommodation	  seems	  unacceptable	  to	  many,	  as	  being	  part	  of	  a	   ‘generation	  of	  renters’	  is	  seen	  as	  equivalent	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  failure.	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  Margaret	   Thatcher’s	   strategy	   –	   “economics	   are	   the	   method;	   the	   object	   is	   to	  change	  the	  heart	  and	  soul”	  -­‐‑	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  convincing	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  population	  that	  privately	  owned	  dwelling	  is	  the	  only	  acceptable	  form	  of	  dwelling	  for	  a	   (middle	   class)	  adult.	   If	  Thatcher’s	   ‘method’	  was	   the	   selling-­‐‑off	  of	   council	  housing	  stock	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  private	  ownership	  through	  such	  measures	  as	  the	  ‘right	  to	  buy’	  scheme,	  then	  the	  ‘change	  of	  heart’	  this	  was	  trying	  to	  effect	  was	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  a	  model	  of	  citizenship	   in	  which	  only	  those	  who	  own	  property	  were	  seen	  to	  ‘have	  a	  stake’	  in	  society.	  By	  implication,	  those	  who	  not	  only	  did	   not	   own	   property,	   but	   lived	   in	   publicly	   owned,	   rent-­‐‑protected	  accommodation,	  had	  no	  such	  ‘stake’	  and	  were	  cast	  as	  social	  miscreants	  in	  need	  of	  ‘activation’	  through	  market	  forces.	  	  	  The	  Big	  Society	  agenda	  seamlessly	  adopts	  this	  rhetoric,	  when	   it	   frames	  home-­‐‑ownership	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘aspiration’,	  frustrated	  only	  because	  of	  the	  detrimental	  influence	  of	  such	  enemies	  of	  the	  up-­‐‑and-­‐‑coming	  middle	  class	  as	  “the	  planning	  system,	  state	  welfare,	  social	  housing	  and	  an	  immoral	  ‘underclass’	  of	  benefit	  claimants,	  tenants,	  squatters	  and	  the	  homeless”	  (Hodkinson/Robbins	  2012,	  67).	  The	  coalition	  introduced	  a	  number	  of	  measures	  aimed	  at	  vitalising	  the	  private	  property	  market,	  such	  as	  a	  renewed	  ‘right	  to	  buy’,	  equity	  loans	  and	  cheap	  mortgages,	  as	  well	  as	  tax	  breaks	  for	  developers	  and	  property	  investors	  such	  as	  Daejan,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  continuing	  to	  push	  for	  the	  privatisation	  of	  public	  land	  under	  such	  socialist-­‐‑sounding	  titles	  as	  ‘community	  right	  to	  reclaim	  land’179.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  coalition	  identified	  the	  housing	  benefit	  system	  as	  a	  main	  cause	   of	   the	   housing	   crisis,	   and	   consequently	   capped	   rent	   subsidies	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  A	  measure	  which	  allows	  local	  actors	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  local	  government	  to	  sell	  unused	  public	  assets	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overall	  percentage	  of	  rent	  paid,	  introduced	  the	  so	  called	  ‘bedroom	  tax’180,	  and,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	   is	  considering	  a	  complete	  removal	  of	  housing	  benefit	  from	  young	  people	  below	  25	  years	  of	  age.	  These	  cuts	  mean	  that	  	  
“from	   April	   2011,	   private	   sector	   claimants	   have	   not	   only	   seen	   their	   weekly	  
payments	  capped	  nationally	  at	  £400	  regardless	  of	  actual	  household	  size,	  rent	  or	  
location,	  but	  also	  their	  choice	  of	  accommodation	  has	  been	  narrowed	  from	  the	  50th	  
percentile	  of	  local	  private	  rents	  to	  the	  30th	  percentile…From	  April	  2013,	  this	  choice	  
will	  reduce	  further	  as	  LHA	  payments	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  Consumer	  Price	  Index	  (CPI).	  
London	  will	  be	  worst	  hit	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  ‘mass	  displacement’	  from	  the	  inner	  
to	  outer	  boroughs…but	  by	  2030,	  60%	  of	  English	   local	  authorities	   could	  be	   ‘very	  
unaffordable’	  to	  LHA	  claimants”181.	  	  	  (Hodkinson	  /Robbins,	  2012,	  p	  68)	  	  With	  homelessness	  and	  displacement	  thus	  expected	  to	  rise	  due	  to	  the	  cuts,	  these	  conditions	  were	  at	  the	  same	  time	  framed	  in	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  moralistic	  ‘broken	  Britain’	  discourse	  that	  saw	  the	  root	  of	  moral	  decay	  in	  ‘welfare	  dependency’	  –	  in	  this	   case,	   dependency	   upon	   subsidised	   housing.	   People	   were	   depicted	   as	  ‘trapped’	   in	   social	   housing	   and	   therefore	   effectively	   excluded	   from	   social	  mobility.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   alleged	   ‘feckless’	   abuse	   of	   the	   social	   housing	  system	  was	  described	  as	  abuse	  first	  and	  foremost	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  tenants	  who	  ‘could	  afford	  to	  buy’	  preferred	  to	  remain	  in	  cheaper	  accommodation,	  which	  was	  therefore	  not	  available	  to	  those	  in	   ‘real	  need’.	  Home	  ownership	  was	  thus	  once	  more	  construed	  as	  a	  hallmark	  of	  social	  mobility,	  and	  the	  refusal	  to	  buy	  ‘if	  one	  can’	  not	   as	   a	   personal	   choice,	   but	   failure	   to	   perform	   a	  moral	   duty.	   Social	   housing	  therefore	   became	   doubly	   stigmatised	   in	   the	   Big	   Society	   discourse	   –	   as	   a	  justification	  of	  the	  ‘second	  class	  citizenship’	  of	  those	  who	  were	  too	  ‘feckless’	  to	  buy	  a	  home;	  and	  as	  a	  direct	  cause	  (rather	  than	  a	  result	  of)	  social	  exclusion.	  As	  Hodkinson	   and	   Robbins	   demonstrate,	   this	   rhetoric	   reached	   a	   peak	   in	   the	  discussion	   of	   the	   2011	   riots,	   with	   council	   housing	   used	   as	   a	   direct	   way	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  The	  ‘underoccupation	  charge’	  by	  official	  title,	  this	  means	  a	  reduction	  in	  housing	  benefit	  for	  council	  and	  housing	  association	  tenants	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  have	  a	  ‘spare	  room’	  181	  Add	  to	  this	  the	  ‘bedroom	  tax’	  and	  the	  end	  to	  unlimited	  tenancies	  for	  existing	  tenants	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disciplining	   suspected	   rioters	   and	   even	   their	   uninvolved	   relatives,	   and	   as	   a	  further	  opportunity	  to	  incriminate	  council	  tenants	  as	  a	  ‘feral’	  underclass	  out	  of	  control.	  The	  authors	  therefore	  conclude:	  
“Such	  measures	  will	  only	  worsen	  the	  real	  housing	  crisis	  –	  the	  expansion	  of	  insecure,	  
unaffordable	  housing,	  overcrowding,	  and	  rogue	  landlordism	  –	  but	  that	  is	  precisely	  
the	  outcome	  desired	  by	  the	  class	  war	  conservatives	  in	  the	  Coalition	  as	  they	  seek	  to	  
shore	   up	   private	   property	   and	   attack	   housing	   protections	   and	   rights	   so	   as	   to	  
discipline	  the	  working	  class	   into	  working	  harder,	   faster,	  and	  longer	  for	   less	  pay”	  (Hodkinson/Robbins,	  2012,	  70).	  	  I	  have	  little	  to	  add	  to	  this	  assessment,	  except	  that	  the	  disciplining	  of	  the	  working	  class	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	   an	   opposition	   between	   the	   ‘hard-­‐‑working,	  taxpaying’	   citizen	   and	   the	   ‘feckless	   scrounger’	   (i.e.	   council	   tenants	   and	   the	  homeless)	  works	   to	   construct	  a	   territorial	  other	  of	   the	  kind	   I	  have	  previously	  discussed	  –	   if	  citizenship	  and	  belonging	  are	  defined	  through	  home-­‐‑ownership,	  then	  those	  without	  such	  a	  ‘stake’	  must	  come	  to	  appear	  as	  what	  Thatcher	  called	  the	  “enemy	  within”182.	  	  Property,	  or	  more	  precisely,	  a	  society	  of	  property	  owners,	  therefore	   here	   produces	   the	   kind	   of	   social	   relations	   that	   characterise	   ‘secure	  space’.	  
	  The	  ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’	  about	  matters	  of	  property	  and	  power	  that	  Thatcher	  envisioned	   can	   thus	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   strategy	   of	   breaking	   dissent	   to	   ‘neo-­‐‑liberal’	  restructuring	  by	   creating	  not	   just	   a	  material,	   but	   a	  moral	   opposition	  between	  ‘haves’	  and	  ‘have-­‐‑nots’.	  This	  is	  achieved	  in	  part	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  private	  property	   –	   even	   in	   modest	   amounts	   –	   in	   what	   at	   first	   glance	   appears	   as	   an	  unusual	   act	   of	   generosity.	   David	   Harvey	   notes	   that	   “at	   first	   blush	   …(the	  privatisation	  of	  council	  housing	  under	  Thatcher)…	  appeared	  as	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  lower	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  In	  her	  speech	  of	  the	  same	  title	  in	  1984,	  Thatcher	  used	  this	  phrase	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  striking	  miners:	  “We	  had	  to	  fight	  the	  enemy	  without	  in	  the	  Falklands.	  We	  always	  have	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  enemy	  within,	  which	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  fight	  and	  more	  dangerous	  to	  liberty”	  (Macdonald	  et	  al,	  2012,	  243).	  Although	  the	  miners	  were	  here	  the	  direct	  target	  of	  the	  insult,	  it	  is	  also	  more	  generally	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  space	  of	  power	  depends	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  both	  an	  external	  and	  an	  internal	  territorial	  other.	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classes,	  who	  could	  now	  convert	  from	  rental	  to	  ownership	  at	  a	  relatively	  low	  cost,	  gain	  control	  over	  a	  valuable	  asset,	  and	  augment	  their	  wealth”	  (2003,	  158).	  What	  was	  more,	  in	  gaining	  a	  ‘stake’	  in	  society	  they	  had	  thus	  achieved	  one	  of	  the	  main	  conditions	  of	  citizenship,	  as	  despite	  their	  differences	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  far	  property	   should	   be	   distributed,	   both	   the	   aristocratic-­‐‑paternalistic	   current	   of	  conservative	  thought	  and	  its	  historically	  acquired	  counterpart,	  liberal-­‐‑bourgeois	  market	   capitalism183,	   can	   agree	   that	   it	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   civic	  life184.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  conservatives	  are	  on	  the	  whole	  opposed	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  property	  should	  be	  equally	  distributed,	  along	  with	  civil	  rights	  –	  how,	  then,	  does	  this	  ‘democratisation’	  of	  property	  ownership	  fit	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘natural’	  inequality?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  privatisation	  of	  space	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  draining	  power	  from	  the	  state,	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  conservatives	  are	  suspicious	  of,	  since	  it’s	  redistributive	  principles	  are	  “bound	  to	  require	  coercion	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   liberty	  and	  voluntary	  principles”	  (Brace,	  2004,	  154).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  partial	  inclusion	  of	  the	  wider	  population	  in	  the	  community	  of	  property	  owners	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  stabilising	  effect	  on	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  have	  traditionally	  been	  exclusive	  members	  of	  this	  club.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  outline	  some	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	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  Eccleshall	  (1980)	  describes	  the	  necessity	  for	  British	  conservatism	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  to	  supplement	  its	  defence	  of	  social	  hierarchy	  with	  a	  meritocratic	  motif	  that	  was	  intended	  to	  prevent	  the	  exodus	  of	  voters	  to	  the	  Liberal	  party	  –	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  twofold	  character	  of	  modern	  conservative	  ideology	  (5).	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  the	  privilege	  of	  propertied	  elites,	  concessions	  had	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  working	  class,	  and	  political	  rhetoric	  had	  to	  ensure	  that	  privilege	  appeared	  as	  a	  result	  of	  individual	  effort	  and	  superior	  skill.	  184	  For	  example,	  while	  “in	  theory,…Locke	  acknowledges	  the	  right	  to	  equal	  citizenship,	  but	  in	  practice	  political	  rights	  are	  dependent	  on	  property	  ownership.	  By	  privileging	  property	  in	  this	  way	  Locke	  asserts	  the	  maintenance	  of	  economic	  inequality,	  rather	  than	  the	  achievement	  of	  political	  equality,	  as	  the	  key	  organising	  principle	  of	  the	  state”	  (Faulks,	  1998,	  14).	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The	  Return	  Of	  The	  Savage	  Noble	  	  	  Let	   us	   return	   to	   the	   ‘Patron	   Saint	   of	   the	  Big	   Society’.	   In	   his	   indictment	   of	   the	  French	  Revolution,	  Burke	  comments	  on	  the	  necessity	  to	  keep	  ancient	  wealth	  safe	  from	  the	  “invasions	  of	  ability”	  of	  the	  aspiring	  bourgeoisie:	  	  “Ability	   is	  a	  vigorous	  and	  active	  principle,	  and	  as	  property	   is	  sluggish,	   inert,	  and	  
timid,	   it	   never	   can	   be	   safe	   from	   the	   invasions	   of	   ability,	   unless	   it	   be,	   out	   of	   all	  
proportion,	  predominant	  in	  the	  representation.	  It	  must	  be	  represented	  too	  in	  great	  
masses	  of	  accumulation,	  or	  it	  is	  not	  rightly	  protected.	  The	  characteristic	  essence	  of	  
property,	  formed	  out	  of	  the	  combined	  principles	  of	  its	  acquisition	  and	  conservation,	  
is	  to	  be	  unequal.	  The	  great	  masses	  therefore	  which	  excite	  envy,	  and	  tempt	  rapacity,	  
must	   be	   put	   out	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   danger.	   Then	   they	   form	  a	  natural	   rampart	  
about	  the	  lesser	  properties	  in	  all	  their	  gradations”	  (Burke,	  1790)	  
Burke	  therefore	  believes	  that	  a	  great	  accumulation	  of	  wealth,	  protected	  from	  any	  attempt	  at	  re-­‐‑distribution,	  guarantees	  the	  acceptance	  of	  unequal	  wealth	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  private	  accumulation	  as	  such.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	   ‘lesser	  properties’	  are	  here	  seen	  to	  benefit	   from	  the	  existence	  of	  the	   ‘great	  masses’,	  which	  form	  a	  ‘natural	  rampart’,	  guaranteeing	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  the	  very	  institution	  of	  property.	  In	  as	  far	  as	  ‘property’	  can	  now	  also	  and	  especially	  mean	  ‘spatial	  entitlement’,	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  the	  accumulation	  of	  large	  masses	  of	  territory	  functions	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  territorial	  entitlement	  by	  individual	  territorial	  selves.	  In	  other	  words:	  if	  Burke	  is	  to	  be	  believed	  that	  where	  there	  are	  small	  properties,	  there	  also	  have	  to	  be	  some	  large	  ones	  guaranteeing	  their	  existence,	  then	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  the	  same	  is	  true	  for	  the	  accumulation	  of	  space.	  	  Let	  us	  consider	  some	  evidence	  for	  this	  claim.	  	  
In	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  Who	  Owns	  Britain	  (2001),	  Kevin	  Cahill	  notes	  that	  the	  first	  difficulty	  in	  doing	  so	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  records.	  The	  land	  registry,	  which	  since	  1925	  requires	   all	   land	   transactions	   to	   be	   recorded	   by	   law,	   has	   in	   some	   areas	   been	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rolled	  out	  as	  late	  as	  the	  1990s,	  and	  for	  older	  land	  holdings	  there	  consequently	  exists	  no	  record	  at	  all.	  Those	  property	  transactions	  it	  does	  record	  are	  mostly	  for	  urban	   dwellings	   and	   other	   small	   property	   holdings,	   but	   for	   about	   50%	   of	  agricultural	  land	  in	  Britain	  there	  exists	  no	  documentation	  at	  all,	  simply	  because	  this	  land	  has	  not	  been	  transferred	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Land	  Registry.	  The	  only	  complete	  record	  of	  agricultural	  land	  ownership	  in	  Britain	  thus	  is	  a	  book	  by	  the	  name	  of	  The	  Return	  of	  Owners	  of	  Land185,	  compiled	  in	  1872,	  which	  for	  the	  first	  and	  only	  time	  gave	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  who	  owns	  the	  entire	  landmass	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  According	  to	  Cahill,	  the	  volume	  “has	  been	  airbrushed	  out	  of	  the	  historic	  and	  administrative	  record	  of	   the	  UK”	   (2001,	  5),	  and	  remains	  virtually	  unknown	  among	  the	  wider	  population,	  despite	  resting	   in	  the	  vaults	  of	  many	  a	  local	  library.	  	  Cahill	  proceeds	  to	  painstakingly	  reconstruct	  the	  recent	  (i.e.	  2001)	  ownership	  of	  the	  land	  holdings	  documented	  in	  the	  1872	  volume,	  and	  concludes	  that	  very	  little	  has	  changed	  since186.	  Of	  the	  60	  million	  acres	  that	  comprise	  the	  UK,	  between	  4.4	  and	  6	  million	  are	  taken	  up	  by	  residential	  dwellings	  of	  the	  general	  population	  (59	  million	   people	   in	   2001),	   and	   ca.	   12	   million	   acres	   are	   uninhabitable.	   The	  remaining	  roughly	  40	  million	  acres	  are	  owned,	  Cahill’s	  research	  shows,	  by	  just	  189.000	  families.	  In	  other	  words,	  0.3	  %	  of	  the	  population	  own	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  land,	  while	  77%	  of	  the	  population	  own	  5.8%	  (10f).	  	  Moreover,	  Cahill	  shows	  that	  the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  the	  large	  estates	  that	  comprise	  the	  landholdings	  of	  these	  families	  has	  hardly	  changed	  at	  all	  since	  1872	  –	  meaning	  that	  the	  same	  people	  who	  owned	  most	  of	  the	  land	  150	  years	  ago	  still	  own	  it	  today.	  Furthermore:	  “the	  vast	  majority	  of	  these	  large	  estates	  are	  held	  by	  just	  three	  classes	  of	  people:	  aristocrats,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Also	  called	  the	  Second	  Domesday	  Book,	  see	  chapter	  6	  186	  	  The	  largest	  private	  landowners	  in	  Britain	  are,	  according	  to	  Cahill,	  the	  Duke	  of	  Buccleuch	  (270.000	  acres),	  the	  Duke	  of	  Atholl’s	  trust	  (148.000	  acres),	  The	  Duke	  of	  Westminster	  (140.000	  acres),	  and	  finally	  the	  Royal	  family	  (comprised	  of	  the	  Crown	  Estate,	  the	  Duchies	  of	  Lancaster	  and	  Cornwall	  and	  lands	  at	  Balmoral	  and	  Sandringham).	  	  The	  Crown	  Estate	  is	  not	  technically	  the	  private	  property	  of	  the	  Windsors,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  she	  is	  Queen,	  Elizabeth	  II	  is	  by	  virtue	  of	  her	  ascendancy,	  freeholder	  of	  the	  estate.	  While	  the	  Estate	  turns	  all	  of	  its	  surplus	  over	  to	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  Queen	  receives	  a	  yearly	  allowance	  for	  personal	  expenses	  out	  of	  this	  revenue.	  The	  payment,	  formerly	  called	  the	  Civil	  List,	  was	  restructured	  under	  the	  new	  title	  Sovereign	  Grant	  in	  2013,	  containing	  a	  rise	  of	  £	  5m	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  £	  31m	  Her	  Majesty	  received	  previously.	  These	  payments	  are	  tax	  free.	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who	  would,	  until	  November	  1999,	  have	  sat	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  baronets	  and	  finally	  the	  residual	   landed	  gentry”	  (ibid).	  Moreover,	   landowners	  have	  not	  only	  been	  able	   to	  enjoy	   tax	  breaks	   intended	   for	   farmers,	   they	  also	   receive	  publicly	  funded	  agricultural	  subsidies,	  while	  the	  majority	  population	  “are	  subject	  to	  a	  land	  tax,	  the	  Council	  tax,	  averaging	  £550	  per	  household”	  (12).	  Landowners	  therefore	  have	  an	  abiding	  interest,	  according	  to	  Cahill,	  to	  handle	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  owns	  the	  land	  with	   greatest	   discretion,	   fearing	   that	   exposure	  may	   lead	   the	   landless	   to	  revolt.	  	  These	  figures	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  territory	  not	  only	  point	  toward	  the	  great	  overlap	  that	  exists	  in	  Britain	  between	  inequalities	  in	  wealth	  and	  inequalities	  in	  entitlement	  to	  space.	  It	  also	  underscores	  how	  tightly	  territorial	  entitlement	  has	  been	  bound	  up	  with	  political	  power,	  ever	  since	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Norman	  conquest.	  Cahill	  describes	  Britain’s	  history	  as	  a	  series	  of	  ‘Great	  Land	  Grabs’,	  meaning	  not	  only	  the	  history	  of	  enclosure	  and	  dispossession	  of	  the	  commons	  by	  the	  aspiring	  capitalist	  class,	  but	  also	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  crown	  and	  aristocratic	  elites	  since	  the	  11th	  century	  have	  stolen	  and	  conquered	  each	  other’s	  land,	  until	  patterns	  of	  ownership	  emerged	  which	  last	  until	  the	  present	  day.	  These	  territorial	  conflicts	  were	   characterised	   by	   mass	   displacement	   of	   the	   rural	   population	   through	  resettlement	   in	  urban	  areas,	   transport	   to	  the	  colonies	  or	  slaughter,	  prompting	  Marx	   to	  declare	   that	   “the	  history	  of	   this,	   their	   expropriation,	   is	  written	   in	   the	  annals	  of	  mankind	  in	  letters	  of	  blood	  and	  fire”	  (Capital,	  vol	  1,	  ch	  6).	  The	  massive	  processes	  of	  displacement	  were	  accompanied	  by	  an	  emergent	  political	  system	  which	  “focused	  the	  most	  active	  form	  of	  economic	  development,	  manufacturing,	  into	  areas	  of	  marginal	  Parliamentary	  representation	  with	  a	  consequent	  lack	  of	  capacity	  to	  influence	  the	  law”	  (Cahill,	  2001,	  26).	  The	  resulting	  power	  imbalance	  between	   urban	   and	   rural	   areas,	   according	   to	   Cahill,	   persists	   to	   this	   day,	   and	  maintains	   a	   strong	   connection	   between	   wealth,	   territorial	   entitlement	   and	  political	  power187.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  15th	  Earl	  of	  Derby;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  these	  ownership	  patterns,	  Cahill	  writes,	  the	  landed	  aristocracy	  effectively	  controlled	  both	  houses	  of	  parliament	  at	  least	  until	  World	  War	  II,	  limiting	  democratic	  representation	  for	  urban	  and	  metropolitan	  areas.	  While	  post-­‐‑war	  labour	  governments	  attempted	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  landowners	  in	  cabinet,	  conservative	  governments	  and	  especially	  Thatcher	  gave	  them	  “another	  lease	  on	  life”	  (p	  25),	  and	  large	  landowning	  families	  can	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  “the	  object	  which	  men	  aim	  at	  when	  they	  become	  possessed	  of	   land	  in	  the	  British	  
Isles188	  may,	  I	  think,	  be	  enumerated	  as	  follows.	  One,	  political	  influence;	  two,	  social	  
importance,	  founded	  on	  territorial	  possession,	  the	  most	  visible	  and	  unmistakeable	  
form	  of	  wealth;	   three,	  power	  exercised	  over	   tenantry;	   the	  pleasure	  of	  managing,	  
directing	   and	   improving	   the	   estate	   itself;	   four,	   residential	   enjoyment,	   including	  
what	  is	  called	  sport;	  five,	  the	  money	  return	  –	  the	  rent”	  (1870s,	  cited	  in	  Cahill,	  2001,	  8)	  	  Why,	  then,	  would	  these	  landed	  elites	  come	  to	  embrace	  a	  diffusion	  of	  territorial	  entitlement	   into	   the	   wider	   population?	   Consider	   for	   example	   the	   interaction	  between	   land	   ownership	   and	   the	   domestic	   housing	   market,	   with	   its	   near-­‐‑perpetual	   crisis.	   Cahill	   argues	   that	   since	   building	   land	   is	   the	   most	   expensive	  component	  of	  new	  house	  building,	  the	  availability	  of	  developable	  land	  is	  a	  key	  factor	   in	  planning.	  However,	   the	   lack	  of	  documentation,	  and	  thus	  valuation,	  of	  large	  swathes	  of	  the	  British	  countryside	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  perceived	  scarcity	  of	  development	  land,	  driving	  up	  prices:	  “(land)	  is	  perceived	  as	  scarce	  when	  not	  only	  is	  it	  not	  scarce	  but	  is	  being	  kept	  from	  dereliction	  by	  huge	  public	  subsidy”	  (16).	  This	  inflation	  of	  land	  values	  through	  artificial	  scarcity	  leads	  to	  an	  inflation	  of	  property	  values	  in	  the	  cities,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  possibility	  for	  expansion,	  and	  thus	  the	  property	  structure	  of	   the	  countryside	   is	   in	  part	  responsible	   for	   the	   lack	  of	  available	  housing	  in	  urban	  areas.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  urban	  space	  becomes	  extremely	  interesting	  market	  for	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  investors,	  such	  as	  exemplified	  in	  the	  current	  inflation	  in	  house	  prices	  in	  London,	   which	   produces	   billions	   in	   revenue	   for	   companies	   like	   Daejan,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  be	  seen	  to	  send	  representatives	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  “The	  inner	  elite	  (…)	  have	  maintained	  their	  influence	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  government	  no	  matter	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  party	  elected	  at	  the	  ballot	  box”	  concludes	  Cahill	  (p	  8).	  After	  New	  Labour	  removed	  the	  majority	  of	  hereditary	  peers	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  1999,	  the	  picture	  has	  only	  changed	  superficially:	  “today	  that	  inner	  elite	  still	  owns	  the	  country,	  both	  by	  operating	  the	  inner	  levers	  of	  power,	  often	  at	  board	  level	  in	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions”	  (8).	  188	  And,	  it	  should	  be	  added,	  in	  the	  territories	  that	  the	  British	  Empire	  colonised	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owners	   of	   the	   HUB189.	   But	   not	   only	   corporations	   profit	   –	   thousands	   of	   small	  investors	  who	   own	   only	   one	   or	   two	   properties	  also	   have	   a	   vested	   interest	   in	  keeping	  property	  values	  high,	  and	  thus	  in	  financially	  and	  politically	  shoring	  up	  the	  power	  structure.	  This	  dynamic	  therefore	  appears	  to	  turn	  Burke’s	  argument	  on	  its	  head:	  ‘lesser	  fortunes’	  here	  come	  to	  form	  a	  ‘rampart’	  that	  guarantees	  the	  continued	   existence	   of	   the	   ‘great	   masses’	   of	   property	   as	   well	   as	   the	   political	  interests	  that	  attach	  to	  them,	  thus	  providing	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  why	  Tory	  governments	  past	  and	  present	  have	  been	  so	  ready	  to	  promote	  individual	  home	  ownership.	  In	  a	  political	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  interests	  of	  landowners,	  investors	  and	  individual	  homeowners	   converge	   on	   high	   property	   values,	   the	   only	   people	   who	   could	  potentially	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  devaluation	  of	  land	  are	  those	  who	  do	  not	  own	  any	   and	   cannot	   afford	   any190.	   As	   was	   discussed	   above,	   these	   are	   exactly	   the	  people	  that	  conservatism	  since	  Thatcher	  has	  set	  out	  to	  stigmatise.	  	  	  As	   this	   example	   shows,	   the	   conservative	   push	   toward	   individual	   home	  ownership	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  enlist	  ‘the	  masses’	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  elite	   while	   appearing	   generous.	   But	   merely	   temporarily	   making	   affordable	  property	  available	  is	  not	  too	  promising	  a	  strategy	  in	  the	  long	  run	  –	  as	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  the	  working	  class	  have	  already	  had	  to	  find	  out,	  the	  supply	  of	  cheap	  housing	  could	  not	  last	  indefinitely,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  meant	  to.	  After	  all,	  economics	  was	  only	   ‘the	  method’,	   the	  goal	  was,	  explicitly,	   to	  affect	  a	   ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  privatisation	  of	  space	  was	  not	  merely	  material	  –	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  achieve	  a	  change	  in	  the	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  experience	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  therefore	  want	  to	  offer	  some	  thoughts	  as	  to	  what	  this	  ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’	  could	  mean,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  To	  be	  precise,	  in	  2014	  Daejan’s	  property	  portfolio	  was	  worth	  GBP	  1,546,718,000,	  up	  from	  GBP	  1,407,544,000	  in	  2013,	  or	  as	  the	  preliminary	  results	  report	  for	  shareholders	  puts	  it:	  “The	  revaluation	  of	  the	  investment	  property	  portfolio	  at	  the	  year	  end	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  net	  valuation	  surplus	  for	  the	  year	  of	  £119,648,000	  (2013	  -­‐‑	  £82,694,000)“	  (Unaudited	  Preliminary	  Results	  Announcement	  for	  the	  year	  ended	  31	  March	  2014,	  from:	  http://www.daejanholdings.com)	  190	  Cahill	  proposes	  a	  massive	  devaluation	  of	  land	  as	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  issues	  he	  asserts,	  but	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  this	  is	  feasible	  under	  democratic	  conditions,	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  ripple	  effect	  on	  the	  value	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  properties.	  Another	  suggestion	  comes	  from	  activists	  and	  campaigners	  for	  a	  ‘land	  value	  tax’,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘The	  Land	  Is	  Ours’	  campaign	  started	  by	  writer	  George	  Monbiot.	  The	  campaign	  was	  well	  known	  among	  Bristol	  squatters	  and	  land	  rights	  were	  a	  regular	  topic	  of	  discussion.	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how	  it	  could	  be	  read	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  previously	  established	  framework.	  Due	  to	  the	   nature	   of	   this	   discussion	   –	   we	   are,	   once	   again,	   talking	   about	   structural	  
patterns	  –	  this	  discussion	  will	  be	  somewhat	  speculative	  in	  nature,	  and	  therefore	  has	  more	  the	  character	  of	  a	  thought	  experiment	  rather	  than	  ‘cold,	  hard	  evidence’.	  Although	  I	  will	  point	  out	  some	  structural	  similarities	  to	  things	  we	  have	  already	  encountered	   in	   other	   contexts,	   I	   cannot	   within	   the	   space	   available	   here	  reconstruct	  these	  similarities	  in	  detail.	  I	  therefore	  have	  to	  ask	  my	  reader	  to	  follow	  me	  on	  some	  leaps	  of	  the	  imagination,	  somewhat	  like	  an	  astronomer	  who	  points	  at	  the	  stars	  and	  asks	  one	  to	  see	  the	  shapes	  of	  an	  archer,	  a	  lion	  or	  a	  bear.	  Whether	  one	   chooses	   to	   do	   so,	   or	  merely	   to	   see	   a	   random	   spattering	   of	   shiny	   dots,	   is	  entirely	  a	  matter	  of	  good	  faith,	  and	  so,	   to	  some	  degree,	  will	  be	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  reader	  sees	  anything	  of	  relevance	  in	  the	  following	  discussion.	  	  	  So	  what	   ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’	   could	  appear	  desirable	   to	   the	  conservative	  mind-­‐‑set?	  Robin	  (2011)	  offers	  us	  a	  clue:	  	  	  
“The	  masses	  must	  either	  be	  able	  to	  locate	  themselves	  symbolically	  in	  the	  ruling	  class	  
or	  be	  provided	  with	  real	  opportunities	  to	  become	  faux	  aristocrats	  themselves	  in	  the	  
family,	   the	   factory,	   and	   the	   field.	   The	   former	   path	   makes	   for	   an	   upside-­‐‑down	  
populism,	  in	  which	  the	  lowest	  of	  the	  low	  see	  themselves	  projected	  in	  the	  highest	  of	  
the	   high;	   the	   latter	  makes	   for	   a	   democratic	   feudalism,	   in	  which	   the	   husband	  or	  
supervisor	  plays	  the	  part	  of	  a	  lord”	  (Robin,	  2011,	  35)	  	  A	  ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’	  can	  therefore	  be	  achieved	  either	  through	  symbolic	  identification	  with	  the	  ruling	  class’	  (as	  the	  Big	  Society	  agenda	  proclaimed,	  “We	  Are	  All	  In	  This	  Together”),	  or	  through	  a	  ‘trickle	  down’	  approach	  to	  political	  power	  that	   gives	   certain	   individuals	   limited	   rule	   over	   others	   within	   personal	   social	  relations,	  and	  thus	  gives	  them	  a	  ‘stake’	  in	  upholding	  the	  general	  architecture	  of	  power.	  In	  both	  cases,	  it	  must	  be	  made	  plausible	  that	  joining	  the	  elite	  is	  open	  to	  anyone	   but	   not	   everyone,	   and	   individual	   success	   stories	   help	   to	   keep	   the	  narrative	   alive.	   “One	  of	   the	  most	   central	   concepts	   of	  maintaining	  power	   is	   by	  sustaining	  a	  creed	  or	  belief…populations	  will	  serve	  power	  if	  they	  believe	  in	  the	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concept	  or	  myth	  propagated	  by	  power”	  (Cahill,	  2001,	  26).	  Symbolic	  identification	  therefore	  rests	  on	  whether	  the	  ‘masses’	  can	  locate	  themselves	  in	  the	  mythology	  of	  the	  ruling	  class,	  i.e.	  whether	  they	  can	  identify	  with	  the	  ideal	  model	  of	  the	  self	  and	  its	  social	  relations	  that	  this	  narrative	  provides.	  	  	  
What,	  then,	  constitutes	  this	  mythology?	  Burke	  gives	  us	  a	  pointer	  when	  he	  asserts	  that	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  power	  is	  that	  it	  is	  obtained	  through	  struggle:	  “I	  do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  say,	  that	  the	  road	  to	  eminence	  and	  power,	  from	  obscure	  condition,	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  made	  too	  easy,	  nor	  a	  thing	  too	  much	  of	  course.	  If	  rare	  merit	  be	  the	  rarest	  of	  all	  rare	  things,	  it	  ought	  to	  pass	  through	  some	  sort	  of	  probation…let	  it	  be	  remembered	  too,	  that	  virtue	  is	  never	  tried	  but	  by	  some	  difficulty	  and	  some	  struggle”	  (Burke,	  1790).	  Only	  through	  adversity,	  therefore,	  does	  true	  excellence	  reveal	  itself,	  and	  is	  both	  political	  power	  and	  property	  earned.	  Burke	  here	  repeats	  a	   theme	   that	   permeates	   conservative	   thought:	   that	   of	   privilege	   earned	   not	  through	  labour,	  but	  through	  the	  heroic	  overcoming	  of	  resistance,	  epitomised	  in	  an	   imagery	   and	   language	  of	  war.	  We	  have	   already	   encountered	   a	   structurally	  very	  similar	  notion	  in	  chapter	  8,	  namely	  in	  Heidegger’s	  idea	  that	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’	  is,	  in	  essence,	  a	  state	  of	  existential	  war	  of	  the	  self	  against	  its	  environment,	  which	  politically	  translates	  into	  an	  ideology	  of	  territorial	  invasion.	  But	  the	  idea	  of	  Being	  as	  war	  is	  not	  just	  a	  German	  specialty:	  as	  Robin	  (2012)	  argues,	  to	  prove	  the	   superiority	   of	   one’s	   class	   or	   race	   on	   the	   battlefield	   is	  more	   generally	   the	  traditional	   path	   to	   establishing	   excellence	   for	   the	   aristocracy191	  –	   in	   modern	  times	  translated	  into	  the	  battlefield	  of	  the	  marketplace:	  
“Though	   most	   early	   conservatives	   were	   ambivalent	   about	   capitalism,	   their	  
successors	  will	   come	   to	  believe	   that	  warriors	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  can	  prove	   their	  
mettle	  in	  the	  manufacture	  and	  trade	  of	  commodities.	  Such	  men	  wrestle	  the	  earth’s	  
resources	   to	   and	   from	   the	   ground,	   taking	   for	   themselves	   what	   they	   want	   and	  
thereby	  establishing	  their	  superiority	  over	  others“.	  (Robin,	  2011,	  p	  30)	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  Compare	  here	  again	  Heidegger	  and	  his	  preoccupation	  with	  ‘heroic’	  struggle	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In	  this	  version	  of	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  Being’,	  the	  capitalist,	  as	  the	  aristocrat	  before	  him,	   thus	   comes	   to	   appear	   as	   a	   conquering	   warrior,	   a	   military	   leader	   in	   an	  economic	  war192.	  His	  superiority	  is	  not	  granted	  merely	  by	  heritage,	  it	  is	  proven	  in	  battle,	  evidence	  of	  his	  excellence	  as	  commander	  of	  others.	  Accumulated	  private	  property,	  then,	  is	  tangible	  proof	  that	  the	  warrior	  is	  worth	  his	  salt:	  “the	  primal	  act	  of	   transgression	   –	   requiring	   daring,	   vision,	   and	   an	   aptitude	   for	   violence	   and	  violation	  –	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  capitalist	  a	  warrior,	  entitling	  him	  not	  only	  to	  great	  wealth	   but	   also,	   ultimately,	   to	   command“	   (ibid).	   Property,	   in	   this	   view,	   is	   the	  product	   of	   a	   transgression	   of	   boundaries,	   of	   a	   violation,	   and	   therefore,	   if	   it	   is	  indeed	  a	   fetish	  category,	   then	  the	  social	   relation	   it	  points	   to	   is	   that	  between	  a	  plunderer	  and	  his	  victim.	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises	  then	  also	  pragmatically	  sums	  up	  the	  conservative	   take	   on	   wealth	   as:	   “All	   ownership	   derives	   from	   occupation	   and	  violence…that	  all	  rights	  derive	  from	  violence,	  all	  ownership	  from	  appropriation	  or	  robbery,	  we	  may	  freely	  admit”	  (Mises,	  1951/1981,	  42f)193.	  If	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  warrior	  is	  therefore	  at	  the	  core	  of	  conservative	  mythology,	  then	  this	  warrior	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  invader	  and	  a	  thief,	  although	  theft	  is	  here	  justified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  original	  owner	  of	  the	  stolen	  goods	  was	  not	  aggressive	  enough	  to	  defend	  them,	  and	  thus	  robbery	  is	  morally	  legitimised	  as	  heroic	  acquisition.	  	  	  I	   can	  only	   speculate	   about	   the	  historical	   origins	  of	   the	  warrior	  myth,	   but	   it	   is	  interesting	  to	  note	  in	  this	  context,	  that	  the	  term	  ‘Anglo-­‐‑Saxon	  power	  elites’	  that	  is	  sometimes	  used	  in	  political	  discourse	  to	  describe	  the	  white	  masculine	  subject	  and	  its	  entourage	  is	  technically	  a	  misnomer,	  since	  the	  actual	  Anglo-­‐‑Saxon	  elites	  were	  mostly	   expropriated	   or	   exiled	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   Norman	   invasion	   of	  William	  the	  Conqueror,	  1066	  AD	  (Wood,	  2001,	  15).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  conquest,	  parts	  of	  the	  modern	  British	  elite	  –	  precisely	  the	  people	  who,	  according	  to	  Cahill,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  It	  is	  interesting	  in	  this	  context	  that	  economic	  conflicts	  between	  corporations	  are	  routinely	  framed	  in	  a	  language	  of	  war,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘patent	  wars’	  between	  two	  large	  computer	  manufacturers	  that	  I	  once	  had	  the	  misfortune	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  research.	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  companies	  themselves	  take	  these	  confrontations	  as	  enactments	  of	  violent	  conflict	  (such	  as	  Apple	  boss	  Steve	  Jobs’	  phrase	  of	  the	  ‘thermonuclear	  war’	  he	  was	  going	  to	  wage	  on	  competitor	  Samsung),	  media	  report	  them	  as	  such	  –	  and	  for	  the	  workers	  in	  Asia,	  who	  labour	  for	  these	  companies	  under	  extremely	  exploitative	  working	  conditions,	  the	  declaration	  of	  ‘war’	  can	  have	  severe	  economic	  and	  personal	  consequences	  193	  While	  conservatives	  and	  anarchists	  thus	  agree	  that	  property	  is	  theft,	  only	  one	  side	  appears	  to	  find	  this	  problematic.	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own	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   land	   –	   are	   the	   descendants	   of	   these	   very	   invaders.	  Historian	  Gregory	  Clark	  discovered	  for	  example	   in	  a	  2010	  statistical	  survey	  of	  social	  mobility	  in	  Britain	  that	  certain	  surnames,	  associated	  with	  the	  conquerors,	  have	  since	  persistently	  remained	  at	  the	  top	  of	  British	  society.	  This	  puzzles	  the	  statistician,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  	  “individual	  family	  histories	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Stanley	  Earls	  of	  Derby,	  at	  the	  top	  of	  
the	   income	   distribution	   for	   29	   generations,	   are	   statistically	   of	   extreme	  
improbability.	  Their	  success	  over	  900	  years	  implies	  that	  at	  least	  at	  the	  very	  top	  of	  
traditional	   English	   society	   there	   must	   be	   some	   limitation	   on	   regression	   to	   the	  
mean”	  (Clark,	  2010,	  n.p.)	  	  Clark	  researches	  class	  in	  different	  cultural	  context	  by	  examining	  the	  distribution	  of	  surnames	  over	  several	  centuries,	   concluding	   in	  his	  2014	  book	  The	  Son	  Also	  
Rises	   that	   class	   inequalities	  especially	   in	  Britain	  are	  a	  matter	   “of	   lineage”,	   and	  therefore,	  unless	  societies	  take	  active	  measures	  to	  balance	  these	  tendencies,	  the	  British	  class	  system	  perpetuates	  a	  ‘winner-­‐‑takes-­‐‑all’	  model	  of	  the	  social	  in	  which	  class	  barriers	  have	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  cross	  (since	  the	  middle	  ages,	  which	  according	  to	  Clark	  were	  more	  permissive	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  mobility	  than	  the	  modern	  day	  UK)	  	  (Clark,	  2014)	  Clark	  therefore	  comes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  Britain	  and	  beyond,	  social	  mobility	   is	   limited	  by	  the	   fact	   that	  wealth	  begets	  wealth	  through	  the	  principle	  of	  inheritance	  (Clark,	  2014).	  As	  Brace	  (2004)	  notes,	  it	  is	  a	  core	  feature	  of	  conservative	  ideology	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  inheritance	  must	  be	  protected,	  and	  the	  conservative	  insistence	  that	  property	  is	  naturally	  unequal	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  ‘great	  masses’	  of	  accumulated	  wealth	  have	   to	   be	   preserved	   for	   ‘future	   generations’	   rather	   than	   squandered	   on	  misguided	   concepts	   of	   redistribution	   (138f).	   If	   this	   ideology	   therefore	  historically	   derives	   from	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   landed	   aristocracy,	   then	   this	  aristocracy	   is	   comprised,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   of	   the	   descendants	   of	   territorial	  invaders.	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The	  land	  ownership	  patterns	  we	  have	  discussed	  above	  are	  a	  result	  of	  the	  same	  historical	  processes.	  After	  the	  battle	  of	  Hastings,	  William	  the	  Conqueror	  declared	  himself	  King	  William	  I,	  and	  decreed	  that	  all	  land	  in	  Britain	  now	  belonged	  to	  the	  monarch.	   He	   subsequently	   distributed	   the	   land	   among	   his	   fellow	   raiders,	  creating	  by	  and	  large	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  land	  ownership	  that	  still	  exists	  today	  (Garnett,	  2007).	  To	  be	  precise,	  the	  word	  ‘ownership’	  is	  here	  not	  entirely	  correct:	  William’s	  granddaughter	  by	  22	  generations,	  Queen	  Elizabeth	  II,	  still	  legally	  owns	  the	   entire	   landmass	   of	   the	   UK 194 ,	   and	   individual	   ‘landowners’	   are	   only	   her	  tenants,	  granted	  their	  holdings	  in	  exchange	  for	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  crown.	  The	  Norman	  land-­‐‑grab	  therefore	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  British	  feudalism195,	  and	  for	  a	   class	   system	   characterised	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   conquerors	   over	   the	   defeated	  indigenous	  population.	  Around	  20.000	  Normans	  came	   to	  rule	  over	  1.5	  million	  Anglo-­‐‑Saxons	  in	  a	  system	  that	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘a	  medieval	  forerunner	  of	  apartheid’196,	  and	  in	  which	  intermarriage	  between	  Normans	  and	  English	  was,	  for	  centuries,	  strongly	  discouraged	  (Keats-­‐‑Rohan,	  1999).	  The	  Normans	  established	  a	   regime	   of	   heavy	   taxation	   (familiar	   from	   stories	   such	   as	   ‘Robin	   Hood’,	   see	  Singman	   1998),	   and	   in	   the	   following	   centuries,	   exported	   this	  model	   to	   other	  places	   they	   annexed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   territorial	   expansion,	   such	   as	   Ireland,	  Scotland	  and	  Wales	  –	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  first	  Domesday	  book	  was	  then	  also	  compiled	  mainly	  a	  tax	  register	  (Littrell,	  2009,	  146).	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  (although	  impossible	  to	  prove)	  that	  the	  warrior	  myth	  originates	  in	  the	  history	  of	  colonial	  conquest	  which,	  quite	  literally,	  split	  Britain	  into	  a	  ‘ruling	  class’	  and	  a	  subjugated	  class	  for	  almost	  a	  millennium.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  mythical	  warrior	   has	   gone	   through	   numerous	   permutations	   in	   the	   centuries	   since,	   not	  least	   the	   abovementioned	  one	   from	   feudal	   ruler	   to	  boardroom-­‐‑warlord.	  What	  remains,	  however,	  is	  the	  is	  the	  mythological	  gestalt	  of	  a	  territorial	  dominant,	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  As	  well	  as	  a	  whole	  6th	  of	  the	  earth’s	  surface	  (Cahill,	  2006),	  making	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  world’s	  number	  1	  landowner	  195	  ‘Feudalism’	  is	  here	  used	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Marx	  as	  describing	  a	  relation	  between	  lords	  and	  peasants,	  not,	  as	  in	  some	  British	  accounts,	  to	  describe	  relationships	  between	  members	  of	  the	  elite	  (see	  Thomas,	  2008,	  71f)	  196	  Katharine	  Keats-­‐‑Rohan	  in	  interview	  with	  the	  Independent,	  13	  March	  1999,	  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/normans-­‐‑practised-­‐‑apartheid-­‐‑on-­‐‑english-­‐‑1080175.html	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is	   legitimised	   in	   his	   claim	   to	   power	   by	   an	   essentially	   pre-­‐‑modern	   ideology	   of	  heroic	  belligerence,	  and	  who	  regards	  property	  as	  the	  spoils	  of	  war.	  	  	  If	  we	   fast-­‐‑forward	  a	  couple	  of	  centuries	   (and	   take	  one	  of	   the	  abovementioned	  leaps	  of	  the	  imagination),	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  warrior	  myth	  informs	  what	  Nick	  Duffell	  (2014,	  see	  chapter	  5)	  describes	  as	  the	  sites	  of	  production	  of	  ‘Rational	  Men’	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  Empire,	  namely	  the	  British	  boarding	  school	  system.	  Duffell	  sees	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  system	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  as	  basically	  a	   reaction	   to	   fears	  on	  part	  of	   the	  elite	   that	   the	   ideas	  of	   the	  French	  Revolution	  might	   catch	   on	   in	   Britain.	   What	   was	   needed	   to	   counteract	   this	   danger	   was	  therefore	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  conservative	  ideas	  of	   ‘natural’	   inequality,	  and	  the	  ‘public	  schools’	  were	  essentially	  designed	  to	  socially	  engineer	  an	  elite	  who	  would	  uphold	   this	   principle	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   Central	   to	   this	   project	   was	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  class	  of	  ‘Rational	  Men’	  destined	  to	  become	  military	  and	  civil	  leaders,	   who	   would	   be	   deeply	   convinced	   of	   their	   inherent	   and	   deserved	  superiority,	  or	  afflicted	  by	  what	  Duffell	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘entitlement	  illusion’.	  The	  collective	  effect	  of	  this	  is	  summed	  up	  by	  the	  remark	  of	  Lord	  Palmerston,	  1858:	  “I	  may	  say,	  without	  any	  vain-­‐‑glorious	  boast,	  or	  without	  great	  offence	  to	  anyone,	  we	  stand	  at	  the	  head	  of	  moral,	  social	  and	  political	  civilisation.	  Our	  task	  is	  to	  lead	  the	  way	  and	  direct	  the	  march	  of	  other	  nations”,	  to	  which	  Archibald	  Philip	  Primrose,	  5th	  Earl	  of	  Rosebery,	  added	  in	  1894/95	  that	  the	  British	  Empire	  was	  “the	  greatest	  secular	  agency	   for	  good	  that	   the	  world	  has	  seen”	  (both	  cited	   in:	  Littrell,	  2009,	  145)	  	  As	   we	   have	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   5,	   this	   level	   of	   grandiosity	   is	   achieved	   by	  producing	  a	  subjectivity	  characterised	  by	  the	  values	  of	  strength,	  independence	  and	   invulnerability,	   and	   the	   projection	   of	   anything	   that	   does	   not	   fit	  with	   this	  construction	   onto	   other	   people.	   Duffell	   proceeds	   to	   point	   out	   how	   this	   same	  psychodynamic	   is	   repeated	   in	   the	   legitimisation	   of	   colonialism	   through	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  projection	  and	  splitting,	  executed	  this	  time	  in	  the	  collective	  rather	  than	  the	  individual	  psyche.	  If	  the	  warrior	  has	  over	  the	  centuries	  cleaned	  himself	  up	  and	  transformed	  into	  the	  ‘head	  of	  moral	  civilisation’,	  then	  in	  relation	  to	  him,	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indigenous	   populations	   come	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘uncivilised’	   and	   ‘savage’,	   and	  therefore	   worthy	   of	   pity	   and	   contempt.	   The	   ‘savages’	   are	   seen	   to	   have	   only	  limited	  capacity	  to	  reason,	  to	  be	  child-­‐‑like	  and	  dependent197,	  lazy,	  immoral	  and	  prone	   to	   fighting	   over	   silly	   things,	   in	   contrast	   to	   white	   men	   who	   fight	   over	  important	  things.	  Like	  the	  younger,	  weaker	  boys	  at	  school,	  they	  therefore	  must	  be	  put	  to	  work	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  their	  ‘character’:	  “we	  had	  the	  whole	  of	  India	  ‘fagging’	  for	  us,	  as	  it	  were”	  (Duffell,	  2014,	  66).	  That	  colonialism	  involves	  not	  only	  occupation	  but	  also	  looting	  goes	  without	  saying	  for	  the	  ‘gentlemen’,	  repeating	  the	  theme	   of	   transgression	   and	   violation	   that	   characterises	   conservative	   ideas	   of	  property	  as	  theft.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  follow	  Duffell	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  colonial	  racism	  is	  mostly	  a	  case	  of	  projection,	  then	  the	  colonialist	  trope	  of	  the	  ‘Noble	  Savage’	  could	  therefore	   be	   replaced	   by	   the	   more	   accurate	   description	   of	   the	   warrior	   as	   a	  ‘Savage	  Noble’.	  	  	  If	  Duffell’s	  ‘Rational	  Man’	  is	  indeed	  a	  latter-­‐‑day	  incarnation	  of	  the	  warrior	  myth,	  then	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  his	  emergence	   in	   the	  early	  19th	  century	  constitutes	  yet	  another	  adverse	  reaction	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  such	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  in	  Burke,	  Heidegger	  and,	  as	  it	  were,	  Goebbels.	  This	  would	  not	  bee	  too	  implausible,	  seeing	   as	   the	   Revolution	   challenged	   precisely	   the	   rights	   of	   entail	   and	  primogeniture	  –	  that	  is	  inheritance	  –	  that	  have	  kept	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  British	  elite	  in	  power	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  a	  thousand	  years.	  The	  figure	  of	  the	  ‘Savage	  Noble’	  could	  then	  be	  seen	  as	  somewhat	  of	  a	  collective	  defence	  mechanism,	  a	  narrative	  structure	   that	  by	  extension	  becomes	   the	  structure	  of	   individual	  and	  collective	  selves.	   Sperber	   (1985)	   speaks	   in	   this	   context	   of	   an	   ‘epidemiology	   of	  representations’,	   comparing	   the	   spread	   of	   cultural	   beliefs,	   practices	   and	   self-­‐‑models	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  infections	  –	  a	  myth	  could	  thus	  become	  ‘contagious’	  like	  a	  virus,	  or	  more	  in	  line	  with	  a	  ‘data’	  view	  of	  the	  mind,	  a	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  malware.	  Sperber	   compares	   the	   diffusion	   of	   cultural	   representations	   (beliefs,	   practices,	  ideological	   figures	  etc.)	   to	   the	  way	   infections	  of	   the	  physical	  body	  spread	   in	  a	  population.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Richard	   Dawkins’	   well	   known	   concept	   of	   a	   ‘meme’	  (Dawkins,	  1976),	  Sperber	  does	  not	  see	  the	  representations	  themselves	  as	  agents,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  in	  this	  the	  classic	  projection	  of	  an	  abandoned	  child	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but	  rather	  uses	  the	  model	  of	  infection	  to	  explain	  “why	  some	  representations	  (are)	  more	  successful	  in	  a	  human	  population,	  more	  contagious,	  more	  'catching'	  than	  others?”	  (1985,	  74).	  Myths,	  for	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  become	  widely	  diffused,	  have	  to	   fulfil	   three	   criteria:	   memorability,	   attractiveness,	   and	   credence.	   A	   myth	   is	  memorable	   if	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   communicate	   through	   oral	   communication	   alone.	  ‘Attractiveness’	  refers	  to	  how	  well	  the	  myth	  fits	  with	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  of	   the	   human	   brain	   –	   since	   humans	   are	   optimised	   for	   efficiency,	   a	   myth	   is	  attractive	  if	  it	  achieves	  “as	  much	  cognitive	  effect	  as	  possible	  for	  as	  little	  mental	  effect	  as	  possible”	  (1996,	  114),	  Finally,	  a	  story	  also	  must	  be	  credible,	  pointing	  to	  its	  connection	  with	  power.	  According	  to	  Sperber,	  credibility	  hinges	  on	  the	  fact	  that	   people	   have	   “confidence	   in	   those	   who	   tell	   it	   to	   them:	   typically	   their	  confidence	  in	  elders	  …Reference	  to	  elders	  provides	  a	  self-­‐‑perpetuating	  authority	  structure	   for	   a	   story	   which	   already	   has	   a	   self-­‐‑perpetuating	   transmission	  structure”	  (1996,	  96).	  Personally	  I	  prefer	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  computer	  virus	  to	  that	  of	  a	   physical	   infection,	   but	   otherwise	   Sperber’s	   model	   is	   a	   great	   metaphor	   for	  propaganda.	  	  If	  we	  want	  to	  believe	  Corey	  Robin	  that	  ‘the	  masses	  have	  to	  symbolically	  locate	  themselves	  in	  the	  ruling	  class’,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  Thatcher’s	  ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	   soul’	   aimed	   at	   yet	   another	   revival	   of	   the	   warrior	   myth198 	  –	   this	   time	   in	  reaction	  to	  the	  post-­‐‑war	  rise	  of	  social	  democracy	  which	  once	  again	  jeopardised	  ruling	   class	   interest.	   In	   contrast	   to	   her	   predecessors,	   however,	   Thatcher	  recognised	  that	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  put	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  warrior	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  the	  people	  –	   the	  people	  had	   to	  be	  persuaded	  to	   identify	  with	  him,	  and	   thus	   to	  become	   “faux	   aristocrats	   themselves	   in	   the	   family,	   the	   factory,	   and	   the	   field”	  (Robin,	   2011,	   35).	  What	   Thatcher	   sought	   to	   effect,	   therefore,	   was	   not	   only	   a	  partial	   economic	   redistribution	   that	   ultimately	   served	   to	   cement	   the	   power	  structure,	   but	   a	   form	   of	   “democratic	   feudalism”	   (ibid),	   achieved	   through	   an	  infection	  of	  the	  ‘masses’	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  territorial	  dominance	  itself.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  This	  would	  certainly	  cast	  an	  interesting	  light	  on	  the	  2011	  London	  riots,	  in	  which	  the	  dreaded	  ‘underclass’	  stunned	  the	  nation	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  looting	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  matter	  of	  privilege.	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This	  also	  means	  that	  ‘the	  masses’	  are	  asked	  to	  adopt	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  self	  that	  this	  implies,	  that	  is,	  to	  maintain	  their	  delusional	  superiority	  by	  way	  of	  denigrating	  others.	   Opportunities	   for	   this	   exist	   plenty	   –	   the	   ‘feckless	   scrounger’	   is	   one	  example,	   as	   are	  migrants	   in	   general	   (UKIP199	  is	   presently	   basing	   an	   electoral	  campaign	  on	  this	  principle),	  but	  also	  of	  course	  women	  (see	  last	  chapter	  –	  there	  is	  now	  also	  an	  avowedly	  ‘anti-­‐‑feminist’	  party,	  Justice	  for	  Men	  and	  Boys,	  standing	  for	  parliament),	   the	   disabled	   (the	   black	   triangle	   campaign,	   who	   documents	   the	  names	   of	   disabled	   people	   who	   have	   died	   through	   suicide	   as	   a	   demonstrable	  result	   of	   austerity,	   currently	   counts	   72,	   stating	   that	   this	   is	   ‘the	   tip	   of	   the	  iceberg’200),	  and	  of	  course	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers,	  squatters	  and	  the	  homeless.	  What	  all	  these	  groups	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	   function	  as	   the	  antithesis	  of	   the	  white,	  masculine	  elite;	   and	  on	   the	  other	  that	  their	  entitlement	  to	  occupy	  space	  is	  consistently	  contested.	  They	  are	  therefore	  all	  varieties	  of	  the	  ‘territorial	  other’	  to	  a	  self	  infused	  with	  the	  dominant	  and	  dominating	  ideology	  of	  the	  mythical	  conqueror.	  	  	  A	   striking	   feature	   of	   the	  warrior’s	   discourse	   is	   the	   perfectly	   circular	   ‘shut-­‐‑up	  clause’	  that	  is	  logically	  implied	  in	  the	  ideology	  of	  superiority.	  Because	  only	  the	  strong	  are	  accepted	  as	  ‘peers’,	  i.e.	  those	  whose	  opinion	  one	  would	  have	  to	  take	  seriously,	  anyone	  who	  raises	  critique	  of	  their	  behaviour	  must	  either	  come	  from	  a	  position	  of	  equal	  strength201,	  or	  be	  discounted	  as	   ‘the	  weak	  one’	  who	  simply	  could	  not	  hack	  it.	  Consequently,	  whatever	  complaints	  those	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  social	  ladder	  voice	  about	  their	  treatment	  is	  by	  definition	  disqualified	  as	  coming	  from	   someone	   who,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   very	   act	   of	   complaining,	   has	   identified	  him/herself	  as	  not	  being	  part	  of	  the	  club.	  This	  subtle	  sleight	  of	  hand	  makes	  sure	  that	  the	  territorial	  self,	  English	  version,	  can	  automatically	  discount	  challenges	  to	  its	   politics,	   at	   least	   in	   as	   far	   as	   they	   stem	   from	   actual	   suffering.	   Conservative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  United	  Kingdom	  Independence	  Party	  200	  “May	  their	  deaths	  be	  avenged”	  http://blacktrianglecampaign.org/2014/10/21/uk-­‐‑welfare-­‐‑reform-­‐‑deaths-­‐‑updated-­‐‑list-­‐‑october-­‐‑21st-­‐‑2014/	  	  201	  Such	  as	  the	  opposition,	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  disagree	  but	  only	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  what	  is	  being	  fought	  over	  is	  not	  whatever	  the	  concrete	  issue,	  but	  political	  power	  as	  such	  –	  the	  intervention	  has	  to	  be	  recognizable	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  power,	  or	  it	  is	  discounted	  with	  a	  condescending	  ‘Calm	  down,	  Dear!’	  (Cameron	  to	  a	  female	  MP,	  April	  2011,	  in:	  Duffell,	  2014)	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discourse,	   in	   this	   way,	   is	   almost	   hermetically	   sealed	   against	   all	   but	   the	  most	  disinterested	   dissent,	   since	   the	   very	   fact	   of	   its	   articulation	   disqualifies	   the	  dissenter202.	  	  	  It	  was,	  in	  this	  sense,	  no	  big	  surprise	  that	  the	  HUB	  occupation,	  with	  its	  logic	  of	  ‘but	  this	  hurts	  people!’	  was	  taken	  seriously	  as	  a	  nuisance,	  but	  not	  as	  an	  intervention.	  After	  roughly	  two	  months	  of	  operation	  and	  a	  protracted	  court-­‐‑	  and	  media	  battle,	  the	  HUB	  was	  eventually	  evicted.	  On	  the	  day	  possession	  was	  granted	  –	  the	  judge,	  although	  he	  appeared	  sympathetic,	  had	  exhausted	  his	  options	  of	  adjournment	  –	  a	  large	  crowd	  had	  gathered	  around	  the	  building,	  expecting	  an	  army	  of	  bailiffs	  to	  march	  on	   the	  HUB	  and	  determined	   to	  defend	   it	   as	   long	   as	  possible.	  An	   initial	  attempt	  to	  turn	  away	  the	  ‘sheriff’	  was	  successful	  –	  the	  operation	  involved	  no	  less	  than	  eight	  police	  vans,	  a	  helicopter,	  a	  cherry	  picker	  and	  a	  fire	  engine,	  but	  only	  a	  single	  bailiff	  –	  but	  Constant&Co	  had	  chosen,	  in	  this	  case,	  to	  take	  their	  time	  with	  the	  repossession	  they	  knew	  would	  eventually	  occur.	  Although	  the	  HUB	  was	  not	  physically	  conquered	  that	  day,	  the	  project	  in	  in	  it	  came	  to	  an	  end	  since	  it	  proved	  impossible	  to	  run	  a	  service	  under	  daily	  threat	  of	  physical	  removal,	  and	  soon	  after,	  a	  lone	  Constant	  bailiff	  discreetly	  crept	  around	  to	  change	  the	  locks.	  	  	  The	  occupiers	  lost	  not	  only	  their	  project,	  but	  also	  the	  roof	  over	  their	  heads,	  and	  spent	  several	  weeks	  piled	  seven	  to	  a	  room	  in	  the	  Smiling	  Chair	  bookshop,	  before	  moving	  into	  a	  squat	  that	  was	  so	  damp	  it	  had	  actual	  algae	  growing	  on	  the	  walls	  (it	  was	  dubbed	   ‘the	  aquarium’).	  While	   for	  Daejan	  and	  the	  council	   the	  matter	  was	  thus	  resolved,	  at	  least	  for	  some	  of	  the	  occupiers	  it	  constituted	  a	  turning	  point,	  as	  they	  finally	  had	  to	  realise	  that	  they	  were	  not	  needed	  or	  wanted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘Big	  Society’,	  whether	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  make	  themselves	  useful	  or	  not.	  While	  the	  more	  disillusioned	  squatters	  saw	  in	  this	  further	  proof	  that	  political	  promises	  are	  there	  to	  be	  broken,	  others	  were	  deeply	  hurt	  by	  the	  ‘conveyor-­‐‑belt	  justice’	  meted	  out	  by	  a	  judge	  whose	  own	  morals	  in	  this	  case	  appeared	  to	  clash	  with	  the	  law	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  A	  related	  discursive	  manoeuvre	  is	  what	  one	  could	  call	  the	  ‘Johnny-­‐‑Foreigner-­‐‑defence’,	  i.e.	  the	  assumption	  that	  outsiders	  cannot	  make	  true	  statements	  about	  British	  issues	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  outsiders,	  regardless	  of	  what	  their	  actual	  argument.	  This	  defence	  can	  be	  observed	  e.g.	  in	  the	  interactions	  of	  British	  politicians	  with	  other	  European	  leaders	  (see	  Duffell,	  2014)	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had	   to	   enforce.	   The	   occupier’s	   opinion	   that	   ‘people	   are	  more	   important	   than	  empty	  buildings’	  simply	  had	  no	  representation	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  property	  and	  those	  who	  own	  it,	  aided	  and	  abetted	  by	  thousands	  of	  miniature	  ‘faux	  aristocrats’	  who	  rarely	  recognise	  the	  self-­‐‑defeating	  nature	  of	  their	  allegiances	  until	  they	  themselves	  end	  up	  on	  the	  street.	  Some	  of	  the	  occupiers	  came	  to	  realise	  that	  what	  they	  had	  in	  common	  with	  the	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  of	  Dale	  Farm	  was	  not	  merely	  an	  enemy	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  Constant&Co,	  but	  that	  there	  are	  deeper	  connections	  between	  those	  cast	  as	  territorial	  others,	  and	   as	   the	   HUBs	   last	   press	   release	   (overleaf)	   shows,	   translated	   this	   into	   a	  continuity	  of	  resistance	  (see	  chapter	  12).	  What	  they	  found	  was	  that	  the	  ‘change	  of	  heart	  and	  soul’	  among	  the	  residents	  of	  Basildon,	  the	  town	  that	  Dale	  Farm	  was	  part	  of,	  had	  been	  thorough	  enough	  to	  mobilise	  a	  small	  territorial	  army	  against	  the	  Travellers	  and	  evict	  them	  from	  their	  own	  land.	  Meanwhile,	  when	  I	  walked	  down	  Cumberland	  Road	  for	  the	  first	  time	  three	  years	  after	  my	  ‘fieldwork’	  ended,	  Schooner	  House	  still	  sat	  empty	  and	  boarded	  up.	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Residents  of  the  Hub  Drop-­in  Centre  resist  eviction  
  
Residents  of  the  Hub  Drop-­in  Centre  successfully  resisted  eviction  on  
Friday  by  notorious  bailiffs  Constant  &  Co.  The  Drop-­in  centre  closed  in  
December  due  to  cuts  in  funding.  In  January,  it  was  re-­opened  by  a  group  
of  squatters  in  protest  at  the  massive  cuts  to  services  for  the  homeless.  
The  adjacent  building,  which  has  been  empty  for  nine  years  and  is  owned  
by  the  same  London  property  company  has  been  and  continues  to  be  used  
as  emergency  housing  for  the  homeless.  
  
The  bailiff  company  contracted  to  carry  out  the  eviction,  Constant  &  co.,  
are  under  investigation  by  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  following  
evictions  of  Traveller  sites  across  the  country  and  were  responsible  for  the  
bulldozing  of  the  Bristol  Eco  village  last  year.  Constant  &  co.  have  also  
been  contracted  to  evict  Europe's  biggest  traveller  site,  Dale  Farm,  home  
to  around  1000  people  who  own  the  land  they  live  on.  
  
On  Friday  morning  the  building  appeared  heavily  barricaded.  A  pirate  flag  
flew  from  the  chimney  and  banners  hung  from  the  windows:  “80%  cuts  to  
sheltered  housing”,  “Less  posh  flats,  more  social  housing”  and  “Mr.  
Constant  you  will  receive  a  warm  welcome  at  Dale  Farm”.  
  
At  around  2pm,  a  bailiff  arrived  to  post  papers  on  the  building  and  carry  out  
a  first  inspection.  He  was  met  with  a  group  of  around  15  persons  dressed  
in  black,  who  surrounded  him  and  prevented  him  from  posting  the  eviction  
notice.  The  bailiff  then  retreated  to  his  car.  He  was,  however,  unable  to  
leave  as  the  road  had  been  barricaded  with  two  lines  of  skips  and  bins.  A  
line  of  petrol  had  been  spilt  between  these  two  lines.  The  street  was  also  
blocked  by  neighbouring  builders  who  had  accidentally  left  their  cherry  
picker  blocking  the  exit  during  tea  break.  
  
Three  vans  of  policemen  arrived  shortly  after,  along  with  a  fire  engine  and  
helicopter.  Onlookers  were  filmed  and  photographed  by  Police,  who  
removed  the  bins  and  the  bailiff  from  his  vehicle.  They  then  appear  to  have  
taken  him  to  their  van  to  breathalyse  him  while  fire  teams  cleared  the  spilt  
petrol.  After  negotiations  with  the  masked  persons  defending  the  Hub,  
Police  gave  assurances  that  the  eviction  would  not  be  allowed  today  and  
the  builders  returned  from  tea  break  to  remove  their  cherry  picker.  
  
The  squatters,  who  prefer  to  describe  themselves  as  “the  empowered  





Simon  Clarke,  0718630361  Figure	  13:	  The	  HUB's	  last	  press	  release,	  March	  2011	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Drew	  is	  in	  a	  lousy	  mood.	  It	  has	  been	  building	  all	  afternoon,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  I	  step	  
out	   of	   the	   caravan	   to	   join	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   crew	   in	   the	   yard	   of	   our	   squat	   in	  
Bedminster,	  it	  is	  about	  to	  escalate	  into	  a	  full-­‐‑blown	  fit.	  	  	  
We’ve	  known	  of	  course	  that	  Drew	  has	  a	  temper,	  the	  stories	  were	  going	  round,	  
but	  until	  the	  eviction	  of	  the	  HUB,	  he’s	  d	  never	  been	  like	  that	  with	  any	  of	  us.	  He	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  people	  who	  most	  strongly	  believed	  in	  what	  the	  HUB	  was	  trying	  to	  
do,	  and	  when	  it	  went,	  like	  it	  was	  always	  going	  to,	  it	  did	  something	  to	  him.	  The	  
moods	  got	  worse.	  
	  
It	  always	  starts	  subtly,	  unnoticeably	  for	  outsiders,	  but	  those	  who	  know	  Drew	  
well	  know	  what	  is	  about	  to	  happen	  when	  his	  voice	  goes	  very	  quiet,	  quieter	  even	  
than	  usual,	  and	  takes	  on	  an	  acidic	  tone	  of	  resentment.	  It	  is	  always	  some	  small	  
thing	  –	  a	  careless	  remark,	  a	  window	  left	  open	  –	  that	  starts	  it,	  but	  by	  the	  time	  his	  
voice	  has	  gone	  from	  a	  sharp	  whisper	  to	  a	  deep,	  threatening	  rumble,	  everything	  
and	  everyone	  is	  fair	  game.	  	  
	  
When	  I	  step	  out	  into	  the	  yard	  he	  has	  reached	  almost	  full	  momentum.	  The	  other	  
guys	  –	  Ralph,	  Joe,	  Caz	  –	  are	  standing	  around	  staring	  at	  their	  feet,	  while	  Drew	  is	  
giving	  them	  a	  good	  dressing-­‐‑down.	  Plunking	  down	  on	  a	  chair	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
the	  yard	  I	  establish	  that	  the	  point	  of	  contention	  is	  the	  lit	  barbecue,	  smouldering	  
in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  good	  dinner.	  The	  lads	  have	  apparently	  decided	  to	  put	  the	  
barricading	  of	  the	  new	  place	  on	  hold	  to	  enjoy	  themselves	  in	  the	  first	  rays	  of	  the	  
spring	  sun.	  Drew	  is	  livid.	  	  
	  
“You	  just	  don’t	  get,	  it,	  do	  you!”	  an	  accusatory	  finger	  pointed	  at	  the	  boys.	  “We	  got	  
the	  cops	  and	  bailiffs	  barging	  in	  here	  any	  minute.	  We’re	  soon	  gonna	  be	  criminals.	  
You	  know	  what	  that	  means,	  it	  means	  we	  go	  to	  prison	  for	  this.	  We	  got	  all	  the	  shit	  
in	  the	  world	  about	  to	  hit	  the	  fan	  AND	  YOU	  BUNCH	  OF	  CUNTS	  THROW	  A	  
PARTY!!!”	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The	  last	  words	  are	  shouted	  and	  to	  give	  them	  some	  extra	  weight,	  Drew	  spins	  
around	  and	  gives	  the	  barbecue	  a	  good	  kick.	  It	  tumbles	  to	  the	  ground	  with	  an	  
almighty	  rattle,	  and	  the	  puppy,	  who	  has	  been	  sniffing	  contently	  in	  a	  corner,	  
startles.	  With	  a	  high-­‐‑pitched	  squeal	  of	  terror,	  he	  dives	  under	  my	  chair	  and	  
huddles	  under	  my	  feet.	  	  
	  
Like	  everyone	  else,	  I	  have	  learned	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  Drew’s	  way	  when	  he	  gets	  like	  
that,	  but	  this	  day,	  something	  is	  different.	  Maybe	  it	  is	  the	  puppy,	  maybe	  I	  just	  feel	  
more	  obstinate	  than	  usual,	  I	  don’t	  know.	  
	  
“Oi	  there,	  keep	  it	  sweet.”	  My	  voice	  has	  no	  tone	  at	  all.	  It	  sounds	  flat	  and	  strange.	  	  
Drew	  turns	  around	  and	  with	  two	  quick	  strides	  is	  standing	  right	  in	  front	  of	  me.	  
The	  boys	  are	  inspecting	  their	  shoes	  even	  more	  intently.	  Drew	  stares	  at	  me.	  	  
	  
“What?”	  he	  hisses	  
	  
“I	  said	  calm	  down.	  This	  isn’t	  going	  to	  help	  now,	  is	  it?”	  
	  
Drew	  just	  stands	  there	  but	  I	  can	  see	  every	  muscle	  in	  his	  body	  vibrating	  with	  
tension.	  His	  fists	  and	  teeth	  are	  clenched,	  holding	  back	  a	  wave	  of	  force	  that	  is	  
about	  to	  come	  down	  on	  my	  head.	  The	  moment	  stretches	  in	  a	  peculiar	  way,	  
giving	  me	  time	  to	  consider	  my	  options.	  I	  am	  still	  sitting,	  and	  getting	  up	  would	  
bring	  me	  face	  to	  face	  with	  Drew,	  in	  a	  gesture	  he	  could	  read	  as	  aggressive.	  I	  
could	  move	  sideways	  and	  bail,	  but	  somehow	  I	  know	  that	  if	  I	  give	  in	  now,	  I	  lose	  
more	  than	  just	  face.	  So	  I	  decide	  to	  do	  nothing	  at	  all.	  	  I	  stay	  motionless	  in	  the	  
exact	  same	  sitting	  position,	  body	  relaxed,	  breathing	  deep.	  In	  the	  same	  toneless	  
voice	  I	  say	  
	  
“Get.	  Out.	  Of.	  My.	  Face.”	  
	  
I	  am	  sure	  he	  is	  going	  to	  pounce	  now,	  but	  he	  just	  stares.	  His	  gaze	  is	  unreadable.	  
After	  what	  seems	  like	  another	  eternity,	  he	  turns	  away	  and	  stomps	  off	  into	  the	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house	  in	  silence.	  It	  takes	  a	  few	  moments	  until	  we	  all	  breathe	  again,	  the	  boys	  
scratching	  their	  heads,	  laughing	  embarrassedly.	  A	  few	  hours	  later,	  this	  will	  be	  
their	  victory.	  	  
	  
I	  pick	  up	  the	  puppy,	  go	  inside	  the	  caravan	  and	  phone	  Jon	  to	  come	  round	  with	  
the	  truck	  first	  thing	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  tow	  me	  out.	  I	  was	  lucky	  this	  time,	  but	  
I’m	  not	  going	  to	  push	  it.	  Weeks	  later,	  I	  will	  learn	  that	  Drew	  went	  inside	  the	  
squat	  and	  proceeded	  to	  trash	  the	  communal	  kitchen	  with	  such	  force	  that	  he	  
broke	  his	  own	  foot	  in	  the	  process,	  but	  by	  the	  time	  I	  hear	  that	  part	  of	  the	  story,	  
the	  wheels	  of	  my	  home	  are	  on	  the	  road.	  	  Figure	  14:	  Fieldnote	  4	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Chapter	  Eleven:	  Fragments	  
	  
	  
The	  genius	  of	  any	  slave	  system	  is	  found	  
in	  the	  dynamics	  which	  isolate	  slaves	  
from	  each	  other,	  obscure	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  
common	  condition,	  and	  make	  united	  
rebellion	  against	  the	  oppressor	  
inconceivable	  Andrea	  Dworkin	  	  	  Drew	  was,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  not	  a	  bad	  person.	  I	  had	  grown	  quite	  fond	  of	  him	  over	  the	  first	  months	  of	  my	  stay	  in	  Bristol,	  and	  the	  hardships	  of	  spending	  the	  winter	  moving	  from	  squat	  to	  squat	  (one	  colder,	  damper	  and	  dingier	  than	  the	  last),	  plus	  the	  spectacular	  occupation	  of	  the	  HUB	  (see	  chapter	  10)	  had	  forged	  a	  bond	   of	   general	   camaraderie	   and	   friendship	   between	   us.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   had	  become	  obvious	  not	  just	  to	  me	  but	  to	  our	  entire	  crew	  that	  Drew	  had	  a	  problem.	  He	  liked	  to	  drink,	  which	  was	  not	  at	  all	  unusual	  for	  a	  squatter,	  but	  while	  in	  others	  the	  alcohol	  produced	  merriness	  or	  bravado,	  in	  Drew	  it	  brought	  out	  a	  dark	  side	  of	  his	   personality	   that	   stood	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	  his	   usual	   gentle	   and	   thoughtful	  demeanour.	  Like	   the	  proverbial	   Jekyll	   and	  Hyde,	  Drew	  reacted	   to	  alcohol	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  seemed	  to	  turn	  him	  into	  a	  different	  person	  –	  he	  became	  first	  quietly	  acidic,	   then	   openly	   hostile,	   and	   finally,	   on	   occasion,	   physically	   violent.	   The	  altercation	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  a	  process	  of	  gradual	  decline	   in	  our	   friendship,	   as	   it	  marked	   the	  point	  at	  which	   I	   realised	   it	  was	  no	  longer	  safe	  to	  inhabit	  the	  same	  space	  as	  him.	  It	  also	  technically	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  my	   squatting	   career,	   since	   after	  moving	   out	   of	   the	   yard,	   I	   began	   to	   live	   in	  vehicles	  and	  on	  sites	  until	  I	  eventually	  moved	  back	  into	  rented	  accommodation.	  	  	  Drew’s	   example	   has	   prompted	  me	   to	   think	   about	  what	   in	   chapter	   5	  we	   have	  called	   ‘gestalt	   shifts’	   (DesAutels,	   1996),	   namely	   switches	   between	   different,	  contradictory	   patterns	   of	   relating	   which	   can	   come	   to	   alternately	   inform	   a	  person’s	  or	  group’s	  behaviour.	  In	  saying	  that	  he	  was	  not	  a	  bad	  person,	  I	  mean	  that	  he	  was	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  standing	  in	  solidarity	  with	  those	  who	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  domination,	  and	  I	  have	  seen	  him	  do	  so	  on	  many	  occasions.	  He	  was	  a	  driving	  force	  in	  many	  an	  action	  and	  project	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  create	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  for	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those	  labelled	  ‘homeless’.	  He	  was	  also	  a	  good	  friend	  a	  trustworthy	  comrade,	  in	  all	  the	  practical	  ways	  that	  surviving	  together	  entails.	  Some	  interpreted	  his	  switching	  between	  Jekyll	  and	  Hyde	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  likeable	  side	  of	  him	  was	  only	  pretence	  and	  that	  when	  he	  was	  drunk,	  his	  real	  self	  came	  out	  to	  play.	  Although	  we	  will	  never	  know	  for	  certain,	  I	  do	  not	  entirely	  agree	  with	  this	  assessment	  –	  I	  think	  that	  both	  sides	  of	  him	  were	  ‘real’	  and	  that	  their	  coexistence	  becomes	  understandable	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  inner	  fragmentation,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  continuity	  of	  selfhood	  typical	  for	  trauma.	  In	  taking	  Drew	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  next	  part	  of	  my	  discussion,	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  portray	  him	  as	  a	  villain,	  or	   to	   turn	   this	   text	   into	  a	   trial	   in	  absence,	   since	  he	   is	  not	   likely	   to	  respond	  in	  kind	  to	  provide	  his	  side	  of	  the	  story.	  	  Rather,	  I	  want	  to	  his	  example	  as	  a	   starting	   point	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   dynamics	   of	   traumatic	   fragmentation	  more	  generally,	  first	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  ‘minds’,	  and	  in	  the	  second	  part,	  in	  terms	  of	  collective	  structures.	  	  	  In	  chapter	  5,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  psychological	  mechanisms	  of	  splitting	  and	  projection	  accompany	  such	  a	   fragmented	  psychic	  structure,	   in	  which	  different	  prototypes	   of	   social	   relations	   (‘object	   relations’)	   exist	   parallel,	   without	  necessarily	   being	   internally	   connected.	   However,	   while	   this	   can	   tell	   us	   what	  dissociation	   ‘does’	   in	   terms	  of	  ethics,	   it	  does	  not	   tell	  us	  what	  causes	   it.	   In	   this	  regard,	   there	   is	   unusual	   agreement	   between	   the	   psychoanalytically	   and	   the	  cognitively	   oriented	   branches	   of	   the	   ‘mind-­‐‑sciences’:	   dissociation	   is	   a	  consequence	  of	  trauma.	  ‘Trauma’	  is	  understood	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  response	  to	  extreme	  life	   events,	   which	   include	   acute	   threat	   to	   a	   person’s	   physical	   or	   cognitive	  integrity,	  overwhelm	  his	  or	  her	  cognitive	  coping	  capacity,	  and	  are	  experienced	  as	  out	   of	   his/her	   control	   (Van	   der	   Kolk,	   1984,	   1994,	   2003,	   2012).	   That	   this	  ‘fragmentation’	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  figure	  of	  speech	  becomes	  obvious	  when	  we	  again	  consider	  Thomas	  Metzinger’s	  (2004)203	  account	  of	  the	  ‘phenomenal	  self	  model’	  (PSM)	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  neural	  firing	  pattern	  that	  “allows	  an	  organism	  to	  conceive	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  whole”	  (1).	  This	  experience	  of	  ‘wholeness’	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  continuous	  process	  in	  which	  the	  brain	  maps	  the	  entire	  ‘system’	  and	  creates	  a	  representation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  See	  also	  chapter	  2	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endowed	   with	   the	   kind	   of	   first	   person	   perspective	   Metzinger	   calls	   the	  ‘phenomenal	   model	   of	   the	   intentionality	   relation’	   (PMIR).	   A	   self-­‐‑model,	  according	  to	  Metzinger,	  is	  therefore	  itself	  a	  kind	  of	  representational	  prototype,	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  prototypes	  for	  ethical	  relations	  are	  coded	  by	  extracting	  the	  central	  statistical	  tendency	  of	  a	  number	   of	   exemplars,	   the	   brain	   produces	   a	   PSM	   by	   establishing	   the	   central	  tendency	   of	   the	   system	   over	   time,	   thus	   producing	   a	   person’s	   experience	   of	  continuous	  identity	  and	  selfhood	  (365,	  399,	  384).	  	  If	  this	  process	  is	  disrupted,	  a	  person’s	  brain	  therefore	  becomes	  unable	  to	  produce	  a	  stable	  sense	  of	  self,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘being	  me’	  consequently	  fragments.	  	  The	  functioning	  of	  the	  PSM	  can	  be	  disrupted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  person’s	  thoughts	  and	  emotions	  “are	  subjectively	  experienced	  as	   inner	  events	   and,	   in	   standard	   situations,	   as	   one’s	   own	   states”	   (267)	   and	   therefore	  characterized	   by	   what	   Metzinger	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   quality	   of	   ‘mineness’204:	   “a	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  all	  contents	  integrated	  into	  the	  phenomenal	  level	  of	  self-­‐‑representation”	  (ibid).	  The	  experience	  of	  oneself	  as	  a	  whole,	  embodied	  person	  therefore	  crucially	  depends	  on	  identification	  with	  the	  content	  that	  is	  represented:	  “The	  integration	  of	  self-­‐‑presentational	  content	  into	  a	  unified,	  globally	  available	  representational	  structure	  underlies	  our	  phenomenal	  experience	  of	  embodiment,	  of	   being	   in	   direct	   and	   immediate	   contact	  with	   our	   own	  bodies”	   (439)	  Violent	  trauma	  disrupts	  this	  process,	  because	  the	  loss	  of	  control	  over	  parts	  or	  all	  of	  one’s	  body	  leads	  to	  a	  state	  where	  these	  parts	  are	  no	  longer	  recognized	  as	  belonging	  to	  ‘me’.	  This	  involves	  particularly	  the	  overwhelming	  experience	  of	  one’s	  body	  not	  being	  ‘a	  safe	  space	  to	  be	  in’,	  and	  many	  traumatised	  persons	  therefore	  report	  a	  subjective	  experience	  of	  ‘leaving	  their	  bodies’	  during	  a	  traumatic/violent	  event	  (van	   der	   Kolk	   et	   al,	   1996).	   This	   characteristically	   also	  means	   a	   disruption	   of	  memory,	   i.e.	  of	   the	  narrative	  the	  brain	  tells	   itself	   to	  produce	  the	  experience	  of	  continuous	  selfhood.	  If	  a	  traumatic	  memory	  is	  said	  to	  be	  ‘split-­‐‑off’	  or	  ‘repressed’,	  then	  this	  therefore	  means	  that	  it	  is	  not	  integrated	  into	  the	  self-­‐‑model,	  and	  one’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Once	  again,	  ‘mineness’	  is	  understood	  to	  point	  to	  a	  relation	  of	  identification	  rather	  than	  ‘ownership’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  ‘ontological	  hiatus’	  between	  owner	  and	  owned.	  The	  whole	  point	  of	  ‘mineness’	  is	  for	  there	  not	  to	  be	  such	  a	  hiatus.	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self	   is	   thus	   is	   not	   recognised	   as	   ‘the	   person	   this	   happened	   to’.	   Such	   trauma	  survivors	  sometimes	  present	  as	   ‘multiple	  selves’,	  alternately	  presenting	  a	  self-­‐‑model	  that	  ‘this	  happened	  to’	  and	  one	  that	  does	  not	  share	  the	  traumatic	  memory.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  experience	  of	  losing	  ‘ownership’	  of	  one’s	  own	  system	  also	  involves	   a	   disruption	   of	   the	   PMIR,	   i.e.	   the	   experience	   of	   having	   a	   unique,	  individual	  perspective	  in	  relating	  to	  the	  world	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  trauma	  involves	  a	   loss	   of	   subjectivity	   that	   results	   in	   a	   disintegration	   of	   the	   self	   (445)205,	   since	  “being	  a	  conscious	  person	  presupposes	  a	  minimal	  degree	  not	  only	  of	  cognitive	  and	  behavioral	  but	  also	  of	  self-­‐‑experiential	  coherence”	  (438).	  Metzinger	  emphasizes	  that	  dissociation	  need	  not	  be	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  single,	  overwhelming	  traumatic	  event	  –	  multiple,	  incompatible	  self-­‐‑models	  can	  also	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  person	  has	  had	  to	  adapt	  to	  highly	  incompatible	  social	  environments,	  by	  creating	  different	  self-­‐‑models	  in	  response	  to	  incommensurable	  social	  demands:	  “One	  and	  the	  same	  person,	  in	  different	  contexts,	  may	  be	  your	  most	  important	  and	  
stable	  source	  of	  security,	  while	  at	  other	  times	  he	  or	  she	  may	  present	  a	  serious	  threat	  
to	  your	  physical	  and	  mental	  health.	  …The	  integrity	  of	  life	  itself	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  
integrity	  of	  the	  PSM.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  that	  there	  will	  be	  situations	  
in	  which	  a	  system	  is	  forced	  to	  use	  multiple,	  alternating	  self-­‐‑models	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  
with	   ‘inconsistent	   data	   sets’,	   for	   instance,	   with	   highly	   inconsistent	   social	  
environments”	  (522)	  While	   ‘trauma’	   can	   therefore	   point	   to	   either	   a	   single,	   violent	   disruption	   of	   a	  person’s	   sense	   of	   self,	   or	   a	   sustained,	   irresolvable	   contradiction	   that	   is	   ‘taken	  inside’	   and	   ‘left	   unresolved’,	   the	   result	   in	   both	   cases	   is	   a	   subjectively	   and	  objectively	  experienced	  disruption	  of	  identity	  and	  integrity.	  Metzinger’s	  account	  is	  interesting	  especially	  since	  he	  believes	  that	  the	  entities	  he	  is	  describing	  are	  not	  merely	  metaphors	  or	  ‘social	  constructions’:	  “A	  PSM	  and	  a	  PMIR	  are	  something	  to	  be	  found	  by	  empirical	  research	  in	  the	  mind	  sciences”	  (9).	  If	   he	   is	   correct,	   then	   it	   may	   well	   one	   day	   be	   possible	   to	   show	   that	   such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  We	  will	  discuss	  this	  aspect	  at	  more	  length	  in	  chapter	  12	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‘metaphysical’	  notions	  as	  ‘emotional’	  or	  ‘psychological’	  abuse	  are	  actually	  forms	  of	  physical	  abuse,	  since	  they	  have	  direct	  effects	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  a	  person’s	  brain.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  empirically	  prove	  that	  some	  people	  deliberately	  inflict	  brain	  damage	  on	  others	  –	  and	  prosecute	  accordingly	  –	  would	  certainly	  go	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  justice	  for	  the	  victims.	  However,	   in	  principle	  these	  ideas	  are	  not	  new:	  psychoanalysis	  has	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  abuse	  on	  the	  personality	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  not	  least	  since	  authors	  such	  as	  Alice	  Miller	  (1984,	  1996,	  1997,	  2002)	   or	   Arno	   Gruen	   (1992,	   2007)	   realised	   that	   the	   intergenerational	  transmission	  of	  violence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems	  for	  social	  change.	  Particularly	  Miller	  is	  to	  be	  credited	  with	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  certain	  cultural	  beliefs	  about	  child-­‐‑rearing	  are	  prone	  to	  normalising	  and	  excusing	  emotional	  and	  physical	  violence	  against	  children.	  She	  connects	  these	  practices	  to	  the	  ideological	  construct	  of	  what	  she	  terms	  ‘black	  pedagogy’	  (Rousseau’s	  ‘Emile’	  being	  a	  prime	  example206),	  which	  centrally	  assumes	  that	  children	  are	  naturally	  ‘bad’,	  ‘wilful’	  and	  ‘evil’	  and	  must	  be	  ‘broken	  down’	  and	  re-­‐‑constructed	  by	  the	  care-­‐‑givers	   at	   the	  earliest	  possible	  occasion,	   since	   later	   in	   life,	   such	   tendencies	   are	  assumed	  to	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  break207.	  Central	  to	  ‘black	  pedagogy’	  is,	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  ‘Emile,	  or	  Treatise	  on	  Education’	  (1762/1979)	  discusses	  the	  fictional	  education	  of	  a	  young	  boy,	  Emile,	  and	  thereby	  lays	  out	  Rousseau’s	  ideas	  on	  child-­‐‑rearing.	  In	  order	  to	  become	  capable	  of	  entering	  in	  the	  Social	  Compact,	  Rousseau	  argues,	  ‘man’	  has	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  State	  of	  Nature	  (represented	  by	  the	  spontaneous	  and	  autonomous	  expressions	  of	  the	  child),	  if	  necessary	  by	  way	  of	  force.	  As	  Miller	  discusses,	  ‘Emile’	  is	  therefore	  essentially	  a	  manual	  for	  ‘civilising’	  a	  child	  by	  systematically	  breaking	  him	  or	  her	  through	  psychological	  manipulation	  and	  physical	  violence.	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  absolute	  parental	  authority,	  reward-­‐‑and	  fear	  conditioning,	  and	  the	  systematic	  way	  in	  which	  the	  child	  is	  forced	  to	  dis-­‐‑identify	  with	  his	  own	  needs	  and	  emotions	  and	  identify	  with	  those	  of	  the	  abusive	  adult,	  resembles	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  what	  in	  other	  contexts	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘brainwashing’	  or	  ‘thought	  reform’	  through	  sustained	  torture	  (for	  comparison	  see	  e.g.	  Lifton,	  1989;	  Thaler-­‐‑Singer,	  2003).	  The	  ideas	  expounded	  by	  Rousseau	  in	  ‘Emile’	  are,	  for	  Miller,	  the	  foundations	  of	  ‘black	  pedagogy’,	  and	  continue	  to	  inform	  attitudes	  to	  children	  today.	  While	  in	  recent	  decades	  the	  social	  acceptance	  of	  physical	  violence	  in	  child-­‐‑rearing	  has	  declined,	  the	  focus	  on	  controlling	  children’s	  ‘evil’	  natural	  impulses	  has	  now	  shifted	  to	  mass-­‐‑medicalisation	  with	  psychoactive	  drugs	  and	  the	  pathologisation	  of	  dissent	  (or	  simply	  autonomous	  action)	  in	  children	  through	  the	  discovery	  of	  such	  ‘mental	  illnesses’	  as	  ‘Oppositional	  Defiant	  Disorder’:	  “a	  psychopathological	  disorder,	  usually	  beginning	  in	  childhood,	  consisting	  of	  negativism,	  disobedience,	  and	  hostile	  behaviour	  toward	  authority	  figures”	  (ICD	  10,	  similarly	  in	  DSM	  V).	  	  207	  Miller	  demonstrates,	  for	  example,	  how	  child-­‐‑rearing	  methods	  in	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  –	  with	  their	  emphasis	  on	  militarist	  discipline	  and	  unquestioning	  obedience	  –	  formed	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  Nazi	  ideology,	  and	  ultimately	  industrially	  organised	  genocide,	  could	  flourish.	  Miller	  makes	  it	  clear	  that,	  in	  analysing	  how	  childhood	  experiences	  of	  violent	  subjugation	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  attitude	  Arendt	  famously	  described	  as	  the	  ‘banality	  of	  evil’	  –	  i.e.	  the	  unquestioning	  following	  of	  murderous	  orders	  –	  she	  does	  not	  excuse	  this	  behaviour,	  nor	  does	  she	  suggest	  it	  is	  inevitable.	  Nevertheless	  she	  deems	  it	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  relations	  of	  domination	  are	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the	  one	  hand,	  a	  relational	  pattern	  between	  caregiver	  and	  child	  in	  which	  the	  child	  becomes	  a	  function	  of	  the	  carer’s	  ego,	  thus	  introducing	  an	  internal	  contradiction	  into	  the	  child’s	  experience	  that	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  the	  child	  to	  experience	  the	  world	  “from	  a	  single	  point	  of	  view”	  (Metzinger,	  2004,	  150).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	   involves	   a	   demand	   for	   compliance	   and	   obedience	   that	   aims	   to	   eradicate	  autonomy,	   resistance	   and	   dissent.	   Since	   an	   abused	   child	   cannot	   escape	   its	  ‘captors’,	  he/she	  has	  little	  other	  choice	  than	  to	  surrender	  and	  identify	  with	  them	  instead208,	  thus	  giving	  up	  both	  a	  sense	  of	  control	  over	  his/her	  ‘system’	  and	  the	  possibility	   to	   express	   his/her	   own	   first-­‐‑person	   perspective.	   Later	   in	   life,	   such	  children	   often	   repeat	   the	   same	   pattern	   with	   their	   own	   children 209 ,	   thus	  perpetuating	   an	   intergenerational	   cycle	   of	   violence	   that	   frequently	   spills	   over	  into	  other	  kinds	  of	  social	  relations210-­‐‑211.	  	  Childhood	  abuse	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  predictors	  of	  future	  homelessness	  (e.g.	  Herman	  et	  al	  1997,	  Buhrich	  et	  al,	  2000,	  Martijn/Sharpe,	  2006,	  etc.).	  There	  are	  certainly	  more	  than	  cognitive	  factors	  involved	  in	  this	  correlation,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  want	   to	   imply	   that	   homelessness	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	  merely	   a	   consequence	   of	  childhood	  trauma212.	  However,	  the	  frequent	  co-­‐‑occurrence	  of	  homelessness	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  transmitted	  individually	  and	  collectively	  through	  the	  application	  of	  harmful	  and	  erroneous	  beliefs	  about	  child-­‐‑rearing	  and	  parental	  authority.	  208	  Anna	  Freud	  original	  formulated	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  two	  basic	  defense	  mechanisms	  are	  either	  surrender	  (i.e.	  identification	  with	  the	  subjugated	  position)	  or	  identification	  with	  the	  aggressor	  (1936/1966).	  While	  for	  her,	  these	  were	  normal	  stages	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  superego,	  later	  writers	  such	  as	  Miller	  have	  come	  to	  see	  them	  as	  responses	  to	  traumatic	  abuse,	  and	  thus	  as	  maladaptive.	  209	  While	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  those	  who	  have	  been	  abused	  go	  on	  to	  abuse	  others,	  most	  perpetrators	  of	  violence	  do	  have	  past	  experiences	  of	  abuse	  (e.g.	  Wisdom	  1989)	  210	  Duffell	  (2000)	  locates	  just	  such	  an	  understanding	  in	  the	  particularly	  British	  attitudes	  to	  child-­‐‑rearing,	  in	  which	  the	  old	  adage	  “children	  should	  be	  seen	  but	  not	  heard”	  has	  more	  recently	  been	  complemented	  by	  a	  medicalization	  of	  ‘bad	  conduct’	  (89f)	  211	  Although	  many	  ‘Western’	  states	  have,	  in	  recent	  decades,	  adopted	  legislation	  that	  prohibits	  more	  extreme	  forms	  of	  violence	  against	  children,	  the	  right	  of	  parents	  to	  physical	  punishment	  is	  still	  widely	  upheld.	  In	  Britain,	  it	  is	  currently	  still	  legal	  to	  use	  ‘reasonable	  force’	  in	  chastising	  a	  child,	  which	  according	  to	  the	  Children’s	  Act	  2004	  means	  violence	  that	  does	  not	  leave	  any	  physical	  marks.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  a	  change	  in	  law	  is	  being	  debated	  that	  would	  make	  forms	  of	  non-­‐‑physical	  child	  abuse	  a	  criminal	  offence,	  thus	  acknowledging	  that	  ‘soft’	  forms	  of	  abuse	  can	  be	  no	  less	  damaging	  than	  outright	  assault.	  http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/mar/31/child-­‐‑abuse-­‐‑neglect-­‐‑law	  212	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  risk	  that	  discussions	  of	  social	  phenomena	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  embodied	  cognition,	  such	  as	  this	  one,	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  reductive,	  in	  suggesting	  that	  e.g.	  homelessness	  is	  ‘just’	  a	  psychological	  phenomenon.	  As	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  made	  clear	  with	  my	  discussion,	  however,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  cognitive	  as	  in	  any	  way	  separate	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  political,	  the	  economic	  or	  the	  social	  in	  a	  wider	  sense.	  Focusing	  on	  cognition	  
	   305	  
childhood	  trauma	  could	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  primary	  consequence	  of	  trauma	  as	  a	  state	  in	  which	  a	  person	  literally	  has	  no	  ‘safe	  space’	  to	  occupy,	  within	  and	  without	  the	  body.	  An	  abused	  child	  is	  confined	  within	  a	  (usually	  quite	  limited)	  space	  with	  a	  violent	  adult	  and	  usually	  little	  opportunity	  to	  hide	  or	  keep	  out	  of	  the	  way.	  The	  child’s	  most	  personal	  spaces	  –	  their	  room	  or	  their	  bed	  for	  example	  –	  are	  thus	  not	  safe,	  but	  are	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  invasion	  by	  a	  dangerous	  other.	  An	  abused	  child	   therefore	   in	   a	   sense	   grows	   up	   as	   a	   ‘spatial	   other’,	   interned	   under	   the	  ‘despotic	  dominion’	  of	  a	  dominant	  whose	  claim	  to	  territorial	  control	  can,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  physical	  and	  sexual	  abuse,	  also	  and	  especially	  involve	  a	  colonisation	  of	  the	  inner	  space	  of	  the	  body.	  This	  state	  leads	  to	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  one’s	  body	  as	  ‘one’s	  own’,	  and	  thus	  an	  abused	  child	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  homeless	  long	  before	  he/she	  ends	  up	  on	  the	  street.	  Homelessness	  in	  adult	  life	  can	  then	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  state	  of	  spatial	  abjection,	  in	  which	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  is	  only	  a	  utopian	  ideal	  to	  be	  longed	  for.	  	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  person	  can	  have	  two	  ‘selves’	  who	  alternately	  influence	  his	  behaviour	  and	  hold	  incompatible	  views	  about	  how	  one	  ought	  to	  relate	  to	  others	  could	  be	  quite	  close	  to	  the	  truth.	  Such	  a	  person	  would	  not	   just	   ‘gestalt	   shift’	   between	   two	   different	   kinds	   of	   moral	   perception	   or	  orientation,	   as	   discussed	   by	   DesAutels,	   but	   in	   so	   far	   as	   these	   types	   of	   ethical	  relating	   involve	   an	   account	   of	   self-­‐‑in-­‐‑relation-­‐‑to-­‐‑other,	   this	   would	   also	   imply	  shifting	  between	  two	  different	  self-­‐‑models.	  As	  far	  as	  Drew	  was	  concerned,	  this	  could	  mean	   that	   as	   long	   as	   he	   could	   perceive	   of	   himself	   as	   a	   subject	  with	   an	  inalienable	  perspective,	  he	  could	  also	  perceive	  of,	  and	  treat,	  others	  as	  such.	  His	  other	  ‘self’,	  however,	  could	  well	  have	  been	  characterised	  by	  a	  defence	  against	  that	  which	  he	  did	  not	  want	   to	  assign	  the	  quality	  of	   ‘mineness’	   to,	  a	  self-­‐‑model	   that	  included	   the	  many	  different	  experiences	  of	   the	  absence	  of	   shelter	   that	  he	  had	  accumulated	  over	  the	  years.	  To	  reject	  these	  experiences	  as	  ‘his’	  then	  meant	  that	  they	  had	  to	  be	  ‘not-­‐‑his’,	  ergo	  somebody	  else’s,	  and	  in	  this	  particular	  instant,	  this	  other	  ended	  up	  being	  me.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  therefore	  here	  is	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  social	  phenomena	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  what	  they	  do	  to	  a	  person’s	  brain	  –	  this	  is	  in	  no	  way	  meant	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  insides	  of	  people’s	  brains	  exist	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  structures	  that	  shape	  them.	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  I	  will	  never	  know	  for	  sure	  why	  Drew	  did	  not	  hit	  me	  that	  day	  –	  judging	  from	  other	  occasions	  when	  he	  had	  no	  such	  reservations	  about	  other	  people,	  it	  certainly	  was	  not	   that	   his	   raging	  was	  merely	   bluster.	  Maybe	   it	  was	   because	   I	   am	  a	  woman,	  maybe	  it	  was	  more	  personal	  than	  that	  –	  Drew	  did	  have	  a	  soft	  spot	  for	  me,	  and	  he	  later	  made	  several	  attempts	  at	  reconciliation,	  one	  of	  which	  ironically	  consisted	  in	  inviting	  me	  to	  see	  a	  puppet	  play	  about	  Hitler’s	  last	  days	  in	  the	  bunker.	  I	  will	  also	  never	  know	  for	  sure	  if	  Drew’s	  self-­‐‑inflicted	  injury	  after	  trashing	  the	  kitchen	  was	  an	  accident	  or	  if	  he	  deliberately	  turned	  his	  aggression	  against	  himself.	  I	  like	  to	   think	   that,	   perhaps,	   he	   had	   a	   moment	   of	   ‘mini-­‐‑sublation’	   and	   made	   the	  experience	   of	   vulnerability	   ‘his’	   again	   by	   victimising	   himself	   instead	   of	   other	  people	  –	  but	  that	  might	  be	  the	  German	  Romantic	  in	  me.	  In	  any	  case,	  if	  Drew	  acted	  like	  a	  right	  Hobbesian	  self,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  said	  that	  this	  was	  not	  entirely	  without	  reason:	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  the	  threat	  that	  he	  saw	  a	  need	  to	  defend	  ourselves	  against	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  figment	  of	  his	   imagination.	  If	   therefore	  Van	  der	  Kolk	  notes	  that	  survivors	  of	  trauma	  “react	  to	  reminders	  of	  the	  trauma	  with	  emergency	  responses	  that	  had	  been	  relevant	  to	  the	  original	  threat,	  but	  that	  had	  no	  bearing	  on	  current	  experience”	  (1994,	  p	  1)213,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  said	  that	  in	  Drew’s	  case,	  they	  did	  have	  bearing	  –	  in	  being	  at	  constant	  risk	  of	  forcible	  removal	  from	  where	  he	  was	   existing,	   he	  was	   really	   being	   told,	   once	   again,	   that	   he	   had	   no	   right	   to	  occupy	  space.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Bessel	  Van	  der	  Kolk,	  MD,	  and	  other	  authors	  in	  the	  field	  of	  trauma	  (such	  as	  Judith	  Herman	  MD)	  have	  made	  extremely	  valuable	  contributions	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  psychological	  trauma	  as	  a	  valid	  form	  of	  suffering.	  However,	  they	  also	  have,	  in	  my	  view,	  a	  tendency	  to	  de-­‐‑politicise	  the	  issue	  by	  turning	  re-­‐‑victimisation	  into	  a	  trauma	  ‘symptom’,	  which	  somehow	  attaches	  to	  the	  traumatised	  person,	  and	  of	  which	  they	  must	  be	  therapeutically	  ‘cured’.	  Van	  der	  Kolk	  says,	  for	  example:	  “having	  a	  history	  of	  helplessness	  with	  people	  in	  power,	  they	  (traumatised	  persons)	  tended	  to	  cast	  most	  subsequent	  relationships	  in	  terms	  of	  dominance	  and	  submission”	  (2012,	  p	  197).	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  that	  these	  relationships	  actually	  are	  characterised	  by	  dominance	  and	  submission.	  Such	  a	  view	  would	  be	  implied	  in	  a	  feminist	  analysis	  that	  sees	  violence	  during	  socialisation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  later	  compliance	  with	  a	  hierarchical	  gender	  system	  and	  a	  hierarchical	  social	  order	  in	  general.	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The	  Cop	  Inside	  Your	  Head	  	  	  	  The	  deterioration	  of	  Drew’s	  social	  skills	  happened	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  winter	  of	  evictions,	   accompanied	   by	   lively	   debate	   among	   squatters	   about	   the	   austerity	  measures	  and	  the	  change	  to	  the	  ‘squatting	  law’	  that	  was	  beginning	  to	  take	  shape.	  Many	  squatters,	  and	  especially	  those	  who	  were	  particularly	  socio-­‐‑economically	  excluded,	   awaited	   these	   developments	  with	   a	   growing	   sense	   of	   dread.	   It	  was	  often	   discussed	   that	   in	   the	   near	   future,	   squats	   would	   have	   to	   be	   massively	  fortified	  against	  police	  and	  bailiffs,	  and	  that	  residents	  would	  have	  to	  live	  with	  a	  constant	  expectation	  of	  attack.	  Drew	  was	  among	  those	  who	  were	  most	  strongly	  affected	   by	   this	   rising	   pressure	   –	   perhaps	   due	   to	   experience	   acquired	   under	  duress,	  he	  was	  the	  one	  among	  our	  crew	  who	  most	  keenly	  perceived	  of	  bad	  things	  lying	  ahead.	  	  	  We	  had	  moved	  into	  the	  yard	  after	  a	  string	  of	  impossible	  squats	  (the	  ‘aquarium’	  mentioned	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  was	  one	  of	  them),	  and	  after	  spending	  several	  weeks	  living	  in	  the	  ‘Smiling	  Chair’	  (moving	  out	  in	  the	  daytime	  so	  normal	  business	  could	  resume),	  we	  had	  finally	  found	  a	  compound	  with	  a	  fenced	  yard	  and	  a	  building	  big	  enough	   for	   our	   crew.	   I	   had,	   at	   that	  point,	   acquired	  not	   only	   a	   car214	  –	   a	   fairly	  ludicrous	  black	  Land	  Rover	  with	  too	  much	  alloy	  and	  a	  safari	  roof	  rack	  on	  which	  five	  double	  mattresses	  could	  be	  transported	  at	  once	  –	  but	  also	  an	  eighteen-­‐‑foot	  ‘Buccaneer	  Clipper’	  caravan.	  I	  had	  bought	  the	  car	  mainly	  as	  an	  asset	  for	  the	  entire	  crew	  –	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  e.g.	  the	  washing	  machine	  was	  technically	  Ralph’s,	  but	  was	  effectively	  collectivised	  at	  least	  until	  he	  would	  leave	  the	  group	  –	  but	  the	  caravan,	  bought	  several	  months	   later,	  was	  to	  be	  my	  own	  space.	  Perhaps	  I	  was	  beginning	  to	  get	  somewhat	  tired	  of	  having	  absolutely	  no	  privacy,	  or	  perhaps	  I	  was	  beginning	  to	  sense	  that	  our	  group	  was	  not	  as	  harmonious	  as	  it	  used	  to	  be	  –	  but	  by	  early	  spring	  2011,	  the	  prospect	  of	  having	  a	  moderate	  amount	  of	  space	  to	  myself	  had	  begun	  to	  look	  increasingly	  appealing.	  When	  we	  moved	  into	  the	  yard,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Made	  possible	  courtesy	  of	  a	  settlement	  from	  London	  Metropolitan	  Police	  for	  falsely	  arresting	  me	  two	  years	  previously	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I	  therefore	  began	  to	  live	  in	  my	  caravan	  in	  the	  open	  concrete	  space	  on	  the	  back	  of	  the	   building,	   while	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   crew	   moved	   into	   the	   house.	   The	   caravan	  functioned	  much	  like	  an	  extra	  room,	  and	  as	  the	  days	  grew	  warmer,	  our	  communal	  life	  increasingly	  took	  place	  outdoors.	  A	  few	  tattered	  sofas	  and	  chairs	  formed	  the	  open-­‐‑air	   lounge	  that	  was	  at	   the	  centre	  of	  our	  squat,	  which	   is	  where	  the	   initial	  scene	  took	  place.	  	  	  The	  yard	  was	  already	  structured	  in	  an	  architectural	  arrangement	  that	  lent	  itself	  supremely	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  ‘secure	  space’.	  It	  was	  entirely	  surrounded	  by	  a	  massive	  fence	  through	  which	  one	  could	  look	  out,	  but	  not	  in,	  interspersed	  only	  by	  an	  iron	  gate	  with	  a	  robust	  chain	  and	  a	  huge	  padlock.	  Visitors	  had	  to	  rattle	  the	  bars,	  which	  triggered	  the	  puppy	  into	  manic	  barking	  and	  alerted	  someone	  inside	  who	  came	  out	  with	  the	  keys.	  The	  building	  itself	  was	  secured	  by	  another	  iron	  gate	  and	  a	  lockable	  door	  on	  the	  inside	  –	  the	  house-­‐‑dwellers	  locked	  these	  doors	  at	  night	  so	  that	   in	  the	  morning,	   I	  had	  to	  wait	   for	  them	  to	  unlock	   if	   I	  wanted	  to	  use	  the	  bathroom.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  building	  was	  a	  platform	  from	  which	  the	  entire	  compound	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  180	  degree	  view,	  and	  the	  roofs	  of	  neighbouring	  buildings	  were	  separated	  by	  partition	  walls	  which	  were	  later	  secured	  with	  rolls	  of	  barbed	  wire.	  Most	  windows	  on	  the	  lower	  floors	  had	  bars,	  and	  the	  door	  out	  to	  the	  street	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  yard	  was	  permanently	  barricaded.	  If	  one	  did	  not	  feel	  paranoid	  yet,	  this	  environment	  could,	  in	  a	  paradoxical	  sense,	  induce	  one	  to	  do	  so	  –	  all	  the	  obstacles	   and	   barriers	   just	   underscored	   the	   idea	   that	   someone	   or	   something	  dangerous	  was	  trying	  to	  get	  in.	  	  	  Drew	  had	  decided	  that	  this	  was	  where	  our	  crew	  was	  going	  to	  make	  its	  last	  stand	  against	   the	   forces	   of	   reaction.	   From	   the	   day	  we	  moved	   in,	   he	   began	   to	  make	  ‘improvements’	   to	   the	   space	  by	   securing	   it	   against	   intrusion.	  He	  had	   a	  never-­‐‑ending	  reservoir	  of	  suspicions	  of	  how	  others	  could	  come	  to	  intrude	  on	  us,	  and	  every	  morning,	  would	  hand	  out	  tasks	  he	  felt	  were	  necessary	  for	  our	  crew’s	  safety.	  Since	  the	  house	  included	  a	  cellar	  full	  of	  old	  and	  unused	  objects	  (tools,	  building	  materials,	   presumably	   stolen	   bicycles),	   he	   also	   had	   a	   never-­‐‑ending	   supply	   of	  fortifications,	  which	  we	  began	  to	  distribute	  around	  our	  ‘vulnerable	  spots’	  until	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the	  squat	  looked	  like	  a	  prison	  complex.	  To	  do	  him	  justice,	  Drew	  really	  did	  believe	  at	  that	  point	  that	  we	  were	  in	  acute	  danger,	  and	  he	  had	  considerable	  reason	  to.	  Only	  days	  after	  we	  moved	  into	  the	  yard,	  Bristol	  saw	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	   the	   ‘Tesco	  Riot’,	   and	   the	  heightened	  police	  presence	   across	   the	   area	   in	   the	  weeks	  that	  followed	  put	  the	  entire	  squatting	  scene	  in	  constant	  eviction	  alert.	  	  	  The	  moniker	   ‘Tesco	  Riot’	   is	  misleading.	  There	   certainly	  was	   a	   riot,	   and	   in	   the	  course	  of	  it	  the	  newly-­‐‑built	  Tesco	  branch	  on	  Stokes	  Croft	  –	  subject	  to	  an	  ongoing	  fierce	  conflict	  between	  local	  residents	  and	  the	  corporation	  –	  was	  damaged	  and	  partly	  looted.	  However,	  neither	  was	  the	  Tesco	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  rioting,	  nor	  was	  it	  the	  primary	  target	  –	  it	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  right	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  confrontation	  between	  protesters	  and	  the	  police,	  and,	  since	  due	  to	  its	  controversial	  status	  it	  did	  not	   enjoy	   the	   same	   degree	   of	   consideration	   as	   local	   businesses,	   it	   ended	   up	  collateral	  damage.	  What	  actually	   caused	   the	   scenes,	  however,	  was	  an	   incident	  that	   took	   place	   across	   the	   road	   from	   the	   contentious	   shop,	   and	   began	   when	  around	  160	  Bristol	  Police,	  in	  full	  riot	  gear,	  stormed	  the	  famous	  landmark	  squat	  ‘Telepathic	  Heights’215.	  	  	  The	  squat	  lay	  on	  the	  upper	  end	  of	  Stokes	  Croft,	  a	  stone’s	  throw	  away	  from	  the	  Tesco,	  which	   in	   the	  past	   had	  been	   the	   target	   of	   some	  paint	   attacks	   and	  other	  expressions	  of	  discontent.	  This	  strategic	  location,	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  police,	  made	  it	  inherently	  suspicious	  of	  harbouring	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  criminal	  damage.	  As	  it	  emerged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  days	  following	  the	  riot,	  the	  police	  were	  raiding	  on	   the	   assumption	   (based	   on	   unclear	   evidence)	   that	   somebody	   had	   been	  fabricating	  petrol	  bombs	  on	  the	  roof	  of	  Telepathic	  Heights,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  throwing	  them	  across	  the	  street	  and	  setting	  Tesco	  on	  fire.	  The	  obvious	  idiocy	  of	  this	  course	  of	  action	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  squatters	  were	  not	  suspected	  of	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  Note:	  unless	  otherwise	  specified,	  all	  citations	  in	  the	  following	  section	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  public	  sphere,	  such	  as	  the	  interviews	  given	  to	  the	  Guardian	  cited	  here,	  or	  eyewitness	  accounts	  deliberately	  and	  knowingly	  published	  elsewhere	  by	  their	  authors.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  the	  police	  have	  been	  and	  may	  still	  be	  actively	  trying	  to	  place	  persons	  at	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  riot,	  and	  they	  have	  been	  and	  are	  currently	  actively	  harassing	  political	  activists	  in	  Bristol.	  Since	  I	  can	  therefore	  not	  guarantee	  that	  citing	  anyone	  in	  this	  context	  could	  not	  cause	  them	  harm,	  I	  will	  use	  material	  that	  has	  already	  been	  publicised	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  and	  of	  which	  I	  can	  assume	  that	  this	  has	  happened	  with	  the	  explicit	  consent	  of	  the	  persons	  in	  question.	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  When	  the	  police	  broke	  down	  the	  front	  door	  and	  stormed	  inside	  the	  squat,	  they	  caught	   the	   four	   current	   residents	   in	   the	   subversive	   act	   of	   cleaning.	   As	   one	  squatter	  later	  told	  the	  ‘Guardian’:	  “We	  were	  working	  on	  tidying	  the	  place	  up,	  as	  you	  do	  –	  it's	  a	  house,	  so	  it's	  got	  to	  be	  tidy.”216	  Their	  objective	  was	  thwarted	  when	  armoured	  riot	  cops	  stormed	  into	  their	  living	  room,	  rudely	  pushed	  them	  out	  of	  the	  way	  and	  began	  to	  tip	  over	  furniture,	  rip	  open	  cushions	  and	  empty	  the	  bins	  on	  the	  floor.	  The	  same	  squatter	  recalls:	  "one	  of	  the	  officers	  barged	  me	  in	  the	  face	  with	  his	  shield	  and	  pushed	  me	  across	  the	  room	  and	  told	  me	  to	  sit	  down	  on	  the	  floor.	  Whilst	  he	  was	  pushing	  me	  I	  said,	  'Leave	  me	  alone,	  I'm	  not	  doing	  anything	  to	  you.'	  Then	  he	  started	  shouting,	  'Sit	  there,	  don't	  move.”	  	  While	  police	  began	  to	  search	  the	  house	  top	  to	  bottom,	  word	  of	  the	  raid	  had	  spread	  across	  the	  ‘scene’.	  Within	  minutes,	  the	  first	  bystanders	  were	  beginning	  to	  gather	  outside,	  demanding	   to	  know	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  Over	   the	   following	  hours	   the	  raid	  carried	  on	  at	  a	  snail’s	  pace,	  and	  the	  crowd	  outside	  grew	  steadily	  in	  size,	  some	  present	   in	  solidarity,	  some	  for	   the	  sheer	  spectacle,	  until	   finally	   the	   first	  minor	  scuffles	  ensued.	  The	  police	  were	  effectively	  surrounded,	  and	  Cheltenham	  Road,	  the	  extension	  of	  Stokes	  Croft	  toward	  Montpellier,	  was	  soon	  blocked	  off	  by	  quickly	  erected	   barricades.	   By	   midnight,	   the	   scene	   had	   begun	   to	   resemble	   an	   actual	  battleground,	  with	  bottles	  flying,	  bins	  on	  fire,	  and	  the	  Tesco	  meeting	  its	  fate	  as	  a	  source	  of	   supplies.	  Police	  were	   reported	   to	  baton-­‐‑charge	   the	  protester’s	   lines,	  while	   protestors	   initially	   responded	   with	   sit-­‐‑down	   blockades	   but	   quickly	  reconsidered.	   An	   anonymous	   eyewitness	   recalls:	   “The	   police	   began	   storming	  forwards,	  shouting	  out	  orders	  to	  one	  another	  as	  if	  in	  a	  military	  operation.	  I	  began	  running	  away	  to	  safety,	  but	  some	  people	  tripped	  over	  the	  barricades	  only	  to	  feel	  the	   full	   force	  of	   the	   law	  cracking	   their	   faces	  with	  batons	  and	   riot	   shields.	  The	  police	  refused	  to	  help	  anyone	  that	  was	   injured.	  	  Anyone	  who	  tried	   to	  help	   the	  fallen	  met	  with	  a	  similar	  punishment”	  217.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  The	  following	  citations	  are	  taken	  from:	  http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/apr/23/bristol-­‐‑squatters-­‐‑tesco-­‐‑attack-­‐‑petrol-­‐‑claims,	  1.8.2014	  	  	  217	  https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/local-­‐‑boy/observing-­‐‑stokes-­‐‑croft-­‐‑riot	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  The	  conflict	  really	  escalated	  when	  the	  police	  made	  a	  crucial	  tactical	  mistake	  in	  picking	  their	  battleground.	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  the	  massive	  raid,	  Bristol	  police	  had	  brought	  in	  reinforcements	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  their	  colleagues	  from	  the	  Welsh	  riot	  police.	  The	  Welsh,	  not	  as	  familiar	  with	  the	  local	  cultural	  geography	  as	  their	  Bristol	   counterparts,	   decided	   to	   push	   the	   protesters	   out	   of	   Stokes	   Croft,	   but	  instead	  of	   pushing	  downhill	   toward	   the	   city	   centre	  or	  uphill	   into	  Montpellier,	  they	  pushed	  east	  –	  right	   into	  the	  area	  of	  St	  Pauls	  that	  had	  been	  the	  site	  of	   the	  Bristol	  riot	  of	  1980.	  	  	  That	  riot	  had	  started	  on	  a	  very	  similar	  note	  –	  the	  police	  had	  raided	  the	  ‘Black	  and	  White’	   café	   on	   Grosvenor	   Road,	   not	   even	   half	   a	   mile	   away	   from	   Telepathic	  Heights.	  As	  a	  result,	  rioting	  had	  spread	  though	  the	  area	  as	  the	  local	  population	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  protest	  against	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  act	  of	  racially	  motivated	  territorial	   aggression.	   Then	   as	   now,	   the	   population	   of	   this	   area	   was	  predominantly	  African	  Caribbean,	  and	  in	  the	  1970s	  had	  been	  severely	  affected	  by	   high	   unemployment,	   ‘racial	   tensions’	   (i.e.	   structural	   racism)	   and	   the	  ‘development’	  of	  the	  area	  in	  form	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  M32	  motorway.	  The	  1980	  riot	  was	  as	  much	  a	  response	  to	  a	  specific	  act	  of	  police	  aggression	  as	  it	  was	  a	  more	  generalised	  outcry	  against	  forms	  of	  institutionalised	  racism	  such	  as	  	  the	  ‘sus	   law’,	   the	   rise	   of	   far-­‐‑right	   groups	   such	   as	   the	   National	   Front,	   and	   the	  disproportionate	   affectedness	   of	   Blacks	   and	   minority	   ethnic	   persons	   by	  economic	  hardship	  (Dresser/Fleming,	  2007).	  ‘Sus’	  is	  short	  for	  ‘suspicious	  person’	  and	  refers	   to	  a	  set	  of	   laws	  allowing	  police	   to	  stop	  and	  search	  any	  person	  they	  suspected	   of	   possibly	   planning	   to	   commit	   a	   criminal	   offense	   (sanctioned	   by	  section	   4	   of	   the	   Vagrancy	   act	   1824).	   The	   sus	   law	  was	   disproportionally	   used	  against	  non-­‐‑whites	  and	  is	  generally	  assumed	  to	  have	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  1980	  Bristol	  riot	  and	  other	  ‘race-­‐‑riots’	  in	  the	  following	  years	  in	  Brixton,	  London	  and	   other	   British	   cities.	   The	   law	   was	   subsequently	   hastily	   repealed	   in	   1981,	  although	  Black	  and	  Minority	  ethnic	  persons	  (particularly	  young	  men)	  continue	  to	  be	  disproportionally	  targeted	  by	  police	  ‘stop	  and	  search’	  powers.	  This	  fact	  was	  widely	  discussed	  in	  public	  discourse	  as	  being	  a	  significant	  cause	  of	  the	  riots	  that	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ensued	  in	  several	  major	  British	  cities	  in	  2011	  after	  the	  shooting	  of	  a	  black	  man,	  Mark	  Duggan,	  by	  Metropolitan	  Police.	  	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  unrest,	  local	  authorities	  had	  re-­‐‑assessed	  some	  of	  their	  policies	  –	  notably	  by	  abolishing	  police	  powers	  to	  systematically	  harass	  non-­‐‑whites	  –	  and	  St	  Pauls	  had	  begun	  to	  enjoy	  a	  reputation	  of	  not	  being	  a	  place	  to	  mess	  about	  in	  if	  you	  were	  white	  and	  wore	  a	  uniform.	  Bristol	  police,	  on	  the	  whole,	  knew	  better	  than	  to	  look	  for	  confrontations	  there	  (to	  the	  extent	   that	   “ran	   into	   St	   Pauls”	   constituted	   a	   sufficient	   explanation	   among	  squatters	  as	  to	  how	  one	  had	  escaped	  being	  chased	  by	  the	  cops).	  	  	  The	  Welsh	  police,	  however,	   lacked	  this	   local	  knowledge.	  As	  the	  clashes	  moved	  down	  Ashley	  Road,	  protesters	  were	  therefore	  joined	  by	  a	  large	  contingent	  of	  local	  youth,	   who,	   although	   mostly	   indifferent	   to	   the	   original	   raid,	   were	   now	  determined	  to	  drive	  the	  cops	  out	  of	  their	  area.	  Eye	  witness	  Oleg	  Resin	  reported	  online:	   “Many	   locals	   got	   out	   from	   their	   houses,	   some	  with	   support	   and	   some	  shouting	  ‘get	  lost	  from	  my	  street,	  who	  the	  fuck	  will	  clean	  this	  mess?!’.	  I	  spoke	  to	  some	  people	  who	  remembered	  the	  riots	  in	  the	  80s	  and	  they	  were	  up	  for	  it.	  One	  older	  woman	  sceptically	  said	  that	  the	  area	  has	  been	  gentrified	  and	  the	  new	  posh	  population	  will	  never	  join	  this”218.	  	  	  Far	  from	  “local	  people	  standing	  up	  against	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  Tesco	  in	  their	  area”219	  as	   local	  Labour	  MP	  Kerry	  McCarthy	   framed	  the	  events	   in	  hindsight	   (in	  unison	  with	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   established	   press),	   the	   so-­‐‑called	   ‘Tesco	   riot’	   was	  therefore	  more	  of	  a	  case	  of	  local	  people	  standing	  up	  against	  race-­‐‑	  and	  class-­‐‑based	  territorial	  aggression.	  While	  initially	  sparked	  by	  the	  state	  invading	  the	  space	  of	  a	  specific	  squat	  –	  considered	  by	  the	  residents,	  as	  most	  squats	  were,	  their	  home	  –	  the	   ensuing	   violence	   had	   brought	   out	   deeper	   issues	   relating	   to	   territorial	  domination	  –	   the	  displacement	  of	  poor	   and	  non-­‐‑white	  populations	   from	   their	  areas,	  the	  hostile	  takeover	  of	  these	  areas	  by	  the	  “new	  posh	  population”,	  i.e.	  richer,	  ‘whiter’,	   more	   powerful	   groups;	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   facilitating	   this	  process	  by	   specifically	   targeting	  particular	  groups	  of	   ‘spatial	  undesirables’.	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  http://thecommune.co.uk/2011/04/22/the-­‐‑first-­‐‑funky-­‐‑riot-­‐‑in-­‐‑bristol/	  219	  http://louderthanwar.com/an-­‐‑eye-­‐‑witness-­‐‑account-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑bristol-­‐‑stokes-­‐‑crofttescos-­‐‑riot-­‐‑from-­‐‑kerry-­‐‑mccarthy-­‐‑mp/	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Resin’s	  report	  –	  representative	  of	  most	  accounts	  I	  heard	  over	  the	  following	  days	  –	  continues:	  	  	  
“When,	  on	  my	  way	  home,	  I	  spoke	  to	  a	  bunch	  of	  local	  black	  kids	  and	  asked	  ‘Have	  you	  
heard	   that	   the	   new	  Tesco	   got	   smashed?’,	   they	   looked	   at	  me	  with	   confusion	   and	  
asked	  ‘No,	  and	  this	  is	  bad	  isn’t	  it?’.	  My	  impression	  is	  that	  people	  joined	  the	  riot	  for	  
different	  reasons:	  the	  harassment	  of	  squatters,	  ethical/political	   issue	  with	  Tesco,	  
the	   commodification	  of	   Stokes	  Croft,	   the	  anti-­‐‑cuts	   sentiment.	  And	   the	  black	  kids	  
from	  St.	  Pauls	  probably	  have	  their	  own	  accounts	  they	  need	  to	  settle	  with	  police”.	  
	  The	   riot	   resulted	   in	   numerous	   injuries	   and	   hospitalisations	   on	   side	   of	   the	  protesters,	  eight	  injured	  police	  officers,	  and	  eighty	  five	  arrests.	  In	  the	  following	  days,	  police	  released	  CCTV	  images	  of	  suspected	  rioters	  and	  urged	  the	  population	  to	   come	   forward	   and	   report	   anyone	   who	   may	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   clashes.	  Violence	  –	  although	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale	  –	  again	  flared	  a	  week	  later,	  and	  a	  week	  after	  that,	  and	  for	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  time	  the	  city	  was	  in	  a	  surreal	  state	  of	  semi-­‐‑emergency,	  as	  police	  aggressively	  patrolled	  the	  Stokes	  Croft	  and	  St	  Pauls	  areas	   from	   the	   air.	   Our	   ‘high-­‐‑security’	   squat	   was	   therefore	   permanently	  surrounded	   by	   screaming	   sirens,	   the	   noise	   of	   helicopters	   flying	   low,	   and	   the	  intrusive	  finger	  of	  the	  police	  searchlight	  shining	  into	  the	  yard	  at	  all	  hours	  of	  night.	  Following	  the	  eviction	  of	  Telepathic	  Heights,	  attack	  was	  a	  very	  real	  possibility	  for	  all	  squatted	  spaces,	  and	  if	  Drew’s	  militaristic	  approach	  to	  keeping	  our	  crew	  safe	  was	  socially	  counterproductive,	  it	  certainly	  was	  not	  unjustified.	  	  	  	  The	  history	  of	  racial	  oppression	  that	  underlies	  this	  and	  past	  riots	  is	  a	  substantial	  topic	  in	  itself	  –	  it	  begins	  with	  Bristol’s	  history	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  slave-­‐‑ports	  of	  the	   British	   Empire,	   and	   ends	   in	   the	   present	   day	   displacement	   of	   local	   ethnic	  minorities	   through	   ‘urban	   planning’	   and	   ‘improvement’.	   It	   would	   be	   doing	  injustice	   to	   this	   history	   to	   sum	   it	   up	   in	   a	   few	   short	   paragraphs,	   and	   neither	  personal	   affectedness	   nor	   commission	   give	   me	   a	   right	   to	   speak	   for	   the	  inhabitants	  of	  St	  Pauls.	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  I	  would	  consider	  it	  problematic	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  their	  intentions	  in	  reacting	  to	  the	  police	  invasion	  the	  way	  they	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did	   –	   these	   intentions	   may	   have	   been	   various	   and	   contradictory,	   and	   I	   am	  certainly	  in	  no	  position	  to	  reconstruct	  them	  from	  my	  armchair.	  My	  positionality	  does	  allow	  me,	  however,	  to	  try	  and	  reconstruct	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  police,	  albeit	  only	   because	   they	   owe	   me	   a	   good	   fortnight’s	   worth	   of	   sleep,	   which	   does	  constitute	  a	  degree	  of	  affectedness.	  The	  raid	  on	  Telepathic	  Heights	  took	  place	  in	  a	   climate	   in	   which	   squatters	   and	   political	   activists	   in	   Bristol	   were	   actively	  harassed	   not	   only	   due	   to	   their	   perceived	   status	   as	   social	   miscreants,	   but	  particularly	  because	  of	  their	  political	  beliefs.	  Shortly	  before	  the	  riot,	  a	  nationwide	  string	  of	  undercover	  police	  operations	  within	  activist	  circles	  had	  come	  to	  public	  attention.	  Police	  had	  been	  discovered	  to	  have	  placed	  agents	  within	  leftist	  activist	  groups,	  who	  had	  assumed	  elaborate	   false	   identities	   and	   lived	   complex	  double	  lives,	  sometimes	  for	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  years.	  These	  infiltrators	  had	  fully	  participated	   in	   (or	   sometimes	   instigated)	   political	   actions,	   had	   formed	   deep	  friendships	   and	   collaborations	  with	   the	   activists	   they	  were	   spying	   on,	   and	   in	  some	   cases,	   had	   had	   ongoing	   sexual	   relationships	   with	   unsuspecting	   women	  activists,	  some	  of	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  birth	  of	  children.	  	  	  To	  literally	  infiltrate	  women’s	  bodies	  as	  a	  way	  of	  infiltrating	  their	  community,	  to	  my	  mind,	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  person	  can	  meaningfully	  consent	  to	  having	   sex	  with	   someone	   about	  whose	   identity	   and	   intentions	   they	   are	   being	  gravely	  and	  intentionally	  misled,	  not	  just	  by	  that	  person	  themselves,	  but	  by	  the	  state.	  While	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  define	  the	  experience	  of	  these	  women	  for	  them,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  to	  be	  made	  in	  principle	  that,	  considering	  the	  power	  relations	   and	   level	   of	   deception	   involved,	   this	   constitutes	   state-­‐‑sanctioned	  rape220.	  At	  least	  one	  of	  the	  women	  expressed	  her	  own	  feelings	  in	  the	  same	  words:	  “"We	  are	  psychologically	  damaged;	  it	  is	  like	  being	  raped	  by	  the	  state.	  We	  feel	  that	  we	   were	   sexually	   abused	   because	   none	   of	   us	   gave	   consent." 221 	  That	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  A	  Law	  Commission	  report	  from	  the	  year	  2000	  states:	  “At	  common	  law,	  therefore,	  an	  apparent	  consent	  to	  a	  sexual	  act	  does	  not	  count	  as	  a	  true	  consent	  if	  it	  is	  given	  under	  a	  mistake	  as	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  person	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  act.”	  (43).	  http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Consent_in_Sex_Offences.pdf	  I	  claim	  no	  legal	  expertise	  whatsoever,	  but	  this	  to	  me	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  here	  a	  crime	  may	  have	  been	  committed.	  221The	  state	  was,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  represented	  by	  Bob	  Lambert,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  a	  lecturer	  in	  ‘Terrorism	  Studies’	  at	  the	  University	  of	  St	  Andrews,	  and,	  possibly	  in	  a	  previous	  role	  a	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infiltrators	  had	  managed	  to	  go	  unnoticed	  for	  such	  a	   long	  time,	  and	  garner	  this	  amount	  of	  trust	  from	  their	  associates,	  was	  perceived	  as	  extremely	  disturbing	  –	  one	  wondered,	   inevitably,	  who	   in	   one’s	   own	   social	   circle	  would	  be	   the	   cop,	   if	  there	  were	  one.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  police	  would	  anticipate	  resistance	  to	  the	  new	  squatting	  law	  and	  attempt	  to	  gather	  information	  beforehand.	  Some	  more	  optimistic	  squatters	  proposed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  deliberate	  effect	  on	  part	  of	  the	  surveillers	  –	  to	  plant	  the	  seed	  of	  mistrust	  in	  activist	  circles	  was	  almost	  as	  good	  (read:	  destructive)	  as	  infiltrating	  them	  –	  and	  that	  we	  should	  not	   let	   this	   undermine	   our	   ability	   to	   trust	   each	   other.	   But	   even	   so,	   suspicion	  added	  to	  the	  growing	  pressure	  that	  the	  upcoming	  law	  put	  on	  squatters,	  and	  what	  had	   once	   been	   a	   relaxed	   and	   highly	   social	   lifestyle	   became	   increasingly	  more	  fragmented	  and	  tense.	  	  	  Additionally,	   police	   were	   openly	   targeting	   individual	   activists,	   attempting	   to	  intimidate	  and	  harass	  them.	  A	  recent	  article	  in	  the	  mainstream	  magazine	  ‘Vice’	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  strategy	  is	  showing	  no	  signs	  of	  going	  out	  of	  style222.	  “Over	  the	  past	  few	  months,	  activists	  from	  across	  the	  anarchist	  community	  say	  the	  police	   have	   been	   targeting	   them	   arbitrarily	   and	   indiscriminately.	   They	   say	  individual	  activists	  have	  been	  harassed,	  houses	  raided,	  work	  places	  visited	  and	  arrests	  made	  without	  charges”,	  states	  the	  magazine	  and	  cites	  the	  story	  of	  ‘Jon’,	  member	  of	  an	  anarchist	  union:	  	  	  “One	  morning	  he	  (‘Jon’)	  arrived	  at	  his	  workplace	  to	  an	  email	  from	  his	  boss	  asking	  
for	  a	  meeting.	  When	  he	  turned	  up,	  he	  was	  told	  the	  police	  had	  visited	  the	  office	  with	  
a	  dossier	  of	  "evidence"	  citing	  him	  as	  a	  domestic	  extremist,	  and	  someone	  that	  ‘might	  
not	  be	  suitable	  to	  work	  with	  children’.	  As	  a	  person	  whose	  job	  involves	  helping	  young	  
people	  with	  emotional	  difficulties,	  the	  suggestion	  was	  that	  he	  should	  be	  fired”223	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  state-­‐‑sponsored	  rapist	  	  http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/24/undercover-­‐‑police-­‐‑spy-­‐‑girlfriend-­‐‑child.	  222	  I	  will	  quote	  from	  the	  article	  at	  some	  length,	  since	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  people	  cited	  have	  consented	  to	  having	  their	  words	  repeated.	  If	  the	  reader	  is	  wondering	  why	  I	  did	  not	  ask	  them	  myself,	  I	  can	  only	  say	  in	  my	  defence	  that	  I	  suffer	  from	  a	  strange	  kind	  of	  reverse	  paranoia	  –	  I	  am	  frequently	  worried	  that	  people	  might	  think	  I	  was	  out	  to	  get	  them.	  	  223	  http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-­‐‑police-­‐‑are-­‐‑cracking-­‐‑down-­‐‑on-­‐‑bristols-­‐‑anarchists-­‐‑833	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  ‘Jon’	  explains	  further:	  	  	  "The	   stuff	   they	   provided	   as	   evidence	   was	   articles	   I'd	   written	   anonymously,	   on	  
whether	   prison	   was	   an	   effective	   form	   of	   rehabilitation	   and	   whether	  
underachievement	   in	   working	   class	   communities	   was	   down	   to	   the	   education	  
system.	  No	   connection	  between	  me	  and	  any	  group	  was	  alleged	  or	  mentioned.	   It	  
really	  seemed	  that	  their	  main	  concern	  was	  that	  I	  held	  anarchist	  views"	  (ibid)	  	  Other	  activists,	  according	  to	  the	  article,	  found	  that	  police	  had	  tapped	  their	  phones	  or	  read	  their	  email,	  and	  some	  woke	  up	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night	  to	  having	  their	  house	  raided.	  An	  activist	  named	  ‘Alan’	  recounts:	  	  	  "I	  woke	  up	  and	  found	  my	  house	  full	  of	  police…and	  when	  I	  say	  full	  I	  mean	  literally	  –	  
it	  was	  hard	  to	  move	  around.	  They	  took	  away	  a	  friend	  that	  was	  staying	  at	  my	  house	  
and	  went	  through	  all	  the	  communal	  areas	  for	  hours.	  As	  well	  as	  taking	  electronic	  
stuff	  like	  a	  hard	  drive	  and	  laptop,	  they	  seemed	  to	  be	  bagging	  anything	  that	  looked	  
political.	  The	  arrested	  guy	  came	  back	  two	  hours	  later	  released	  without	  charge	  on	  
police	  bail.	  They	  had	  no	  evidence	  at	  all.	  The	  whole	  point	  was	  to	  intimidate	  people	  
and	  build	  up	  a	  sense	  that	  you	  are	  being	  watched	  the	  whole	  time”	  (ibid)	  
	  As	  a	  result	  of	   this	  campaign,	   in	  October	  2014	  several	  Bristol	  anarchist	  groups	  published	  a	  statement	  that	  included	  the	  following:	  	  “These	   home	   visits,	   arrests,	   searches	   and	   requests	   to	   snitch	   are	   not	   just	   about	  
information	  and	  evidence	  gathering.	  They	  have	  as	  much	   to	  do	  with	  a	   concerted	  
effort	  to	  intimidate	  and	  divide	  us	  all.	  A	  big	  part	  of	  their	  plan	  is	  to	  scare	  people	  into	  
inaction	  and	  to	  create	  divisions	  between	  us.	  They	  hope	  to	  get	  us	  blaming	  each	  other	  
for	  increased	  surveillance	  to	  the	  point	  where	  someone	  falls	  for	  their	  lies	  and	  starts	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talking	   to	   the	   bad	   guys.	   These	   are	   tactics	   that	   have	   been	   used	   against	   social	  
movements	  in	  countless	  places	  and	  times”224	  	  As	  the	  above	  statement	  shows,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  police	  was	  recognised	  by	  the	  squatters	   as	   a	   strategy	   to	   actively	   undermine	   collaboration	   and	   trust	   among	  activists	  and	  to	  terrify	  individuals	  into	  collaboration.	  As	  the	  activists	  were	  keenly	  aware,	  the	  millennia	  old	  adage	  ‘divide	  and	  rule’	  exists	  for	  a	  reason	  –	  in	  order	  to	  subjugate	  any	  group	  of	  people,	  power	  has	  always	   first	   and	   foremost	  aimed	  at	  fragmenting	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  community	  it	  wanted	  to	  dominate.	  Machiavelli	  advises	  in	  The	  Art	  of	  War:	  “A	  Captain	  ought,	  among	  all	  the	  other	  actions	  of	  his,	  endeavor	  with	  every	  art	  to	  divide	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  enemy,	  either	  by	  making	  him	  suspicious	  of	  his	  men	  in	  whom	  he	  trusted,	  or	  by	  giving	  him	  cause	  that	  he	  has	  to	  separate	   his	   forces,	   and,	   because	   of	   this,	   become	  weaker”	   (1521/2009).	   This	  strategy	   has	   been	   successfully	   used	   by	   many	   an	   imperial	   force,	   such	   as	   for	  example	  in	  the	  deliberate	  re-­‐‑enforcement	  of	  ethnic	  divisions	  between	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	   in	   Rwanda	   by	   the	   Belgians	   (Makinda,	   1996)	   or	   in	   the	   exploitation	   of	  divisions	   between	   Igbo	   and	   Hausa	   in	   colonial	   Nigeria	   by	   the	   British	  (Subrahmanyam,	  2006).	  As	  diverse	  and	  manifold	  as	  the	  historical	  examples	  are,	  the	  basic	  strategy,	  in	  game-­‐‑theoretical	  terms	  is	  very	  simple:	  “(1)	  A	  unitary	  actor	  bargains	  with	  or	  competes	  against	  a	  set	  of	  multiple	  actors.	  (2)	  The	  unitary	  actor	  follows	   an	   intentional	   strategy	   of	   exploiting	   problems	   of	   coordination	   or	  collective	  action	  among	  the	  multiple	  actors”	  (Posner	  et	  al,	  2010,	  419).	  As	  Posner	  et	  al	  argue,	  	  
“the	  stipulation	  that	  a	  ‘unitary	  actor’	  is	  necessary	  does	  not	  literally	  require	  that	  the	  
actor	  be	  a	  single	  natural	  person.	  Any	  group	  that	  has	   itself	  overcome	   its	   internal	  
collective	  action	  problems,	  at	  least	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  pursuing	  a	  
unified	  strategy	  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis	  an	  external	  competitor,	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor…	  
Similarly,	  the	  set	  of	  multiple	  actors	  may	  have	  originally	  had	  a	  unitary	  quality	  prior	  
to	  being	  divided”	  (ibid)	  	  A	  strictly	  organised	  and	  hierarchical	  ‘corporate’	  structure,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  an	  army	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  https://bristolabc.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/statement-­‐‑against-­‐‑police-­‐‑harassment/	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or	  the	  police,	  can	  thus	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  presenting	  as	  a	  ‘unitary	  actor’	  while	  simultaneously	  attempting	  to	  introduce	  fragmentation	  and	  contradiction	  into	  the	  organisational	  structure	  of	  the	  opponent.	  One	  very	  effective	  way	  of	  achieving	  this	  is	  to	  introduce	  fear	  of	  each	  other	  –	  a	  single	  successful	  infiltration	  can	  leave	  long-­‐‑lasting	  scars	  on	  a	  community,	  as	  regardless	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  information	  has	  been	  procured,	   the	   very	   fact	   of	   infiltration	   itself	   destroys	   social	   coherence	   by	  introducing	  suspicion	  and	  secrecy.	  Another	  timeless	  favourite	  is	  the	  co-­‐‑option	  of	  some	  members	  of	   the	  opponent’s	   community	   through	  alternating	   reward	  and	  punishment	  –	  the	  police	  employ	  this	  strategy	  by	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  by	  rewarding	  ‘snitching’,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  by	  singling	  out	  particular	  individuals	  for	  harassment	  in	  order	  to	  separate	  them	  from	  the	  ‘flock’.	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  not	  too	  much	  of	  a	  stretch	  of	  the	  imagination	  for	  my	  reader	  when	  I	  point	  out	  the	  similarities	  between	  this	  kind	  of	  tactic	  on	  an	  interpersonal	  level,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  traumatic	  violence	  on	  an	  individual	  psyche,	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter.	   In	   the	   same	  way	   as	   the	   imperialist	   ‘divide	   and	   rule’	  strategy	  is	  designed	  to	  fragment	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  the	  colonised,	  traumatic	  abuse	  fragments	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  inner	  experience	  of	  the	  victim,	  separating	  the	  self	  from	  itself.	  A	  central	  role	  in	  such	  trauma	  is	  thought	  to	  fall	  to	  ‘introjection’,	  which	  is	  another	  word	  for	  the	  internalisation	  of	  cognitive	  content	  presented	  in	  the	   environment,	   and	   its	   encoding	   in	   the	   neural	   pathways	   of	   the	   brain.	  ‘Introjection’	   refers	   to	   the	   way	   that	   a	   subordinate	   comes	   to	   internalise	   a	  
representation	   of	   a	   dominant,	   who	   in	   this	   way	   establishes	   a	   kind	   of	   ‘colonial	  outpost’	  in	  the	  subjugated	  party’s	  mind	  –	  the	  anti-­‐‑authoritarian	  slogan	  “kill	  the	  cop	   inside	   your	   head”	   (Shantz/Williams,	   2013,	   133)	   can	   then	   be	   taken	   quite	  literally.	   In	   terms	   of	   Sperber’s	   ‘epidemiology	   of	   representations’,	   a	  representation	   is	   here	   deliberately	   (although	   not	   necessarily	   consciously)	  inserted	  into	  another	  persons	  mind	  to	  manipulate	  them	  –	  one	  could	  say,	  ‘the	  cop	  inside	  one’s	  head’	  is	  a	  very	  efficient	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  malware.	  	  Introjection	  can	  thus	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   parallel	   the	   mechanism	   to	   infiltration	   –	   a	   way	   in	   which	   a	  dominant	   –	   or	   a	   class	   of	   dominants	   –	   establishes	   control	  within	   the	   psychic	  domain	  of	  the	  subordinate,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  she	  will	  anticipate	  and	  pre-­‐‑empt	  his	  wishes	  without	  him	  having	  to	  exercise	  permanent,	  direct	  control.	  The	  effect	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on	  the	  victim’s	  experience	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  ‘divide	  and	  rule’	  on	  the	  colonised	  –	  it	  destroys	  the	  ‘wholeness’	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  subjugated	  self	  and	  thus	   undermines	   co-­‐‑ordinated	   resistance,	   while	   simultaneously	   producing	   a	  sense	  of	  ‘constantly	  being	  watched’	  by	  an	  ever-­‐‑present	  oppressor.	  	  Fragmentation	   can	   therefore	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   general	   strategy	   of	   domination,	  common	   to	   many	   forms	   of	   oppression.	   Patterson	   (1985)	   discusses	   it	   in	   the	  context	   of	   slavery,	   where	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   master	   to	   sever	   the	   slave’s	  relationships	   among	   each	   other	   constituted	   a	   strategy	   to	   prevent	   them	   from	  forming	  lasting	  bonds	  of	  trust	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  resistance.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Marx	  describes	  alienation	  as	  both	  “the	  separation	  of	  the	  worker	  from	  himself”	  (EPM	  1844)	  through	  his	  identification	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  capital,	  and	  the	  separation	  of	   the	   workers	   from	   each	   other	   through	   the	   principle	   of	   labour	   market	  competition.	  Feminists	  have	  emphasised	  how	  ‘identification	  with	  the	  aggressor’	  in	  the	  form	  of	  internalised	  misogyny	  undermines	  women’s	  solidarity,	  and	  some	  writers	  have	  extended	  this	  critique	  to	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  ‘identity	  politics’	  more	  generally	  (e.g.	  Harvey,	  2008).	  What	  all	  of	  these	  critiques	  share	  in	  common	  is	  a	  recognition	  of	  fragmentation	  as	  a	  technology	  of	  power,	  and	  a	  consequent	  call	  to	   fight	   these	   tendencies	  by	   ‘somehow	  coming	   together’	   (ibid)	  and	  acting	  as	  a	  collective	  subject.	  	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  dynamics	  of	  splitting	  and	  projection	  we	  have	  discussed,	   it	  could	  perhaps	  be	  said	  that	   this	  constitutes	  a	  strategy	  on	  part	  of	  the	  aggressor	  to	  externalise	  his	  own	  fragmentation	  by	  making	  somebody	  else	  ‘the	  incoherent	  one’.	  This	  could	  certainly	  point	  towards	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  strong	   inner	   coherence	   observable	   on	   side	   of	   the	   aggressor,	   for	   example	   the	  
esprit	  de	  corps	  among	  the	  police	  that	  reliably	  protects	  uniformed	  perpetrators	  of	  violence	  from	  prosecution.	  By	  yet	  another	  stretch	  of	  the	  imagination,	  one	  could	  see	  in	  this	  the	  basic	  functioning	  of	  a	  territorial	  self	  –	  the	  inside	  is	  made	  ‘rational’	  and	  controllable	  by	  externalising	  contradiction	  and	  making	  somebody	  else	  deal	  with	  it.	  ‘Divide	  and	  rule’	  has	  therefore	  always	  also	  and	  especially	  been	  a	  strategy	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of	   territorial	   power,	   both	   of	   colonial	   conquest	   and	   of	   the	   ‘colonisation’	   of	   the	  inner	  domains	  of	  other	  spatial	  selves.	  	  	  The	  above	  examples	  also	   show	   that	  while	   it	   is	   important	   to	  discuss	   the	   ‘Anti-­‐‑squatting-­‐‑law’	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  people	  without	  shelter,	   it	  would	  be	  an	  incomplete	  view	  to	  see	  it	  only	  in	  this	  light	  –	  as	  numerous	  raids	  such	  as	  the	  one	  on	  Telepathic	   Heights	   show,	   squats	   were	   often	   targeted	   because	   they	   were	  suspected	  of	  harbouring	  activists.	  The	  effect	  of	  ‘Weatherley’s	  law’	  was	  therefore	  not	  just	  the	  protection	  of	  property	  in	  the	  direct	  sense	  –	  in	  taking	  away	  the	  spaces	  in	   which	   political	   resistance	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   flourishing,	   the	   law	   also	   and	  especially	  attempted	  to	  silence	  dissent	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  property	  as	  such.	  The	  direct	   attacks	   on	   squats	   were	   accompanied	   by	   a	   sustained	   media	   campaign	  throughout	   2011,	  which	   portrayed	   squatters	   as	   destructive,	   anti-­‐‑social	   quasi-­‐‑burglars	  who	  stole	  people’s	  homes	  from	  under	  their	  noses	  when	  they	  had	  just	  popped	  out	  for	  milk.	  Some	  parts	  of	  the	  media	  –	  the	  Daily	  Mail	  and	  the	  Telegraph	  were	   at	   the	   forefronts	   –	  made	   a	  point	   of	   connecting	   squatters	   to	  Gypsies	   and	  Travellers,	   producing	   screaming	   headlines	   about	   ‘Gangs	   of	   Romanian	   Gypsy	  Squatters!’225	  The	  politics	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  discursive	  warfare	  is	  a	  topic	  in	  itself,	  and	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  conflation	  of	  different	  groups	  of	  spatial	  undesirables	  at	  more	  length	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Telegraph,	  Aug	  17,	  2011	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The	  note	   is	  written	   in	  capitals,	  black	  marker	  pen	  on	   the	  back	  of	  an	   insurance	  
certificate.	  I	  find	  it	  attached	  to	  the	  door	  of	  my	  caravan,	  no	  sender,	  no	  signature,	  
no	  response	  expected.	  	  
	  
ST	  WERBURGHS	  ROAD	  IS	  NOT	  A	  CARAVAN	  PARK!	  
IT	  IS	  A	  COMMUNITY	  AND	  LOVE	  OUR	  AREA.	  
YOUR	  CARAVAN	  IS	  OBSTRUCTING.	  
IT	  IS	  UNLAWFUL	  TO	  LEAVE	  CARAVANS	  UNATTACHED	  TO	  A	  VEHICLE.	  THERE	  
ARE	  SPECIAL	  CARAVAN	  PARKS	  TO	  STORE	  CARAVANS	  OUR	  STREET	  IS	  NOT	  
ONE.	  
WE	  ARE	  REPRTING	  TO	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  HEALTH	  AND	  BE	  YOUR	  CARAVAN	  
MAY	  BE	  TOWED	  AWAY	  IN	  THE	  NEAR	  FUTURE.	  
THE	  POLICE	  HAVE	  BEEN	  INFORMED	  TOO.	  
OUR	  COMMUNITY	  IS	  ON	  THE	  CASE.	  
	  
I’m	  not	  particularly	  surprised	  to	  find	  it	  there,	  although	  I	  was	  expecting	  to	  get	  a	  
little	  more	  time	  out	  of	  the	  spot.	  I’ve	  been	  parked	  up	  there	  for	  two	  days.	  Jon	  chose	  
the	   spot,	   after	   a	   decade	   of	   roadside	   parking	   he	   knows	   every	   alleyway	   in	   and	  
around	  Bristol.	  “Outside	  the	  scout	  home	  no	  one	  can	  say	  a	  thing”	  he	  said,	  “you’re	  
not	  on	  anyone’s	  doorstep.”	  Judging	  from	  the	  note,	  somebody’s	  doorstep	  extends	  
across	  the	  road.	  	  
	  
My	  caravan	  is	  the	  last	  of	  three,	  neatly	  lined	  up	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sac	  bordering	  
on	  allotments.	  Two	  of	  them	  –	  mine	  and	  the	  one	  at	  the	  end	  –	  have	  their	  metal	  legs	  
down,	  a	  sign	  to	  the	  attentive	  observer	  that	  they	  are	  inhabited.	  If	  a	  caravan	  is	  just	  
parked,	  one	  would	  not	  bother	  with	  the	  legs,	  but	  a	  caravan	  that’s	  in	  use	  must	  be	  
stabilised	  so	   it	  does	  not	  rock	  back	  and	  forth	  on	   its	  middle	  axis.	   I	  wonder	   for	  a	  
minute	  if	  the	  letter-­‐‑writer	  realises	  this.	  	  
	  
While	  I	  undo	  the	  assortment	  of	  bolts	  and	  padlocks	  that	  lock	  the	  barn	  door,	  I	  feel	  
a	   kind	   of	   defiant	   exhilaration	   about	   the	   note.	   This	   is	   great	  material,	   I	   say	   to	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myself,	  I	  can	  stick	  that	  I	  my	  thesis,	  as	  evidence.	  For	  a	  minute,	  I	  fantasize	  about	  the	  
day	  my	  adventures	  will	   be	  published	   in	   book	   form,	   and	  how	  embarrassed	   the	  
note-­‐‑writer	  will	  feel	  when	  he	  realises	  he	  has	  not	  been	  targeting	  just	  a	  roadside	  
parker	  but	  an	  actual	  anthropologist.	  I	  wasn’t	  really	  there	  you	  know.	  I	  was	  doing	  
research.	  I	  was	  exposing	  you	  and	  your	  intolerant	  middle	  class	  ways	  and	  repulsive	  
grammar,	  you	  bastard.	  Now	  feel	  bad	  about	  yourself.	  
	  
Then	   I	   realise	  how	  utterly	   ridiculous	   I	  am	  being.	   	  No	  one	  around	  here	  gives	  a	  
flying	   fuck	   about	  whether	   or	   not	   I	   consider	  myself	   an	   anthropologist,	   not	  my	  
friends	  and	  certainly	  not	  my	  foes.	  For	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  I	  am	  living	  in	  a	  
caravan	  by	  the	  roadside	  because	  I	  have	  nowhere	  else	  to	  live	  and	  no	  money.	  This	  
is	  not	  a	  game.	  	  	  Figure	  15:	  Fieldnote	  5	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Chapter	  Twelve:	  Extinction	  	  	  
Death	  is	  the	  veil	  which	  those	  who	  live	  call	  life;	  	  
They	  sleep,	  and	  it	  is	  lifted	  Percy	  Bysshe	  Shelley	  	  	  After	  moving	  out	  of	  the	  yard,	  I	  relied	  heavily	  on	  my	  friend	  Jon,	  a	  seasoned	  vehicle	  dweller,	   to	   introduce	  me	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   roadside	   parking.	   Jon	   had	   parked	   up	  throughout	  the	  West	  Country	  for	  decades	  and	  knew	  every	  hidden,	  safe	  spot	  in	  Bristol.	  There	  were	  many	  of	  them.	  Once	  I	  learned	  to	  spot	  the	  signs	  that	  a	  vehicle	  was	   inhabited	   –	   a	   caravan	  with	   its	  metal	   ‘feet’	   down,	   a	   van	  with	   a	   discreetly	  placed	  chimney	  –	  I	  realised	  that	  there	  was	  an	  entire	  hidden	  layer	  of	  habitation	  to	  the	  city.	  Vans	  and	  caravans	  congregated	   in	  backstreets,	   around	  green	  squares	  and	  on	  designated	  sites	  throughout	  Bristol	  and	  the	  surrounding	  areas.	  In	  2011,	  there	  were	  three	  large	  sites	  in	  the	  city,	  one	  of	  them	  ‘legitimate’	  (that	  is,	  tolerated)	  and	   situated	   on	   a	   piece	   of	   land	   adjacent	   to	   a	   large,	   multi-­‐‑storey	   abandoned	  building,	  the	  other	  two	  not	  sites	  as	  much	  as	  they	  were	  groups	  of	  vehicle	  dwellers,	  who	  moved	  from	  property	  to	  property	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  pedestrian	  squatters	  did:	  finding	  a	  way	  in,	  pulling	  up,	  securing	  the	  place,	  waiting	  for	  eviction.	  	  	  Although	  there	  was	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  social	   interaction	  between	  squatters	  and	  site-­‐‑dwellers,	  the	  two	  groups	  were	  nevertheless	  distinct	  and	  followed	  their	  own	  rules	  and	  agendas.	  Vehicle	  dwellers	  had	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  problems	  of	  their	  own	  –	  the	  vans,	  lorries	  and	  caravans	  they	  were	  using	  were	  usually	  old	  and	  required	  constant	  maintenance,	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  basic	  amenities	  on	  site,	  such	  as	  water	  and	  electricity,	  required	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  work	  and	  technical	  skills.	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  ‘classic’	  cars	  (i.e.	  cars	  that	  are	  more	  than	  15	  years	  old)	  helped	  to	  reduce	  the	   normally	   forbidding	   cost	   of	   compulsory	   insurance,	   the	   old	   vehicles	   also	  frequently	  broke	  down	  and	  required	  costly	  repair.	  Site	  evictions	  were	  also	  more	  dramatic	  than	  squat	  evictions	  –	  while	  squatters	  could	  often	  simply	  find	  a	  crash	  space	  anywhere	  in	  town	  until	  a	  new	  building	  was	  found,	  site	  evictions	  meant	  that	  up	  to	  30	   large,	  partly	   immobile,	  partly	  uninsured	  vehicles	  had	  to	  be	  driven	  or	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towed	   off	   and	   parked	   somewhere	   secure	   (not	   always	   easy	   due	   to	   parking	  restrictions).	  Generators	  and	  communal	  equipment	  such	  as	  kitchens	  could	  not	  be	  used	  unless	  safely	  sited,	  and	  since	  every	  property	  could	  normally	  only	  be	  used	  once	  until	   it	  was	  evicted,	  sufficient	  space	  was	  often	  hard	  to	   find.	  Site	  dwellers	  therefore	   formed	   relatively	   closed	   communities,	   and	   joining	   a	   site	   was	  more	  difficult	   than	   joining	  a	  squatting	  crew.	  Since	  group	  size	  was	  a	  crucial	   factor	   in	  finding	  suitable	  sites,	  the	  number	  of	  newcomers	  had	  to	  be	  well	  considered,	  and	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  park	  up	  required	  connections	  and	  recommendations.	  	  	  Those	  who	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  a	  site	  therefore	  simply	  parked	  wherever	  they	  could	   find	   an	   undisturbed	   space	   in	   the	   city,	   and	   throughout	   St	   Pauls,	   St	  Werburghs	  and	  Easton,	  mobile	  mini-­‐‑sites	  dotted	  the	  streets.	  My	  first	  park-­‐‑up	  was	  located	  in	  a	  cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sac	  in	  St	  Werburghs,	  a	  relatively	  affluent	  area	  populated	  by	  people	   who	   frequented	   the	   local	   organic	   foods	   shop,	   cultivated	   nearby	  allotments	  and	  took	  pride	  in	  a	  generally	  ‘alternative’	  lifestyle.	  At	  night,	  sitting	  in	  the	  caravan	  by	  the	  light	  of	  a	  gas	  lamp,	  I	  could	  hear	  them	  singing	  pagan	  chants	  amidst	  the	  vegetables	  while	  the	  people	  parked	  on	  their	  doorstep	  were	  trying	  to	  sleep.	   By	   daylight,	   some	   of	   them	  made	   calls	   to	   the	   local	   Community	   Support	  Officers,	  who	  came	  around	  to	  read	  us	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law.	  It	  was	  not	  illegal	  to	  be	  inside	  a	  vehicle	  by	  the	  roadside,	  but	  it	  was	  illegal	  to	  sleep	  in	  one,	  a	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  prove	  offence,	  since	  by	  the	  time	  one	  answered	  the	  knock	  on	  the	  door	  one	  was	  usually	  awake.	  CSO’s	  do	  not	  have	  actual	  police	  powers,	  but	  one	  would	  not	  know	  this	  by	  their	  uniform	  and	  demeanour	  –	  after	  their	  first	  visit,	  a	  fellow	  street	  parker	  pointed	  out	   to	  me	   that	   ‘I	  didn’t	  have	   to	   listen	   to	   them’,	  but	   they	  pinned	  notices	  with	  intimidating	  legal	  warnings	  on	  my	  door	  regardless226.	  Asked	  why	   people	   complained,	   they	   explained	   that	   the	   caravans	   were	   considered	  ‘eyesores’,	   a	   rather	   harsh	   judgment,	   as	   the	   Buccaneer	   was	   an	   exceptionally	  stately	  caravan.	  The	  vehicle	  dwellers	  themselves	  thought	  that	  the	  caravans	  were	  unwelcome	  because	  of	  their	  symbolic	  association	  with	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers.	  I	  did	  not	  meet	  any	  actual	  (i.e.	  ethnic)	  Travellers	  in	  street-­‐‑parking,	  but	  the	  settled	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  As	  of	  2014,	  I	  have	  been	  told	  that	  Bristol	  police	  have	  actually	  stopped	  harassing	  street	  parkers	  –	  if	  this	  is	  true	  then	  they	  should	  for	  once	  be	  commended.	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population	  did	  not	  always	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  who	  was	  a	  Gypsy	  and	  who	  was	  merely	  treated	  like	  one.	  	  Moishe	  Postone,	  a	  Marxist	  theorist,	  is	  well	  known	  for	  his	  analysis	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘structural	  anti-­‐‑Semitism’	  (1980).	  By	  this	  he	  means	  that	  the	  usual	  hallmarks	  of	  anti-­‐‑Semitic	   propaganda	   –	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   greedy,	   all-­‐‑powerful	   international	  Jewry	  that	  exploits	  and	  controls	  honest	  working	  people	  –	  can	  become	  detached	  from	  their	  conventional	  connection	  to	  secular	  or	  religious	  Jews,	  and	  applied	  to	  other	  groups,	   such	  as	  bankers	  and	   financial	   speculators,	  without	  changing	   the	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  ideological	  figure.	  Postone	  ascribes	  this	  phenomenon	  to	  an	  truncated	   critique	   of	   capitalism	  which,	   rather	   than	   addressing	   the	   totality	   of	  capitalist	  relations,	  singles	  out	  a	  particular	  group	  which	  is	  seen	  to	  profit	  from	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  (or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘bankers’,	  actually	  does),	  and	  thus	  personalises	  what	  should	  be	  a	  systemic	  critique.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  this	  mode	  of	  argument,	  namely	  to	  detach	  a	  basically	  racist	  argument	  from	  its	  racial	  implications	  and	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  free-­‐‑floating	  ressentiment	  that	  can	  attach	  to	  other,	  non-­‐‑racially	  defined	  groups,	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  anti-­‐‑Semitism.	  	  	  If	  one	  looks	  at	  anti-­‐‑Gypsy	  sentiment,	  for	  example	  –	  which	  I	  will	  call	  here,	  drawing	  on	  the	  German	  theorist	  Roswitha	  Scholz	  (2007)	  ‘anti-­‐‑Ziganism’	  –	  one	  can	  see	  a	  very	   similar	   mechanism	   at	   work.	   Scholz	   writes	   that	   discrimination	   against	  gypsies,	  apart	  from	  its	  overtly	  racist	  component,	  involves	  two	  distinct	  but	  related	  stereotypes.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  ‘the	  Gypsy’	  is	  seen	  as	  lazy,	  shiftless	  and	  work-­‐‑shy,	  and	  therefore	  given	  to	  thieving	  and	  trickery,	  all	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  avoiding	  ‘honest’	  work.	  In	  this	  regard,	  ‘the	  Gypsy’	  is	  constructed	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  Protestant	  work	   ethic,	   the	   lazy,	   happy-­‐‑go-­‐‑lucky	   idler	   who	   will	   work	   exactly	   as	   much	   as	  necessary	  and	  lift	  not	  a	  finger	  more.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  is	  also	  construed	  as	  an	  idealised	  nomad,	  a	  merry	  traveller	  who	  sings	  and	  dances	  all	  day	  long,	  and	  lives	  a	  life	  unfettered	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  property	  and	  responsibility.	  While	  the	  former	  stereotype	   tends	   to	   carry	   negative	   connotations	   while	   the	   latter	   is	   often	  positively	  romanticised,	  Scholz	  argues	   that	   the	   two	  constructions	  describe	   the	  same	  figure:	  the	  split-­‐‑off	  and	  projected	  other	  of	  the	  capitalist	  subject.	  Both	  ‘work-­‐‑
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shyness’	  and	  the	  imagined	  pleasures	  of	  ‘the	  simple	  life’	  have	  to	  be	  repressed	  by	  the	   self	   in	   order	   accept	   the	   discipline	   of	   wage	   labour	   and	   the	   modest	  accumulation	   of	   property.	   ‘The	   Gypsy’	   therefore	   embodies	   the	   laziness	   and	  idleness	  that	  the	  capitalist	  subject	  has	  to	  exorcise	  in	  order	  to	  ‘succeed’,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  stands	  in	  for	  a	   longed-­‐‑for	  freedom	  from	  the	  demands	  of	  work,	  self-­‐‑discipline	   and	   the	   overwhelming	   sole	   responsibility	   for	   one’s	   own	   fate.	   The	  reality	  is	  of	  course	  very	  different,	  beginning	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  mobility,	  for	  real	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘free	  movement’	  but	  rather	  of	   ‘being	   moved	   on’.	   As	   my	   friend	   Martin,	   a	   Gypsy	   activist	   who	   identifies	   as	  English	  Romany,	  once	  expressed	  it,	  “it’s	  not	  up	  to	  me	  if	  I	  move,	  I’m	  being	  made	  to”,	  pointing	  out	  the	  frequent	  connection	  between	  mobility	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  is	  not	  wanted	  where	  one	  is227.	  He	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  people	  choose	  to	  live	  in	  caravans	  is	  so	  that	  they	  can	  get	  away	  if	  they	  have	  to	  –	  “it’s	  not	  about	  moving	  so	  much	  as	  knowing	  that	  you	  can	  move”,	  and	  he	  was	  surprised	  to	  hear	  that	  this	  was	  precisely	  the	  reason	  I	  lived	  in	  one,	  too.	  	  	  Martin	  thinks	  that	  the	  word	  ‘traveller’	  originally	  did	  not	  refer	  so	  much	  to	  a	  person	  who	  constantly	  moves	  but	  to	  somebody	  who	  has	  travelled	  ‘here’	  from	  another	  place,	  i.e.	  an	  outsider.	  Like	  that	  of	  his	  imaginary	  colleague,	  the	  ‘Wandering	  Jew’,	  the	  nomadism	  of	  ‘the	  Gypsy’	  is	  therefore	  perhaps	  more	  of	  a	  collective	  projection,	  another	  way	  of	  expressing	  that	  these	  people	  belong	  somewhere	  else.	  The	  Gypsy	  stereotype	  is	  another	  rendition	  of	  the	  racialised	  spatial	  other,	  the	  one	  who	  does	  not	  belong,	  who	  has	  no	  place,	  and	  who,	  like	  the	  proverbial	  scapegoat,	  is	  burdened	  with	   the	   parts	   of	   the	   collective	   self	   that	   have	   to	   be	   ritually	   driven	   out	   of	   the	  territorial	   space	  of	  power.	  As	   I	   have	  previously	   argued,	   such	   symbolic	  or	   real	  displacement	   is	   often	   racially	   legitimised,	   with	   ‘race’	   or	   ‘ethnicity’	   coming	   to	  stand	  in	  for	  ‘belonging’.	  But	  racial	  categories	  are	  not	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  for	  spatial	   othering,	   as	   the	   overlap	   in	   aversions	   to	   Gypsies,	   squatters	   and	   the	  homeless	   shows,	   and	   while	   it	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   specific	  implications	   of	   different	   racial	   stereotypes,	   they	   can	   also	   distract	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  This	  is	  again	  a	  context	  in	  which	  a	  discussion	  of	  ‘coerced	  agency’	  underlying	  a	  presumed	  (and	  ethnicised)	  voluntarism	  could	  be	  interesting,	  see	  chapter	  2	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underlying	  logic	  of	  spatial	  abjection	  that	  connects	  them.	  Analogous	  to	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘structral	   anti-­‐‑Semitism’,	   it	   could	   therefore	   be	   said,	   there	   is	   something	   like	  ‘structural	  anti-­‐‑Ziganism’	  –	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  Gypsy	  stereotype	  to	  groups	  who	  have	  no	  ethnic	  connection	  to	  actual	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers.	  Most	  obviously,	  this	  concerns	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘New	  Age	  Travellers’228,	  the	  label	  most	  often	  attached	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  vehicle	  dwellers	  I	  encountered	  on	  my	  forays	  into	  street-­‐‑parking.	  	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  this	  group	  is	  assumed	  to	  have	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  hippie	  movement	  of	  the	   1970s,	   and	   experienced	   substantial	   growth	   in	   numbers	   in	   the	   80s	   when	  Thatcherite	  housing	  policy	   forced	  more	  and	  more	  people	  onto	   the	  road.	  Soon,	  these	   travellers	   found	   themselves	   targeted	   by	   similar	   repression	   as	   ethnic	  Travellers,	   often	   perpetrated	   by	   the	   very	   same	   institutions,	   for	   example	  companies	   like	   Constant&Co,	   who	   police	   space	   regardless	   of	   the	   ethnic	  background	  of	  those	  who	  are	  seen	  to	  have	  no	  right	  to	  occupy	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  ‘New	   Age	   Travellers’	   have	   come	   to	   identify	   strongly	   with	   the	   culture	   and	  traditions	  of	   ethnic	  Travellers	  –	   a	   sympathy	   that	   is	  not	   always	   reciprocated	   -­‐‑,	  adopting	  their	  songs	  and	  stories	  and,	  not	  unreasonably,	  demanding	  some	  of	  the	  same	   hard-­‐‑won	   rights	   that	   award	   some	   ethnic	   Travellers	   a	   modicum	   of	  protection.	  It	   is	  not	  without	  irony	  that	  this	  protection,	  for	  example	  the	  duty	  of	  local	  authorities	  to	  provide	  legal	  pitches,	  is	  bound	  to	  a	  commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  to	  an	  ‘ethnic	  identity’	  –	  the	  logic	  implying	  that	  it	  is	  only	  legitimate	  to	  live	  in	  a	  caravan	  or	  mobile	  home	  if	  one’s	  ‘ethnicity’	  leaves	  one	  no	  other	  choice.	  Martin	  points	  out	  that	  for	  example	  attempts	  on	  part	  of	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  to	  ‘settle’,	  i.e.	  to	  remain	  in	  one	  place,	  are	  frequently	  thwarted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  significantly	  more	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  obtain	  planning	  permission	  than	   for	  non-­‐‑Gypsies,	  meaning	   that	   –	   like	   in	   the	   case	  of	  Dale	  Farm	  –	   they	  are	  forced	  to	  ‘move	  on’	  even	  when	  they	  were	  trying	  not	  to.	  One	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  –	  like	  at	  Dale	  Farm	  –	  large	  families	  are	  often	  broken	  up	  by	  the	  necessity	  to	  move,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  I	  have	  never	  heard	  anyone	  actually	  applying	  this	  label	  to	  themselves,	  but	  academic	  discussion	  of	  vehicle-­‐‑dwelling	  populations	  regularly	  uses	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  movement	  (here:	  literally)	  that	  are	  not	  ethnic	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  (e.g.	  Martin,	  2002,	  1998;	  Davis,	  1997)	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isolating	  members	  from	  each	  other,	  and	  once	  again	  highlighting	  fragmentation	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  power.	  	  	  Martin	  sees	  one	  advantage	  of	  defining	  one’s	  group	  in	  terms	  of	  ethnicity	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  “people	  are	  more	  racist	  when	  they	  think	  you	  should	  be	  living	  by	  their	  rules”,	  meaning	   that	   he	   sees	  more	   potential	   for	   tolerance	  when	   the	   dominant	   group	  assumes	  that	  a	  minority	  ‘cannot	  help’	  but	  break	  the	  rules	  because	  of	  an	  innate	  ethnic	  compulsion.	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  recalls	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  “strategic	  essentialism”	   (see	   Spivak,	   1987,	   205)	   or	   “tactical	   essentialism”	   (Alleyne,	  2002ab),	  namely	  a	  strategic	  or	  tactical	  appropriation	  of	  an	  essentialised	  ethnic	  category	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  making	  political	  arguments	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  specific	  ethnicised	  or	  racialised	  group.	  As	  Alleyne	  argues,	  this	  move	  involves	  using	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  essentialised	  ethnic	  identity	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end,	  not	  setting	  this	  identity	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  (2002b,	  620).	  This	  strategy	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  so	  far	  as	  research	  on	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  within	  the	  UK	  in	  general	  discusses	  the	  group	   under	   the	   paradigm	   of	   ethnicity,	   distinguishing	  most	   often	   between	   at	  least	   two	  groups,	  namely	  Roma	  on	   the	  one	  and	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  on	   the	  other	   hand.	   Bancroft	   (2012)	   for	   example	   includes	   “under	   the	   term	   ‘Gypsy-­‐‑Traveller’	  English	  Romanichels,	  Welsh	  Kale,	   Scottish	  Travellers	   (Nawken)	  and	  Irish	   Travellers	   (Minceir)”	   (5),	   while	   referring	   to	   as	   Roma	   “the	   Gypsies	   of	  Continental	  Europe,	   including	  Roma,	   Sinti	   and	   so	  on”	   (6),	  while	   stressing	   that	  there	  is	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  cultural	  overlap	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  This	  distinction	  has	  previously	  been	  criticised	  by	  Simhandl	  (2006),	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  division	  into	  ‘Western’	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  and	  ‘Eastern’	  Roma	  shows	  an	  orientalist	  bias	  in	  EU	  policy.	  Judith	  Okely	  (1983),	  author	  of	  one	  of	  the	  very	  few	  ethnographies	  of	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers,	  uses	  a	  similar	  distinction	  but	  refers	  to	  ‘Traveller-­‐‑Gypsies’,	  an	  unusual	  name	  for	  this	  group.	  While,	  due	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  gaining	  access	  to	  this	  group	  for	  outsiders,	  detailed	  ethnographic	  data	  is	  limited,	  a	  wealth	  of	  research	  exists	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  subjects	  relating	  to	  Gypsy’s	  place	  in	  society,	   for	   example	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   policy	   (Clark	   and	   Greenfields,	   2006;	  Greenfields	  and	  Home,	  2006),	  mobility	  and	  settlement	  (Smith	  and	  Grenfields,	  2012,	  2013;	  Greenfields	  2009,	  Greenfields	  and	  Smith	  2010),	  health	  (Parry	  et	  al,	  2004;	  van	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Cleemput,	   2007)	   and	   law	   (Greenfields,	   2007).	   The	   broad	   tenor	   in	   research	   on	  Gypsies	   and	   Travellers	   is	   that	   this	   group	   is	   affected	   by	   a	   high	   number	   of	   issues	  preventing	  equal	  access	  to	  education	  (Bhopal,	  2004),	  and	  social	  services	  (Cemlyn,	  2008;	  Commission	  for	  Racial	  Equality,	  2006).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Commission	  for	  Racial	  Equality	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  advocates	  for	  the	  equal	  rights	  of	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  illustrates	  the	  value	  of	  a	  form	  of	  ‘tactical	  essentialism’	  on	  part	  of	  Travellers	  –	  ‘race’	  here	  becomes	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  claims	  to	  social	  justice.	  This	  point	  is	  particularly	   visible	   in	   debates	   around	   Gypsies	   and	   mobility,	   since,	   as	   Kabachnik	  (2009)	   argues,	   whether	   culture	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   ‘choice’	   or	   as	   ‘innate’	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Gypsies	   often	   translates	   into	   strategies	   to	   either	   ‘integrate’	   them	   into	   the	   settled	  population	  or	  to	  quasi-­‐‑condemn	  them	  to	  uphold	  their	  ‘naturally’	  nomadic	  way	  of	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  While	   it	   would	   therefore	   be	   mistaken	   to	   hold	   against	   ethnic	   Gypsies	   and	  Travellers	  that	  they	  have,	  in	  this	  case,	  turned	  a	  racist	  stereotype	  into	  a	  strategy	  for	  protection,	  the	  veneer	  of	  tolerance	  implied	  in	  ‘multiculturalism’	  still	  remains	  thin,	  as	   the	  eviction	  of	  Dale	  Farm	  in	  2011	  showed.	  The	  site	  was	  then	  home	  to	  about	  1000	  families	  who,	  contrary	  to	  popular	  images	  of	  Travellers	  as	  illegitimate	  occupiers,	   legally	   owned	   the	   land	   they	  were	   living	   on	  near	   the	  Essex	   town	  of	  Basildon.	  The	  Travellers	  had	   for	  a	   long	   time	  been	   the	   target	  of	   a	   campaign	   to	  remove	  them	  by	  the	  city	  council,	  since	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  inflict	  damage	  on	  ‘the	  green	   belt’.	   In	   2011,	   things	   had	   finally	   come	   to	   a	   head	   and	   an	   eviction	   by	  Constant&Co	   had	   been	   ordered.	   The	   eviction	   itself	   was,	   in	   a	   sense,	   not	  remarkable	  –	  it	  was	  only	  the	  last	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  high-­‐‑profile	  clearances	  of	  similar	  sites.	  What	  was	   remarkable	   in	   this	   case	  was	   the	  wide-­‐‑spread	   solidarity	   those	  affected	   found	   from	   unexpected	   allies	   –	   squatters,	   anarchists	   and	   assorted	  activists	   who	   flocked	   in	   by	   the	   hundreds	   to	   provide	   human	   shields	   for	   the	  Travellers.	  This	  was	  certainly	  unusual,	  since	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  often	  mistaken	  for	  each	  other,	  ‘New	  Agers’	  and	  ethnic	  Gypsies	  and	  Travellers	  are	  not	  necessarily	   ‘natural’	  allies.	  Martin	  points	   for	  example	  to	  the	   intricate	  practices	  and	   beliefs	   around	   purity	   among	   Travellers,	   manifested	   in	   elaborate	   rules	  regarding	  hygiene,	  a	  cultural	  area	  in	  which	  the	  ideas	  of	  Gypsies	  and	  ‘New	  Agers’	  ostensibly	   clash.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   common	   enemy,	   and,	   more	  importantly,	   of	   a	   common	   position	   as	   spatial	   undesirables,	   helped	   forge	   an	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alliance	  on	  this	  occasion.	  The	  resistance	  failed	  eventually,	  as	  despite	  last-­‐‑minute	  efforts	  to	  reach	  an	  amicable	  solution,	  an	  army	  of	  bailiffs	  and	  riot	  police	  marched	  on	  the	  site	  and	  the	  Travellers	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  move	  or	  be	  physically	  carried	  off.	  The	  alliance,	  however,	  left	  traces	  in	  the	  imagination	  –	  in	  2013,	  I	  attended	  a	  history	  event	  with	  music	  performances	  and	  talks	  for	  and	  by	  Travellers.	  A	  young	  Traveller	  man	  performed	  a	  song	  one	  could	  have	  mistaken	  for	  a	  poetic	  ballad	  from	  a	  remote	  past,	  but	  listening	  closely,	  I	  realised	  it	  was	  a	  song	  about	  the	  end	  of	  Dale	  Farm,	   a	  beautiful	   and	   simple	   thank	  you	  note	   for	   those	  who	  had	   come	   to	  help	  defend	  it.	  	  	  Back	   in	  Bristol,	   living	   in	   a	   caravan	   confronted	  me	  with	   problems	   I	   had	  never	  before	  considered,	  for	  example	  those	  posed	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  bathroom.	  While	  male	  vehicle	  dwellers	  usually	  did	  their	  business	  in	  the	  shelter	  of	  the	  nearest	  bush,	  I	  was	  reluctant	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  not	  purely	  out	  of	  squeamishness.	  To	  have	  to	  leave	  my	  house	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night	  to	  go	  and	  squat	  down	  behind	  the	  last	  house	  on	  the	  street	   in	   the	  hope	  no	  one	  was	   looking	  out	  of	   their	  window	  became	  such	  a	  chore	   that,	   short	   of	   contracting	   a	   serious	   case	   of	   constipation,	   I	   invested	   in	   a	  chemical	  camping	  toilet,	  wedged	  inside	  the	  small	  bath	  cubicle	  inside	  the	  caravan.	  There	  was	  a	  shower	  too,	  but	  to	  regularly	  fill	  the	  water	  tank	  without	  access	  to	  a	  tap	  was,	  as	   Jon	  phrased	   it	   ‘a	  mission’,	  and	  so	  showers	  as	  well	  as	  clean	  clothes	  continued	   to	   involve	   trips	   to	   other	   people’s	   squats.	   In	   all	   this,	   I	   remained	  domestic	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  amused	  my	  fellow	  street	  parkers	  –	  the	  Ikea	  curtains	  I	  equipped	  the	  caravan	  with	  were	  the	  source	  of	  great	  hilarity.	  I	  did	  get	  fond	  of	  the	  caravan,	  thinking	  of	  it	  as	  my	  ‘shell’	  –	  tucked	  in	  at	  night	  I	  felt	  like	  one	  of	  Bachelard’s	  molluscs,	  neatly	  contained	  in	  my	  housing	  of	  aluminium	  and	  wood,	  yet	  constantly	  aware	  of	  every	  noise	  outside	  in	  a	  way	  I	  had	  not	  been	  even	  in	  the	  most	  contested	  of	  squats.	  Wedged	  in	  a	  halfway	  space	  between	  the	  houses	  of	  the	  settled	  and	  the	  road	  of	  the	  travellers,	  I	  was	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  alone	  in	  a	  place	  I	  should	  not	  be.	  	  	  I	  eventually	  fled	  St	  Werburghs	  and	  pulled	  up	  in	  Easton,	  outside	  my	  friend’s	  squat	  in	  Co-­‐‑operation	  Road	   (that	  was	   its	  actually	  name).	  Co-­‐‑op	  road	  was	  one	  of	   the	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longest-­‐‑standing	  squats	  in	  Bristol,	  and	  on	  many	  an	  occasion	  I	  had	  found	  myself	  taking	  refuge	  on	  one	  of	  the	  dusty	  sofas	  in	  its	  windowless	  living	  room	  –	  the	  ‘Room	  of	  Gloom’	  as	  Jon	  dubbed	  it.	  It	  was	  a	  leaking,	  ramshackle	  place,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  the	  safest	  space	  I	  knew	  about,	  and	  I	  naturally	  gravitated	  towards	  somewhere	  I	  was	  known.	   Ralph,	   eventually	   also	   exiled	   from	   the	   yard	   by	   Drew’s	   violence,	   had	  wound	  up	  camped	  out	  in	  the	  back	  yard	  in	  another	  caravan,	  and	  together	  with	  the	  five	  residents	  of	  the	  small	  house,	  we	  formed	  a	  kind	  of	  mini-­‐‑site	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  Easton.	  The	  area	  was	  poor	  and	  considered	  dangerous	  by	  the	  residents	  of	  more	  up-­‐‑market	  places	  such	  as	  Clifton,	  and	  we	  lived	  just	  adjacent	  to	  the	  infamous	  cycle	  path	  where	  muggers	  collected	  toll	  from	  anyone	  who	  was	  reckless	  enough	  to	  walk	  after	  dark.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Easton	  provided	  a	  kind	  of	  safety	  more	  affluent	  areas	  did	  not	  –	  only	  here	  could	  you	  find	  fly-­‐‑posters	  reading	  ‘Muggers	  of	  Easton!	  Be	  a	  little	  more	  like	  Robin	  Hood	  and	  a	  little	   less	  like	  Margaret	  Thatcher!’	  Only	  here	  would	  residents	  call	  each	  other	  to	  order	  because	  after	  all,	  everyone	  could	  agree	  that	  no-­‐‑one	  wanted	  the	  police	  in	  the	  area.	  Only	  here	  were	  street	  parkers	  not	  just	  treated	  like	  people,	  but,	  in	  some	  cases,	  like	  neighbours229.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  a	  caravan	  still	  enjoyed	  less	  privilege	  than	  a	  house	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  one’s	  space	  respected	  –	  the	  fact	  that	  one’s	  house	  had	  wheels	  appeared	  to	  raise	  people’s	   curiosity,	   and	   frequently	   I	   encountered	   complete	   strangers	   sticking	  their	  noses	   through	   the	  windows	   to	  see	   if	   anyone	  was	   in.	   	  For	   the	   least	  bit	  of	  privacy,	   the	   curtains	   had	   to	   be	   permanently	   drawn,	   resulting	   in	   the	   ‘Room	  of	  Gloom’	  being	  complemented	  by	  the	  ‘caravan	  of	  gloom’.	  Some	  passers-­‐‑by	  skipped	  the	  peeping	  and	  just	  gave	  the	  vehicle	  a	  good	  kick	  to	  see	  if	  anything	  moved	  inside	  –	  in	  my	  case,	  the	  puppy	  took	  good	  care	  of	  such	  intrusion.	  He	  was	  already	  a	  huge	  dog	  at	  not	  even	  six	  months	  of	  age,	  and	  his	  bark	  sounded	  as	  if	  it	  belonged	  to	  a	  dog	  three	  times	  his	  size.	  German	  Shepherds	  are	  renowned	  for	  their	  (purposely	  bred)	  territoriality	   and	   protectiveness,	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   safety	   the	   furry	   Hobbesian	  produced	  was	  well	  worth	  the	  inconvenience	  of	  sharing	  a	  15	  by	  6	  foot	  space	  with	  a	  130-­‐‑pound	  animal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  In	  other	  cases,	  not	  so,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  torching	  of	  several	  vehicles	  later	  that	  year,	  luckily	  without	  their	  residents	  in	  them.	  The	  arson	  was	  thought	  to	  have	  been	  committed	  by	  local	  neo-­‐‑Nazis,	  although	  this	  was	  never	  established	  for	  certain.	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  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  long	  I	  was	  outside	  Co-­‐‑op	  road.	  The	  days	  had	  begun	  to	  blur	  into	  each	  other,	  filled	  with	  the	  technicalities	  of	  vehicle-­‐‑dwelling	  –	  wheeling	  the	  heavy	  12	   volt	   batteries	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   house	   and	   the	   caravan	   on	   a	  skateboard	  to	  charge	  them,	  replacing	  gas	  bottles	  and	  lugging	  water	  –	  one	  does	  not	  really	  appreciate	  one’s	  consumption	  of	  resources	  until	  one	  has	  to	  carry	  every	  single	  volt,	   litre	  or	   cubic	   centimetre	  of	   them.	  Days	  were	  spent	   in	   the	  Room	  of	  Gloom,	  watching	  others	  play	  video	  games,	  chain-­‐‑smoking	  and	  winding	  each	  other	  up	  because	   there	  was	  nothing	  else	   to	  do.	  Money	  was	  scarce.	   In	  one	  particular	  instant,	   F.,	   a	   long-­‐‑term	   resident	   of	   the	   house,	   came	   back	   from	   the	   Jobcentre,	  having	  been	  sanctioned	  for	  being	  five	  minutes	  late.	  He	  sat	  there	  silently,	  staring	  at	  the	  coins	  in	  his	  hand,	  not	  even	  amounting	  to	  a	  fiver,	  which	  was	  now	  supposed	  to	  last	  him	  for	  two	  weeks.	  He	  turned	  around	  to	  me,	  a	  look	  of	  utter	  disgust	  on	  his	  face,	  but	  not	  directed	  at	  me	  –	  it	  was	  directed	  at	  himself	  and	  the	  fact	  he	  had	  to	  ask	  me	  for	  a	  tenner,	  “for	  bread”.	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  if	  the	  Jobcentre	  workers	  who	  regularly	  sanction	   people	   like	   this	   –	   according	   to	   a	   study	   by	   the	   University	   of	   Oxford,	  “between	   June	  2011	  and	  March	  2014,	   the	  official	  data	   shows	  over	  1.9	  million	  sanctions	  were	  imposed	  on	  people	  receiving	  Jobseeker’s	  Allowance”230	  –	  realise	  that	   leaving	   a	   person	   without	   any	   monetary	   income	   whatsoever	   essentially	  amounts	  to	  a	  death	  sentence231,	  and	  if	  they	  generally	  approve	  of	  this	  or	  if	  they	  just	  do	  not	  care.	  To	  take	  away	  the	  last	  few	  pounds	  that	  enable	  a	  person	  to	  sustain	  their	   basic	   biological	   functioning	   under	   capitalism	   amounts	   to	   an	   implicit	  command	  to	  suicide,	  and	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  10,	  hundreds	  of	  disabled	  and	  able-­‐‑bodied	  people	  on	  benefits	  have	  heeded	  this	  command	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  Eventually,	  my	  caravan	  was	  broken	  into	  one	  night	  when	  I	  was	  over	  at	  the	  house	  and	  had	  the	  dog	  with	  me,	  and	  that	  was	  the	  final	  straw	  in	  my	  street-­‐‑parking	  career.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  “The	  researchers'	  analysis	  found	  there	  was	  a	  40%	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  people	  being	  sanctioned	  after	  June	  2011	  compared	  with	  the	  previous	  seven	  years	  (which	  also	  covers	  years	  before	  the	  reforms	  came	  in).	  The	  research	  also	  shows	  that	  after	  2011,	  an	  estimated	  43%	  of	  people	  who	  received	  sanctions	  went	  on	  to	  leave	  the	  JSA	  altogether”.	  http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2015-­‐‑01-­‐‑21-­‐‑sanctions-­‐‑linked-­‐‑drop-­‐‑benefits-­‐‑few-­‐‑return-­‐‑work-­‐‑report-­‐‑0	  231	  Or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  a	  sentence	  to	  pursue	  income	  by	  any	  means,	  including	  prostitution	  or	  other	  illegal	  action	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Anyone	  who	  has	  been	  burgled	  knows	   the	   feeling	  of	  having	   the	  safety	  of	  one’s	  home	   stripped	   away	   by	   such	   intrusion,	   and	   a	   caravan,	   though	   smaller,	   is	   no	  different.	  I	  did	  not	  have	  much	  worth	  stealing	  –	  two	  broken	  laptops	  and	  some	  tools	  –	  but	  I	  had	  to	  take	  the	  caravan	  off	  the	  road	  because	  it	  no	  longer	  felt	  safe,	  dog	  or	  no	  dog.	  There	  was	  not	  enough	  space	  in	  Co-­‐‑op	  Road,	  and	  so	  I	  began	  to	  drift.	  I	  slept	  in	  the	  car,	  which,	  although	  cramped,	  was	  a	  little	  fortress	  on	  wheels.	  I	  spent	  a	  few	  weeks	  on	  a	  small	  and	  filthy	  but	  well	  protected	  site	  inside	  a	  building	  opposite	  the	  railway	  station,	  before	  it	  got	  evicted.	  There	  were	  about	  ten	  people	  there,	  all	  nice	  enough,	  but	  I	  had	  begun	  to	  withdraw	  into	  myself.	  Without	  realising,	  I	  had	  slipped	  into	   depression	   –	   a	   common	   feature	   of	   homelessness	   –	   and	   my	   focus	   and	  perspective	   imperceptibly	   narrowed	   until	   day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day	   survival	   was	   all	   that	  mattered.	  After	  I	  abandoned	  the	  caravan,	  there	  were	  endless	  weeks	  of	  me	  and	  the	   dog	   living	   in	   the	   Smiling	   Chair,	   finally	   on	   our	   own	   and	   a	   tolerated	  inconvenience	   for	   the	  collective	   that	   tried	   to	  run	   the	  shop	  as	  a	  radical	  hub	  on	  Stokes	  Croft.	  When	  we	  got	  chucked	  out	  of	  there	  –	  the	  dog	  was	  not	  always	  selective	  in	  whom	  he	  regarded	  a	  threat	  to	  my	  safety,	  and	  terrified	  the	  patrons	  –	  I	  couch-­‐‑surfed	  in	  squats.	  Squatting	  in	  a	  squat	  is	  probably	  as	  low	  as	  one	  can	  get	  short	  of	  sleeping	  rough,	  but	  I	  felt	  insufficiently	  equipped	  to	  fend	  for	  myself	  on	  the	  street	  like	  an	  ‘Ordinary	  Homeless	  Person’,	  and	  so	  I	  clung	  on.	  	  I	   was	   lucky,	   eventually,	   that	   the	   story	   that	   is	   me	   sometimes	   has	   a	   tendency	  towards	  the	  clichéd.	  Having	  sold	  the	  caravan	  and	  not	  being	  entitled	  to	  any	  benefit	  payments	  due	  to	  my	  still	  existing	  student	  status,	  I	  had	  exactly	  enough	  money	  left	  to	  fill	  up	  the	  car,	  drive	  it	  back	  to	  Austria	  and	  hope	  for	  my	  parents	  to	  take	  me	  in,	  when	  I	  found	  a	  job.	  I	  had	  previously	  worked	  in	  marketing,	  and	  had	  half-­‐‑heartedly	  responded	  to	  an	  ad	  by	  a	  London	  company	  hiring	  German	  speakers	  –	  no	  one	  was	  more	  surprised	  than	  me	  when	  I	  got	  an	  interview	  and,	  thanks	  to	  an	  immediately	  required	  start	  date,	  was	  hired	  on	  the	  spot.	   I	  remember	  sitting	   in	  an	  office	   in	  a	  shiny	   glass	   tower	   high	   up	   above	   the	   city	   of	   London,	   across	   a	   table	   from	   two	  pinstriped	  men	  who	  seemed	  to	  belong	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  movie,	  trying	  to	  hide	  the	  fact	  I	  had	  not	  had	  a	  shower	  in	  days	  and	  my	  clothes	  were	  still	  damp	  from	  washing	  them	  in	  the	  kitchen	  sink	  the	  night	  before.	  To	  show	  that	  life	  is	  sometimes	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stranger	  than	  fieldwork:	  I	  found	  out,	  long	  after	  leaving	  this	  job,	  that	  the	  building	  in	  question,	  the	  Centre	  Point	  tower	  at	  Tottenham	  Court	  Road,	  had	  in	  1974	  been	  squatted	   by	   homeless	   campaigners	   in	   a	   protest	   against	   housing	   shortages	   in	  London,	   leading	  to	  the	  building	  continuing	  to	  be	  “a	  symbol	  of	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  homeless”	   (Wikipedia).	  The	   job	  saved	  my	  existence,	   if	  not	  my	  dignity,	  and	  the	  suits	   never	   learned	   that	   for	   the	   first	   four	   months	   I	   worked	   for	   them,	   I	   was	  commuting	  out	  of	  a	  squat	  in	  Bristol.	  They	  did	  not	  know	  this	  world	  even	  existed.	  The	  money	  they	  paid	  me	  eventually	  accumulated	  enough	  for	  a	  deposit	  on	  a	  room,	  and	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2012,	  I	  was	  no	  longer	  homeless,	  the	  past	  year	  being	  nothing	  but	  a	  blur.	  	  	  I	  thus	  got	  a	  taste,	  albeit	  a	  fleeting	  one	  compared	  to	  many	  others,	  of	  why	  it	  is	  that	  while	   trauma	   is	   a	   frequent	   predictor	   of	   homelessness	   (see	   last	   chapter),	   the	  experience	  of	  homelessness	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  traumatic	  (Goodman	  et	  al,	  1991).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  homelessness	  describes	  a	  state	  of	  spatial	  abjection	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  safe	  space,	  and	  as	  Van	  der	  Kolk	  notes,	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  trauma	  more	  generally:	  "Trauma	  occurs…when	  one	  loses	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  a	  safe	  place	  to	  retreat	  within	  or	  outside	  oneself	  to	  deal	  with	  frightening	  emotions	  or	  experiences"	  (Van	  der	  Kolk,	  1987,	  31).	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  6,	  this	  lack	  of	  ‘safe	  space’	  means	  that	  the	  bodies	  of	  homeless	  people	  are	  at	  permanent	  risk	  of	  violent	  attack.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  sense	  of	  “being	  without	  sanctuary	  in	  a	  world	  filled	  with	  malevolent	  forces”	  (Goodman	  et	  al,	  1991,	  1220)	  also	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  “people	  often	  react	  to	  victims	  by	  rejecting	  them”	  (ibid),	  either	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  victimized	  person	  is	  responsible	  for	  their	  fate,	  or	  because	  they	  simply	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  ‘losers’	  (ibid).	  This	  means	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  traumatizing	  experience	  of	  being	  at	  risk	  of	  death	  or	  injury	  from	  natural	   or	   human	   causes,	   homelessness	   also	   affects	   a	   person’s	   sense	   of	   self	  through	   the	   severance	   of	   important	   social	   ties	   that	   have	   previously	   informed	  their	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  selfhood.	  	  	  My	  brief	  foray	  into	  street-­‐‑parking	  made	  me	  realize	  that	  this	  social	  component	  of	  trauma	  does	  not	  merely	   constitute	   an	   absence	   –	   it	   is	   not	   only	   that	   sustaining	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social	  relations	  are	  withdrawn,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  replaced	  with	  something	  else.	  My	  inner	  insistence	  on	  my	  role	  as	  an	  anthropologist,	  which	  before	  this	  point	  had	  not	   significantly	   impacted	   on	   the	  way	   I	   considered	  my	   position	   in	   the	   ‘field’,	  suddenly	  became	  important	  for	  me	  when	  I	  saw	  myself	  confronted	  with	  others	  who	  communicated	  with	  words,	  gestures	  and	  the	  occasional	  spitting-­‐‑attack	  that	  to	  their	  minds,	  I	  was	  something	  entirely	  different.	  I	  realised	  at	  that	  point	  that	  for	  all	  its	  methodological	  quandaries,	  Bourdieu’s	  distortion	  also	  functions	  as	  a	  safety	  valve	  –	  if	  one	  is	  ‘not	  really	  there’	  then	  one	  can	  ergo	  not	  actually	  be	  meant	  by	  such	  insult.	   It	   turned	   out,	   however,	   that	   in	   the	   perception	   of	   others,	   actual	  placelessness	   trumped	  epistemological	  placelessness,	  and	  so	   I	  got	  a	   flavour	  of	  what	   it	   feels	   like	   to	  be	   regarded	   “matter	  out	  of	  place”	   (Douglas,	  1966).	   In	   the	  following,	  I	  will	  therefore	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  what	  this	  experience	  is	  about	  –	  not	   to	   over-­‐‑dramatise	  my	   own	   limited	   exposure,	   but	   to	   capture	   what	   is	   that	  Bourdieu’s	  distortion	  ultimately	  secured	  my	  ‘self’	  from.	  	  	  	  
Res	  Ipsa	  Loquitur	  	  	  In	  a	  2009	  study,	  a	  team	  of	  social	  neuroscientists	  asked	  participants	  to	  step	  into	  an	  MRI	   scanner,	   and	   showed	   them	   images	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   persons	  who	  were	  visually	  recognisable	  as	  belonging	  to	  marginalised	  groups,	  hoping	  to	  gain	  some	  insight	   into	  how	  social	  relations	  influence	  neurological	  responses	   in	  the	  brain.	  	  When	   they	   showed	   participants	   pictures	   of	   “recognisably”	   homeless	   (that	   is,	  stereotypically	   dirty,	   dishevelled	   and	   toothless)	   people,	   the	   effect	   was	   quite	  remarkable:	  	  	  
“Within	   a	   moment	   of	   seeing	   the	   photograph	   of	   an	   apparently	   homeless	  
man…people’s	  brains	  set	  off	  a	  sequence	  of	  reactions	  characteristic	  of	  disgust	  and	  
avoidance.	   The	   activated	   areas	   included	   the	   insula,	  which	   is	   reliably	   associated	  
with	  feelings	  of	  disgust	  toward	  objects	  such	  as	  garbage	  and	  human	  waste.	  Notably,	  
the	   homeless	   people’s	   photographs	   failed	   to	   stimulate	   areas	   of	   the	   brain	   that	  
usually	  activate	  whenever	  people	  think	  about	  other	  people,	  or	  themselves.	  Toward	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the	  homeless	  (and	  drug	  addicts),	  these	  areas	  simply	  failed	  to	  light	  up,	  as	  if	  people	  
had	  stumbled	  on	  a	  pile	  of	  trash”	  (Fiske,	  2010,	  p)	  	  Given	   that	   the	  human	  mind	  has	  been	  described	   as	   a	   “medley	  of	   sophisticated	  pattern-­‐‑completion	  devices”	  (May	  et	  al,	  1996,	  4),	  such	  a	   failure	  to	  register	   the	  pattern	   ‘human’	   is	   quite	   worrying,	   and	   would	   under	   different	   circumstances	  perhaps	   be	   seen	   as	   sign	   of	   a	   neurological	   disorder.	   From	   a	   strictly	   cognitive	  perspective,	  misrecognising	  a	  human	  being	  for	  an	  inanimate	  object	  –	  ‘trash’,	  no	  less	  –	  is	  a	  substantial	  category	  mistake,	  an	  attribution	  error	  of	  quite	  spectacular	  proportions,	   akin	   to	   the	   famous	  man	   who	  mistook	   his	   wife	   for	   a	   hat	   (Sacks,	  1985232).	  This	  kind	  of	  ‘misrecognition’	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  disliking	  certain	  political	  identities	  (as	  could	  be	  read	  into	  Honneth’s	  account	  of	  ‘misrecognition’),	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  brains	  physically	  failing	  to	  recognise	  others	  as	  members	  of	  their	  own	  species.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  we	  can	  therefore	  take	   ‘misrecognition’	  not	  just	  as	  a	  social	  or	  ethical,	  but	  as	  a	  neurobiological	  category,	  and	  try	  to	  reconstruct	  what	  happens	  when	  people	  become	  the	  target	  of	  it.	  I	  am	  at	  present	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  MRI	  studies	  of	  people	   in	  the	  act	  of	  being	  misrecognised,	  and	  so	  I	  can	  only	  approach	   the	  matter	   phenomenologically,	   via	   some	   of	   the	   concepts	   that	   have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  this	  experience.	  	  	  As	   was	   mentioned	   before,	   a	   frequently	   used	   metaphor	   for	   the	   trauma	   of	  homelessness	  is	  ‘social	  death’	  (e.g.	  Ligget,	  1991,	  Ruddick,	  2002),	  referring	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  through	  a	  severing	  of	  social	  relations,	  a	  person	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  no	  longer	  inhabit	  the	  symbolic	  sphere	  of	  the	  living.	  Despite	  my	  well-­‐‑honed	  honed	  taste	  for	  blaming	  capitalism,	  ‘social	  death’	  is	  not	  a	  modern	  invention.	  In	  ancient	  Greece,	  in	  times	  of	  crisis,	  a	  cripple,	  a	  beggar	  or	  a	  criminal	  would	  be	  singled	  out	  and	  taken	  outside	  the	  space	  of	  the	  polis	  to	  be	  ritually	  punished	  or	  killed	  (Bremmer,	  1983).	  The	  body	  of	  the	  abject	  -­‐‑	  called	  ‘pharmakos’,	  literally	  ‘poisoner’	  –	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  all	  that	  was	  wrong	  inside	  the	  space	  of	  the	  city,	  and	  its	  expulsion	  was	  seen	  to	  cure	  the	  ‘infection’	  and	  restore	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  inside	  space.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Sacks,	  a	  neurologist,	  details	  several	  neurological	  disorders	  in	  which	  people	  make	  such	  category	  mistakes	  –	  it	  appears	  though	  that	  such	  issues	  are	  only	  considered	  a	  ‘disorder’	  when	  they	  appear	  individually	  rather	  than	  as	  part	  of	  collective	  social	  relations	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related	  word	   ‘scapegoat’	   stems	   from	   the	   Jewish	  and	  old	  Testament	   traditions,	  and	  describes	  an	  ancient	  rite	  in	  which	  a	  goat	  was	  symbolically	  burdened	  with	  all	  the	  sins	  of	  the	  community	  and	  driven	  into	  the	  desert	  on	  the	  Day	  of	  Atonement	  (Levy,	   1998).	  Modern	   homelessness	   is	   somewhat	   reminiscent	   of	   this,	  when	   a	  person	  who	  is	  seen	  to	  have	  offended	  against	  God	  Market	  is	  left	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  consequences,	  including	  ‘the	  market’	  putting	  them	  out	  on	  the	  street	  where	  they	  can	  be	  attacked	  without	  impunity233.	  Social	  forms	  like	  these	  point	  to	  a	  need	  that	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  vanished	  from	  modern	  human	  life	  –	  that	  of	  cleansing	  the	  community	   from	   its	   own	   unwanted	   aspects	   through	   the	   enactment	   of	   an	  expulsion	  of	  the	  symbolic	  bearer	  of	  these	  aspects	  from	  the	  ‘inside’.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  discussion,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  ritual	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  express	  a	  fundamental	   aspect	   of	   territoriality,	   understood	   as	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	  constructing	  space	  –	  a	  space	  that	  is	  ordered	  and	  pacified	  on	  the	  inside,	  and	  exiles	  all	  that	  is	  undesirable	  on	  the	  outside.	  The	  ideological	  justifications	  for	  this	  social	  process	  of	  splitting	  and	  projection	  change,	  as	  do	  the	  complex	  social	  structures	  that	  mediate	  who	   is	   excluded	   and	   for	  what	   reason	   –	   capitalism	   has	   certainly	  developed	   its	   own	   mechanisms	   of	   exclusion	   and	   its	   own	   ideological	  legitimisations	  for	  it,	  and	  they	  are	  no	  less	  murderous	  than	  those	  of	  religion.	  	  	  The	  most	  in-­‐‑depth	  discussion	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  comes	  from	  Patterson	  (1985),	  who	  invokes	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  slavery.	  Scholars	  studying	  homelessness	  have	  found	  his	  argument	  congenial,	  since	  it	  appears	  to	  describe	  a	  number	  of	  things	  that	  can	  also	  be	  said	  about	  the	  homeless:	  	  “The	   slave	   is	   violently	   uprooted	   from	   his	   milieu.	   He	   is	   desocialized	   and	  
depersonalized.	   This	   process	   of	   social	   negation	   constitutes	   the	   first,	   essentially	  
external,	   phase	   of	   enslavement.	   The	   next	   phase	   involves	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
slave	  into	  the	  community	  of	  his	  master,	  but	  it	  involves	  the	  paradox	  of	  introducing	  
him	  as	  a	  nonbeing”(38).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  The	  connection	  to	  sacrifice	  here	  is	  not	  coincidental	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  Walter	  Benjamin	  (1921/2004)	  analysed	  capitalism	  as	  a	  religion,	  the	  social	  production	  of	  homelessness	  has	  a	  similar	  purpose	  as	  ‘scapegoat’	  rituals,	  namely	  to	  symbolically	  shun	  that	  which	  is	  forbidden:	  the	  embodied	  failure	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  take	  care	  of	  him/herself	  in	  the	  market.	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Patterson	  describes	  two	  different	  roads	  to	  ‘social	  death’	  that	  echo	  the	  previous	  distinction	   we	   have	   made	   between	   racialised	   and	   gendered	   forms	   of	   spatial	  abjection,	  and	  the	  dual	  mode	  of	   ‘secure	  space’	  as	  exclusion	  and	  internment.	   In	  what	   he	   calls	   “the	   intrusive	  mode	   of	   representing	   social	   death,	   the	   slave	  was	  ritually	   incorporated	   as	   the	   permanent	   enemy	   on	   the	   inside	   -­‐‑	   the	   ‘domestic	  enemy’…unsupported	  by	  a	  chain	  of	  ancestors	  reaching	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  time"(39),	   which	   does	   not	   only	   recall	   the	   description	   of	   Margaret	   Thatcher’s	  ‘enemy	  within’,	  but	  also	  that	  of	  the	  racialised	  spatial	  other	  more	  generally	  (see	  chapter	   8).	   This	   other	   is	   defined	   as	   an	   intruder,	   a	   hostile	   alien	   who	   has	   no	  business	  being	  where	  he	  is,	  and	  thus	  must	  be	  either	  excluded,	  or,	  if	  he	  breaches	  the	  boundary,	  interned,	  i.e.	  enslaved.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  “in	   sharp	   contrast	   with	   the	   intrusive	   conception	   of	   death	   was	   the	   extrusive	  
representation.	  Here	  the	  dominant	  image	  of	  the	  slave	  was	  that	  of	  an	  insider	  who	  
had	   fallen,	   one	   who	   ceased	   to	   belong	   and	   had	   been	   expelled	   from	   normal	  
participation	   in	   the	   community…The	   destitute	   were	   included	   in	   this	   group,	   for	  
while	  they	  perhaps	  had	  committed	  no	  overt	  crime	  their	  failure	  to	  survive	  on	  their	  
own	  was	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  innate	  incompetence	  and	  of	  divine	  disfavor”	  (41).	  This	  echoes	  the	  gendered	  aspect	  of	  territorial	  othering,	  in	  that	  members	  of	  the	  in-­‐‑group	   are	   seen	   to	   have	   sunk	   so	   low	   in	   status	   that	   they	   no	   longer	   count	   as	  people.	  The	  ‘destitute’	  are	  explicitly	  covered	  in	  this	  explanation,	  since	  they	  have	  failed	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   are	   able	   to	   survive	   ‘on	   their	   own’,	   recalling	  Anderson’s	  (2013)	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘failed	  citizen’.	  Patterson	  admits	  that	  societies	  in	  which	  slavery	  is	  based	  exclusively	  on	  this	  mode	  are	  relatively	  rare,	  which	  may	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘social	  death’	  of	  the	  domestic	  poor	  always	  also	  involves	  an	   element	   of	   othering234 .	   We	   may	   therefore	   “summarize	   the	   two	   modes	   of	  representing	   the	   social	   death	   that	  was	   slavery	   by	   saying	   that	   in	   the	   intrusive	  mode	  the	  slave	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  someone	  who	  did	  not	  belong	  because	  he	  was	  an	  outsider,	  while	  in	  the	  extrusive	  mode	  the	  slave	  became	  an	  outsider	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  For	  example	  when	  domestic	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Roma	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘actually	  from	  India’.	  Anderson	  (2013)	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument,	  when	  she	  asserts	  that	  the	  differences	  between	  ‘non-­‐‑citizens’	  and	  ‘failed	  citizens’	  are	  not	  nearly	  as	  striking	  as	  the	  similarities.	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he	  did	  not	  (or	  no	  longer)	  belonged”	  (44).	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   condition	   of	   powerlessness	   and	   the	   severance	   of	   social	   ties	  implied	   in	   ‘social	   death’,	   Patterson’s	   concept	   might	   therefore	   indeed	   be	   well	  suited	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  homelessness.	  However,	  Patterson	  adds	  a	  third	  feature	  of	   this	   condition,	   which	   to	  my	  mind	  makes	   his	   account	   questionable,	   namely	  ‘dishonour’:	  	  “the	  dishonor	  of	  slavery…was	  not	  a	  specific	  but	  a	  generalized	  condition.	  It	  came	  in	  
the	  primal	  act	  of	  submission.	  It	  was	  the	  most	  immediate	  human	  expression	  of	  the	  
inability	   to	   defend	   oneself	   or	   to	   secure	   one's	   livelihood.	   It	   was	   not	   part	   of	   the	  
institutionalization	  of	  slavery,	  for	  its	  source	  was	  not	  culture.	  The	  dishonor	  the	  slave	  
was	   compelled	   to	   experience	   sprang	   instead	   from	   that	   raw,	   human	   sense	   of	  
debasement	   inherent	   in	   having	   no	   being	   except	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   another's	  
being235”	  Patterson’s	  concept	  of	  ‘honour’	  is	  explicitly	  that	  of	  the	  Hobbesian	  territorial	  self	  (10,	  79),	  because	  apparently,	  	  “modern	  anthropologists	  have	  confirmed	  Thomas	  Hobbes'	   insight	   that	   the	  sense	  of	  honour	   is	   intimately	  related	   to	  power,	   for	   in	  competing	   for	   precedence	   one	   needs	   power	   to	   defend	   one's	   honour”(80).	   He	  agrees	  with	  Pitt-­‐‑Rivers	  notion	  that	  "the	  claim	  to	  honour	  depends	  always	  in	  the	  last	  resort,	  upon	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  claimant	  to	  impose	  himself.	  Might	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  right	  to	  precedence,	  which	  goes	  to	  the	  man	  who	  is	  bold	  enough	  to	  enforce	  his	  claim,	  regardless	  of	  what	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  his	  merits"	  (80).	  This	  should	  remind	  us	   of	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   ‘code	   of	   honour’	   in	   chapter	   7,	   and	   again	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  Patterson	  presents	  this	  without	  any	  indication	  of	  critical	  distance,	  and	  I	  therefore	  think	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  infer	  that	  he	  agrees	  with	  the	  view	  that	  a	  person	  who	  submits	  to	  domination	  is	  therefore	  ‘dishonoured’.	  The	  ‘dishonour’	  consists	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  slave	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  territorial	  self	  and	  defend	  him/herself,	  which	  makes	  him/her	  fair	  game	  for	  plunder	  (in	  this	  case,	  with	  him/herself	  as	  the	  loot)	  and	  it	  is	  not	  a	  result	  of	  ‘culture’,	  but	  supposedly	  human	  nature	  to	  get	  that	  ‘raw	  human	  sense	  of	  debasement’	  when	  one	  has	  been	  violently	  subjugated.	  This	  argument	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  represents	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  ‘invulnerable’,	  ‘independent’	  territorial	  dominant	  who	  is	  only	  a	  man	  as	  long	  as	  he	  defends	  his	  turf,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  also	  replicates	  the	  kind	  of	  victim-­‐‑blaming	  levelled,	  for	  example,	  at	  survivors	  of	  sexual	  violence,	  whose	  ‘shame’	  is	  supposed	  to	  consist	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  didn’t	  effectively	  fight	  back,	  or	  at	  least	  have	  the	  decency	  to	  die	  before	  being	  ‘dishonoured’.	  Patterson	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  latter	  option,	  since	  he	  quotes	  a	  long	  line	  of	  white	  men	  from	  Pascal	  to	  Nietzsche	  who	  glorify	  it	  (78)	  This	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  the	  logic	  of	  rape	  apologists,	  but	  also	  of	  perpetrators	  of	  what	  is	  commonly	  called	  ‘honour	  based	  violence’	  (see	  e.g.	  Gill,	  2010),	  namely	  the	  injuring	  and	  killing	  of	  women	  over	  men’s	  precarious	  sense	  of	  self-­‐‑worth.	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masculine	   subject	   in	   chapter	   8	   –	   status	   is	   here	   again	   negotiated	   through	   the	  capacity	   to	   engage	   in	   violent	   competition,	   expressed	   in	   real	   or	   metaphorical	  territorial	  posturing.	  Patterson’s	  concept	  of	  ‘dishonour’	  then	  also	  appears	  mainly	  as	  the	  emasculation	  of	  a	  territorial	  self’,	  consisting	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  ‘autonomy’236	  read	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  subjugate	  others,	  and	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  question	  “can	  he	  assert	  his	  will	  as	  a	  man	  of	  honor?”	  (ibid).	  With	  Hobbes,	  Patterson	  sees	  honour	  not	  as	  a	  form	  of	  recognition,	  but	  as	  a	  form	  of	  intimidation:	  “To	  obey,	  is	  to	  Honour;	  because	  no	  man	  obeys	  them,	  whom	  they	  think	  have	  no	  power	  to	  help,	  or	  hurt	  them.	  And	  consequently	  to	  disobey,	  is	  to	  Dishonour"	  (Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  in:	  Patterson,	  10).	  	  Patterson	   continues:	   “‘Those	   who	   aspire	   to	   no	   honour	   cannot	   be	   humiliated’	  What	  this	  immediately	  implies	  is	  that	  those	  who	  do	  not	  compete	  for	  honour,	  or	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  do	  so,	  are	  in	  a	  real	  sense	  outside	  the	  social	  order”	  (79)237.	  He	  thus	  repeats	  a	  theme	  that	  appears	  also	  in	  other	  anti-­‐‑slavery	  writers	  –	  that	  the	  opposite	  of	  subjugation	  is	  not	  equality,	  but	  the	  possibility	  to	  fight	  other	  men	  for	  it,	  and	  freedom	  therefore	  is	  worthless	  if	  it	  hasn’t	  been	  won	  in	  struggle:	  "A	  man	  without	  force	  is	  without	  the	  essential	  dignity	  of	  humanity.	  Human	  nature	  is	  so	  constituted	  that	  it	  cannot	  honour	  a	  helpless	  man,	  although	  it	  can	  pity	  him;	  and	  even	   that	   it	   cannot	   do	   long,	   if	   the	   signs	   of	   power	   do	   not	   arise”	   (Frederick	  Douglass,	  cited	  in	  Patterson,	  13).	  Franz	  Fanon	  adds	  a	  similar	  sentiment:	  “Man	  is	  human	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  he	  tries	  to	  impose	  his	  existence	  on	  another	  man	  in	  order	  to	  be	  recognized	  by	  him”(1967,	  168).	  While	  I	  am	  certainly	  not	  going	  to	  argue	  with	  these	  men’s	  analysis	  of	  their	  own	  oppression	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘race’,	  it	  would	   appear	   that	   the	   common	   theme	   underlying	   these	   accounts	   is	   that	   of	   a	  racially	   subjugated	   masculinity	   which	   asserts	   itself	   by	   challenging	   the	   white	  masculine	  subject	  on	  its	  very	  own	  terms	  –	  accepting	  that	  human	  is	  only	  he	  who	  imposes	   himself	   on	   others	   and	   takes	   recognition	   by	   force.	   It	   recalls	   Andrea	  Dworkin’s	  argument	  that	  the	  privileging	  of	  masculinity	  transcends	  boundaries	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  I	  am	  not	  implying	  that	  autonomous	  existence	  cannot	  be,	  in	  some	  contexts,	  a	  valid	  political	  goal,	  but	  I	  am	  disputing	  the	  a	  priori	  assumption	  that	  it	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  through	  violent	  competition.	  237	  What	  this	  immediately	  implies	  to	  me	  is	  that	  whoever	  wants	  to	  be	  inside	  a	  social	  order	  that	  exclusively	  consists	  in	  competing	  over	  who	  is	  best	  at	  enforcing	  obedience	  through	  the	  imposition	  of	  his	  will	  on	  others	  would	  probably	  fit	  the	  description	  of	  a	  ‘sociopath’.	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ethnicity	  or	  ‘race’:	  “the	  internal,	  intraethnic	  contempt	  for	  women	  (i.e.	  non-­‐‑men)	  is	   apparent	   in	   victors	   and	   losers”	   (2000,	   xi).	   His	   inability	   to	   look	   past	   his	  masculine	  bias	  then	  also	  leads	  Patterson	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  astonishing	  conclusion	  that	  “before	  slavery	  people	  simply	  could	  not	  have	  conceived	  of	  the	  thing	  we	  call	  freedom”	  (340),	  and	  therefore,	  freedom	  is	  actually	  a	  result	  of	  slavery.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Patterson	  is	  generally	  oblivious	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  gender	  in	  the	   context	   of	   slavery,	   as	   he	   demonstrates	   in	   later	  work	   (2012),	   in	  which	   he	  argues	  that	  “slavery	  has	  always	  been	  a	  highly	  gendered	  relation	  of	  domination”	  involving	   a	   “complex	   interplay	   of	   economic	   and	   socio-­‐‑cultural	   factors”	   (1).	  Patterson	  rejects	  the	  view,	  taken	  e.g.	  by	  Bales	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012)	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  slavery	  in	  pre-­‐‑modern	  and	  in	  modern	  societies,	  and	  argues	  –	  based	  on	  his	  previous	  argument	   that	  slavery	   is	  best	  viewed	  as	  a	  relation	   of	   physical	   brute-­‐‑force	   domination	   –	   that	   on	   the	   contrary,	   there	   are	  strong	  continuities	  between	  ‘old’	  and	  ‘new’	  slavery	  particularly	  concerning	  the	  status	   of	   women.	   Since	   “slavery	   is	   no	   longer	   legally	   sanctioned,	   the	   closest	  approximation	  to	  traditional	  natal	  alienation	  are	  persons	  who	  find	  themselves	  illegally	  transported	  to	  foreign	  countries	  where	  they	  are	  fearful	  of	  seeking	  the	  protection	  of	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  state	  authorities	  and	  are	  isolated	  from	  familial	  and	  social	  ties”(2),	  and	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  trafficked	  persons	  are	  women,	  Patterson	   identifies	   the	   international	   sex	   trade,	   as	   well	   as	   trafficking	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   domestic	   servitude,	   as	   the	   predominant	   way	   in	   which	   the	  master/slave	   relation	   is	   contemporarily	   enacted.	   After	   critiquing	   Bales’	  distinction,	   Patterson	   presents	   extensive	   quantitative	   data	   from	   ‘pre-­‐‑modern’	  slave-­‐‑holding	  societies	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  single	  most	  prominent	  predictor	  of	   slavery	   is	   polygyny,	   indicating	   that	   “that	   the	   decisive	   factors	   determining	  trafficking	  and	  slavery	  in	  these	  societies	  was	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  women’s	  bodies,	  as	  sex	  objects,	  as	  concubines	  and	  as	  secondary	  wives	  where	  free	  women	  were	  relatively	  scarce	  or	  too	  expensive”	  (16).	  
Patterson	   then	   proceeds	   to	   relate	   these	   findings	   to	   data	   about	   contemporary	  human	   trafficking	   and	   especially	   trafficking	   into	   prostitution,	   carefully	  distinguishing	   between	   prostituted	   women	   who	   are	   under	   “the	   total,	   violent	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control	   of	   another	   person—a	  pimp	  or	  madam	  or	   other	   abuser-­‐‑-­‐‑	  who	   exploits	  them	  both	  economically	  and	  psychologically”	  (22),	  and	  “older	  career	  prostitutes	  and	   high-­‐‑end	   call-­‐‑girls”	   whom	   he	   counts	   as	   “independent	   sex	   workers	   who	  voluntarily	  chose	  this	  kind	  of	  work,	  keep	  their	  earnings	  and	  freely	  turn	  to	  other	  forms	   of	   livelihood	  when	   they	   choose”	   (ibid),	   a	   distinction	   that,	   as	   Patterson	  acknowledges,	  remains	  contested	  among	  both	  academics	  and	  activists	  (see	  e.g.	  Jeffreys,	  2002).	  Patterson	  then	  draws	  parallels	  between	  the	  traditional	  process	  of	  enslavement	  and	  the	   ‘recruitment’	  of	  “sex	  slaves”,	   including	  social	   isolation,	  rape	  and	  torture.	  Finally,	  he	  returns	  to	  the	  point	  made	  in	  his	  earlier	  work,	  that	  the	  slave	  –	  in	  this	  case	  the	  prostituted	  woman	  –	  suffers	  intense	  and	  intentional	  degradation	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  her	  abusers,	  and	  shows	  how	  this	  degradation	  serves	  to	  enhance	  the	  “sense	  of	  manly	  power	  and	  honorific	  pride	  of	  her	  pimp-­‐‑	  master”	  (27).	  Therefore,	  	  “like	  slaves	  of	  old	  the	  slave	  prostitute	  is	  an	  utterly	  dishonored	  and	  degraded	  person	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  free	  members	  of	  the	  states	  in	  which	  she	  is	  exploited”	  (ibid),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  her	  own	  estimation	  of	  herself.	  While,	  in	  contrast	  to	  his	  earlier	  work	  Patterson	  here	  adds	  the	  caveat	  that	  the	  slave’s	  degradation	  lies	  “in	  the	  eyes	  of	  free	  members	  of	  the	  states	  in	  which	  she	  is	  exploited”,	  it	  remains	  subject	  to	  further	  inquiry	  whether	  the	  traumatic	  shame	  the	  forcibly	  prostituted	  experience	  –	  as	  Patterson	  outlines	  –	  can	  or	  should	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  loss	  or	   lack	   of	   ‘honour’.	   As	   it	   were,	   Patterson’s	   own	   description	   of	   the	   toxic	  masculinity	  of	  pimps	  appears	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  (male)	  honour	  is	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  Despite	  his	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  gendered	  nature	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   exploitation,	   Patterson	   maintains	   that	   “the	   absolute	  degradation	  attached	  to	  slave	  status,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  slave	  is	  a	  person	  without	  honor,	  having	  no	  dignity	  that	  any	  free	  person	  is	  required	  to	  respect,	  and	  that	  this	  dishonor	  parasitically	  aggrandized	  the	  power	  and	  honor	  of	  the	  slave-­‐‑holder	  “	  (3),	  without	   however	   problematizing	   the	   concept	   of	   honour	   itself.	   His	   argument	  could	   therefore	   be	   interpreted	   as	   implying	   that	   a	   re-­‐‑balancing	   of	   the	  honour-­‐‑stakes,	  rather	  than	  a	  radical	  critique	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  honour	  as	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  masculinity,	  could	  provide	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  
Outside	   of	   Patterson’s	   treatment	   (see	   also	   Patterson,	   2004,	   1977)	   and	   the	  discussion	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  homelessness	  already	  mentioned,	  the	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concept	   has	   also	   been	   used	   by	   scholars	   in	   anthropology	   (Peter,	   2010),	   Social	  Psychology	  and	  Health	  Studies	  (Sexton,	  2011;	  Williams,	  2007;	  Whitehead,	  2001;	  Sweeting/Gilhooly,	  1992,	  1997;	  Dageid/Duckert,	  2008;),	  Sociology	  (Ouwerkerk	  et	   al.	   2005,	   Cacho,	   2012;	   Timmermans	   1998;	   Mulkay/Ernst,	   1991),	   feminist	  theory	  (Mills,	  2007;	  Card,	  2003),	  and	  history	  (Brown,	  2009,	  Mason,	  2003),	  among	  others.	  Judith	  Butler	  employs	  the	  concept	  in	  her	  discussion	  of	  vulnerability	  and	  ethics	  as	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  2,	  although,	  as	  Mills	  (2007)	  remarks,	  she	  departs	  from	  Patterson’s	  original	  formulation	  in	  so	  far	  as	  hers	  “entails	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  sociostructural	  logic	  of	  Patterson’s	  conception	  of	  social	  death	  as	  liminality	  to	  make	  social	  death	  a	  topological	  feature	  of	  subjectivation	  itself”	  (138)	  which,	  as	  I	   discuss	   in	   the	   literature	   review,	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   her	  Foucauldian	  conception	  of	  subjectivation	  as	  subjugation.	  For	   the	  discussion	  of	  social	  death	  in	  the	  context	  of	  homelessness,	  this	  latter	  argument	  may	  be	  of	  less	  relevance,	   as	   the	   social	   death	  of	   the	  homeless	   arguably	  does	  not	   result	   in	   the	  formation	   of	   a	   fixed,	   necessary	   ‘homeless	   subjectivity’,	   but	   rather,	   as	   in	  Patterson’s	  original	  formulation,	  a	  stripping-­‐‑away	  of	  the	  full	  moral	  status	  of	  the	  homeless	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ‘settled’	   population,	   and	   thus,	   their	   structural	  exclusion	  from	  the	  ethical	  relations	  that	  constitute	  ‘normal’	  society,	  manifesting	  in	  “a	  marked	  lack	  of	  safety	  in	  both	  public	  and	  private	  places”	  (Huey,	  2010,	  79).	  	  Patterson’s	   (and	  Fanon’s)	   focus	   on	   a	   recovery	   of	   ‘honour’	   as	   the	   only	   road	   to	  freedom	  appears	  to	  stem	  from	  a	  particular	  misreading	  of	  the	  opening	  position	  of	  
Lordship	  and	  Bondage.	  I	  make	  no	  claim	  to	  the	  ‘correct’	  interpretation	  of	  what	  the	  passage	   is	   ‘actually’	   about,	   since	   what	   it	   appears	   to	   describe	   is	   a	   self-­‐‑consciousness	  that	  gets	  in	  trouble	  with	  itself	  over	  the	  subject	  of	  self-­‐‑recognition,	  and	  any	  interpretation	  of	  it	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  real	  social	  relations	  is	  necessarily	  somewhat	  of	  a	  projection.	  However,	  since	  the	  story	  appears	  to	  function	  as	  a	  kind	  of	   Rorschach	   test	   for	   political	   critiques,	   I	   will	   in	   the	   following	   suggest	   an	  interpretation	  of	  my	  own,	  and	  argue	  that	   it	  can	  give	  us	  a	  conception	  of	   ‘social	  death’	  without	  having	  to	  resort	  to	  a	  concept	  such	  as	  ‘dishonour’.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  in	  the	   first	  meeting	  of	   the	   two	  self-­‐‑consciousnesses,	  both	  cannot	  be	  sure	  of	   their	  own	   existence	   and	   therefore	   have	   to	   fight	   each	   other	   to	   the	   death.	   However,	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Hegel	  also	  informs	  us	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  two	  combatants	  end	  up	  in	  this	  position	  is	   that	   they	  both	  operate	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   they	  are	  disembodied:	   “pure	  abstraction	  of	  self-­‐‑consciousness	  consists	  in	  showing	  itself	  as	  a	  pure	  negation	  of	  its	  objective	  form,	  or	  in	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  fettered	  to	  no	  determinate	  existence,	  that	   it	   is	   not	   bound	   at	   all	   by	   the	   particularity	   everywhere	   characteristic	   of	  existence	  as	  such,	  and	  is	  not	  tied	  up	  with	  life”	  (§187).	  Hegel	  here	  describes	  the	  problem	   of	   a	   consciousness	   that	   conceives	   of	   itself	   as	   pure	   abstraction,	   as	  disembodied	  res	  cogitans,	  not	  bound	  to	  mortal	  form.	  What	  the	  two	  want	  to	  prove	  to	  each	  other	  is	  therefore	  not	  their	  humanity,	  but	  precisely	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  
not	  human,	  that	  they	  are	   ‘immortal	  souls’,	  or	   ‘minds’	  as	  opposed	  to	   ‘bodies’238.	  	  They	  proceed	  to	  try	  and	  kill	  each	  other	  over	  who	  is	  the	  most	  abstract,	  and	  the	  consciousness	   who,	   through	   fear	   for	   its	   life,	   first	   realises	   that	   it	   is	   embodied	  
consciousness	  decides	  to	  yield	  and	  is	  thus	  ‘enslaved’.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  ‘struggle	  for	  recognition’	  is,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  it	  ends.	  It	  is	  over.	  Now,	  something	  new	  happens:	  the	  slave,	  in	  having	  accepted	  his	  embodiment,	  begins	  to	  labour	  on	  the	  ‘thing’,	  i.e.	  the	  external	  world,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  discovers	  his	  self	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  object:	  “Thus	  precisely	  in	  labour	  where	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  merely	  some	  outsider’s	  mind	  and	  ideas	  involved,	  the	  bondsman	  becomes	  aware,	  through	  this	  re-­‐‑discovery	  of	  himself	  by	  himself,	  of	  having	  and	  being	  a	  ‘mind	  of	  his	  own’”	  (§196).	  So	  what	  does	  this	  mean?	  	  I	  want	  to	  approach	  this	  question	  through	  Thomas	  Metzinger’s	  theory	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  mental	  representation,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  As	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  11,	  according	  to	  Metzinger	  brains	  operate	  by	  constructing	  a	  representational	  prototype	  of	   the	  whole	   ‘system’,	   called	   the	   ‘phenomenal	   self-­‐‑model’	  or	  PSM,	  which	  most	  people	  mean	  when	  they	  refer	  to	  their	  ‘selves’.	  Trauma	  can	   then	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   disruption	   of	   the	   brain’s	   ability	   to	   produce	   a	  coherent	  self-­‐‑model,	  and	  results	   in	  a	   fragmentation	  of	  cognitive	  experience.	   In	  this	  context,	  I	  have	  also	  mentioned	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  PMIR,	  the	  ‘phenomenal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  To	  add	  yet	  another	  interpretation,	  Lordship	  could	  therefore	  also	  be	  read	  as	  a	  subversive,	  tongue-­‐‑in-­‐‑cheek	  rendition	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  religious	  to	  a	  secular	  society	  –	  the	  illusion	  of	  the	  self	  as	  supernatural,	  immortal	  soul	  here	  leads	  to	  conflict,	  and	  true	  selfhood	  is	  only	  obtained	  by	  understanding	  that	  consciousness	  is	  embodied,	  and	  created	  in	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  with	  the	  material	  world.	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model	   of	   the	   intentionality	   relation’.	   Metzinger	   argues	   that	   “the	   experiential	  perspectivity	   of	   one’s	   own	   consciousness	   is	   constituted	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  phenomenal	   space	   is	   centered	   by	   a	   phenomenal	   self:	   it	   possesses	   a	   focus	   of	  experience,	   a	   point	   of	   view”	   (157).	   This	   point	   of	   view	   is	   the	   ‘arrow	   of	  intentionality’	  that	  connects	  the	  self	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  a	  self	  with	  a	  functioning	  PMIR	  is	  therefore	  a	  ‘self	  in	  the	  act	  of	  having	  a	  perspective’239.	  	  A	  PMIR	  is	  also	  a	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  ‘being	  someone’:	  “generally	  speaking,	  to	  become	  a	  true	  subject	  of	  experience	  you	  have	  to	  represent	  the	  world	  under	  a	  stable	  PMIR”	  (570).	  This	  kind	  of	  perspectivalness	  is	  not	  an	  all-­‐‑or-­‐‑nothing	  matter	  but	  occurs	  in	  degrees	  (572),	  i.e.	  a	  PMIR	  can	  be	  a	  
more	  or	  less	  stable	  relation	  to	  the	  world.	  How	  stable	  it	  is	  –	  and	  this	  is	  the	  crucial	  point	   for	   a	   discussion	   of	   ‘social	   death’	   –	   depends	   to	   a	   large	   degree	   on	  intersubjective	  affirmation	  that	  one	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  has	  a	  perspective:	  “a	  phenomenal	  reality	  as	  such	  becomes	  the	  more	  real	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  presence	  –	  the	  more	  agents	  recognizing	  one	  and	  interacting	  with	  one	  are	  contained	  in	  this	  reality.	  Phenomenologically,	  ongoing	  social	  cognition	  enhances	  both	  this	  reality	  and	  the	  self	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  ‘realness’”	  (365)	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  experience	  oneself	  as	  a	  subject	  i.e.	  “a	  model	  of	  the	  system	  as	  acting	  
and	  experiencing…as	  opposed	   to	  a	  mere	  phenomenal	   self”	   (159),	   other	  agents	  therefore	   have	   to	   affirm	   that	   one	   is	   indeed	   acting	   and	   experiencing.	   So	  what	  happens	   to	   a	   self-­‐‑model	  when	   it	   is	   confronted	  with	   others	  whose	   brains,	   like	  those	  of	  the	  participants	   in	  the	  MRI	  study	  above,	  activate	  the	  representational	  prototype	   for	   ‘rubbish’	   instead	   of	   that	   for	   ‘person’?	   This	   self-­‐‑model	   has	   just	  experienced	   itself	   as	   literally	  misrecognized	  as	   the	   sort	  of	   thing	   that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  PMIR	  –	  a	  mere	  object,	  a	  thing.	  From	  Metzinger’s	  account	  would	  follow	  that	  as	   a	   result,	   the	   phenomenal	   ‘realness’	   of	   the	   self-­‐‑model	   declines	   –	   the	   self	   is	  subjectively	   becoming	   ‘less	   real’	   to	   itself,	   it	   is	   ‘disappearing	   to	   itself’.	   In	   the	  extreme,	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  state	  of	  consciousness	  that	  is	  in	  clinical	  terms	  is	  called	  ‘depersonalisation’	  and	  in	  political	  terms	  ‘objectification’:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Metzinger	  alternately	  compares	  the	  PMIR	  to	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘agency’	  and	  then	  again’	  perspective’,	  implying	  that	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  involves	  both	  a	  direction	  and	  a	  ‘doing’.	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  “a	   transparent,	   conscious	   self-­‐‑model	   is	   in	   place,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   a	   subject-­‐‑model	  
anymore,	  only	  an	  object-­‐‑model.	  Something	  still	  exists,	  something	  that	  looks	  like	  the	  
model	  of	  a	  person,	  but	   something	   that	   is	  utterly	  unfamiliar,	  not	  alive,	  and	  not	  a	  
phenomenal	  self	  in	  the	  act	  of	  living,	  perceiving,	  attending,	  and	  thinking.	  The	  PSM	  
has	  lost	  the	  emotional	  layer.	  The	  PMIR	  in	  such	  a	  case	  would	  not	  be	  a	  model	  of	  a	  
subject-­‐‑object	   relation,	   but	   only	   one	   of	   an	   object-­‐‑object	   relation.	   It	   would	   not	  
constitute	   a	   phenomenal	   first-­‐‑person	   perspective,	   but	   rather	   a	   first-­‐‑object	  
perspective.	  The	  ‘first	  object’,	  for	  purely	  functional	  reasons,	  persists	  as	  the	  invariant	  
center	  of	  reality,	  because	  it	   is	  tied	  to	  an	  invariant	  source	  of	   internally	  generated	  
input.	  Phenomenally,	  this	  functional	  center	  is	  the	  place	  where	  things	  happen,	  but	  
all	  of	  them	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  center	  itself	  –	  are	  not	  owned.	  The	  phenomenal	  property	  
of	  ‘mineness’	  has	  disappeared”	  (460)	  As	  Metzinger	  notes,	  this	  extreme	  loss	  of	  phenomenal	  subjectivity	  is	  the	  farthest	  outlier	  on	  a	  spectrum	  of	  depersonalisation:	   “human	  beings	  can	  consciously	  be	  
someone	   to	   many	   different	   degrees,	   and	   they	   can	   also	   lose	   this	   property	  altogether	  without	   losing	   conscious	   experience	   as	   such”	   (438).	  While	   a	   single	  instant	   of	   being	   objectified	   will	   thus	   not	   lead	   to	   a	   complete	   extinction	   of	  phenomenal	  subjecthood240	  as	  described	  above,	  from	  Metzinger’s	  account	  would	  follow	  that	  continued	  and	  exclusive	  misrecognition	  as	  a	  ‘thing’	  could	  be	  likely	  to	  cause	  a	  person’s	  brain	  to	  produce	  a	  self-­‐‑model	  that	  has	  lost	  its	  personhood	  and	  is	  reduced	  to	  ‘phenomenal	  bare	  life’	  –	  being	  treated	  like	  a	  thing	  has	  then	  caused	  the	  person	  to	  become	  a	  thing	  in	  their	  own	  perception.	  	  To	  take	  ‘social	  death’	  to	  mean	  just	  being	  dead	  to	  the	  social	  order	  therefore	  implies	  that	  one	  is	  speaking	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  are	  still	  part	  of	  this	  order,	  declaring	  a	  body	  ‘dead	  matter’	  since	  it	  is	  not	  recognized	  as	  a	  living	  being.	  Seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  ‘dead’,	  ‘social	  death’	  implies	  being	  literally	  cognitively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Although	  even	  intermittent	  objectification	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  cause	  a	  disruption	  to	  the	  self-­‐‑model,	  which	  manifests	  in	  symptoms	  of	  depression,	  anxiety	  and	  a	  subjective	  experience	  of	  ‘self-­‐‑objectification’.	  For	  example,	  numerous	  studies	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  have	  confirmed	  a	  link	  between	  experiences	  of	  objectification	  and	  negative	  self-­‐‑perception	  among	  women:	  street	  harassment	  “functions	  to	  socialize	  girls	  and	  women	  to,	  at	  some	  level,	  treat	  themselves	  as	  objects	  to	  be	  looked	  at	  and	  evaluated”	  (Fredrickon/Roberts,	  1997,	  177)	  and	  can	  therefore	  result	  in	  negative	  mental	  health	  outcomes	  such	  as	  depression	  and	  PTSD	  (Street	  et	  al,	  2007,	  see	  also:	  Bowman,	  1993;	  Fairchild/Rudman,	  2008;	  Sullivan	  et	  al,	  2010;	  Rajoura	  et	  al,	  2012)	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extinguished	  through	  the	  invisible	  violence	  of	  social	  relations.	  In	  legal	  terms,	  a	  ‘social	  death’,	  i.e.	  a	  death	  that	  involves	  the	  participation	  of	  more	  than	  one	  person,	  is	  usually	  called	  ‘murder’,	  or	  at	  least	  ‘manslaughter’	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  most	  people	  do	  not	   simply	   die	   a	   symbolic	   ‘social	   death’	   all	   on	   their	   own,	   ‘social	   murder’	   or	  ‘cognitive	   murder’	   would	   perhaps	   be	   more	   appropriate.	   It	   results	   in	   the	  experience	  of	  a	  self	   that	  has	   lost	   the	  ability	   to	  represent	   ‘itself	  as	   in	   the	  act	  of	  experiencing’,	   and	   thus,	   its	   possibility	   to	   relate	   to	   the	  world	   as	   someone,	   as	   a	  person	  with	  a	  unique	  perspective	  –	  this	  self	  stops	  being	  a	  subject	  and	  develops	  something	   that	   could	   be	   described	   as	   ‘object	   consciousness’.	   This	   is	   also	   the	  condition	  of	  Hegel’s	  ‘slave’	  after	  his	  tussle	  with	  the	  Master.	  The	  ‘fear	  of	  death’	  that	  has	   reminded	   the	   slave	   of	   his	   embodiment	   has	   also	   disrupted	   his	   previous	  experience	   of	   his	   self,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   he	   has	   temporarily	   lost	   his	   ability	   to	  conceive	  of	  himself	  as	  coherent:	  	  “For	  this	  consciousness	  was	  not	  in	  peril	  and	  fear	  for	  this	  element	  or	  that,	  nor	  for	  this	  
or	  that	  moment	  of	  time,	  it	  was	  afraid	  for	  its	  entire	  being;	  it	  felt	  the	  fear	  of	  death,	  
the	  sovereign	  master.	  It	  has	  been	  in	  that	  experience	  melted	  to	  its	  inmost	  soul,	  has	  
trembled	  throughout	  its	  every	  fibre,	  and	  all	  that	  was	  fixed	  and	  steadfast	  has	  quaked	  
within	   it.	   This	   complete	   perturbation	   of	   its	   entire	   substance,	   this	   absolute	  
dissolution	  of	  all	  its	  stability	  into	  fluent	  continuity,	  is,	  however,	  the	  simple,	  ultimate	  
nature	   of	   self-­‐‑consciousness,	   absolute	   negativity,	   pure	   self-­‐‑referent	   existence”	   (§	  194)	  	  ‘Pure,	   self-­‐‑referent	   existence’	   is	   the	   experiental	   state	  of	   a	   self	   that	  has	   lost	   its	  subjectivity	  and	  is	  thrown	  back	  on	  the	  most	  basic	  representation	  of	  itself	  in	  the	  act	  of	  existing,	  the	  ‘empty’	  perspective	  of	  the	  ‘first	  object’.	  It	  is	  still	  there,	  but	  it	  is	  no	   longer	   somebody,	   since	   “full-­‐‑blown	   conscious	   experience	   –	   phenomenal	  subjectivity	  in	  a	  philosophically	  interesting	  sense	  –	  is	  more	  than	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  conscious	  self,	  and	  it	  is	  much	  more	  than	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  a	  world.	  It	  results	  from	  the	  dynamic	  interplay	  between	  this	  self	  and	  the	  world,	  as	  situated	  in	  a	  lived,	  embodied	  present”	  (Metzinger,	  569).	  If	  the	  world	  does	  not	  affirm	  that	  one	  is	  a	  subject	  but	  communicates	  that	  one	  is	  an	  object,	  the	  connection	  between	  ‘self’	  and	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‘world’	   is	   severed,	   and	   the	   experience	   of	   living,	   embodied	   present	   turns	   into	  absence,	  into	  ‘cognitive	  death’.	  So	   how	   does	   Hegel’s	   slave	   return	   from	   the	   dead?	   Not	   by	   trying	   to	   shake	  recognition	  out	  of	  the	  master,	  but,	  as	  Hegel	  informs	  us,	  through	  his	  labour,	  i.e.	  “in	  fashioning	  the	  thing,	  self-­‐‑existence	  comes	  to	  be	  felt	  explicitly	  as	  his	  own	  proper	  being,	  and	  he	  attains	  the	  consciousness	  that	  he	  himself	  exists	  in	  its	  own	  right	  and	  on	  its	  own	  account”	  (§	  196)	  The	  slave	  therefore	  finds	  himself	  by	  directing	  himself	  
at	   the	  world	   as	   object,	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	   rediscovers	   that	   he	   is	   not	   a	   thing	   but	  someone	  with	  a	  unique	  perspective:	  “phenomenal	  subjectivity…	  is	  the	  moment	  in	   which	   the	   system	   experiences	   itself	   as	   directed	   at	   a	   possible	   object	   of	  knowledge,	   an	   action	   goal,	   or	   a	   perceptual	   object”	   (Metzinger,	   568).	   In	   other	  words,	  through	  his	  work	  the	  slave	  re-­‐‑creates	  himself	  as	  a	  subject	  because	  in	  the	  act	  of	  ‘work’,	  i.e.	  of	  causing	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  world,	  he	  becomes	  real	  to	  himself	  –	  he	  re-­‐‑creates	  his	  phenomenal	  subjectivity	  in	  something	  that	  could	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘externally	  mediated	  autogenesis’.	  ‘Autogenesis’	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  slave	  creates	  his	  experience	  of	  himself	  as	  an	  actor	  through	  his	  own	  constituent	  act	  –	  ‘fashioning	  the	  thing’.	  He	  is,	  so	  to	  speak,	  no	  longer	  ‘feckless’,	  but	  he	  has	  precisely	  discovered	  himself	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  having	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  world.	  But	  this	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   only	   possible	   through	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   external	  world	   	   (the	   ‘thing’)	   that	   feeds	  back	   to	   the	  slave	   that	  he	  has	   just	  acted,	   i.e.	   it	   is	  ‘externally	  mediated’.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  slave’s	  subjectivity	  is	  not	  exclusively	  ‘self-­‐‑generated’	  nor	  is	  it	  exclusively	  ‘other-­‐‑generated’,	  but	  is	  conceived	  from	  the	  interaction	  between	  self	  and	  world.	  The	  ‘thing’	  that	  gives	  the	  slave	  back	  to	  himself	  can	  be	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  which	  he	  can	  relate	  himself	  to	  “as	  currently	   being	   a	   subject	   of	   experience,	   as	   currently	   being	   an	   agent,	   bodily,	  attentional,	   or	   cognitive”	   (576).	   	   His	   constituent	   act	   may	   not	   be	   any	   more	  structured	   than	   John	  Holloway’s	   “in	   the	   beginning	   is	   the	   scream.	  We	   scream”	  (2002,	  1).	  In	  the	  first	  instant,	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  it	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  world	  and	   that	   the	   world	   is	   thus	   ‘fashioned’	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   it	   confirms	   that	  somebody	   has	   just	   screamed,	   and	   thus	   a	   self-­‐‑world	   relation	   is	   established.	  However,	   in	   order	   for	   this	   relation	   to	   become	   stable	   and	   ‘real’,	   it	   has	   to	   be	  affirmed	  and	  reflected	  by	  other	  people:	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“Ongoing	  social	  cognition	  enhances	  both	  this	  reality	  and	  the	  self	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  
‘realness’.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  a	  basic	  underlying	  content	  common	  
to	   all	   such	   states…we	   could	   call	   this	   the	   phenomenal	   ‘I-­‐‑Thou	   structure’:	   the	  
conscious	  experience	  of	  currently	  being	  confronted	  with	  another	  conscious	  agent,	  
the	  phenomenal	  representation	  of	  currently	  interacting	  with	  a	  being	  possessing	  a	  
genuine	  phenomenal	   first-­‐‑person	  perspective	   itself	   -­‐‑	   thereby	   constituting	  a	   first-­‐‑
person	  plural	  perspective”.	  (365)	  The	  term	  ‘I-­‐‑Thou’	  structure	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Martin	  Buber	  (1970),	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  previous	  discussion	  we	  could	  also	  recognise	  in	  this	  this	  phenomenal	  structure	  what	  we	  have	  called	  the	  ‘pattern	  of	  recognition’	  –	  a	  prototype	  of	  self-­‐‑world	  relation	  in	  which	  self	  and	  other	  treat	  one	  another	  as	  subjects,	  i.e.	  entities	  who	  have	  a	  unique	  perspective	  and	  experience.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  we	  have	  seen	  a	  number	  of	  practical	  examples	  of	  this	  principle	  –	  the	  HUB	  occupation,	  in	  giving	   people	   an	   opportunity	   to	   be	   treated	   like	   equals	   in	   a	   safe	   environment,	  counteracted	   the	   experience	   of	   ‘social	   death’	   by	   re-­‐‑affirming	   the	   moral	  personhood	  of	   everyone	   involved,	   the	   fact	   that	  people	  mattered	  because	   they	  were	   people.	   In	   the	   same	   way,	   squatting	   as	   a	   whole	   worked	   by	   affirming	  intentionality	   –	   in	   the	   transformation	   of	   a	   homeless	   person	   into	   a	   squatter	  through	   the	  constituent	  act	  of	   squatting,	  but	  also	   through	   the	  affirmation	  of	  a	  common	  goal	  and	  a	  shared	  perspective.	  The	  feminist	  movement	  has	  known	  this	  principle	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   and	   it	   is	   called	   ‘consciousness-­‐‑raising’	   for	   a	   reason.	  Brace	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  the	  same	  concept	  of	  ‘social	  death’	  that	  attaches	  to	  slaves	  also	  was	   and	   is	   applicable	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   women,	   and	   argues	   that	   in	   the	  context	  of	  traditional	  marriage,	  “the	  very	  being	  and	  existence	  of	  the	  woman	  is	  suspended…or	  entirely	  merged	  and	  incorporated	  in	  that	  of	  the	  husband”	  (191)	  and	  that	  women	  thus	  became	  socially	  ‘invisible’	  or	  simply	  “ceased	  to	  exist”	  (190).	  The	   cognitive	   corollary	   of	   this	   status	   was,	   for	   may	   women,	   that	   the	   social	  extinction	   of	   their	   independence	  was	  mirrored	   in	   a	   experienced	   extinction	   of	  their	  selfhood	  –	   the	   ‘social	  death’	  of	  women	  qua	  women	  therefore	  means	   that	  performing	   ‘femininity’	   in	   itself	   becomes	   an	   auto-­‐‑aggressive	   disappearing	   act,	  the	   coerced	   and	   self-­‐‑re-­‐‑enforced	   extinction	   of	   the	   subject-­‐‑consciousness	   of	   a	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female	  body,	  so	  that	  this	  body	  can	  be	  used	  by	  others.	  Feminist	  consciousness-­‐‑raising	   therefore	   has	   precisely	   the	   function	   to	   rekindle	   selfhood,	   by	  mutually	  affirming	   one	   another’s	   experiencing	   and	   acting.	   Although	   just	   one	   Hegel-­‐‑interpretation	  among	  many,	  if	  there	  is	  anything	  to	  my	  description	  of	  this	  ‘struggle	  for	  personhood’,	  then	  through	  perceiving	  of	  each	  other,	  and	  treating	  each	  other,	  as	  subjects,	  people	  literally,	  physically,	  enable	  one	  another’s	  brains	  to	  produce	  the	  experience	   of	   subjecthood,	   countering	   ‘social	  death’	  with	  a	   ‘social	   spark	  of	  life’241.	  	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  slave	  would	  now	  once	  again	  turn	  around	  and	  once	   again	   challenge	   the	  master	   to	   a	   duel	   of	   wills.	   Their	   initial	   struggle	   was	  motivated	  by	  negating	  death,	  through	  proving	  that	  one	  does	  not	  fear	  it,	  but	  this	  negation	  is	  ultimately	  fuelled	  by	  fear	  –	  the	  master’s	  delusional	  ‘invulnerability’	  is	  a	  desperate	  denial	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  body	  is	  mortal.	  The	  slave,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	   experienced	  his	   embodiment	   through	   vulnerability	   and	   fear,	   and	   has	   thus	  discovered	  himself	  as	  mortal	  and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  order.	  He	  can	  now	  relate	  to	  embodied	  others	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  pass	  on	  the	  spark	  of	  recognition.	  The	  slave	  may	  perhaps	  even	  have	  discovered	  that	  she	  is	  a	  woman	  –	  women,	  after	  all,	  have	  always	   been	   suspicious	   of	   being	   ‘the	   ones	   with	   the	   bodies’	   (see	   Prokhovnik,	  2002),	   and	   proving	   that	   one	   is	   ‘not	   bound	   up	  with	   life’,	   like	  Hegel’s	   two	   self-­‐‑consciousnesses,	  is	  thus	  once	  again	  a	  way	  to	  prove,	  that	  ‘honour’	  lies	  in	  not	  being	  one	   of	   ‘them’.	   Either	   way,	   accepting	   her	   body	   and	   its	   needs,	   and	   finding	  acceptance	  of	   it	   in	  others	  –	  what	   is	  more,	   finding	  needs	  met	  and	  vulnerability	  protected	  –	  has	   led	   the	  slave	   from	  delusion	   to	   truth	  (in	   the	  sense	  of	   ‘practical	  adequacy’).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  former	  bondsmen	  and	  -­‐‑women	  may	  not	  have	  to	  fight	  the	  master	  in	  whichever	  guise	  he	  appears,	  but	  now	  they	  will	  be	  fighting	  for	  their	  humanity,	  not	  its	  negation.	  Such	  persons	  might	  then	  really	  “aspire	  to	  no	  honour”,	  and	  they	  might	  very	  well	  end	  up	  standing	  “in	  a	  real	  sense	  outside	  the	  social	  order”	  (Patterson,	  79),	  but	   to	  call	   them	   ‘dishonoured’	   is	   to	   look	  at	   them	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  master	  –	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  ‘slave’,	  the	  rules	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  I	  like	  to	  think	  of	  this	  as	  the	  ‘phenomenal	  model	  of	  the	  solidarity	  relation’.	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have	  changed.	  	  The	  rules	  have	  also	  changed	   for	  squatters	  –	  since	  Weatherley’s	   law	  came	   into	  force	  on	  September	  1st	  2012,	  squatting	  in	  residential	  properties	  is	  now	  a	  criminal	  offence,	  punishable	  with	  up	  to	  6	  months	  in	  prison	  or	  a	  fine	  up	  to	  GBP	  5000.00.	  Immediately	  after	  the	  law	  was	  implemented,	  an	  example	  was	  made	  of	  21-­‐‑year	  old	  Alex	  Haigh242	  and	  a	  Bristol	  man	  only	   identified	  as	   ‘Henry’,	  who	  were	  both	  sentenced	  to	  several	  months	  in	  prison	  for	  occupying	  an	  empty	  building.	  Just	  three	  weeks	  into	  September,	  the	  Squatters	  Legal	  Network	  reported:	  	  	  “There	  have	  definitely	  been	  arrests	  in	  Brighton	  and	  Bristol,	  but	  most	  other	  police	  
interventions	  have	  ended	  either	  with	  the	  police	  being	  persuaded	  that	  no	  offence	  has	  
taken	  place,	  or	  in	  the	  police	  persuading	  the	  occupiers	  that	  they	  should	  get	  out	  or	  
else	   be	   nicked.	   In	   one	   case	   this	   happened	   despite	   the	   fact	   the	   occupiers	   were	  
licensees,	  or	  at	   least	   licensees	  holding	  over,	  and	  the	   fact	  that	  some	  of	   the	  people	  
threatened	  with	  arrest	  were	  not	  living	  at	  the	  property	  and	  so	  not	  committing	  any	  
offence.	  The	  police	   then	  handed	  the	  property	  over	   to	   someone	  with	  no	  apparent	  
right	  to	  the	  place,	  although	  he	  reckoned	  he	  did”243	  	  Since	   then,	   several	   squatters	   were	   acquitted	   or	   convictions	   overturned	   on	  appeal,	   since	   the	  wording	   of	   the	   law	  makes	   the	   specific	   offence	   of	   ‘squatting’	  difficult	  to	  prove	  –	  prosecutors	  have	  to	  show	  that	  a	  person	  is	  ‘living	  or	  intending	  to	   live’	   in	  a	  squat,	  which,	  as	  a	  squatter’s	  organisation	  remarked,	   is	  “difficult	   to	  prove…without	  a	  major	  surveillance	  operation”244.	  The	  law	  has	  thus	  proven	  to	  be,	  in	  practice,	  largely	  ‘unworkable	  and	  unenforceable’	  (ibid),	  and	  squatters	  have	  developed	  a	  number	  of	   successful	   strategies	   to	   fight	   convictions.	  Additionally,	  squatting	  commercial	  properties	  –	  shops,	  pubs,	  etc.	  –	  is	  not	  yet	  covered	  by	  the	  law,	  although	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  Mike	  Weatherley	  has	  tabled	  a	  new	  early	  day	  motion	   in	   Parliament	   to	   make	   squatting	   in	   commercial	   buildings	   a	   criminal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐‑england-­‐‑london-­‐‑19753414	  243	  https://network23.org/squatterslegalnetwork/2012/09/23/the-­‐‑first-­‐‑3-­‐‑weeks-­‐‑of-­‐‑s144/	  244	  http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2013/11/513676.html	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offence,	  too.	  In	  2013,	  a	  person	  was	  charged	  with	  ‘threatening	  and	  intimidating	  behaviour’	  in	  Brighton	  Magistrates	  Court	  for	  publicly	  calling	  Mike	  Weatherley	  a	  ‘coward’	   –	   the	   case	   was,	   however,	   dismissed,	   and	   despite	   all	   other	   legal	  challenges,	  at	   least	  saying	  that	  Mike	  Weatherley	   is,	   in	   fact,	  a	  coward	  therefore	  remains	  entirely	  within	  the	  law.	  	  	  Squatting	   has	   not	   disappeared,	   it	   has	   just	   become	   more	   difficult	   and	   more	  dangerous.	   It	  would	  be	  unreasonable	   to	  assume	  that	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  a	   ‘space	  crisis’	   squatting	   is	   likely	   to	  decrease	  purely	  because	   it	   is	   prosecuted,	   and	  one	  inevitably	   wonders	   why	   lawmakers	   would	   assume	   it	   would.	   Watching	   the	  parliamentary	   debate	   on	   section	   144	   of	   the	   Legal	   Aid,	   Sentencing	   and	  Punishment	   of	   Offenders	   Bill	   on	   television,	   I	   got	   the	   impression	   that	  considerations	  never	  went	  this	  far	  –	  the	  law	  was	  pushed	  through	  in	  a	  late-­‐‑night	  session,	  stapled	  to	  the	  back	  of	  another,	  no	  less	  controversial	  bill,	  and	  despite	  the	  efforts	  of	   two	   female	  MPs	   to	  make	  clear	   to	   their	  colleagues	  what	  was	  actually	  being	  debated,	  interest	  in	  the	  issue	  appeared	  to	  be	  drowned	  out	  by	  the	  interest	  to	  finally	  make	  it	  home	  and	  go	  to	  bed.	  What	  has	  been	  achieved	  by	  the	  law	  is	  next	  to	  nothing	  –	  homeless	  numbers	  are	  still	  skyrocketing,	  people	  are	  still	  squatting,	  and	  the	  Conservative’s	  core	  voters	  –	  private	  landlords	  –	  are	  still	  picking	  up	  the	  tab	  for	  decades	  of	  failed	  housing	  policy,	  by	  finding	  the	  very	  homeless	  people	  the	  state	  has	  abandoned	  in	  their	  own	  properties	  (it	  can	  only	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  decades	  now	  before	  they	  realise	  this).	  One	  squatter’s	  group	  remarked:	  	  	  “In	   the	  main,	   it	   seems	   that	   a	   standoff	   has	   developed	  where	   the	  police	   are	   fairly	  
reluctant	  to	  charge	  people,	  but	  will	  use	  it	  to	  evict	  under	  threat	  of	  arrest,	  especially	  
when	  the	  squatters	  are	  seen	  by	  them	  as	  easy	  targets.	  This	  might	  then	  explain	  why	  
41	   out	   of	   the	   95	   people	   arrested	   for	   squatting	   by	   the	  Metropolitan	   police	  were	  
Romanian	  (who	  perhaps	  but	  not	  necessarily	  were	  inexperienced	  squatters	  and/or	  
could	  not	  speak	  English	  very	  well	  to	  assert	  their	  rights)”245	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The	  standoff	  continues,	  as	  does	  the	  ‘space	  crisis’,	  although	  as	  of	  spring	  2015,	  a	  number	  of	  grassroots	  campaign	  and	   large	  public	  protests	  have	  begun	  to	  draw	  attention	   to	   homelessness	   and	   precarious	   housing	   in	   general.	   As	   the	   above	  squatter’s	  group	  puts	   it:	   “can	  we	  mobilise	  and	   take	  action	  again?	  Well	   it’s	  not	  going	   to	   be	   easy,	   but	   it	   doesn’t	   seem	   impossible.	   Putting	   people	   in	   prison	   for	  occupying	  empty	  property	  won’t	  help	  solve	  the	  housing	  crisis.	  We’ll	  have	  to	  solve	  it	  ourselves”.	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Conclusion	  	  
	  
And	  a	  beautiful	  world	  we	  live	  in,	  when	  it	  is	  
possible,	  and	  when	  many	  other	  such	  things	  are	  
possible,	  and	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  done	  -­‐‑	  done,	  
see	  you!	  -­‐‑	  under	  that	  sky	  there,	  every	  day	  Charles	  Dickens,	  A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Cities	  
	  	  I	  did	  not	  hear	  from	  Gavin	  for	  over	  two	  years	  after	  I	  left	  Bristol.	  There	  had	  been	  some	   strong	   words,	   nothing	   that	   would	   break	   a	   friendship	   necessarily,	   but	  enough	  not	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  phone	  and	  ring	  each	  other	  for	  a	  while.	  In	  retrospect,	  Gavin’s	  criticism	  –	  not	  the	  one	  that	  I	  was	  dabbling	  in	  poverty	  without	  good	  reason,	  but	  the	  later	  one	  that	  I	  was	  getting	  somewhat	  proficient	  at	  territorial	  dominance	  myself	  –	  had	  been	  completely	  warranted,	  and	  (having	  straightened	  myself	  out)	  I	  was	  glad	  to	  hear	  from	  him.	  There	  was	  much	  catching	  up	  to	  do,	  and	  two	  weeks	  later	  I	  found	  myself	  in	  Gavin’s	  living	  room	  in	  Bristol,	  reminiscing	  about	  the	  old	  days.	  He	  had	  moved	  to	  a	  flat	  in	  Montpellier	  with	  his	  partner,	  situated	  in	  exactly	  the	   kind	   of	   building	   an	   ex-­‐‑squatter	  would	   pick:	   thick,	   solid	  walls	   and	   double-­‐‑glazing.	   I	  remembered	  Gavin’s	  old	  home	  in	  Easton	  –	  the	  holes	   in	  the	  walls	  and	  ceilings	   were	   so	   big	   that	   somebody	   had	   stuck	   the	   entire	   leg	   of	   a	   mannequin	  through	  one	  of	   them,	   and	   the	  window	   in	  Gavin’s	   bedroom	  had	  never	   shut.	  He	  seemed	  much	  happier	  now,	  having	  managed	  to	  get	  a	  job	  and	  some	  money,	  and	  calmer	  than	  I	  remembered	  him.	  Gavin	  was	  amazed	  that	  I	  was	  still	  doing	  ‘that	  PhD’,	  even	  when	  I	  told	  him	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  writing	  but	  the	  thinking	  that	  took	  so	  long.	  When	   I	   told	  him	  about	   the	  part	   in	  which	  he	   features,	   and	   recounted	   the	   story	  about	  the	  argument	  that	  started	  my	  argument	  -­‐‑	  “So	  my	  point	  is:	  you	  were	  pissed	  off	  because	  I	  was	  squatting	  when	  I	  didn’t	  have	  to,	  whereas	  you	  had	  no	  choice”	  –	  his	  face	  lit	  up	  and	  he	  nearly	  jumped	  out	  of	  his	  chair,	  shouting	  “Yes!	  Yes!	  Yes!”	  and	  pointing	   at	   me.	   I	   was	   genuinely	   impressed	   at	   what	   effect	   the	   attempt	   at	  understanding	  somebody	  can	  have	  –	  and	  it	  only	  took	  me	  four	  years	  and	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  100.000	  words	  of	  writing	  to	  get	  there.	  	  	  My	   discussion	   has	   moved	   around	   in	   somewhat	   of	   a	   circle	   –	   from	   the	   initial	  problem	  of	  a	  cognitive	  distortion	  in	  chapter	  one	  we	  have	  returned	  to	  another	  one	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in	  the	  last.	  I	  will	  briefly	  re-­‐‑capitulate	  the	  steps	  that	  have	  brought	  us	  this	  far,	  and	  then	  see	  what	  conclusions	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  this.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  initial	  cognitive	  distortion	  I	  have	  discussed	  –	  the	  one	  that	  made	  me	  blind	  to	  what	  Gavin	  saw	   in	   my	   behaviour	   –	   stemmed	   from	   a	   particular	   construction	   of	   the	  ethnographic	   ‘field’	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   ‘morally	   neutral	   zone’,	   in	   which	   the	  anthropologist	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  actor	  who	  is	  by	  definition	  not	  affected	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  his/her	  respondents.	  This	  factual	  or	  imagined	  disaffectedness	  leads	  to	  a	  cognitive	  distortion,	  because	  it	  removes	  an	  element	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  social	  that	  fundamentally	  influences	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  ‘native’,	  namely	  that	  what	  is	  going	  on	  matters	  to	  oneself	  because	  of	  its	  potential	  to	  cause	  flourishing	  or	  suffering,	  i.e.	  because	  one	  is	  an	  embodied	  and	  thus	  vulnerable	  actor.	  	  	  The	  immediate	  experience	  of	  embodiment	  stems	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  need	  for	  certain	  things	  –	  food,	  air	  and,	  importantly,	  space.	  Since	  we	  are	  spatial	  beings,	  ‘safe	  space’,	   i.e.	   the	   undisturbed	   spatial	   experience	   of	   the	   body,	   and	   of	   the	   body’s	  embeddedness	   in	   ‘outside	   space’,	   is	   an	   immediate	   survival	   requirement,	   and	   its	  absence	   is	   a	   problem	   of	   absolutely	   vital	   importance.	   Mutually	   recognising	   one	  another	   as	   a	   being	   for	   whom	   this	   matters	   –	   a	   being	   who	   is,	   in	   this	   regard,	  vulnerable,	   who	   can	   suffer	   –	   is	   thus	   the	   basis	   for	  what	  we	   have	   referred	   to	   as	  recognition.	  Recognition	  was	  defined,	  with	  Honneth,	  as	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  one	   another	   as	   moral	   subjects	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   shared	   ability	   to	   suffer.	  Misrecognition,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  another	  is	  not	  considered	  a	  subject	  but	  an	  object,	  and	  thus	  not	  a	  moral	  agent.	  	  	  We	   have	   then	   discussed	   some	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   literature	   has	   treated	  homelessness,	   and	  pointed	  out	   some	  difficulties	   in	  defining	  what	   it	   is	   and	  what	  causes	   it.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   this	   step,	   I	   have	   also	   discussed	   a	   Critical	   Realist	  framework,	  not	  only	  as	   the	  meta-­‐‑theoretical	  position	  underlying	   this	   thesis,	  but	  also	   as	   the	   epistemological	   position	   that	   is	   best	   suited	   to	   overcome	   the	   in-­‐‑built	  cognitive	  and	  ethical	  distortions	  of	  both	  positivism	  and	  strong	  subjectivism.	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From	   the	   consideration	   of	   ethics	   as	   about	   bodies	   we	   have	   then	   turned	   to	   a	  discussion	  of	  how	  ethics	  gets	  into	  bodies.	  Drawing	  on	  anthropology,	  psychoanalysis	  and	  cognitive	  science,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  embodied	  ethics	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  relational	  patterns,	  which,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  representational	  prototypes	  or	  ‘object	   relations’	   are	   at	   the	   same	   time	   embodied	   and	   ‘en-­‐‑minded’.	   Drawing	   on	  psychoanalysis,	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	   example	   of	   ‘boarding	   school	   survivors’	   to	  show	  how	  a	  process	  of	  socialisation	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  manufacture	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  self,	  which,	  due	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  relational	  patterns	  it	  has	  internalised,	  is	  well	  suited	   to	   serve	   in	   the	   territorial	   interests	   of	   Empire.	   Such	   a	   self	   structures	  relationships	  spatially	  through	  metaphors	  of	  ‘inside	  and	  outside’,	  characterised	  by	  a	  dynamic	  of	  splitting	  and	  projection	  that	  establishes	  control	  through	  exclusion	  and	  internment.	  	  	  I	  have	  then	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  the	  embodied	  relational	  patterns	  I	  have	  described	   come	   to	   structure	   physical	   and	   social	   space.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	  consists	   in	   arranging	   the	  material	   configuration	   of	   space	   in	   a	  way	   that	   reflects	  belonging,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  consists	  in	  particular	  social	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  ‘Safe	  Space	  policies’.	  In	  discussing	  the	  logic	  of	  ‘Safe	  Spaces’,	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  reflect	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  vulnerability,	  which	  can	  be	  assigned	  in	  dynamic	  and	  flexible	  ways.	  Based	  on	  this,	  I	  have	  identified	  ‘safe	  space’	   and	   ‘secure	   space’	   as	   two	   possible	   spatial	   configurations,	   and	   compared	  them	  to	  the	  different	  models	  of	  spatial	  selfhood	  suggested	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Hobbes	  and	  Winstanley.	  Discussing	  the	  logic	  of	  ‘secure	  space’	  as	  the	  space	  of	  a	  territorial	  self,	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  overlap	  of	  this	  concept	  with	  both	  dominant	  masculinity	  and	   ideas	   of	   racial	   superiority,	   resulting	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   racialised	   and	  gendered	  ‘spatial	  others’	  through	  a	  dual	  strategy	  of	  exclusion	  and	  internment.	  	  	  In	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   HUB	   occupation,	   we	   have	   seen	   how	   these	   two	   spatial	  ‘modes’	  can	  come	  to	  clash.	  The	  logic	  of	  creating	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  for	  those	  affected	  by	  homelessness	   was	   here	   confronted	   with	   a	   political	   agenda	   that	   reflected	   a	  particular	   attitude	   to	   territoriality	   as	   it	   is	   typical	   for	   conservative	   thought,	  understood	  as	  an	  ideology	  of	  power.	  We	  have	  looked	  at	  some	  ways	  that	  the	  built	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environment	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  conservative	  understanding	  of	  ‘property’	  on	  the	  other,	  are	  both	  informed	  by	  territoriality	  and	  the	  logic	  of	   ‘secure	  space’,	  and	  have	  thus	  informed	  British	  housing	  policy	  since	  Thatcher.	  We	  have	  then	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  territorial	  strategies	  of	  aggressors,	  particularly	  the	  state,	  and	  finally	  arrived	  at	  the	  notion	  of	  spatial	  abjection	  as	  ‘social	  death’.	  ‘Social	  death’,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  describes	  not	  just	  a	  social	  phenomenon,	  but	  importantly,	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  cognitively	  extinguished	  though	  objectification.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  have	  finally	  come	  full	  circle	  and	  ended	  where	  we	  started:	  with	  a	  cognitive	  distortion.	  	  	  Our	   trajectory	   therefore	   resembles	   what	   cognitive	   scientist	   Douglas	   Hofstadter	  calls	  a	  ‘strange	  loop’:	  	  “not	   a	   physical	   circuit	   but	   an	   abstract	   loop	   in	   which,	   in	   the	   series	   of	   stages	   that	  
constitute	   the	   cycling-­‐‑around,	   there	   is	   a	   shift	   from	   one	   level	   of	   abstraction	   (or	  
structure)	  to	  another,	  which	  feels	  like	  an	  upwards	  movement	  in	  a	  hierarchy,	  and	  yet	  
somehow	  the	  successive	  "upward"	  shifts	  turn	  out	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  closed	  cycle.	  That	  is,	  
despite	  one's	  sense	  of	  departing	  ever	  further	  from	  one's	  origin,	  one	  winds	  up,	  to	  one's	  
shock,	  exactly	  where	  one	  had	  started	  out”	  (2008,	  101)246.	  	  This	   time,	   surprisingly,	   our	   ‘cognitive	   distortion’	   it	   is	   even	   measurable	   –	   and	  perhaps	   even	  more	   surprisingly,	   it	   can	  kill.	  Metaphorically,	   by	   removing	   from	  a	  person	  the	  recognition	  as	  a	  human	  subject	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  them	  that,	  and	  literally,	  when	  the	  cognitively	  distorted	  treat	  the	  bodies	  of	  homeless	  people	  as	  if	  they	  were	  actual	  rubbish	  and	  set	  them	  on	  fire.	  	  What	  should	  give	  us	  pause	  here	  is	  that	  despite	  its	  more	  devastating	  scale,	  we	  are	  still	  dealing	  with	  the	  same	  distortion	  –	  one	  that	  removes	  a	  layer	  from	  one’s	  perception	  of	  the	  other,	  namely	  the	  one	  that	  identifies	  them	  as	  a	  living	  and	  experiencing	  subject	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  suffer.	  The	  first	  distortion	  –	  merely	  pretending	  that	  what	  matters	  to	  this	  other	  is	  unrelated	  to	  what	  matters	  to	  oneself	  –	  is	  the	  first	  step	  in	  a	  process,	  in	  which	  the	  other	  becomes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  A‘strange	  loop’	  is	  an	  abstract	  feedback	  loop	  of	  the	  kind	  Goedel’s	  incompleteness	  theorem	  proves	  for	  any	  complex	  logical	  or	  arithmetic	  system	  (Hofstadter,	  1980,	  2008).	  Hofstadter	  –	  similarly	  to	  Metzinger	  –	  believes	  that	  such	  feedback	  loos	  underlie	  the	  	  phenomenal	  experience	  of	  self,	  in	  that	  they	  produce	  the	  kind	  of	  perspectivalness	  expressed	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  PMIR.	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more	  and	  more	  dehumanised	  until	  eventually,	  nothing	  is	  left	  in	  common	  and	  the	  other	  might	  as	  well	  be	  dead.	  	  So	  what	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this?	  	  We	  have	  seen	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  when	  we	  ask	  what	  homelessness	  is	  –	  not	  just	  how	  it	   is	  defined	  by	   law	  and	  policy,	  but	  what	  kind	  of	   thing	   it	   is,	   things	   can	  get	  quite	  messy.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  homelessness	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  state,	  but	  rather,	  that	  it	  consists	  in	  occupying	  a	  particular	  subject	  position	  –	  or,	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  ‘object-­‐‑position’	  –	  in	  a	  spatial	  configuration	  –	  be	  that	  the	  ‘home’,	  the	  city,	  the	  state,	  or	  the	  abstract,	  mathematical	  ‘state	  space’	  of	  embodied	  cognition.	  What	  all	  of	  these	  spaces	  share	   in	   common	   is	   that	   they	   are	   defined	  by	   a	   conflictual	   relationship	   between	  ‘inside’	  and	  ‘outside’,	  and	  spatial	  abjection	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  is	  considered	  either	  an	   ‘outsider	  within’	  or	  an	   ‘insider	  without’.	  Homelessness,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  ‘spatial	  abjection’,	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  both	  the	  result	  of	  the	  process	  in	  which	  this	  boundary	  is	  drawn,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  splitting	  itself.	  Spatial	  abjection	  is	  then	  not	  just	  a	  category	  to	  describe	  those	  who	  end	  up	  ‘outsiders’,	  but	  it	  also	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  their	  production,	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  we	  ‘make	  outsiders’.	  Homelessness,	  in	  this	  view,	  is	  something	  that	  we	  do	  to	  each	  other,	  by	  splitting	  space	  and	  thereby	  the	  social,	  or	  by	  splitting	  the	  social	  and	  thereby	  the	  spaces	  we	  construct	  –	  and	  homelessness,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  kills.	  	  As	   an	   immediate	   consequence,	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   people’s	   attempts	   to	  counteract	   this	   socialised	   form	   of	   killing	   by	   creating	   spaces	   in	   which	   people’s	  embodied,	   spatial,	   selfhood	   is	   protected,	   should	   be	   encouraged	   rather	   than	  punished.	   ‘Weatherley’s	   law’	   did	   more	   than	   just	   to	   criminalise	   squatters	   –	   in	  attempting	  to	  take	  away	  their	  spaces,	  it	  directly	  attacked	  people’s	  ability	  to	  keep	  themselves	   and	   each	   other	   alive	   through	  mutual	   recognition	   and	   protection.	   It	  attempted	   to	  destroy	   the	  connections	  people	   in	  squatting	  had	  built,	   in	   the	  same	  way	   that	   power	   has	   always	   tried	   to	   silence	   dissent	   through	   the	   violent	  fragmentation	  of	  communality.	  It	  thus	  put	  people	  at	  risk	  of	  social,	  cognitive	  and,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  Daniel	  Gauntlett	  shows,	  physical	  death.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  for	  the	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general	  thrust	  of	  the	  politics	  it	  was	  embedded	  in	  –	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  an	  ideology	  of	  territorial	   dominance	   and	   exclusion.	   While	   conservative	   politics	   may	   be	   more	  explicit	  about	  this	  than	  other	  ideologies,	  the	  logic	  of	  creating	  an	  ‘enemy	  within’	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  Tories	  or	  political	  parties	  in	  general	  –	  it	  is	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  social	  order	  that	  maintains	  its	  integrity	  by	  externalising	  contradiction,	  in	  just	  the	  same	  way	   as	   a	   territorial	   self	   maintains	   its	   inner	   order	   through	   internment	   and	  exclusion.	  Like	  in	  the	  scapegoat-­‐‑rituals	  of	  old,	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  lies	  in	  the	  refusal	   of	   the	   self	   to,	   as	   the	   saying	   goes,	   ‘own	   its	   shit’	   –	   its	   sins,	   its	   failures,	   its	  emotions,	  its	  vulnerable	  body,	  its	  mortality.	  And	  as	  long	  as	  it	  does,	  others	  will	  end	  up	  being	  the	  symbolic	  incarnations	  of	  the	  ‘non-­‐‑I’,	  and	  die	  because	  of	  it.	  	  	  While	   it	   is	   thus	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   specific	   political	   struggles	   in	   their	  particularity,	   the	  multiplex	  connections	  between	  the	  different	  proponents	  of	   the	  ‘non-­‐‑I’	  show	  that	  they	  themselves	  are	  beginning	  to	  realise	  that	  they	  share	  more	  in	  common	  than	  separates	  them.	  What	  could	  unite	   them	  is	  not	  only	  a	   ‘Right	   to	   the	  City’,	  as	  David	  Harvey	  (2008,	  after	  Lefebvre)	  advocates,	  but	  more	  generally	  a	  ‘Right	  to	  Safe	  Space’,	  understood	  as	   the	   right	  of	  every	  human	  being	   to	  an	  undisturbed	  spatial	  existence	  as	  concrete,	  embodied	  consciousness.	  This	  means	  to	  demand	  that	  one’s	  body	  must	  be	  a	  ‘safe	  space’	  to	  occupy	  for	  the	  self,	  it	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  a	  state	  that	  allows	  the	  brain	  to	  form	  a	  self-­‐‑model	  that	  is	  integrated,	  whole	  and	  capable	  of	  conceiving	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  person.	  Maybe	  this	  is	  what	  Winstanley	  referred	  to	  when	  he	  spoke	  of	  the	  ‘sphere’	  that	  the	  soul	  occupies,	  and	  that	  is	  its	  lasting	  connection	  to	  the	  ‘Kingdom’,	   the	   mythical	   ‘home’.	   As	   Winstanley	   writes,	   the	   ‘Kingdom’	   has	   been	  divided	  by	  a	  dam	  built	  by	  the	  imagination	  –	  in	  modern	  language,	  by	  splitting	  the	  space	   of	   the	   self	   into	   partitions,	   such	   as	   mind/body,	   masculine/feminine,	  reason/emotion,	   dominant/subordinate.	   The	   divisions	   that	   fragment	   the	   inner	  realm	   are	   reflected	   on	   the	   outside,	   and	   thus	   the	   ideology	   of	   private	   property	  repeats	  in	  outside	  space	  what	  the	  ideology	  of	  ‘honour’	  does	  on	  the	  inside.	  Cognitive	  and	  material	  splitting	  is	  the	  basic	  manoeuvre	  of	  the	  territorial	  self	  –	  the	  Hobbesian	  self,	   the	   masculine	   self	   –	   and	   it	   fuels	   this	   self’s	   delusion	   of	   invulnerability	   and	  superiority	  over	  others.	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   in	  my	   take	  on	  Hegel,	   at	   its	   core	   is	   the	  delusion	   of	   immortality,	   the	   negation	   of	   embodiment,	   which	   ultimately	   betrays	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nothing	  other	  than	  a	  fear	  of	  death.	  The	  securisation	  of	  this	  self	   is	  the	  attempt	  to	  ward	  off	  the	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  being	  human	  –	  that	  one	  is	  vulnerable,	  that	  one	  will	  die	  –	  and	  in	  the	  process,	   it	  externalises	  death	  by	  making	  it	   the	  death	  of	  others.	  	  	  The	  other	  kind	  of	  self,	  the	  one	  Winstanley	  advocated,	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  describe,	  mainly	  because	  we	  do	  not	  have	  nearly	  as	  much	  evidence	  of	  its	  existence	  than	  we	  have	  of	  our	  Hobbesian	  tendencies.	  The	  metaphor	  of	  the	  ‘sphere’	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  possible	  self	  is	  whole	  and	  undivided,	  internally	  mediated	  instead	  of	  split	  into	  partitions,	  integrated	  instead	  of	  fragmented.	  ‘Integrated’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   homogenous	   –	   such	   a	   self	   can	   still	   be	  multifaceted,	   fluid	   and	   flexible.	   As	  Metzinger	  writes,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  just	  one	  self-­‐‑model	  –	  our	  brains	  produce	  a	  whole	  kaleidoscope	   of	   prototypes	   for	   ‘possible	   selves’,	   and	   depending	   on	   context,	   we	  enact	  a	  version	  of	  ourselves	   that	   is	  best	   suited	   to	   the	   task	  at	  hand.	   ‘Integration’	  means,	   however,	   that	   these	   possible	   selves	   are	   not	   compartmentalised,	  contradicting	  each	  other,	  producing	  a	  self	  at	  war	  with	   itself.	   ‘Integration’	  means	  that	  fragmentation	  is	  owned	  and	  resolved	  on	  the	  inside	  instead	  of	  externalising	  it,	  and	  therein	  lies	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  moral	  concept	  of	  ‘integrity’	  –	  integrity	  in	  this	  sense	  means	   to	   own	   one’s	   contradiction	   instead	   of	   acting	   it	   out	   with	   reluctant	  others	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘non-­‐‑I’.	  	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  psychoanalysis	  becomes	  a	  relevant	  tool	  for	  integrating	  the	  self	  in	  its	  social	  and	  biological	  dimensions,	  as	  discussed	  e.g.	  by	  Metzinger,	  and	  political	  arguments	  about	  how	  embodied	  selves	  –	  i.e.	  people	  –	  should	  relate	  to	  each	   other.	  While	   philosophers	   such	   as	  Metzinger	   are	   usually	   relatively	   little	  concerned	  with	  politics,	  and	  political	  theorists	  do	  not	  often	  take	  recourse	  to	  the	  biological	   and	   psychological	   substrates	   of	   social	   structure	   in	   the	   individual,	  psychoanalysis	   –	   and	   particularly	   object	   relations	   –	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   type	   of	  ‘common	  ground’	  which	  allows	  for	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  from	  both	  types	  of	  theory	  to	  be	  discussed	  under	  the	  same	  conceptual	  framework.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  talk	  about	  political	  processes	  such	  as	   ‘othering’	  as	  something	  more	  than	  either	  a	  bio-­‐‑psychological	  or	  a	  political	  process,	  and	  to	  show	  that	  in	  fact,	  it	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is	  both	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  specific	  contribution	  of	  psychoanalysis	  to	  this	  work	  is	   therefore	   that	   it	   provides	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   cultural	   forms	   such	   as	  patterns	  of	  relating	  are	  transmitted	  and	  learned,	  and	  possibly,	  how	  they	  can	  be	  changed	  once	  they	  are	  internalised.	  Within	  the	  here	  described	  Western	  context,	  psychoanalysis	   can	   also	   provide	   a	   helpful	   framework	   for	   discussing	   the	  topography	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  particularly,	  how	  defensive	  psychodynamics	  such	  as	  projection	  and	  splitting	  organise	  and	  maintain	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  self.	  	  Winstanley’s	  ‘spheres’	  also	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  integrity	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  assign	  the	  quality	  of	   ‘mineness’	   to	  the	  space	  that	  one	   is,	  and	  the	  space	  one	   is	   in.	  ‘Mineness’	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  ‘ownership’	  or	  ‘property’,	  although	  language	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  express	  relationships	  in	  anything	  other	  than	  an	  idiom	  of	  subject	  and	  object.	  ‘Mineness’	  is	  a	  form	  of	  identification	  –	  if	  I	  say	  ‘my	  body’	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  an	  abstract	  ‘I’	  is	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  biological	  body	  but	  that	  ‘I’	  am	  this	  body,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  can	  perceive	  of	  it,	  and	  describe	  it,	  as	  an	  object,	  as	  ‘my	  hand’	  or	   ‘my	   face’.	   According	   to	  Metzinger,	   the	   Cartesian	   error	   that	   is	   built	   into	   such	  statements	  is	  a	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  being	  an	  embodied	  consciousness	  –	  we	  cannot	   not	   perceive	   of	   our	   selves	   as	   ‘I’s’	  who	   ‘have’	   bodies.	   But	   ultimately,	   this	  relation	   is	   a	   cognitive	   illusion	   –	   there	   is	   no	   ‘I’	   separate	   from	   that	   which	   we	  experience	   as	   characterised	   by	   the	   property	   of	   ‘mineness’.	   The	   domain	   of	  ‘mineness’	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  Winstanley’s	  ‘sphere’	  –	  the	  experienced	  spatial	  expanse	  that	  is	  ‘me’,	  an	  organism	  under	  the	  strong	  phenomenal	  impression	  of	  being	  a	  ‘self’.	  When	   ‘mineness’	   is	   lost,	   such	   as	   in	   ‘social	   death’,	   then	   it	   is	   more	   than	   just	  ‘ownership’	  that	  is	  taken	  away	  –	  it	  is	  the	  very	  capacity	  to	  experience	  myself	  as	  a	  person.	  Ironically,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  ‘ownership’	  destroys	  ‘mineness’,	  in	  separating	  the	  self	  from	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  body	  –	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  somebody	  else’s	  claim	  to	  ownership	  can	  cognitively	  displace	  my	  ‘self’	  from	  its	  spatial	  expanse;	  and	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘self-­‐‑ownership’,	  in	  introducing	  a	  split	  between	  owner	  and	   owned,	   substitutes	   a	   property	   relation	   for	   an	   integrated	   experience	   of	  embodiment.	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‘Social	  death’	  therefore	  describes	  not	  only	  a	  position	  of	  certain	  selves	  in	  relation	  to	  others,	  it	  also	  refers	  to	  a	  subjective	  experience	  of	  ‘homelessness’	  –	  the	  loss	  of	  one’s	  sense	  of	  being	  ‘at	  home’	  in	  one’s	  body,	  and	  of	  the	  body	  being	  ‘at	  home’	  in	  the	  world.	  One	  could	  see	  this	  eviction	  of	  the	  self	  from	  itself	  as	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  territorial	  aggression,	  a	  form	  of	  displacement	  that,	  for	  Winstanley,	  was	  akin	  to	  the	  eviction	  of	  man	  and	  woman	  from	  the	  Garden	  of	  Eden	  by	  a	  god	  who	  appears	  to	  have	  more	  in	  common	   with	   Hobbes	   than	   with	   Jesus.	   Where	   I	   therefore	   part	   ways	   with	  Winstanley	  is	  in	  the	  remedy	  –	  where	  he	  believes	  that	  ‘man’	  can	  return	  to	  Eden	  by	  “reject(ing)	  outward	  objects	  and	  prefer(ing)	  his	  inner	  kingdom	  to	  outward	  riches”	  (Brace,	  1997,	  148),	  I	  am	  quite	  content	  that	  we	  are	  out	  of	  there,	  since	  in	  Eden,	  we	  were	  only	  ever	  god’s	  tenants.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  do	  to	  become	  ‘at	  home	  in	  the	  world’	  (Jackson,	  1995)	  is	  precisely	  not	  to	  reject	  the	  magnificent	  riches	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  that	  we	  are	  part	  of,	  but	  to	  understand	  that	  no	  mystical	  maker	  pulls	  the	  strings	  of	  our	  consciousness	  behind	  the	  scenes	  –	  the	  world	  out	  there,	  especially	  in	  the	  shape	  of	   other	   people,	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   us	   to	   be	   ‘selves’,	   and	   in	   our	  communion	   with	   it	   we	   become	   our	   own	   makers	   and	   each	   other’s.	   The	   reason	  Winstanley’s	  ideas	  live	  on	  in	  the	  collective	  imagination	  is	  not	  his	  puritan	  theology	  –	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Diggers	  understood	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  human,	  you	  have	  to	  squat	  the	  world.	  	  	  The	  importance	  of	  recognition	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  our	  ‘sphere’,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  mythical	  home,	  others	  have	  to	  communicate	  in	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  they	  respect	  the	  bubble	  of	  ‘mineness’	  we	  are	  in,	  and	  that	  they	  will	  take	  care	  not	  to	  violate	  its	  boundaries.	  This	  is	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  we	  must	  respect	  each	  other’s	  spatiality,	  each	  other’s	  bodies,	   in	  all	   their	  vulnerability	  and	  proneness	  to	  suffering	  and	  death	  –	  that	  in	  order	  to	  make	  each	  other	  human,	  we	  have	  to	  respect	  each	  other’s	  humanity.	  Interestingly,	  for	  a	  discipline	  that	  calls	  itself	  ‘knowledge	  of	  human	   beings’,	   anthropology	   appears	   to	   have	   trouble	   with	   this	   concept	   –	  somewhere	  throughout	  the	  awful	  confusion	  fascism	  caused	  in	  France,	  ‘humanism’	  ended	  up	  being	  cast	  as	  a	  bad	  thing,	  and	  90	  years	  later	  some	  of	  us	  are	  still	  rolling	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with	  that247.	  This	  legacy	  is	  perhaps	  the	  reason	  we	  do	  not	  quite	  appear	  to	  get	  what	  people	  want	  from	  us	  when	  they	  insist	  that	  ‘human’	  is	  what	  they	  are.	  	  	  At	  Dale	  Farm,	  and	  elsewhere,	  I	  have	  observed	  that	  people	  who	  fall	  into	  common	  descriptions	  of	  ‘oppressed’,	  when	  questioned	  about	  their	  oppression,	  will	  at	  some	  point	  often	  exclaim,	  with	  great	  emphasis:	   “I	  am	  human!”,	  or,	   if	  referring	  to	  their	  whole	  group,	  “we	  are	  human!”.	  This	  happens	  quite	  regularly,	  and	  even	  the	  quietest,	  most	  introverted	  interlocutor,	  when	  uttering	  these	  words,	  will	  look	  one	  straight	  in	  the	  eye,	  emphasising	   their	  words	  with	  gestures	  of	  urgency,	  as	   if	   to	   locate	   in	   the	  other	  the	  part	  who	  will	  respond,	  solemnly	  and	  sincerely,	  “yes,	  you	  are”.	  The	  people	  who	  thus	   lay	  claim	  to	  humanity	  are	  not	  making	  a	   factual	  statement,	   they	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  inform	  their	  audience	  that	  they	  are	  members	  of	  the	  species	  homo	  sapiens,	  they	  do	  not	  make	  a	  ‘truth	  claim248’	  or	  invite	  their	  listener	  to	  play	  a	  ‘language	  game’.	  They	  do	  not	  put	  up	  for	  debate	  their	  cultural	  or	  individual	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  human	  being	  is.	  What	  they	  want,	  I	  believe	  (and	  I	  could	  be	  wrong,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  I	  am),	  is	  to	  be	  seen,	  to	  be	  recognised,	  as	  the	  sort	  of	  being	  who	  has	  a	  perspective	  –	  and	  whose	  perspective	  is	  irrevocably	  determined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  through	  his/her	  embodiment,	  he/she	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  flourish	  or	  to	  suffer.	  	  	  In	  this	  finally	  lies	  another,	  although	  in	  this	  thesis	  more	  implicit,	  relevance	  of	  Critical	  Realism	  as	  a	  metatheoretical	  framework,	  since	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  ‘humanism’	  refers	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  really	  existing	  (or	  potentially	  really	  existing)	  entity	  called	  ‘human’,	  then	   there	   must	   be	   a	   possibility	   that	   this	   entity	   has	   reality	   beyond	   subjective	  appreciations	  of	  what	  ‘human’	  is.	  It	  has	  not	  been	  my	  purpose	  here	  to	  go	  deeper	  into	  this	  question	  and	  it	  is	  certainly	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  attempt	  to	  answer	  it,	  but	  the	  particular	  kind	  of	  recognition	  ethics	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  rests	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  one	  another’s	  humanity,	  especially	  in	  the	  aspect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	  One	  of	  the	  excuses	  that	  was	  made	  for	  Heidegger’s	  involvement	  with	  Nazism	  was	  that	  what	  drew	  him	  to	  it	  was	  its	  ‘humanism’	  (Wolin,	  2004,	  254)	  –	  who	  knows,	  had	  he	  disavowed	  it	  earlier,	  he	  might	  have	  joined	  the	  Resistance	  	  248	  A	  ‘truth	  claim’	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  a	  ‘true	  statement’.	  The	  word	  ‘claim’	  indicates	  that	  somebody	  just	  purports	  to	  be	  speaking	  the	  truth,	  leaving	  that	  modicum	  of	  skeptical	  distance,	  in	  case	  the	  ‘claim’	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  false.	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of	  shared	  vulnerable	  embodiment,	  and	  in	  order	  for	  this	  possibility	  to	  exist,	  it	  must	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  metatheoretical	  assumptions	  the	  argument	  builds	  on.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  logic	  of	  recognition	  is	  such	  that,	  in	  the	  same	  utterance,	  the	  addressee	   is	   identified	  as	   the	  sort	  of	  being	  who	  can	  award	  such	  recognition	  –	  a	  being	  who,	  through	  its	  own	  embodied	  perspective,	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  recognise	  the	  other	  as	  a	  being	  such	  as	  itself.	  “I	  am	  human!”	  therefore	  always	  means	  “and	  so	  are	  you”.	  A	  person	  who	  asks	  to	  be	  recognised	  thus	  does	  not	  simply	  make	  a	  demand,	  he/she	  also	  offers	  something:	  an	  opportunity,	   in	   recognising	   them	  as	  human,	   to	  identify	  oneself	  as	  such,	  in	  recognising	  to	  be	  at	  the	  same	  time	  recognised.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	   to	  be	  human	  then	   is	  not	   the	  scarce	  good	  that	   the	  critics	  of	  humanism	  want	  to	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be,	  nor	  is	  it	  an	  essential	  property	  of	  some	  but	  not	  of	  others.	  Being	  human,	  here,	  is	  something	  that	  is	  constantly	  co-­‐‑created	  in	  relations	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  –	  one	  could	  call	  it,	  perhaps,	  a	  gift,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  an	  object	  that	  is	  passed	  around,	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  property	  of	  the	  strange	  organisms	  that	  we	  are,	  one	  that	  it	  only	  ever	  realised	  in	  the	  act	  of	  sharing.	  	  	  In	  chapter	  11,	  we	  have	  touched	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  representations	  can	  be	  passed	  around	  between	  humans	  like	  ‘viruses’.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  rather	  than	  thinking	  of	  these	  infectious	  patterns	  as	  parthenogens,	  we	  could	  see	  them	  as	  something	  like	  computer	   viruses	   –	   data	   patterns	   that	   are	   exchanged	   through	   interaction	   and	  ‘infect’	  the	  bio-­‐‑cognitive	  system	  of	  the	  ‘host’.	  While	  this	  can	  be	  true	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  ‘malware’,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  harmful	  myths,	  beliefs	  and	  practices,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  true	  for	  the	  opposite	  –	  for	  representational	  patterns	  that	  encode	  how	  to	  treat	  one	  another	  in	  pro-­‐‑social	  ways.	  What	  we	  have	  called	  the	  ‘pattern	  of	  recognition’	  or	  the	  the	  ‘I-­‐‑Thou	  structure’	  is	  such	  a	  representation	  –	  the	  abstract	  model	  of	  the	  kind	   of	   human	   relationship	   that	   makes	   human	   consciousness	   as	   we	   know	   it	  possible.	  This	  pattern	   is	  passed	  on	  between	  people	   in	  every	  act	  of	  recognition,	  from	  the	  constituent	  act	  of	  welcoming	  a	  new	  human	  to	  the	  world,	  to	  the	  myths	  of	  solidarity	  and	  cooperation	  that	  inform	  some	  of	  our	  ‘grand	  narratives’.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  we	  ‘subjectify’	  each	  other	  by	  continuously	  infecting	  each	  other’s	  systems	  with	  the	  spark	  of	  phenomenal	  subjecthood.	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  true,	  then	  it	  would	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mean	  that	  human	  consciousness	  –	  in	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  ‘subject-­‐‑consciousness’	  –	  is	  a	  genuinely	   social	   phenomenon.	  We	   are	   human	   to	   each	   other	   and	   to	   ourselves	  because	  we	  constantly	  co-­‐‑create	  each	  other	  as	  human	  –	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  human	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  One	  consequence	  of	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  computer	  virus	  is	  that	  a	  representation	  such	  as	  this	  would	  very	  difficult	  to	  contain.	  If	  it	  is	  extinguished	  in	  one	  system,	  for	  example	  through	  ‘social	  death’,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  ‘backup’	  in	  the	  next,	  and	  the	  spark	  can	  be	  sent	  back	  and	  forth	  again	  and	  again,	  like	  a	  form	  of	  existential	  file-­‐‑sharing.	  This	  would	  lend	  some	  credence	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘solidarity	  is	  a	  weapon’	  –	  not	  because	  it	  harms,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  a	  powerful	  ‘technology	  of	  consciousness’	  that	  anyone	   can	   use	   to	   bring	   the	   ‘socially	   dead’	   back	   to	   life.	   And,	   to	   express	   a	  speculative	   thought	   at	   the	   very	   end	   of	   this	   text,	   it	  would	   also	  mean	   that	   our	  ‘existential	  software’	  is	  bound	  to	  our	  bodies,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  limited	  to	  our	  bodies.	   Andy	   Clark’s	   ‘extended	   mind’	   hypothesis	   holds	   that	   objects	   in	   the	  environment,	  such	  as	  a	  notepad	  or	  a	  computer,	  can	  come	  to	  function	  as	  parts	  of	  our	  ‘mind’	  if	  we	  use	  them	  as	  such,	  for	  example	  to	  store	  or	  edit	  information.	  If	  that	  is	  so,	  then	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  other	  people	  can	  become	  part	  of	  our	  ‘extended	  mind’	   as	  well,	   in	   so	   far	   as	  we	   keep	   a	   backup	  of	   our	   ‘data’	   on	   their	   ‘bio-­‐‑hard-­‐‑drives’.	  Anyone	  who,	  after	  a	  long	  time	  of	  solitude,	  has	  ever	  met	  up	  with	  an	  old	  friend	  and	  instantly	  felt	  ‘like	  themselves’	  again,	  has	  experienced	  this	  effect	  –	  the	  friend	  has	  here	  acted	  as	  an	  ‘external	  storage	  device’	  that	  contained	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  self-­‐‑model	  he/she	  has	  last	  stored	  us	  as.	  In	  our	  encounter,	  he/she	  relates	  not	  so	  much	   to	  our	  current	   self-­‐‑model	  but	   to	   the	  one	  he/she	  remembers	  –	  and	   thus	  induces	  in	  our	  own	  system	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  that	  person	  again.	  In	  this	  way,	  embodied	  consciousnesses	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  partake	  in	  a	  web	  of	  representations	  that	   extends	   between	   individual	   bodies,	   where	   possible	   selves	   and	   possible	  kinds	   of	   relating	   to	   others	   exist	   not	   just	   inside	   one’s	   own	   brain,	   but	   are	  distributed	  throughout	  a	  network	  of	  all	  whose	  brains	  one	  has	  come	  in	  contact	  with.	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Whether	  one	  wants	  to	  see	  in	  this	  a	  parallel	  to	  Hegel	  depends	  strongly	  on	  whether	  one	  wants	  to	  translate	  the	  word	  Geist	  (as	  in	  Weltgeist)	  as	  ‘spirit’,	  or,	  as	  is	  equally	  valid,	   as	   ‘mind’	   –	   in	   the	   latter	   sense,	  we	  would	   be	   talking	   not	   about	   an	   ideal	  spiritual	  substance	  that	  infuses	  the	  natural	  world,	  but	  about	  the	   ‘world-­‐‑mind’,	  the	  network	  of	  representations	  that	  links	  our	  bodies	  into	  the	  big	  data-­‐‑streams	  of	  culture	  and	  history:	  
“With	  this	  we	  already	  have	  before	  us	  the	  notion	  of	  Mind.	  What	  consciousness	  has	  
further	   to	   become	   aware	   of,	   is	   the	   experience	   of	   what	  mind	   is	  —	   this	   absolute	  
substance,	   which	   is	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   different	   self-­‐‑related	   and	   self-­‐‑existent	   self-­‐‑
consciousnesses	   in	   the	   perfect	   freedom	   and	   independence	   of	   their	   opposition	   as	  
component	   elements	   of	   that	   substance:	   ‘I’	   that	   is	   ‘we’,	   and	   ‘we’	   that	   is	   ‘I’.	  
Consciousness	   first	   finds	   in	  self-­‐‑consciousness	  –	   the	  notion	  of	  mind	  –	   its	   turning-­‐‑
point,	  where	  it	  leaves	  the	  parti-­‐‑coloured	  illusion	  of	  the	  sensuous	  immediate,	  passes	  
from	  the	  empty	  night	  of	  the	  supernatural	  beyond,	  and	  steps	  into	  the	  mental	  daylight	  
of	  the	  present”249	  (PoM	  §177)	  
Like	   most	   things	   with	   Hegel,	   this	   is	   certainly	   a	   matter	   of	   interpretation.	   But	  interpreted	  this	  way,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  a	  ‘world-­‐‑mind’	  could	  be	  read	  as	  more	  than	  just	  the	  idealist	  vision	  of	  an	  atheist	  who	  could	  not	  quite	  let	  go	  of	  religion	  –	  it	  could	  point	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  continuous	  movement	  between	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘we’	  and	  ‘we’	  and	  ‘I’,	  the	  vibrating	  spark	  of	  consciousness	  flying	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  individual	   bodies,	   could	   be	   what	   makes	   us	   human	   –	   that	   humanity	   lives,	  ultimately,	  in	  the	  network.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  Translation	  from	  German	  mine.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  translation	  at	  https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phb.htm,	  I	  have	  translated	  
Geist	  as	  ‘mind’	  instead	  of	  ‘spirit’,	  Ich	  as	  ‘I’	  instead	  of	  ‘Ego’	  and	  geistig	  with	  ‘mental’	  instead	  of	  ‘spiritual’	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Appendix	  1:	  Methodology	  and	  Method	  	  	  The	   methodology	   herein	   applied	   is,	   as	   befits	   an	   Anthropology	   thesis,	   an	  ethnographic	  one,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  approach	  originally	  pioneered	  by	  Bronislaw	  Malinowski	  (1922)	  and	  subsequently	  refined	  through	  the	  efforts	  of	  generations	  of	  fieldworkers	  such	  as	  Frantz	  Boas,	  Margaret	  Mead,	  E.E.E.	  Evans-­‐‑Pritchard,	  and	  many	  distinguished	  others.	  As	  Atkinson	  and	  Hammersley	  (2007)	  outline,	  while	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  ‘ethnography’	  has	  the	  relatively	  clearly	  defined	  character	  of	  a	  comprehensive	   description	   of	   a	   particular	   (usually	   non-­‐‑Western)	   culture,	   in	  recent	   decades	   the	   term	   has	   come	   to	   define	   a	   more	   diverse	   spectrum	   of	  qualitative	  approaches,	  covering	  also	  the	  description	  of	  relatively	  circumscribed	  social	  contexts	  (e.g.	  individual	  ‘life	  histories’),	  partial	  accounts	  of	  larger	  cultural	  contexts,	  and	  non-­‐‑geographically	  constituted	   field	  sites	   (such	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  online	  ethnography).The	  authors	  assert	  that	  “carrying	  out	  such	  work,	  usually	  in	  a	  society	  very	  different	   from	  one’s	  own,	  became	  a	  rite	  of	  passage	  required	  for	  entry	  to	  the	  ‘tribe’	  of	  anthropologists.	  Fieldwork	  usually	  required	  living	  with	  a	  group	  of	  people	  for	  extended	  periods,	  often	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  year	  or	  more,	  in	  order	  to	  document	  and	  interpret	  their	  distinctive	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  the	  beliefs	  and	  values	  integral	  to	  it”	  (Atkinson/Hammersley,	  2007,	  1),	  and	  such	  is	  also	  the	  shape	  and	   impetus	   of	   the	  work	   undertaken	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   this	   thesis.	   The	   thesis	  therefore	  displays	  all	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  ethnographic	  research,	  as	  there	  are	  according	  to	  Atkinson	  and	  Hammersley:	  a)	  a	  data	  gathering	  through	  extended	  fieldwork,	  i.e.	  work	  within	  the	  everyday	  contexts	  encountered	  by	  participants,	  b)	  a	  focus	  on	  participant	  observation	  and	  informal	  conversations,	  amended	  by	  use	  of	   other	   documentary	   evidence,	   c)	   a	   relatively	   small-­‐‑scale	   setting	   and	   d)	   an	  interpretative	  approach	  to	  data	  analysis	  (3).	  	  
The	  main	  method	  employed	   in	   this	  study	  consisted	   in	  participant	  observation	  within	   the	   specific	   local	   community	   herein	   described,	   as	   well	   as	   numerous	  informal	  conversations	  with	  members	  of	  the	  social	  group	  under	  investigation,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  number	  of	  other	  data	  sources	  detailed	  below.	  As	  has	  been	  remarked	  by	  a	  number	  of	  authors,	   for	  example	   Junker	   (1960)	  and	  Gold	   (1958)	   (cited	   in	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Atkinson/Hammersley,	   2007,	   93),	   participant	   observation	   can	   further	   be	  subdivided	   into	   four	   subtypes,	   namely:	   complete	   participant;	   participant	   as	  observer;	  observer	  as	  participant;	  and	  complete	  observer.	  These	  four	  categories	  describe	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   relative	  weight	   given	   to	   either	   participation	   or	  observation	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  process,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  give	  clues	  as	  to	  the	   relative	   openness	   or	   concealment	   of	   data	   collection	   within	   the	   fieldwork	  situation.	  While	  thus	  a	  ‘complete	  participant’	  may	  be	  engaged	  in	  participation	  but	  not	  overt	  data	  gathering,	  conversely,	  a	  ‘complete	  observer’	  would	  be	  a	  researcher	  who	  is	  disengaged	  from	  the	  social	  world	  under	  study	  for	  all	  but	  the	  purpose	  of	  data	  collection.	  In	  anthropological	  practice,	  most	  participant	  observation	  will	  fall	  between	   these	   two	   extremes	   and	   constitute	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   roles	   of	  participant	   and	   observer,	   while	   potentially	   foregrounding	   one	   or	   the	   other	  depending	  on	  the	  concrete	  context,	  and	  such	  is	  also	  the	  case	  for	  the	  heretofore	  presented	   data,	   in	   as	   far	   as	   the	   ethnographer	   during	   the	   fieldwork	   period	  oscillated	   between	   observation	   and	   participation	   while	   most	   of	   the	   time	  engaging	  in	  both	  simultaneously.	  	  
Participant	  observation	  in	  this	  case	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘squatting	  scene’,	  as	  defined	  by	  its	  members,	  i.e.	  a	  relatively	  unstructured	  association	  of	  individuals	  engaging	  in	  or	  supporting	  squatting	  and	  associated	  practices	  herein	  described.	  As	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  ethnographic	  material	  here	  presented	  concerns	  squatting,	  ‘participation’	  here	  refers	   in	  the	  main	  to	  participation	   in	  the	   inhabitation	  of	  squatted	  spaces,	  including	  the	  social	  practices	  herewith	  associated,	  such	  as	  meetings	  and	  informal	  gatherings;	  as	  well	  as	  in	  activities	  of	  the	  ‘squatting	  scene’	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  habitation,	  such	  as	  political	  activism,	  practices	  relating	  to	  culture	  and	  art	  such	  as	  community	  workshops,	   parties	   and	   raves,	   and	  networking	  meetings.	   Since,	   as	  this	   thesis	   argues,	   squatting	   in	   the	   particular	   ethnographic	   context	   under	  investigation	  largely	  constituted	  a	  response	  to	  homelessness,	  ‘participation’	  in	  a	  wider	   sense	   also	   meant	   participation	   in	   homelessness	   itself,	   in	   that	   the	  ethnographer,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapters	  one	  and	  two,	  was	  herself	  legally	  homeless	  during	  the	  fieldwork	  period.	  ‘Observation’	  here	  can	  for	  the	  most	  part	  be	  taken	  in	  its	   most	   literal	   sense,	   i.e.	   the	   visual	   and	   auditory	   recording	   of	   practices	   and	  speech	  acts	  pertaining	   to	   squatting	  and	   related	  activism	   through	   the	   sensory-­‐‑
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cognitive	  apparatus	  of	  the	  ethnographer,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  chronicling	  thereof	  through	   the	  means	   of	   handwritten	   fieldnotes	   in	   a	   notebook	   specified	   for	   this	  purpose.	  	  
Furthermore,	   due	   to	   the	   specific	   circumstances	   of	   the	   ethnographic	   situation,	  especially	  the	  omnipresent	  concern	  with	  police	  infiltration	  permeating	  activist	  environs	   (see	   chapter	   11),	   the	   manufacture	   of	   electronic	   recordings	   of	   an	  audiovisual	  nature,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  writing	  of	  fieldnotes,	  was	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  necessity	  to	  not	  arouse	  the	  suspicion	  of	  participants	  who	  may	  have	  interpreted	  such	  recording	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  ulterior	  motive	  on	  part	  of	   the	  ethnographer.	  This	  pertained	  particularly	  to	  voice	  recordings	  and	  photographs,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  generally	  explicitly	  or	   implicitly	  prohibited	   in	  squatted	  spaces.	  Similarly,	  the	  overt	  taking	  of	  handwritten	  notes	  during	  social	   interactions,	  e.g.	  meetings,	  was	  prone	  to	  arouse	  suspicion,	  and	  note-­‐‑taking	  therefore	  in	  the	  main	  took	  place	  during	  times	  when	  the	  ethnographer	  had	  retreated	  to	  whatever	  personal	  space	  was	  available	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  same	  considerations	  applied	  to	  individual	  informal	  conversations	  with	   squatters,	   since	   the	   general	   feeling	  within	   the	   community	  appeared	   to	   be	   that	   excessive	   note-­‐‑taking	   during	   a	   conversation	   could	   be	  regarded	  evidence	  that	  said	  conversation	  was	  not	  conducted	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  but	  for	   a	   purpose	   outside	   of	   the	   conversational	   situation,	  which	   inevitably	  would	  have	  raised	  questions	  about	  what	  purpose	  this	  was.	  While	  the	  ethnographer	  was,	  throughout	   the	   fieldwork,	   open	   about	   the	   observational	   nature	   of	   her	  participation,	   it	   could	  be	  said	   that	   this	  was	  accepted	  by	   the	  community	  under	  investigation	   only	   in	   so	   far	   as	   the	   observation	   should	   not	   distract	   from	   the	  participation,	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	   ‘full	   immersion’	  ethnography	  that	  forms	  the	   backbone	   of	   anthropological	  methods,	   data	   gathering	   activities	   had	   to	   be	  performed	   in	   a	   way	   that	   did	   not	   interfere	   with	   being	   regarded	   a	   useful	   and	  trustworthy	  member	  of	  the	  social	  network.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  participant	  observation	  and	  informal	  conversations,	  data	  was	  also	  drawn	  from	  documents	  provided	  by	  participants	  (such	  as	  the	  press	  releases	  used	  in	  chapters	  9	  and	  10),	  online	  sources	  such	  as	  squatter’s	  blogs	  and	  websites,	  as	  well	   as	   public	   discourse	   as	   represented	   by	   mainstream	   news	   media.	   The	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rationale	  for	  including	  the	  former	  was	  specifically	  to	  include	  the	  reasoning	  and	  motivations	   of	   squatters	   who	   were	   involved	   in	   the	   occupation	   detailed	   in	  chapters	   9	   and	   10	   without	   making	   individual	   squatters	   recognisable	   by	  associating	  their	  utterances	  with	  descriptions	  given	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  thesis,	  and	  thus	   potentially	   placing	   particular	   persons	   at	   the	   scene.	   Furthermore,	   this	  material	   was	   included	   to	   give	   a	   first-­‐‑hand	   account	   of	   these	   motivations	   as	  expressed	  by	  the	  squatters	  themselves,	  while	  avoiding	  a	  post-­‐‑hoc	  distortion	  of	  these	   intentions	   through	   the	   interpretations	   of	   the	   ethnographer.	   The	   same	  rationale	  holds	   for	   the	   inclusion	  of	   squatter’s	  websites	  and	  blogs,	  which	  were	  here	   treated	   en	   par	   with	   primary	   data	   since	   they	   represent	   much	   the	   same	  opinions	   and	   concerns	   voiced	   by	   squatters	   within	   the	   specific	   fieldwork	  situation.	  Finally,	  material	  from	  mainstream	  media	  such	  as	  the	  Daily	  Mail	  or	  Vice	  Magazine	   was	   included	   in	   order	   to	   illustrate	   specific	   points	   about	   the	   public	  perception	  of	  squatting	  and	  squatters,	  the	  general	  political	  climate	  within	  public	  discourse	   around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   research,	   and	   specifically	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  article	   cited	   in	   chapter	   11,	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   first-­‐‑hand	   accounts	   of	   police	  repression	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  exposing	  participant’s	  identities.	  	  
As	   Atkinson	   and	   Hammersley	   detail	   further	   in	   their	   discussion	   of	   the	  ethnographic	  method,	  ethnographic	   ‘research	  designs’	  are	  usually	  more	  open-­‐‑ended	  than	  other	  methodologies,	  and	  this	  ethnography	  is	  no	  exception.	  While,	  in	  the	   spirit	   of	   Malinowski,	   the	   general	   direction	   of	   investigation	   was	  ‘foreshadowed’	   in	   the	   main	   through	   the	   choice	   of	   fieldwork	   location	   and	  participant	  group,	  it	  was	  also	  the	  case,	  as	  Atkinson	  and	  Hammersley	  argue,	  that	  the	  research	  took	  an	  exploratory	  course	  in	  that	  the	  research	  questions	  emerged	  from,	   and	   were	   developed	   alongside	   the	   discovery	   of,	   the	   concerns	   and	  understandings	   expressed	   by	   participants	   during	   fieldwork	   (compare	  Atkinson/Hammersley,	  2007,	  3).	  	  While	  it	  was	  therefore	  clear	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  research	  that	  the	  focus	  would	  be	  on	  activities	  within	  the	  wider	  squatting	  community,	   the	   angle	   eventually	   taken,	   namely	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   moral	   and	  cognitive	  dimensions	  of	  homelessness	  and	   squatting,	   emerged	   from	   fieldwork	  experiences.	  Data	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  fieldnotes	  was	  first	  organized	  in	  a	  chronological	  manner	  and	  subsequently	  arranged	  into	  themes	  while	  simultaneously,	  existing	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and	  potential	  theoretical	  connections	  between	  these	  themes	  were	  explored.	  The	  decision	   to	   draw	   specifically	   on	  moral	   and	   cognitive	   anthropology	   as	  well	   as	  wider	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cognition	  was	  taken	  at	  the	  point	  that	  primary	  data	  was	  first	  systematized	  and	  analysed,	  and	  patterns	  in	  this	  data	  became	  visible.	  As	  Atkinson	   and	   Hammersley	   assert,	   this	   approach	   is	   typical	   for	   ethnographic	  research,	  since	  “in	  ethnography	  the	  analysis	  of	  data	  is	  not	  a	  distinct	  stage	  of	  the	  research.	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  begins	  in	  the	  pre-­‐‑fieldwork	  phase,	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  clarification	  of	  research	  problems,	  and	  continues	  through	  to	  the	  process	  of	  writing	   reports,	   articles,	   and	   books”	   (158),	   thus	   resembling	   the	   process	   of	  ‘grounded	  theorizing’	  promoted	  e.g.	  by	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss	  (1967).	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  writing	  process	  of	  this	  text,	  despite	  taking	  place	  after	  returning	  from	  the	  field,	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  constitute	  an	  extension	  of	  data	  analysis.	  This	  pertains	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  the	  primary	  data	  proper,	  i.e.	  fieldnotes,	  photographs	  and	  other	  materials,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  secondary	  data	  and	  theoretical	  sources	  drawn	  from	  a	  range	  of	  literatures.	  The	  scope	  of	  literatures	  drawn	  on	  is	  relatively	  broad	  and	   not	   restricted	   to	   just	   one	   disciplinary	   context,	   following	   Atkinson	   and	  Hammersley’s	  suggestion	  that	  “we	  need	  to	  cultivate	  the	  capacity	  to	  read	  for	  the	  rhetoric	  and	  forms	  of	  writing	  employed	  by	  others,	  not	  just	  to	  read	  for	  content.	  And	  what	  is	  read	  need	  not	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  work	  of	  other	  ethnographers,	  or	  other	  social	  scientists.	  There	  are,	  after	  all,	  many	  genres	  through	  which	  authors	  explore	  social	  worlds.	  The	  domains	  of	  fiction	  and	  non-­‐‑fiction	  alike	  provide	  many	  sources	   and	   models	   for	   written	   representations”	   (192).	   What	   is	   needed,	  according	  to	  the	  authors,	  is	  therefore	  “an	  appreciation	  of	  texts	  as	  the	  products	  of	  reading	  and	  writing.	  This	  calls	  for	  a	  widening	  of	  the	  ethnographer’s	  traditional	  range	  of	   interests.	  One	  needs	   to	   think	  about	  more	   than	   ‘research	  methods’,	  as	  conventionally	  defined,	  or	  just	  the	  substantive	  focus	  of	  inquiry”	  (191).	  For	  this	  reason,	   while	   literature	   was	   drawn	   from	   research	   on	   homelessness	   in	   the	  conventional	  sense,	  further	  partial	  literatures	  were	  added	  based	  on	  whether	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  contribute	  to	  an	  understanding	  not	  just	  of	  the	  immediate	  field	  of	  inquiry	   but	   also	   and	   particularly	   the	   connections	   that	   the	   data	   implied	   for	  theoretical	  concepts	  which	  were	  hitherto	  unconnected	  (see	  literature	  review).	  In	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this	  manner,	  literature	  from	  the	  area	  of	  psychoanalysis	  was	  put	  in	  a	  dialogue	  with	  literature	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  ethics	  and	  politics,	  among	  others,	  in	  order	  to	  show	  recurring	  themes	  and	  patterns	  and	  develop	  ideas	  as	  to	  why	  and	  how	  they	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  real	  world	  phenomena.	  	  	  The	  choice	  of	  sources	  followed	  a	  core	  theoretical	  structure	  roughly	  outlining	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  Hegelian	  ethics	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  cognitive	  as	  exemplified	  in	  the	   work	   of	   Axel	   Honneth,	   and	   other	   sources	   were	   added	   to	   this	   core	  configuration	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  particular	  questions	  arising	  from	  field	  data	  (see	  literature	   review).	  From	   this	   theoretical	   core,	   the	   concepts	  of	   recognition	  and	  misrecognition	   were	   defined	   as	   abstract	   relational	   patterns	   describing	   basic	  tendencies	  or	  movements	  toward	  equality	  and	  inequality	  respectively,	  and	  these	  patterns	  were	  then	  transferred	  abductively	  into	  other	  bodies	  of	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  argue	   that	   theoretical	  constructs	   from	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  disciplines	  can	  be	  interpreted	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  similar	  kinds	  of	  dynamics	  and	  phenomena	  as	  observed	  during	  fieldwork,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  different	  theoretical	  positions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	   different	   particular	   perspectives	   describing	   the	   same	   general	   ‘powers	   and	  mechanisms’	   (as	   defined	   within	   Critical	   Realism).	   The	   rationale	   for	   this	  methodological	  approach	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  theory	  in	  this	  instant	  was	  put	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  data	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  community	  under	  investigation),	  rather	  than	  making	  this	  community	  a	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  refining	  or	  supporting	  a	  specific	  theoretical	  position.	  Moreover,	  as	  Atkinson	  and	  Hammersley	  warn	  “it	  is	  almost	  always	  a	  mistake	  to	  try	  to	  make	  a	  whole	  ethnography	  conform	  to	  just	  one	  theoretical	  framework”	  (157)	  since	  this	  would	  restrict	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  data	  to	  the	  categorical	  limitations	  of	  the	  theory	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  explanatory	  or	  interpretative	  power.	  	  
	  
	  	   	  
	   373	  
Appendix	  2:	  Field	  overview	  	  
	  
Project	  timeline:	  Oct	  2010:	  	   	   	   Arrival	  Oct-­‐‑Nov	  2010:	   First	  squat	  and	  smiling	  chair	  bookshop	  (events	  of	  chapters	  1-­‐‑2)	  Nov	  2010	  -­‐‑	  Jan	  2011:	  	   The	  Nursery	  (events	  of	  chapters	  6-­‐‑7)	  Jan	  –	  Feb	  2011:	  	   	   HUB	  occupation	  (events	  of	  chapters	  9-­‐‑10)	  Feb-­‐‑April	  2011:	   	   	  The	  Yard	  (events	  of	  chapter	  11)	  April-­‐‑July	  2011:	  	   	   Street	  parking	  (events	  of	  chapter	  12)	  November	  2011:	  	   	   Return	  into	  rented	  accommodation	  Nov-­‐‑	  May	  2011:	  	   Involvement	  in	  campaigning	  against	  squatting	  criminalisation,	  first	  sighting	  of	  data,	  conceptual	  work	  	  May	  2012:	  	   	   	   End	  of	  official	  fieldwork	  Sept	  2012:	  	   	   	   Begin	  of	  data	  analysis,	  additional	  literature	  review	  May	  2013:	  	   	   	   Begin	  writing	  up	  	  
	  
Facts	  and	  Figures:	  
Note:	  the	  following	  figures	  are	  estimates	  since	  no	  quantitative	  data	  was	  collected	  
during	  fieldwork	  due	  to	  confidentiality	  
	  Number	  of	  squats	  visited	  during	  fieldwork:	  40	  Number	  of	  other	  locations	  visited	  (e.g.	  community	  centres,	  free-­‐‑shop,	  etc):	  10	  Number	  of	  interlocutors:	  ca.	  40	  regularly,	  ca.	  150-­‐‑200	  on	  occasional	  basis	  Number	  of	  squats	  lived	  in:	  13	  Number	  of	  squats	  evicted	  from:	  9	  Number	  of	  illegal	  evictions:	  2	  Average	  number	  of	  weeks	  in	  one	  property	  during	  fieldwork:	  4	  Longest	  period	  in	  one	  property:	  two	  months	  Shortest	  period	  in	  one	  property:	  24	  hrs	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